Fragmented power: Europe and the global economy by André Sapir
I
n the last twenty years, Europe has come a long way: the European Union has
expanded from 12 to 27 members, created a unified internal market and intro-
duced a single currency, the euro. This internal transformation has had profound
external consequences. With now the largest unified market in the world and the
second most important global currency, Europe has become a powerful global play-
er. But the world has changed too, only more so. Market openness and technologi-
cal change have spread world wide and helped China and India to become new glob-
al powers. Demographic change and poverty in other parts of the world such as
Africa have brought mass international migration. And climate change has become
the main symbol of the emergence of the global commons. As a result, foreign
economic relations – be they in trade, development, market regulation, migration,
money, climate or energy – have become central to the activities of the EU.
In a nutshell, globalisation has become the central theme of the European narrative
for the 21st century. This year, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Europe’s
Treaty of Rome and the celebration of a peaceful European political order, heads of
state and government proclaimed that the EU is an effective response to major glob-
al challenges which allows Europeans to ‘shape the increasing interdependence of
the global economy and ever-growing competition on international markets accord-
ing to [their] values’. Many leaders, such as European Commission President
Barroso, have declared that the new raison d’être of the EU is ‘to use its collective
weight to shape globalisation’ in order ‘to help Europeans prosper in a globalised
world’ and ‘to create a new and better global order’. 
This way of considering the EU is new. As recently as twenty years ago, it was
Forewordprimarily envisaged as a regional integration experiment among a relatively small
number of participating countries. ‘Europe’ was about tearing down the walls that
separated member countries and prevented their economic and political integra-
tion. Accordingly, the EU’s external policy was essentially a side-product of its inter-
nal dynamics. There were even fears of a ‘fortress Europe’ that would have liber-
alised internally while closing borders externally. But then came globalisation and
Europeans began to realise that in a world of freer trade, global capital flows and
globally integrated enterprises, they could hardly define the entity they were build-
ing by reference to the differential degree of integration within it – that is, as a sin-
gle market. An EU defined in this way – by ‘negative integration’ in the jargon of EU
scholars – was bound steadily to lose its relevance as global integration developed. 
Such an inward-looking view of the EU still has supporters among those who advo-
cate building a European shield against the winds of global change. But it is increas-
ingly challenged by another view which sees Europe primarily as a player in a fast-
changing world. According to this view, the EU should be characterised by the role it
plays in shaping its environment rather than by its economic borders. Europe
should not define itself by the degree to which it is closed to flows of products and
capital from the rest of the world but by its stance on the global rules governing
these flows, and by the role it plays in defining them. Again according to this view,
Europe should not solve its identity crisis by arbitrarily deciding that enlargement
has come to an end but by actively promoting development and stability in its
neighbourhood. It should certainly retain economic legislation that corresponds to
the preferences of its citizens and member countries but, just as importantly, it
should contribute to defining global rules for integrated markets and companies.
And it should first and foremost wake up to the full extent of its responsibilities as
one of the few players with an ability to tackle questions related to the global com-
mons: climate, global diseases, world poverty...  
It is thus paradoxical that there has been no comprehensive study of European for-
eign economic policy. There is, for sure, much research on the various sectoral
aspects of EU external relations. But to our knowledge, no research has attempted
to provide an overall picture of Europe’s interaction with its international environ-
ment, outlining priorities and discussing policy coherence. Clearly, the fragmented
character of the governance of Europe’s external economic policy – with responsi-
bility shared or split between the Commission, the European Central Bank, the
Council of Ministers, the Eurogroup or the member states – makes formulating a
comprehensive view a tall order. By contrast, American foreign economic relations
have long been the subject of numerous studies.  
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culminating in this publication, was precisely to fill this gap. The project was divid-
ed into two parts. The first part involved systematically examining seven separate
areas of European foreign policy: trade policy; development policy; external compe-
tition policy; external financial markets policy; external monetary policy; migration
policy; and external energy/environmental policy. 
The results of these seven investigations are reported in chapters three to nine of
this volume. 
The second part of the project consisted of drawing upon the individual policy stud-
ies to examine the coherence of European foreign economic policy, in particular but
not exclusively in terms of European governance. The outcome of the two transver-
sal analyses undertaken is presented is chapters one and two.  
Two major themes pervade the nine chapters of the study: first, the new geography
of the world outside the European Union, which dictates an overhaul of the external
policy agendas and, second, the need to improve the governance framework of
Europe’s foreign economic policies in order to ensure their effectiveness.
Viewed from the EU standpoint, the world outside the EU can be divided into five
groupings: i) the neighbours in Europe (including Russia), the Middle East and
North Africa (EMENA), which together have a somewhat larger population than the
EU, a much smaller GDP, and a significant part of the world’s energy resources; ii)
the United States, with roughly the same GDP as the EU but a smaller population; iii)
the other advanced countries, which together have the same population as the US
but a much smaller GDP; iv) the emerging and developing countries of Asia and
Latin America, which have a population of five times, and a GDP of about the same
size as, that of the EU and the US combined; and v) the non-emerging developing
countries (essentially sub-Saharan Africa), with a population as large as, but a GDP
of less than one third, that of the EMENA region.
This way of analysing the world reveals that Europe confronts three agendas at the
global, transatlantic and regional levels. 
A global agenda
The first agenda relates to increasing economic integration world wide and its man-
agement in a way conducive to growth, development and financial stability through
enhancement and reform of the core set of multilateral rules and institutions. It also
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ixrelates to the provision of global public goods such as containment of climate
change. 
What is at stake here is adjustment and response to the emergence of new global
economic powers in some parts of the world (mainly Asia) and the absence of
progress elsewhere (mainly Africa) in a context of increasing awareness of risks to
the global commons and tensions about access to resources world wide. The main
policy instruments are trade policy, international finance and development policy,
which are managed globally by three multilateral economic institutions – the World
Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – as well
as environment policy, for which there is no single forum or world institution. 
The EU is in all these fields an undisputed player. It is one of the few key participants
in all trade discussions, the issuer of one of the two main global currencies, a major
stakeholder in the international financial institutions, the number one provider of
development assistance and a leader in the field of the environment. However, the
effectiveness of its policy in these areas varies depending on its internal gover-
nance structure - from excellent (in trade) or acceptable (in international money
and finance) to second rate (in development). In comparison to the other main
player, the US, the EU sometimes exercises world leadership (in trade and the envi-
ronment) and sometimes seems happy to take a secondary role. Furthermore, the
EU faces the need to adjust its representation in international fora in accordance
with its rapidly declining relative demographic and economic weight. The challenge
here is one of effectiveness and, as developed in this book, this calls for significant
reforms of internal governance and external representation.     
A transatlantic agenda
The second agenda involves both bilateral EU-US relations and the stance of the two
sides of the Atlantic on global issues. What is special about the EU and the US is that
they jointly continue to be the ‘regulators of the world’. Even though together they
only account for 40 percent of world GDP (at PPP) and world trade and a little more
than 10 percent of world population, they probably produce around 80 percent of
the international norms and standards that regulate world markets. Although this
leadership is bound to dwindle eventually as new powers emerge and become more
assertive, it is likely to persist for a few decades yet, because China, India and the
other emerging powers are still far from having developed at home the elaborate
body of law and institutions that is essential in order to be effective regulators. In
fields like competition policy, product and financial market regulation or technical
standards, the US and the EU are, and will remain, ahead of the pack by virtue of
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Japan, a country of comparable development, has not really challenged their lead-
ership in this area.  
A big question is whether the EU and the US will act separately or even as rivals on
the global regulatory scene or whether they will cooperate with each other and also
involve the new global powers. Voices on both sides of the Atlantic complain about
the other side’s suspected pretension to act as the regulator of the world.
Regulatory competition is certainly healthy as it helps to sort out which rules per-
form best. But this should not hide the fact that the main joint challenge for the EU
and the US is what role they will jointly play in setting the rules for the world econo-
my of the 21st century, and with whom they will do so. 
How well is the EU equipped for this task? Its effectiveness in external regulatory
matters varies, again depending on internal regulatory organisation. It is either
excellent (for instance, in competition policy) or merely satisfactory (for instance,
in external financial market policy). But what has until now been in short supply is
the strategic perspective, as illustrated by repeated failure to provide an overall
framework for the transatlantic economic dialogue. German Chancellor Merkel’s
recent initiative in this field is a welcome attempt to put EU/US dialogue onto a
promising track. Yet as it involves, by the nature of the exercise, a host of different
issues, responsibility for which is scattered among many agencies, the challenge of
implementation is a significant one.
A regional agenda
The third agenda involves the relationship between the EU and its EMENA neighbours.
Of the three agendas, it is here that one would expect the EU to be most effective,
since it is the undisputed regional economic power and has much to gain from peace-
ful development in the region. From the Maghreb to the Middle East, from the former
Soviet republics to Russia itself, and in Turkey, the EU’s neighbours have consider-
able potential. Experience in other regions of the world, especially Asia, illustrates the
extent to which integration between countries of different development levels can
help promote all partners’ successful integration within the web of world trade and
foreign direct investment. But economic failure and political instability at the border
can also act as major drags on prosperity.
Paradoxically, however, it is on this front that the EU is in fact the least effective. Two
reasons account for this paradox. First, the European Neighbourhood Policy, which
was meant to provide a framework for countries with little or no prospect of joining
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xithe EU, is a complete shambles: it is a plane without a pilot. Partners are drawn into
procedures but are not given a credible political and economic perspective for their
relations with the EU. Second, the EU has little or no common approach in two areas
that are particularly important for interaction between the EU and its neighbours:
migration policy, owing to proximity and income differentials, and energy policy,
since the EU possesses little oil and gas and its neighbours hold between 70 and 80
percent of the world’s reserves. In spite of the Commission’s recent efforts and the
agreement reached in March 2007 on a common energy strategy, the effectiveness
of EU policy in these two areas is not what it should be, simply because a common
migration policy and a common energy security policy do not exist. What is miss-
ing, therefore, is a genuine political commitment in these fields supported by
effective implementation.
The three agendas above clearly suggest a need for an integrated, coherent foreign
policy to confront Europe’s global, transtlantic and regional challenges. Yet a com-
mon finding of the studies in this volume is that current arrangements for Europe’s
foreign economic policy ‘are both complex and evolving, that their efficiency is
questionable, and that the choice of governance models is inherited from history
rather than based on efficiency criteria’. Authors make a number of suggestions for
improving the situation, which all revolve around the idea of delegating more
responsibility for foreign economic policies either to the European Commission
alone or to the European Commission in partnership with the Council of Ministers,
possibly via the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy envisaged in the new treaty. 
As long as the EU was legitimately centred on achieving peace in Europe, or reunify-
ing it, the design and implemention of internal integration obviously took prece-
dence over external relations. The message from this volume is that this era has
passed and that, in a fast-changing and challenging international environment,
external economic relations have become too important an issue for the EU to
remain a fragmented power.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director of Bruegel
André Sapir, Professor of Economics at Université Libre de Bruxelles,




he European Union is the largest single economic entity in the world, with half a
billion people and a gross domestic product (GDP) slightly larger than that of the
United States. Its presence in the world economy is powerful: it is the largest
exporter and the second largest importer (behind the US) of goods; the largest
exporter and importer of services; the largest importer of energy; the largest donor
of foreign aid; the second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the
second largest destination of FDI (behind the US); and the second destination for
foreign migrants (also behind the US).
The EU’s presence in the world economy manifests itself not only through trade,
capital and migratory flows but also via an intense regulatory activity. It is, if not the
main, at least the second most important regulatory power in the world in just about
every area, including: competition policy, where EU authorities have taken the lead
in certain aspects of antitrust; environmental protection, where the EU is the main
proponent of regulation against global warming; money, with the euro being the
second largest international currency in the world (behind the US dollar); and finan-
cial market regulation, with European markets also ranking number two in the world
(again behind the US).
The European Union is not only aglobal economic power, more or less on a par with
the United States. It is also the undisputed regional economic power of a geograph-
ical area that encompasses Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (EMENA). But
is it a global or even a regional economic leader, with clearly defined objectives and
a coherent set of foreign economic policies to achieve them?    
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Europe and the global economyThe question arises because, unlike other economic powers such as the US, the EU is
obviously not a state or a federation, but a collection of states that share sovereignty.
Yet, like a state, the EU aspires to play a leading role in foreign economic policy, an area
which is a subset of foreign policy, itself a core prerogative of states.
The need and the desire of the European Union to play a bigger role on the interna-
tional scene stem from dramatic changes in the international environment that
have occurred in the last twenty years.   
At the regional level, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of new
states, some of which are now inside a vastly expanded European Union with 27
member states (EU27), while others remain outside its new eastern borders. After
an initial period of high economic and political instability in some of these coun-
tries, the situation has improved, although important risks remain. A similar danger
prevails in many of the EU’s southern neighbours that stretch around the
Mediterranean and the Gulf. Consequently, the EMENA region which is close to the
EU27 can be described as potentially volatile. 
At the global level, the last twenty years have witnessed three major developments
which have an important bearing on Europe’s international economic relations. The
first is globalisation, which is characterised by the emergence of a number of devel-
oping countries with the technological capacity to supply an increasingly sophisti-
cated range of manufactured goods and services. These emerging economies are
located essentially in Asia and Latin America and include new global powers –
China, India and Brazil – with huge populations and very rapid economic growth. By
contrast, Africa remains by and large a continent in dire straits with few emerging
economies and where conflict and poverty prevail. The second global development
is the unprecedented pressure on the environment and on natural resources, which
has led to major concerns about climate change and energy security. The third
development is the new status of the United States as the sole superpower, combin-
ing a military might totally unrivalled since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and an
economic dynamism currently superior to that of the European Union or of any
other advanced economic entity. 
The European Commission under President Barroso has probably devoted more atten-
tion to Europe’s foreign economic policy than any previous Commission. This reflects
the personality and foreign policy experience of Barroso himself and of some members
of his team. But it is also a reflection of the challenges Europe faces and of the demand
on the part of public opinion for a ‘global Europe’, capable both of helping ‘Europeans
prosper in a globalised world’ and of creating ‘a new and better global order’.
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quite clear.
On the economic front, the EU’s primary goal is spelled out in the Lisbon Strategy for
economic reform, which was re-launched in 2005 and now clearly focuses on
growth, jobs and competitiveness in the context of globalisation. The external
dimension of the renewed Lisbon Strategy has been developed in a number of
recent Commission policy papers (‘communications’), most notably in Trade
Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s 2006 Communication ‘Global Europe: Competing
in the World’ which, although it focuses on trade policy, ‘also addresses some of the
links between the policies we pursue at home and abroad. As globalisation collaps-
es distinctions between domestic and international policies, our domestic policies
will often have a determining influence on our external competitiveness and vice
versa. Recognising the need for an integrated, coherent approach to domestic and
to global challenges has been a hallmark of this Commission
1. But there is more to
do to reflect this in the ways we think and work’ (emphasis added; footnote in the
original text).
On the political front, the EU’s three foreign policy objectives are: contributing to sta-
bility and governance in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood; helping build an inter-
national order based on ‘effective multilateralism’; and dealing with security threats.
It is against these ambitious objectives that the complex character of the gover-
nance of Europe’s external economic policy – with different roles for the EU and the
member states, for the European Commission and the Council of Minsters, for differ-
ent policies – poses a real challenge to Europe.
This introductory chapter is divided into five parts. The first provides a map, which
divides the world outside the European Union into five groupings: the neighbours in
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa; the United States; the other advanced
countries; the emerging and developing countries of Asia and Latin America; and
finally sub-Saharan Africa and its mainly non-emerging developing countries. This
division suggests that Europe confronts three agendas: a global agenda, which is
the subject of the second section; a transatlantic agenda, which is examined in the
third section; and a regional agenda, which is the subject of the fourth section. The
chapter concludes with a finding that there is a gap between, on the one hand, the
need for an integrated, coherent foreign policy that will meet Europe’s global,
transatlantic and regional challenges and, on the other hand, the current gover-
nance of Europe’s foreign economic policy, which is complex and not very efficient.
Suggestions are made to fill the gap.   
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A map of Europe and the world
We divide the world outside EU27 into five groupings (shown in Table 1.1): the
EMENA neighbours; the United States; the other advanced economies; the emerging
developing economies; and the other developing economies. 
The main economic features of each grouping and the most significant economic
linkages with the EU are as follows:
1. The EU’s EMENA neighbours
2 have a somewhat larger population, but a much
smaller GDP than the European Union. Their average per capitaGDP (measured at













EU27 7.6 20.4 100.0 2.4
(Euro area) (4.9) (14.8) (112.5) (2.1)
Neighbours* 10.9 8.5 29.1 4.2
(Russia) (2.3) (2.6) (42.1) (5.4)
United States 4.6 20.1 162.8 3.1
Other advanced 4.5 13.9 115.1 1.8
(Japan) (2.0) (6.4) (119.2) (1.3)
Emerging economies** 60.8 34.5 21.1 6.1
(China) (20.7) (15.4) (27.7) (9.1)
(India) (17.3) (6.0) (12.9) (6.6)
(Brazil) (2.9) (2.6) (33.4) (2.4)
Other developing*** 11.6 2.6 8.3 4.3
World 100.0 100.0 37.2 4.1
- G7**** 11.4 41.2 134.6 2.4
- BRICS***** 43.2 26.6 23.0 7.8
Table 1.1: Europe and the world
* Rest of Europe (including Russia and other CIS countries), Middle East and North Africa.
** Developing Asia and Latin America.
*** Sub-Saharan Africa.
**** Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.
***** Brazil, Russia, India and China.
Source: own calculations based on IMF (2006).EU market, which absorbs more than 70 percent of its exports; it is also an impor-
tant outlet for the EU, with more than one third of its exports being sold there. In
turn, the EU relies heavily on its neighbours, who hold most of the world’s oil and
gas reserves
3, for its energy imports. Given the wide income and demographic
disparities between the two regions, there are significant flows of migrants from
EMENA to the EU, and of labour remittances in the opposite direction. Moreover,
the neighbouring region receives large amounts of foreign aid from Europe: about
25 percent of total aid granted by the EU and the member states (see the chap-
ter by Arne Bigsten in this volume).  
2. The United States has roughly the same GDP as the European Union, although
with 200 million fewer inhabitants, which implies that per capitaGDP is about 60
percent higher than the EU’s. The bilateral transatlantic economic relationship is
the largest in the world. The two entities are each other’s largest single trading
partner, accounting for roughly 20 percent of each other’s total trade in goods,
and almost 40 percent of trade in services. They are also each other’s most
important source and destination of foreign direct investment, accounting for
more or less 50 percent of each other’s total inward and outward flows – and
stocks – of FDI. 
3. The other advanced (non-European) countries, which include Japan, have the
same population as the United States, but a much smaller GDP. Consequently,
their trade and FDI relationship with the EU is also less significant, although far
from negligible.  
4. The emerging economies, which include China, India and Brazil
4, constitute by far
the largest of the five groupings. They account for 60 percent of world population
and 35 percent of world GDP, almost as much as the EU and the US combined. But
their average GDP per capita is only one fifth that of the EU. The main channel of
interaction between these fast-growing countries and the European Union is
trade. They have recently become a sizeable outlet for the EU, already absorbing
more than 25 percent of its total exports. The EU is also an important market for
their fast-growing exports. In addition, there are major investment flows from
Europe to emerging countries, and increasingly in the opposite direction,
although from a very low base. Finally, in spite of their relatively low income and
their large populations, emerging economies receive only 25 percent of Europe’s
foreign aid, the same share as the EU’s EMENA neighbours, who have a slightly
higher income level and a much smaller population.  
5. The last grouping is sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises mostly non-emerging
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developing countries. It is, by far, the poorest of the five groups. It accounts for
nearly 12 percent of world population but less than three percent of world GDP,
which implies an average GDP per capita of less than one tenth that of the
European Union. This region is heavily dependent on the EU market, which
absorbs about 40 percent of its exports. By contrast, it represents a very small
outlet for EU exports. The income and demographic disparities with the European
Union are even greater than is the case for the EU’s EMENA neighbours; yet the
flows of migrants are smaller, although illegal migration is rapidly rising. On the
other hand, sub-Saharan Africa attracts about twice as much foreign aid as the
EMENA neighbours, for a population of roughly the same size but a GDP per capi-
ta more than three times smaller. 
This map of the world suggests that Europe confronts three agendas: a global agen-
da, relating to the emergence of new global economic powers; a transatlantic agen-
da, involving not only bilateral EU-US relations but the relationship between the two
partners vis-à-vis the emerging global powers; and a regional agenda, involving
Europe’s relations with its neighbourhood.  
The global agenda
All the issues on the EU’s global agenda – trade, money and finance, and develop-
ment – share one common feature: the challenge arising from the shift of economic
power towards emerging economies. It is increasingly evident that policies and
institutions must be adapted to the new global reality, and that this requires a re-
think on the part of the EU in terms of both policies and institutional design.
Nowhere has the change been more dramatic than in international trade. In 1994,
at the end of the Uruguay Round and just before the creation of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), the four leading goods exporters were: the EU12, the US, Japan,
and Canada. Together, these so-called Quad countries accounted for 50 percent of
world trade (excluding intra-EU trade). By 2005, their share had dropped to 40 per-
cent, and the four leading exporters were: the EU25, the US, China and Japan.
The chapter by Simon Evenett leaves no doubt that the biggest challenge to
Europe’s trade policy comes from the emerging countries, which are both major
competitors and markets. He argues that Europe and the emerging countries share
a common interest in preserving the multilateral trading system, but have different
commercial interests. This leads him to recommend that Europe seek a modus
vivendiwith the new trading powers and develop a trade strategy with the ultimate
goal of identifying the potential basis for future multilateral trade agreements.How well are the global trading system and the European Union itself equipped to
respond to the challenge? The short answer is: fairly well, but the problems should
not be underestimated. 
During the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference, the then EU Trade
Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, famously declared that the WTO was ‘medieval’. He
was right. The Quad, that cosy club of old powers, basically set the agenda of the
World Trade Organisation, as it had done for many years with its predecessor, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But what Lamy was describing was
in fact an ancient regime about to change. In 2001, China became a member of the
WTO, and by the time of the 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference, it had joined
forces with Brazil, India and South Africa to create a powerful coalition of twenty
emerging trading countries, the G20, which together account for about the same
share of world trade as the European Union or the United States. The Quad disap-
peared and was replaced by the G4, a new quartet of old and new powers (the EU,
the US, Brazil and India) which is attempting to steer the multilateral trade
negotiations.
The fact that the EU always sits at the high table of global trade negotiations reflects
not only its size in world trade but also its ability to speak with one voice in trade
policy. However, one clearly needs to make a distinction between institutional and
political ability. Trade policy is an exclusive competence of the European Union (at
least as far as goods are concerned), which is conducted by the European
Commission under the supervision of the Council. Hence, the EU indeed speaks with
one voice, that of the EU trade commissioner, but the accent of this single voice
must reflect the many, and increasingly numerous, accents of the member states.
As the chapter by Benoît Coeuré and Jean Pisani-Ferry shows, trade is an interest-
ing case of a policy that has been centralised since the early days of the EU, but
where national public opinion and policymakers exhibit a fairly high degree of pref-
erence heterogeneity. They conclude that this is an indication that a common EU
policy can be maintained in spite of diverging national preferences, provided the
institutional structure allow decisions to be taken. But they also admit that
European trade policy is notoriously contentious within the EU. One could add that
the balance is probably shifting towards greater political difficulty in conducting
common trade policy, because globalisation and the emergence of new global
actors are viewed very differently across EU member countries. Eurobarometer sur-
veys indicate that globalisation is generally viewed as an opportunity in the Nordic
and Anglo-Saxon countries, as well in some of the new member states, but mainly
as a threat in the other countries, a division that largely reflects differences in the
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5. Hence, as long as EU member states remain
split between those with efficient and inefficient social models, the EU trade com-
missioner will find it difficult to speak with a clear and loud voice and to put forward
the kind of trade strategy advocated by Simon Evenett in his chapter.
The situation is very different in monetary and financial affairs, and in development
policy. Here, the emergence of new global powers also poses a major challenge but
the current governance of global institutions and the European Union is inadequate
and cannot respond effectively.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the two global institu-
tions in charge of monetary and development affairs long seen as most effective,
are struggling to adapt to the new global reality. As Ahearne et al. (2006) suggest,
they are both in danger of losing their relevance. The IMF core business of financial
assistance is threatened by Asian dissatisfaction and Latin American detachment
and its attempt to resurrect itself as a venue for managing global current account
imbalances, although welcome, is a gamble. The World Bank has been largely crowd-
ed out by the development of private financial markets. It remains important for the
world’s poorest countries through its soft-loan window, the International
Development Association (IDA). Even here, however, conditional debt relief to poor,
non-emerging countries is being undermined by a new wave of unconditional bilat-
eral credits from emerging countries such as China and India.
Both institutions are also badly in need of further governance reform to enhance
the voice and participation of emerging countries. The composition of the 24-person
Executive Board of the IMF and the World Bank is a relic of the past. European coun-
tries have eight members on the boards of the two institutions and control 30 per-
cent of the votes. Their overrepresentation is exactly mirrored by the underrepre-
sentation of emerging countries. At the same time, Europe’s fragmented represen-
tation causes it to punch below its weight, as Alan Ahearne and Barry Eichengreen
note in their chapter on Europe’s external monetary and financial relations.
Consequently, in the same vein as Bini-Smaghi (2006a), they propose that Europe
should unify its representation at the IMF and the World Bank so that places can be
freed for underrepresented emerging countries – thereby enhancing the legitimacy
of the two Bretton Woods institutions – and Europe’s influence can match its
economic size. 
Ahearne and Eichengreen clearly recognise that the political obstacles to progress
towards single European representation in the IMF and the World Bank are huge
because it implies an apparent loss of sovereignty over an important area of foreign
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tives to take the plunge. First, even the largest ones recognise that they have lost
their status as global powers and that the only way for them to exercise effective
foreign policy is collectively. Second, making room for emerging countries is crucial
for the reinforcement of multilateral institutions, a sine qua non for achieving the
EU’s stated foreign policy objective of effective multilateralism.
In view of this, Ahearne and Eichengreen suggest an incremental strategy, starting
with the IMF. They argue that the rationale for consolidating EU representation at the
IMF is stronger than in the World Bank for two reasons. First, preferences among
European countries are relatively more homogenous, especially among the coun-
tries in the euro area, who share the same currency and the same exchange rate.
Second, European countries have already made progress in coordinating their
national positions in the Fund by creating a specialised sub-committee in the EU
Economic and Financial Committee.
An important caveat to this is that consolidation of Europe’s representation at the
IMF and the World Bank would largely be ineffective as long as Europe is unable to
improve its decision-making mechanism. External monetary affairs are, like trade
policy, an exclusive competence of the Union, but with two important qualifications.
First, the competence of the Union only applies to the monetary policy and the
exchange rate of the euro area. Second, according to the EU treaty, external repre-
sentation of the euro area is conducted by the Council, not by the Commission
under the Council’s supervision as for trade policy, with the Commission and the
European Central Bank being ‘fully associated’ in the process. Effective representa-
tion of the euro area at the IMF would require clarification of the respective respon-
sibilities of each of these three actors. 
By contrast, development policy is a shared competence of the European Union and
the member states, with two separate tracks. On the one hand, there is a common
policy, which is an exclusive competence of the EU, and which is conducted by the
European Commission under the supervision of the Council. On the other hand,
there are 27 national policies, which are the exclusive competence of the member
states, with loose EU coordination at the EU level. 
Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry find that this combination of partial centralisation and
loose coordination is hard to justify on economic grounds. The chapter by Arne
Bigsten argues that the reasons for the persistence of this situation are two-fold:
the fact that development policy belongs to the realm of foreign policy, and the dis-
satisfaction of many member states with the way EU development policy is run. The
EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
9FRAGMENTED POWER
10
counterargument to the first point – that member states should pool together all
their development assistance in order to regain power in foreign policy – is proba-
bly less persuasive here than for monetary affairs, since countries with a colonial
past tend to direct a disproportionate part of their bilateral aid flows to their former
colonies where they continue to enjoy influence. Regarding the alleged inefficiency
of EU development policy, the correct way to address the problem would seem to be
to reform its substance rather than to maintain decentralised national policies.
The real question, then, is what the content of a reformed EU development policy
should be, and how it should relate to other EU policies, especially trade policy.      
The transatlantic agenda
The European Union and the United States are the two largest economic entities in
the world. Their economic relationship, therefore, matters a great deal, not only to
themselves but also to the world at large. We focus here on the transatlantic
economic relationship between the EU and the US and examine, first, its purely
bilateral context and, second, the global context.       
The bilateral EU-US trade relationship – the largest in the world – takes place essen-
tially within the framework of the multilateral trading system. Although there are
naturally some trade frictions between the two partners, the bilateral relationship
runs quite smoothly. So much so, that the chapter on EU trade policy by Simon
Evenett does not devote any space to EU-US trade relations. In fact, out of 171 trade
disputes brought before the WTO during the period 2000-2006, seven were com-
plaints by the US against the EU and 13 by the EU against the US, which makes an
average of only three transatlantic disputes per year. Granted, some of them (such
as the Airbus/Boeing case) are fairly significant, but they are nonetheless relative-
ly minor in the overall scheme of things.
There have long been attempts to supplement the multilateral trading framework
with bilateral transatlantic agreements. The first was in the early 1960s, just after
the creation of the European Economic Community, when the US administration
proposed the creation of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The idea re-
emerged in the early 1990s under the label Transatlantic Free Trade Area, or TAFTA,
the acronym NAFTA having meanwhile been taken by the North American Free Trade
Agreement. TAFTA encountered strong opposition on both sides of the Atlantic,
which eventually led to the creation of the less ambitious New Transatlantic Agenda
(NTA) in 1995
6.The NTA essentially ignores the more contentious conventional trade barriers (such
as those in agriculture), focusing instead on regulatory issues, including competition
policy. It involves a number of fora, including the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD), which brings together American and European business leaders and high-
level officials with a view to promoting transatlantic regulatory cooperation.
Besides trade and the exchange rate of the euro, competition policy is the only area
where the EU has exclusive competence. As Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry observe, it is
also the sole area where the Commission has been granted unconditional delega-
tion, rather than supervised delegation as in trade or development policy. The
Commission has, therefore, exceptionally extensive powers to conduct competition
policy in an international setting and to conclude foreign agreements.  
As discussed at great length in the chapter by Olivier Bertrand and Marc Ivaldi, the
Commission enjoys far-reaching extraterritorial powers in the enforcement of EU
competition rules. Unilateral exercise of such power clearly risks creating serious
tensions with countries where large companies, which are the most likely target of
EU antitrust action, are headquartered. The United States is obviously the prime
country concerned. There have been a number of instances where the Commission
has acted to block a merger between two US-based companies (ie
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, and General Electric/Honeywell) or sought to prevent
the abuse of dominant power in the EU market by US-based corporations (ie Intel,
Microsoft and Qualcom), which could have resulted in serious EU-US disputes. In
fact, no major clash has occurred on account of the excellent formal cooperation
between the EU and US competition authorities initiated in the early 1990s. 
Whether or not regulatory cooperation in the field of competition policy constitutes a
good example of potential cooperation in other regulatory areas remains an open
question. The main obstacle to extending the competition policy approach to other
areas is generally the lack of a single regulator and hence of a single voice on the
European side. 
The difficulty faced by Europe in negotiating with foreign partners on certain regu-
latory matters is well illustrated by the situation in financial markets, one of the
areas singled out in the New Transatlantic Economic Partnership. This initiative,
launched by German Chancellor Merkel at the start of the German presidency of the
EU in 2007, aims to reduce regulatory obstacles in key economic sectors, including
industrial products, energy, intellectual property, financial markets and emerging
technologies. A framework agreement intended to launch negotiations to that end
was concluded at the EU-US summit in Washington on 30 April 2007.
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clearly shows that Europe’s international role in this area is often severely impeded
by its inability to adopt EU-wide regulation. A remarkable exception is in the field of
accounting, where the EU was instrumental in promoting the creation of an interna-
tional standard and in making it compulsory for all EU-listed companies. To a large
extent, therefore, Europe’s potential to negotiate in the regulatory area with foreign
partners like the United States depends on its ability to improve its internal regula-
tory regime.
Will the EU and the US act separately or even as rivals on the global regulatory scene
or will they cooperate with each other and with the new global powers? Regulatory
competition is certainly positive as a way to identify the best rules. Nonetheless,
the EU and the US cannot escape the fact that they both have a vital role to play in
setting the rules for the world economy. In the 21st century, however, they can no
longer act alone and will need to involve new global powers. 
At the moment, the European Union and the United States are clearly the two ‘regula-
tors of the world’. Although together they only account for about 40 percent of world
GDP (at PPP) and world trade, they probably produce around 80 percent of the inter-
national norms and standards that regulate global markets, including the dollar and
the euro.
In recent years the EU and the US have each sought to export their regulatory rules.
The commonest approach has been to include regulatory requirements in bilateral
or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) that principally seek reciprocal preferen-
tial trade access. There has been a proliferation of FTAs centred on the EU and the
US. Initially most of the FTAs were with countries in the relative vicinity of the EU or
the US: the Americas for the United States, and EMENA or Africa for the European
Union. In a second phase, the two hubs went on to sign agreements in the each
other’s ‘backyard’: for instance, the EU with Mexico and Chile, and the United States
with Jordan and Morocco. 
The latest, and most significant, development is the drive by the European Union
and the United States to enter into FTAs with emerging Asian economies, many of
which are engaged in bilateral negotiations with Asian partners, including China and
Japan. The US concluded an agreement with Singapore in 2004 and with Korea in
2007. The European Union started negotiating an FTA with Korea in May 2007 and
is considering a similar move with India.  
Clearly, the proliferation of FTAs is a phenomenon which is by no means limited to
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also many FTAs among countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America. Nonetheless, the
fact that the EU and the US are the two largest trading blocs in the world implies that
FTAs centred on them pose a far greater systemic challenge to the WTO than any
other FTA.     
This competitive attitude between the EU and the US, in terms of gaining preferen-
tial market access and extending regulatory rules to emerging countries, manifests
itself beyond the signature of FTAs. In competition policy, for instance, the EU main-
tains different forms of cooperation with various countries, including China, to
which the Commission currently provides technical assistance for preparing its first
comprehensive competition policy law, which the Commission hopes will be similar
to EU competition policy. 
In financial market regulation, the EU was the first to adopt in 2005 the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as the required accounting stan-
dard for companies listed on its territory and has been successfully pushing for
their adoption by other countries. The IFRS, which aims to harmonise financial
reporting in a world of cross-border trade and investment, have already been, or
soon will be, adopted by over 100 countries, including Australia, Canada, China,
Hong Kong and Russia. The IFRS are a rival to the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) used by the US and other systems of national standards in major
countries, such as India and Japan, where the IFRS are currently not permitted. All
these countries are, however, considering recognition of IFRS as an acceptable set
of standards for at least some of the companies listed on their markets
7. In the end,
therefore, IFRS may actually emerge as the global accounting rules.
Clearly, one of the main objectives of the New Transatlantic Economic Partnership
initiative is for the EU and the US to change gear and adopt a more cooperative atti-
tude at a time when their global economic leadership is more and more called into
question by the emergence of new economic powers.
This view was recently articulated by members of the Commission on Transatlantic
Leadership in the Global Economy convened by the Atlantic Council of the United
States who declared that
8: ‘The United States and the European Union [have not]
proven adept at providing leadership in this modern economy. They have too often
been divided, sometimes acting as rivals... [N]ow [they] face a serious challenge –
the international economic system from which they have prospered so much now
hangs in the balance. If they do nothing, the global economy may well fracture –
regional arrangements will divide the world into blocs, protectionism and economic
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with stronger and broader leadership will the global economy continue to be open
and stable in the face of the pressures of globalization and economic nationalism’.
For the members of the Transatlantic Commission referred to above, the EU and the
US need to move on two separate, but complementary, fronts. First, they must help
rebuild global economic governance by ensuring that all the essential economic
players have a stake in the process and are effectively engaged. Second, they must
promote the development of a new approach to reducing the remaining barriers to
trade and investment, with the eventual goal of creating a global market. In their
view, as a first step in this direction, the EU and the US should negotiate a series of
agreements, including a framework regulatory accord along the lines suggested by
Chancellor Angela Merkel, aimed at creating a barrier-free transatlantic market.
Although these various transatlantic initiatives are clearly and rightly couched in
the language of the new global economic environment, their ultimate aim is
nonetheless ambiguous. Do they constitute a last-ditch effort to maintain the supe-
riority of the transatlantic incumbent powers against the inevitable rise of new glob-
al giants? Or do they instead amount to a genuine attempt on the part of America
and Europe, who founded the global economic institutions after the Second World
War, to share power with the newcomers in order to ensure that these institutions
continue their mission of ensuring a world economy of peaceful interdependence? 
To put it differently: will bilateral transatlantic regulatory cooperation pave the way
for genuine multilateral cooperation?
In the case of competition policy the answer seems to be ‘yes’. The EU and the US
were instrumental in the creation, in 2001, of the International Competition
Network (ICN), an informal network of antitrust agencies from about 80 developed
and developing countries that addresses practical antitrust enforcement and policy
issues of common concern. Its aim is to bring ‘antitrust enforcement into the 21st
century. By enhancing convergence and cooperation, the ICN promotes more effi-
cient, effective antitrust enforcement world wide’. But exactly how far cooperation
will go is hard to say at the moment.
What is clear is that, at least for a while longer, the EU and the US will continue to
dominate the formulation of global rules. But whether they cooperate or compete,
the consequences will be huge not only for them but also for the global economy.
Bilateral cooperation could pave the way for a new age of global economic gover-
nance involving all major actors, old and new alike. By contrast, competition
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possibly in fights between the two protagonists over alliances with emerging pow-
ers that would be detrimental to all countries.      
The regional agenda
A key challenge for the EU is to promote economic and political stability among its
regional neighbours. This is in fact the EU’s overriding foreign policy objective. In
order to achieve this objective, the EU implements different strategies towards dif-
ferent groups of neighbours, which involve different policy instruments: 
1. The first group comprises Turkey and the six Balkan countries
9, and also the
three EFTA countries
10, all of which are considered as potential members by the
EU. They have, therefore, the greatest incentive – and receive the greatest help –
to fulfil the EU’s foreign policy objective. This applies in particular to Turkey and
the Balkan countries, which are clearly intent on joining the EU. The EFTA nations,
on the other hand, show no sign of wanting to join the EU at the moment, but nor
do they pose any foreign policy challenge to the EU. Most of these countries
already enjoy very close economic ties with the EU in the framework of bilateral
arrangements that ensure free movements of goods, services and capital.  
2. The second group includes the ten Mediterranean countries
11 and the six former
Soviet republics
12belonging to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which
was developed in 2004 in order to provide an economic and political framework
for countries that border the EU but have little or no prospect of joining it in the
foreseeable future or, for those outside Europe, even later. The aim of the ENP was
‘to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries
in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is
designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged
EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU
activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural coopera-
tion’
13. As far as economic policy is concerned, the ENP envisages preferential
trade agreements and financial cooperation as well as the prospect of a stake in
the EU’s single market, but excludes the free movement of workers. It does not,
however, contain concrete steps for moving the agenda forward. The Commission
recognised as much in 2006 and proposed a number of concrete actions to
strengthen the ENP, including in the area of short-term labour mobility
14. At the
moment the ENP remains incomplete. Nevertheless, with time it can be expected
to build upon the bilateral free trade agreements in goods that were already in
place for most Mediterranean countries before the ENP was launched. 
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3. Russia is not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is simply too big and
too important to be lumped together with 16 other countries, of which six are its
own neighbours and former satellites. Instead the EU and Russia decided in
2003 to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ through the creation of four common
spheres: a common economic sphere, including and with specific reference to
environment and energy; a common sphere of freedom, security and justice; a
sphere of cooperation in the field of external security; and a sphere of research
and education, including cultural aspects. The EU-Russia energy dialogue initiat-
ed in 2000 – dealing with issues such as security of supply, energy efficiency,
infrastructure, investment and trade – is a key component of the partnership. 
4. The Gulf Cooperation Council, a customs union grouping together six oil-produc-
ing Arab countries
15, has been negotiating a free trade agreement in goods with
the European Union since 1990. Progress has been hampered by sensitivities on
both sides regarding a limited number of product categories, mainly petrochem-
icals, aluminium and fisheries. The negotiations, however, have made good
progress recently and are likely to be concluded in 2007. 
5. Iran and Iraq are not included in any of the EU’s preferential schemes.  
These different arrangements point to two important conclusions. First, as one
would expect on foreign policy grounds, the closer the geographical proximity
between the EU and a neighbour, the deeper their economic relationship. It is sur-
prising, however, that the ENP makes no formal distinction between European and
non-European neighbours. It risks, therefore, sending a confusing political message
to both sets of countries. Does belonging to the ENP mean that one will never
become an EU candidate, even if one is a full member of the Council of Europe and
therefore ‘certified’ as European? Or does it mean the opposite, that belonging to the
ENP gives one hope of acquiring one day the status of EU candidate, which non-
European Morocco has already sought twice in the past?   
The second conclusion is that the EU still lacks the political will seriously to address
its prime foreign policy objective of a stable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood
defined in a broad sense rather than in the narrow sense of the ENP. An ambitious
neighbourhood economic policy would amount to the construction of a true single
market encompassing all eastern, Mediterranean and Gulf neighbours. This single
market would provide for free movement of goods, services, capital and labour.
Compared to the existing patchwork of bilateral free trade areas between the EU and
individual neighbours, it would constitute a plurilateral arrangement and extend
free trade to all goods (agricultural products are either excluded or severelyrestricted in the existing arrangements) and services. It would also ensure free
movement of capital. There would also be free movement for certain categories of
labour in accordance with a joint migration arrangement, which would obviously
require the creation of an EU migration policy superseding the migration policies of
the EU member states, at least for the relevant categories of labour. In addition to
free movement, the single market should encompass a certain number of flanking
policies, including competition policy and energy policy. This clearly requires the
creation of an EU external energy policy.
As the chapter by Coby van der Linde correctly notes, the European Union is already
competent for two of the three European energy policy objectives: competitiveness,
with the EU internal market and competition policy; and environmental sustainabil-
ity, with the EU environment policy. By contrast, it has no competence in the third
area, security of supply. In particular, there is no EU external energy policy. 
At the moment energy diplomacy is purely a matter of national responsibility.
Whenever European energy companies require the backing of public authorities in
an international context, they naturally turn to their national governments with
which they often entertain close relationships. The problem with this arrangement
is twofold. First, it tends to perpetuate the power of the old national champions,
thereby thwarting efforts to complete the single market and achieve the competi-
tiveness objective. As the EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes recently
remarked
16: “Supply security should not translate into incumbency security”.
The second reason for concern about the lack of an EU external energy policy is that
the global energy market is turning decidedly harsh. On the one hand, energy
demand is increasing rapidly, especially in the emerging countries. On the other,
fossil fuel reserves are depleting and concentrated in few countries, generally in the
hands of states. The combination of high demand and state-controlled monopolistic
supply has created the conditions for a seller’s market, where European companies
face strong state actors. 
It is against this background that in January 2007 the European Commission put
forward a communication, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, which makes the case for a
common external energy policy. The chapter by Coby van der Linde examines the
likelihood of such a development and concludes that the odds are relatively low. Her
main argument is that vast differences among member states in terms of import
dependency, preference for certain energy mixes and foreign policy ties will long
prevent the EU from ‘speaking with one voice’ on energy. Nonetheless, she acknowl-
edges the Commission argument that the EU holds one strong card: it already
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with energy-producing countries could, therefore, be used to negotiate equal ener-
gy security terms for all member states. This approach is particularly relevant vis-
à-vis the neighbours, including Russia, with whom the EU has the closest trade ties.
Conclusion 
To paraphrase the quote from the Commission communication cited at the begin-
ning, there is clearly a need for an integrated, coherent foreign economic policy in
order to meet Europe’s global and regional challenges. Yet, after careful assess-
ment, Benoît Coeuré and Jean Pisani conclude that current arrangements for
Europe’s foreign economic policy ‘are both complex and evolving, that their efficien-
cy is questionable, and that the choice of governance models are inherited from his-
tory rather than based on efficiency criteria’. 
Complexity and inefficiency imply that Europe has difficulties in meeting its foreign
economic policy objectives. This is the case not only at the global level, where it has
to contend with other economic powers, but even at the regional level, where it is the
sole economic power.
Presently, the only successful neighbourhood policy is enlargement, a strategy that
clearly cannot apply to all countries in the EMENA region surrounding the EU, and
certainly not to Russia, the Middle East or North Africa. The lack of effectiveness of
the EU in relations with these neighbours owes a great deal to the complete or par-
tial absence of a common policy in two areas of prime mutual interest: energy secu-
rity and migration. A common external energy policy and a common migration poli-
cy are sine qua nonconditions for the EU to develop solid and healthy relationships
with neighbours who possess vast energy and/or human resources that are vital to
its security and well-being. However, this objective cannot be achieved as long as
some member states, usually the larger ones, continue to live with the false impres-
sion that they can tackle these issues with their own foreign policy initiatives.
Obviously, the issue of delegating new competence to the EU cannot be separated
from the issue of who the ‘delegate’ would be and what its mandate would be.
Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry show that the conditional or supervised delegation model
is the only viable choice. They argue in favour of a uniform governance model across
the different policy areas in order to ensure coherence. They do not take a position
as to whether the delegate, or agent, should be the Commission or the Council,
though their implicit choice clearly favours the former, as is already the case in trade
policy, an area where the EU has operated with relative simplicity and efficiency. 
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it already occupies this function in all the areas that relate to the internal market
(trade, competition, financial markets). On the other hand, it could be argued that
these are precisely areas where the foreign policy dimension is relatively minor and
where, therefore, member states are least reluctant to cede sovereignty. The same
cannot be said of energy security and migration policy, where the foreign policy
dimension is probably larger than the economic or competitiveness dimension nor-
mally associated with the action of the Commission.
One solution would be to delegate responsibility for foreign economic policies like
energy and migration, where the foreign policy dimension prevails, to the new High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy envisaged by the
draft Constitutional Treaty. The minister will wear two hats: he or she will be appoint-
ed by the European Council, with the agreement of the president of the European
Commission, and will be one of the vice-presidents of the Commission. The minis-
ter's role will be to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), using all the instruments at his or
her disposal. However, since the High Representative will have a double affiliation,
it would be natural that he or she also oversees an expanded common development
policy, which would bring together the current EU policy and the policies of the
member states that badly require centralisation. 
The foreign affairs template could also be used for economic and monetary affairs,
where the president of the Eurogroup could be jointly appointed by the members of
the European Council belonging to the euro area and the president of the European
Commission. Like the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, the High Representative for Economic and Financial Affairs would
therefore be a member of both the Council and the Commission, which would great-
ly facilitate the external representation of the euro.
The changes suggested here appear crucial if Europe is to speak with one voice in
foreign economic policy and to overcome its ‘fragmented power’ status. These
changes would allow the EU to take a more active role in the system of global gover-
nance, which is in dire need of reform to accommodate the rise of new global
economic powers. These changes are also essential to enable the EU to speak on an
equal footing with the United States and to promote partnership aimed at effective
multilateralism. In addition, they will help Europe to strengthen its relations with its
neighbours and consolidate stability in a region prone to volatility.
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1 See ‘A Citizen's Agenda for Europe’, adopted by the Commission in May 2006, the ‘EU's renewed
Strategy for Sustainable Development’, adopted by the Council in June 2006, and ‘Europe in the
World’, adopted by the Commission in June 2006.
2 The EU’s neighbours are defined here as the rest of geographical Europe outside the EU27 (the
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Balkan countries, Turkey, Russia and
six other former Soviet republics, plus the Mediterranean and the Gulf countries (including Iraq and
Iran).
3 At the end of 2006 the EU’s neighbours as defined here held 70 and 80 percent of the world’s
proven reserves of, respectively, oil and natural gas. Source: The PennWell Corporation, ‘Oil & Gas
Journal’, vol. 104.47 (December 18, 2006).  
4 For simplicity, the group of emerging developing countries is defined as developing Asia and Latin
America.     
5 See Sapir (2005).
6 Meanwhile the acronym TAFTA has also been taken. It now refers to the Thailand-Australia Free
Trade Area, which entered into force in 2005.
7 See Véron (2007) for a fascinating analysis of the development in this area.
8 Burwell (2007).
9 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
10 Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
11 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia.
12 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
13 European Commission (2004). ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’,
Communication from the Commission, COM (2004) 373. 
14 European Commission (2006). ‘On Strengthening European Neighbourhood Policy’,
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006)
726. 
15 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
16 Quoted in Röller et al.(2007).
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n the ‘legacy’ paper he posted at the end of his mandate as the European Union’s
trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy (2004) gave a sanguine view of the EU’s ability
to play a leading role on the world economic stage: ‘The lesson to be taken from the
experience of the past five years,’ he wrote, ‘is that, when it chooses to pursue a
truly federal policy, the EU can play a decisive role on the world stage. Together, we
have a far greater ‘weight’ than the sum of the member states. We have the ability,
not only to resist initiatives that we do not support [..], but also to set the interna-
tional agenda.’
However, another senior European policymaker gave an unequivocally downbeat
view. In a controversial paper entitled ‘Powerless Europe: Why is the Euro Area Still a
Political Dwarf?’, Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, the European Central Bank board member in
charge of external relations, wrote that Europe ‘has much less influence over inter-
national policy issues than would be expected on the basis of its relative economic
weight. This is particularly the case in international institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) where, as compared to the World Trade
Organisation [WTO], Europe is much less influential than the United States’ (Bini-
Smaghi 2006a). As a precondition for a stronger EU voice in the IMF, Bini-Smaghi
advocates the consolidation of European chairs.
Depending on the issues and the fora, the EU is indeed sometimes a leader and
sometimes a follower, sometimes a vocal player and sometimes a silent one. While
the US exercises leadership over the entire scope of international economic rela-
tions, Europe can be characterised as an ‘accidental player’ (Pisani-Ferry 2005),
whose international behaviour lacks consistency.
2
Benoît Coeuré and Jean Pisani-Ferry
1
The governance of the European Union’s
international economic relations:
how many voices?As a remedy to this situation, a consistent school of thought – illustrated by the
quotation from Bini-Smaghi – emphasises the fragmentation of European external
representation or the weakness of the governance arrangements in place for coor-
dinating the member states’ positions, and advocates a further federalisation of
external economic policies. Yet other explanations can be offered to account for a
high degree of variance in the external economic role of the European Union. To start
with, the EU could have more to gain in developing an external economic policy in
certain fields than in others. Also, the desirability of a common policy depends on
the degree to which the member states agree with each other. It is by no means
obvious that more centralisation will systematically result in improving the welfare
of Europeans.
Bruegel’s project on Europe and the global economy provides an opportunity for clar-
ification. By systematically evaluating EU external policies across a range of sectors,
it offers a basis for assessing where and why Europe has or has not been an effective
player.
Against this background, our chapter is intended to serve several purposes:
• First, to provide a broad-brush overview of the governance arrangements in
place, their legal basis and their evolution over time;
• Second, to offer an analytical framework for organising sector-specific evidence
on the governance of external economic relations and to provide normative cri-
teria for choosing among alternative external governance models;
• Third, to evaluate the extent of preference heterogeneity across policy domains;
• Fourth, to assess whether the diversity of existing arrangements can be
accounted for within our framework and whether the corresponding choices can
be deemed optimal;
• Fifth, to provide some policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness
of the external economic relations of the EU.
What we do not do in the chapter is trace the history of current arrangements and
provide explanations for the current situation in each and every policy field. We do
not address global governance issues either (our standpoint is that of a welfare-max-
imising EU citizen, altruism allowed). Finally, we do not discuss the content of the EU
policies.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: we start in the first section by briefly
reviewing the evidence on the size of the EU as a global player. We present existing
external governance arrangements in the second section. In the third section, we
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try to make sense of existing arrangements and discuss whether they can be
regarded as optimal. Policy conclusions are offered in the fourth and final section.
The EU: how big a player? How much is at stake in external relations?
In discussions on European external economic relations, the US is almost always
taken as a benchmark. But is this correct? Is the EU as big a player as the US? To
answer those questions, Table 2.1 provides a series of comparative indicators on
the size and openness of the EU25 and the US in the fields covered by the project.
It is apparent that the EU is very similar to the US in economic size and weight in
world trade. It has a somewhat lower share of global energy consumption, as a con-
sequence of differing consumption habits. The same is probably true for migration,
for which statistics are imprecise (they do not distinguish between intra-EU migra-
tion from third countries; proper accounting would lower somewhat the share of the
EU). Only in financial markets is the EU a significantly smaller player, because of its
comparatively lower degree of financial development. However, the EU is a more sig-
nificant player than the US in official development assistance (ODA): its share in the
total ODA of OECD countries is twice as large as that of the US. 
SIZE EU25 US OPENNESS EU25 US
MACROECONOMICS
Share of world GDP (current US$) 30 28
Share of world GDP (PPP) 20 20
TRADE
Share of world trade* 18.1 16.7 Trade as a share of GDP* 19.2 20.8
ENERGY
Energy consumption 16.8 21.6 Share of imports in energy consumption 72.1 42.2
ENVIRONMENT
CO2 emissions 15.5 22.9
DEVELOPMENT
Share of official development assistance 52 26 Share of ODA in GDP 0.41 0.22
FINANCE
Share of world financial markets** 22 46.9 Share of foreign assets in total holdings*** 33.1 10.2
MIGRATION
Share of world immigration**** 20.9 20.2 Share of foreign-born in population***** 8.6 12.9
Source: IMF, Eurostat, IEA, OECD, World Federation of Exchange, BIS, WDI, CIPS.
(*) Intra-EU25 trade excluded; (**) Sum of stock market capitalisation and domestic debt securities issued by the private sector;
(***) Intra-EU25 foreign asset holdings excluded; (****) Share of world foreign-born population; intra-EU25 migration not
excluded; (*****) Intra-EU25 migration not excluded.
Table 2.1: Indicators of size and openness, EU25 and US percentagesTurning to openness, the EU is as open as the US for trade, but is much more open
regarding energy and financial assets. It has therefore more to gain or lose in the
functioning of the international system. Only for migration is the EU more closed than
the US. 
All in all, size and openness put the EU and the US in the same category. Both are
very big players – depending on the indicator, they jointly account for between 35
and 70 percent of  the world total – and both are open economies vulnerable to
external shocks and impacted by one another’s decisions. 
An overview of current arrangements
The distribution of external competence between the EU
2 and the member states
and the arrangements for exercising it are diverse, evolving and contentious. They
are diverse because there is no single template for assigning external competence
or for organising external representation. Significant variation can be observed
across sectors and even within sectors. They are evolving because the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community (hereafter the EC Treaty or ‘the Treaty’) has been
amended many times since 1957 but also because there are only a few cases in
which it explicitly defines the external competence of the Union. In most cases that
competence is implicit and derives from internal competence. The arrangements
are contentious because the issue has been the matter of numerous legal battles
between the Commission and the Council. In many fields where the Treaty does not
explicitly allocate competences, it is the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which has
eventually taken responsibility for defining them. 
We start here by reviewing the legal dimension of the issue. We then outline a frame-
work for analysing the governance of external economic relations in various sec-
tors. Next, we provide some quantitative evidence on the importance of external
governance. Finally, we apply that framework to the fields under review. 
Legal dimensions
3
The general Treaty provision covering international agreements between the
Community and states or international organisations is Article 300, which origi-
nates in the Treaty of Rome. This article however does not include provisions regard-
ing the scope of such agreements (beyond the very general first sentence). It only
determines the procedure to be followed for concluding agreements. 
There are two ways for the Union to acquire external competence. First, the Treaty can
FRAGMENTED POWER
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explicitly grant it such competence. This is particularly the case for trade policy
(Article 133), for international monetary and exchange rate matters (Article 111) and
for development (Article 177). External dimensions are also mentioned in the Treaty
in connection with migration (Article 61) and the environment (Article 174), but in a
cursory manner.
Second, external competence can derive implicitly from internal competences and
their evolution over time. This follows the landmark 1971 ‘AETR’ (French acronym
for European Road Transport Agreement) ruling by the ECJ and the subsequent
jurisprudence, which the Constitutional Convention tried to summarise in its char-
acteristically equivocal Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty: ‘The Union shall also
have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when
its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion
may affect common rules or alter their scope.’ 
The absence of a clear delimitation of competence led already at the time of the
European Coal and Steel Community to the emergence of mixed agreements to
which both the EU and (some or all of) the member states are parties (Louis 2006).
The later proliferation of such agreements vividly illustrates the complex and disput-
ed character of the external representation issue. 
The notion of implied competence
The 1971 AETR ruling was a watershed because it introduced for the first time the
notion of implied (or implicit) competence. The issue was to determine who had
competence for entering into an international agreement concerning the work of
crews in international road transport
4. 
The rationale for the Court decision was that external competence derives from
internal competence. It recalled that ‘the Community enjoys the capacity to estab-
lish contractual links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined
by the Treaty’ and most importantly, that ‘each time the Community, with a view to
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying
down common rules, whatever form they may take, the member states no longer
have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with
third countries which affect those rules or alter their scope’
5. Furthermore, following
what Loukas Tsoukalis (1977) called the cumulative logic of integration, the Court
explicitly stated that ‘as and when such common rules come into being, the
Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligationsFRAGMENTED POWER
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towards third countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community
legal system.’
An evolving jurisprudence
The Court’s philosophy led it to lay down in a series of subsequent rulings precise
conditions for the EU to be assigned an implied external competence: first, it must
have been given the corresponding internal competence; second, this competence
must be effectively exercised by the EU; and third, the external agreement must be
conducive to achieving Treaty objectives. This means for example that for the EU to
enter into international agreements on, say, international bank transfers, it needs to
have been granted competence in the field (which is the case through the single
market provisions), to exercise this competence (which is also the case since the
adoption of a European bank payment standard), and to establish that entering an
agreement with a third country contributes to achieving Treaty objectives (such as
economic efficiency and free capital movements)
6. However, if only the second of
those conditions fails to be fulfilled, member state competence remains transitori-
ly. According to the Court’s early jurisprudence, the second condition (effective
exercise of internal competence) could also be softened if common external action
is indispensable for achieving Treaty objectives.  
In 1994 an important issue arose when the Court had to decide on the relative com-
petence of the EU and the member states concerning the services part of the
Uruguay Round agreement. The Commission’s view was that the EU had exclusive
competence in the field, as for trade in general. Member states held the opposite
view on the grounds that the agreement included elements that were not tradition-
ally regarded as commercial policy (such as intellectual property rights). 
The Court did not side with either of the parties. It ruled that some modes of service
provision were akin to trade and therefore belonged to the exclusive remit of the
Union, while for others, which imply a movement of persons and can be assimilated
to the free movement of people, the basis for deciding on competence could not be
Article 133 of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Court decided that in the absence of
‘complete harmonisation’ of the rules governing access to a self-employed activity
in the services sector, there was no basis for granting exclusive competence to the
EU. In other words, the incompleteness of the single market for services implied a
limitation on the exercise of a virtual external EU competence. This interpretation of
the Treaty paved the way for a multiplication of shared competence cases. 
The Open Skies agreements with the US entered into by a number of member statesTHE GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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during the 1990s seemed to confirm the move to a more restrictive, less integra-
tionist Court philosophy (Dehousse and Maczkovics 2003). In the mid-1990s, after
several member states had concluded bilateral agreements, the Commission
brought the case to Court, which rejected the Commission’s claim that the matter
was exclusive EU competence. In the opinion of the Court, there was a wide grey
area between agreements which are clearly in conflict with common rules (and are
thus unlawful), and agreements that cover the same subject matter as those gov-
erned by common rules (and are thus unlawful on the basis of the AETR judgment).
The Open Skies agreement was deemed to belong to this middle category; the
Court’s view was that the risk of distortions ‘did not suffice for that purpose since
such distortions could easily be avoided by other means.’ In particular, the Court
noted, ‘there is nothing in the Treaty which prevents the institutions from arranging,
in the common rules laid down by them, concerted action in relation to non-member
countries or from prescribing the approach to be taken by the member states in
their external dealings’
7. 
The matter is however still evolving. In 2006, the Court concluded the examination
of another case (the Lugano Convention on the states’ judicial competence) by
stating that ‘detailed analysis must be carried out to determine whether the
Community has the competence to conclude an international agreement and
whether that competence is exclusive. In doing so, account must be taken not only
of the area covered by the Community rules and by the provisions of the agreement
envisaged, insofar as the latter are known, but also of the nature and content of
those rules and those provisions, to ensure that the agreement is not capable of
undermining the uniform and consistent application of the Community rules and
the proper functioning of the system which they establish’
8. The mention of the con-
tent of the rules leaves room for pragmatism in determining if and when a matter
falls under EU competence.
The governance of external relations
While the delimitation of external competence is not fully laid down in the EC Treaty,
the relative role of EU institutions is more precisely defined. 
According to Article 300, the responsibility for deciding to open or to conclude
negotiations  belongs to the Council, while the responsibility for conducting them
belongs to the Commission. Furthermore, the Council is granted supervisory powers
through the appointment of special committees overseeing the conduct of the
negotiation. In economic jargon, the Council is thus without ambiguity the principal,
while the Commission is the agent. However, by making recommendations to theFRAGMENTED POWER
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Council as regards the opening of negotiations, the Commission also exercises its
right of initiative in the external field. It therefore acts both as agenda-setter and
agent. 
The same pattern applies to the association agreements as governed by Article 310
(the difference being that they need to be approved by unanimity). It also applies
to trade negotiations as governed by Article 133. There are however two differences
here: first, the leash is kept somewhat shorter as Article 133 states that ‘the
Commission shall report regularly to the special committee [actually known as the
‘133 Committee’ in EU parlance] on the progress of negotiations.’ Second, the arti-
cle explicitly prohibits agreements that would result in internal harmonisation
where the Treaty rules it out. This is meant to be a safeguard against the EU using
external agreements to increase its internal powers. At French insistence, cultural,
audiovisual, educational and social services are explicitly mentioned as being cov-
ered by this safeguard. Furthermore, the Treaty explicitly rules that agreements in
those fields ‘fall within the shared competence of the Community and its member
states and that they shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the member
states.’ At Nice, therefore, both shared external competences and mixed agree-
ments explicitly made their way into the Treaty (Louis 2006). 
In the case of shared competence, the ECJ clearly considers that member states act
as agents of the Community and have a duty of cooperation with the institutions of
the Community, in particular with the Commission. In its 1993 opinion on the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention on safety in the use of chemi-
cals at work, the Court stated that ‘cooperation between the Community and the
member states is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the former cannot,
as international law stands at present, itself conclude an ILO convention and must
do so through the medium of the member states’, and that ‘it is therefore for the
Community institutions and the member states to take all the measures necessary
so as best to ensure such cooperation’
9.
Finally, Article 111, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, governs the external
aspects of Economic and Monetary Union. The pattern is different here, first,
because the Council takes over from the Commission the role of external represen-
tative
10and, second, because the European Central Bank (ECB) intervenes as a third
agent of the Community besides the Commission and the Council. The Commission
unambiguously has a subordinate role to the Council (it is only ‘fully associated
with the negotiations’) and on exchange rate matters it even loses its right of initia-
tive since it can be bypassed if the Council acts on a recommendation from the ECB
(see Bini-Smaghi 2006a for a full discussion of Article 111). THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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The fields under review therefore exhibit significant variation in extent, legal basis
and clarity, as well as stability, of the distribution of competence between EU and
member states. In some fields, such as trade in goods, the situation is homoge-
neous, unambiguous and stable. In others such as financial services or the environ-
ment, it is heterogeneous, ambiguous and unstable.  
Governance models
How competence is distributed between the EU and the member states certainly
provides the primary characterisation of the governance of external economic rela-
tions in a given field. However, this does not suffice. As the discussion of the legal
dimension makes apparent, there are various templates for organising representa-
tion and decision-making in a field which has been assigned to the EU. Not only are
there different possible choices of agent to represent the EU (it can be the
Commission, a Community agency such as the ECB, the Council acting through its
presidency, or even the member states themselves), but there are also various pos-
sibilities for organising the relationship between the principal (the Community) and
the agent. Moreover, the mere fact that representation in a certain field has not been
delegated to the EU does not mean that the EU has no role at all. There can be soft-
er forms of coordination among the representatives of the member states. 
We therefore have to introduce both various degrees of centralisation of external
economic relations and various models for their governance. This leads us to dis-
tinguish three basic models for the governance of EU policies, which apply to both
internal and external dimensions (we discuss the specific external dimension in
the next section).
In the first model, unconditional delegation, competence to act is entirely assigned
to an EU body according to, and within the limits of, a predefined mandate. This body
then retains full discretion within the limit of its mandate and can only be made
accountable on an ex-post basis. This applies for example to the Commission’s com-
petition policy decisions (including when they have extraterritorial effect) or to the
monetary policy decisions of the ECB
11. The only constraints on the autonomy of the
agent are its mandate, the threat of an appeal to the Court of Justice, and possibly
to non-jurisdictional checks and balances such as the reaction of public opinion
and/or protests or retaliation from non-EU countries. 
The second model, supervised delegation, is one in which an EU body acts as an
agent while the member states (and generally also the European Parliament)
actively monitor and steer its behaviour. The standard case in this respect is tradeFRAGMENTED POWER
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policy where the role of principal is exercised by the 133 Committee made up of
trade officials nominated by the member states, which meets frequently to monitor
the negotiation process and give guidance to the trade commissioner. Mutatis
mutandis, a broadly similar pattern applies in other fields such as environmental
negotiations, with the difference that the Council presidency plays the role of agent.
The third model, coordination, is one in which member states do not delegate
responsibilities or external representation roles to the EU but coordinate among
themselves while retaining their seats and speaking with their own voice in interna-
tional fora. This could be regarded as a soft commitment, but as already noted the
ECJ considers that in those areas that fall within the competence of the EU, member
states have the legal duty to coordinate among themselves and with the institu-
tions of the EU. 
As an example, the EU cannot formally be a member of the IMF under the Fund’s cur-
rent bylaws, but European member countries have to speak with one voice and
coordinate with the Commission when it comes to trade or single market issues.
Increasingly, they aim at defining common positions on major topics of discussion.
Since the Vienna European Council (1998), prior discussions take place within the
Council of Ministers (‘Ecofin’), the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) made
up of treasury officials, and a special EFC sub-committee on IMF-related issues,
which result in the adoption of common understandings
12. In turn, those common
understandings are expected to influence the positions taken by the member states
in international discussions, but in most cases they are not binding in character.
Prior discussions seem smooth enough: neither the Commission nor the ECB have
ever asked the ECJ to force member states to abide by common positions in areas
such as trade, competition or money, or more generally on first pillar issues (as was
the case for the ILO convention mentioned above). 
Table 2.2 provides a presentation of our three models as well as examples of fields
in which they are used.
This classification involves some simplification as there is in fact more continuity
between models than suggested by the table. There is not much difference between
unconditional and supervised delegation if the agent’s mandate is limited in time,
as its renewal depends on the principal agreeing to the agent’s behaviour. In the
same way, there is not much difference between supervised delegation and coordi-
nation if supervision involves a committee that meets continuously and issues fre-
quent guidelines. Nevertheless, the classification can serve as an instrument for
organising analysis. THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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The increasing international content of European law
How important is the international dimension in current EU legislation? Quantitative
evidence does not say everything, but at least it provides a comprehensive picture.
In order to answer this question, we have dug into the EUR-lex database, which con-
tains all EU legislation since 1957
13. EU legislation includes directives (ie European
framework laws), regulations (European laws), secondary legislation such as deci-
sions of the Council or the Commission and agreements with non-member states
and international organisations. We have studied the evolution of the latter catego-
ry over time, in absolute numbers and as a proportion of total EU legislation, in the
eight fields under review. The results are summarised in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, while
detailed tables are to be found in Appendix 3. 
There has been an expansion of EU legislation with the total number of texts
increasing from 9,776 in the period 1966 to 1975, to 45,062 in the period 1996 to
2005. Over the entire period 1957-2005, the biggest contributing field has been
trade, with 36 percent of all texts produced, followed by macroeconomic policy and
finance (10.3 percent), then development (8.7 percent). External dimensions have
therefore played a major role in the development of EU legislation.  
When it comes specifically to agreements with non-member states and with inter-
national organisations, there was a steady increase until the mid 1990’s, with the
total number of agreements increasing from 360 in the period 1966 to 1975 to
1,251 in the period 1986 to 1995, then only 967 in the period 1996 to 2005
(Figure 2.1). In relative terms, however, agreements with non-member states repre-
sented a much higher share of overall legislation in the 1960s (Figure 2.2). 
Interestingly, even though trade dominates the absolute number of agreements
Model Main features Examples
Unconditional delegation
Policy responsibility delegated to EU institution;
Monitoring by member states, if any, not binding on deci-




External representation and negotiation authority delegated
to EU institution;
Council exercises supervision through issuing guidelines
and monitoring implementation.





No delegation of external representation to EU institution;
member states coordinate among themselves and with EU
institutions and may or may not commit to follow guidelines.
Representation on IMF Board
(ex-ante coordination within
subcommittee of EFC)






































Figure 2.2: Number of agreements with non-member states and international
organisations, as a percentage of total legislation in the respective policy field
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from 1957 to 2005, the most ‘internationally exposed’ policy fields, as seen from
the relative importance of international agreements to the total number of texts
over the same period, are energy (4.5 percent of legislation passed has an interna-
tional dimension) and environment (4.4 percent), followed by development (4.1
percent), defence (3.9 percent) and trade (2.7 percent, a very low ratio that results
from the large number of EU trade-related acts which do not have the character of an
international agreement). Other fields lag significantly (see Appendix 3). In relative
terms, development has played an important role historically, but it has now been
outpaced by defence, the environment and energy (Figure 2.2).
An overview of the situation in eight policy fields
We can now use our framework to provide an overview of the situation in eight
fields: the seven under detailed review in this book plus environment. Information
for preparing this assessment was provided to us by the authors of sector chapters
using a common questionnaire (Appendix 1)
14. 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the situation regarding both competence and gov-
ernance. A few observations can be made. 
First, there is considerable variation both across and within fields in the nature of
issues involved, the legal provisions governing international relations and the corre-
sponding governance arrangements. Trade (at least for goods), competition, devel-
opment, migration and international money are homogeneous in those respects.
Financial markets, energy and the environment are by contrast aggregations of
heterogeneous subfields with differing degrees of EU competence and different gov-
ernance arrangements. For example, in spite of the overall agreement on an EU
energy strategy, there is little in common between oil, which is not a matter for EU
policy, nuclear energy which is covered by a specific treaty, and electricity which is
part of the single market. 
Second, there are only three fields where the EU has exclusive competence, as a
result of explicit Treaty provisions: trade, competition and the euro exchange rate. In
all other cases, EU competence (if any) derives from jurisprudence and it is shared
to some extent at least with the member states. This frequently goes with fuzzy
delimitations and the resulting controversies, as indicated under ‘clarity’ in Table
2.3. Significant cases in this respect are financial markets, energy and the environ-
ment. All three are heterogeneous and, in all three, a combination of competition
and cooperation between the EU and member states can be observed, frequently
resulting in mixed and unstable agreements in which both levels participate.Third, the nature of the international activity also varies from field to field. In some,
such as trade, financial markets or the environment, the core activity is to enact
rules through negotiating multilateral or regional/bilateral agreements. In others
such as competition, development and international money, the emphasis is on
case-by-case decisions, ie quasi-judicial or executive functions.
FRAGMENTED POWER
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Table 2.3 continued: An overview of competence assignment and governance
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Fourth, the decision-making rule is generally qualified majority voting (QMV), but
there are exceptions such as trade negotiations on services and migration.
Furthermore, QMV may not be enforced because of the search for consensus within
the EU and because the existence of mixed agreements formally gives the member
states veto power over the ratification of agreements negotiated by the EU. The
practice therefore is much more complex than the theory (Meunier 2000). 
Source: author’s compilation of answers to the governance questionnaire (Appendix I)FRAGMENTED POWER
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Fifth, the governance mechanisms in place are diverse. All three models identified
above are in use and are implemented in various ways. For example, the Treaty
grants the ECB and the Commission unconditional delegation in some areas
(money, competition) while, as regards supervised delegation, the agent can be
either the Commission (for trade, development) or the Council (for the environment,
although there is considerable diversity within the sector). The Treaty also makes
room for future evolution: as noted above, this is the case for external representa-
tion in areas relevant to Economic and Monetary Union (Article 111(4)).
Summing up, there is considerable variation regarding the arrangements in use in
the sectors under review. The question, then, becomes whether there is an underly-
ing rationale for different choices as regards degrees of centralisation and gover-
nance arrangements, or if they are purely the result of history and/or are mechani-
cally derived from internal arrangements. This is what we intend to investigate next.
How efficient are existing arrangements?
Having presented the existing arrangements, we now move on to discuss them. The
two issues we need to explore are, first, assignment of powers, ie whether a given
policy should be carried out at a decentralised level or if there should be some form
of centralisation – a question usually referred to as that of competence in EU parl-
ance; and, second, governance, or how best to organise joint decision-making when
there is a degree of centralisation.
These are obviously not completely separate questions: actually, the governance
issue has stronger relevance when competence is neither completely decentralised
(in which case there is nothing to govern) nor completely centralised (in which case
the international dimension vanishes). But it makes sense to examine them
successively.
In what follows, we take up the competence issue first, before turning to gover-
nance, starting in each case with analytical issues before trying to make our
approach operational. We then sum up.
Competence
Lessons from the literature
Since Tiebout (1956), Olson (1969) and Oates (1972), theories of federalism have
studied the allocation of public goods by different levels of government. In this lineTHE GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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of thinking, decentralised decisions match best the preferences of citizens, unless
preferences are homogeneous and economies of scale are significant enough to
justify devolution to the federal level. The modern literature on political unions
builds on the same insight, ie a trade-off between economies of scale and the het-
erogeneity of preferences, as in the model of Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and
Frederico Etro (2005). For scholars of Europe, this echoes the familiar trade-off
between deepening and widening.
Introducing the external dimension into this framework does not lead to significant
changes. In spite of Guido Tabellini’s (2003) sobering warning (“What mandate can
be given in the realm of foreign policy? The only feasible mandate is to pursue the
common interest of the EU. But what does that mean in practice?”), we do not see
major reasons why the standard approach should not apply. What matters to EU cit-
izens is how their welfare will be impacted by the choice of separate or joint deci-
sions. The economies of scale/heterogeneity of preferences framework applies with
only one proviso: that economies of scale have to be understood in a broad sense,
ie including the gain to EU member states from jointly exercising market power or
from pooling their votes in international organisations
15. The same criteria can pro-
vide guidance for choosing between degrees of centralisation.
Think for example of immigration policy: there are externalities across member
states because individuals holding a residence permit in one EU country can more
easily move to another, and this favours the centralisation of visa policy, at least for
internationally mobile migrants. But if some countries favour increasing immigra-
tion and others stopping it, the loss from a common policy can be significant. And if
implementing the common policy implies setting up common consulates across the
world, it involves additional costs that can make the net benefit unclear, at least in
the short run.
Centralisation is therefore warranted for policies involving limited heterogeneity of
preference with strong economies of scale and externalities across countries, as
well as low transaction costs. Otherwise decentralisation should be preferred
16.
Measurement
Opinion surveys such as the European Commission’s regular Eurobarometer, and
specific surveys of international public opinion, provide consistent information on
many policy issues. While the degree to which they accurately measure national
preferences is a matter for discussion, their advantage is that they facilitate com-
parison across policy domains and (for Eurobarometer surveys at least) over time.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Figure 2.3 presents the type of information we start from, here taken from the
Eurobarometer survey and the European Values Survey (EVS). We plot on the hori-
zontal axis a measure of substantive policy preference (in this case a measure of
the price citizens are willing to pay for a cleaner environment, which we take as an
indication of the implicit value of the environment for citizens) and on the vertical
axis the proportion of citizens who respond that environmental policy should be
allocated to the EU level. We regard the latter as a measure of the perceived
economies of scale/spillovers. 
As the figure immediately illustrates, there is considerable convergence on assign-
ing environment policy to the EU level but considerable divergence on the desirable
content of that common policy. This is understandable: citizens (rightly) consider
that cross-border pollution and global climate change can only be tackled at the EU
level (if not at global level) but this does not lead them to converge on the actual
features of that common policy. From geography to population density, income lev-
els and overall tax burdens, there are many reasons why they might diverge.
We have collected similar information for a wide range of policy issues, drawing on
opinion surveys from a variety of sources (Appendix 2). Indicators of the desire for
centralisation are available from the regular Eurobarometer surveys and cover a





























































Desire for an increase in taxation if used to prevent environmental pollution
Figure 2.3: Public opinion preferences on environmental policy, EU25, 2000
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remarkably stable over time – we do not observe important shifts following the
broadening of EU membership. (Changes mostly reflect the overall evolution of pub-
lic opinion about Europe as well as reactions to events. For example, the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks in the US resulted in a clear increase in the demand for allocating the
fight against terrorism to the EU level).
However, there is significant heterogeneity across countries. Figure 2.4 plots the
distribution or preferences for centralisation for 15 policy fields considered in the
Eurobarometer surveys. Policies with a significant external dimension are plotted in
black; policies that are mostly internal are plotted in white. The length of the bar cor-
responds to two standard deviations (across countries), thus the longer the bar, the
greater the heterogeneity within Europe as regards the desirability of centralisation.
On the whole, public opinion preferences broadly conform to the economists’ crite-
ria of economies of scales and externalities. Desire for centralisation is strong in
fields where public opinion rightly perceives that spillover effects from national poli-
cies are high (research) or that national states do not have the required dimension
(global crime). However this is not always the case: there is only weak support for
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Figure 2.4: Preference for centralisation, 1989-2005
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. Economy I, II and III are categories grouping questions related to unemployment and labour mar-
kets (I), consumer protection, competition and industrial policy (II) and value added taxation (III). Social I, II and III refer to health
insurance and pensions (I), education and culture (II) and poverty and exclusion (III).centralising competition policy/consumer protection/industrial policy (which have
been aggregated because questions asked often cut across sub-domains). There is
also a preference for centralisation in fields with an external dimension, although
with the exception of defence (where heterogeneity is high). For example, European
opinion clearly regards social protection as an essentially national competence, but
development assistance is overwhelmingly considered a European affair. 
Comparing substantive policy preferences across fields is more delicate. First, one
has to rely on a variety of sources, some of which only cover a subset of EU mem-
ber states. Second, available measures are provided by responses to questions that
are by nature specific to a certain policy field. To make it possible to compare pref-
erence heterogeneity across fields, we have first collected a large number (90) of
responses to surveys on the issues we are interested in, conducted in the 1990s or
the 2000s. Second, we have defined aggregate categories by grouping questions
having to do with the same field (for example, eight different questions on the envi-
ronment). This helps eliminate cross-country variations attributable to question
specificity (for example, some questions ask whether citizens are willing to pay
more taxes for the environment and some whether they could accept reductions in
their standard of living). Third and finally, in any given field we take as an indicator
of substantive preference heterogeneity across countries the average standard
deviation of the responses to the questions belonging to the field, divided by the
average standard deviation of responses for all fields. This approach is intended to
eliminate or at least to limit the effects of variations due to the wording of the ques-
tions. We have also verified that the two dimensions are independent, namely, that
responses on the desirable degree of centralisation are not determined by the het-
erogeneity of preferences
17.
Results are given in Figure 2.5, where we have plotted on the horizontal axis the het-
erogeneity of preferences as measured by the intra-EU variance of national
responses, and on the vertical axis the desire for centralisation (measured by the
proportion of EU citizens who respond that the corresponding policy should be allo-
cated to the EU level). Candidates for centralisation should be found in the north-
west corner while decentralisation should be preferred in the south-east corner.
Other situations are ambiguous
18.
What Figure 2.5 shows is that as far as public opinion is concerned, development
and foreign policy are the prime candidates for centralisation. The environment and
trade-related policies come next, however with a markedly higher index of policy
preference heterogeneity. A third group is composed of energy and immigration, for
which support for centralisation is somewhat weaker and preference heterogeneity
FRAGMENTED POWER
40THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
41
somewhat stronger. Unemployment and labour market policies are regarded as
mostly national, and this applies to a larger extent to social policies. Economic poli-
cies, especially in the fields of competition and consumer protection, as well as
unemployment and the labour market, clearly face a trade-off between a desire for
centralisation and evident heterogeneity of preferences.  
Implementing the approach
We now have the ingredients for assessing the distribution of competence. We were
only able to collect survey data for six of our eight categories. We order policies
using a ‘centralisation index’ I that combines the two dimensions of preference for
centralisation and heterogeneity of preference (Figure 2.6). Graphically, Imeasures
the distance of a given policy to the north-west corner of Figure 2.5.We find that the
case for centralisation is very strong for development assistance (and for foreign
policy, which is beyond the scope of this chapter) and strong for trade and the envi-
ronment. It is weaker for energy and weak for competition and migrations, fields
which actually involve both internal and external dimensions.  
There is only an approximate correspondence between our results and the current


















































Figure 2.5: Desire for centralisation vs heterogeneity of preferences
Source: Eurobarometers, EVS, ESS, ISSP.for the most part) while trade and competition (above thresholds) are. Energy is
currently very decentralised (but the case for a EU approach is being discussed);
the situation varies in the field of environment.
Trade is interesting because it is a policy that has been centralised since the early
days of the European Community, while opinion- and policymakers exhibit a fair
degree of preference heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is actually underestimated
in our data because we had to exclude surveys covering only a few countries, such
as the German Marshall Fund’s trade and poverty surveys (US German Marshall
Fund 2006). From judgement of the effects of trade opening to specific trade policy
prescriptions, opinion in France and the UK exhibit in this survey a high degree of
divergence across a wide range of trade-related issues – and national governments
frequently behave in accordance with public opinion preferences. This must be
taken as an indication that a common policy can be run in spite of diverging prefer-
ences, provided the governance structure allows decision-making. However,
European trade policy is notoriously contentious within the Union. 
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x = x - x
     √Vx
ˉ ˆ
I = ĉ - ĥ
Source: European surveys (Eurobarometer, EVS, ESS and ISSP, see Appendix 2) and authors’ calculation. To establish this graph,
three categories (High, Medium and Low) were defined for both the desire for centralisation and the heterogeneity of preferences.
A very strong case for centralisation corresponds to a high preference for it and low heterogeneity. The case for centralisation is
assessed by giving equal weight to both criteria. The ‘centralisation index’ is                       where c is the desire for centralisation, h








































































































































































Figure 2.6: Desire for centralisation and preference heterogeneity in the EU:
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Governance
Lessons from the literature
For a given level of centralisation, how should external relations be governed and,
more specifically, what should guide choice among the three models of uncondi-
tional delegation, supervised delegation and coordination? This is what we will
investigate next.
The design of efficient contracts has been a central topic in the theory of corporate
governance (see Becht, Bolton and Roëll 2002 for a survey). Since corporate man-
agers typically have to deal with multiple principals such as shareholders, creditors
and employees,  the theory of the firm has naturally addressed common agency
problems, which are relevant for our study. Ownership of the firm amounts to exer-
cising residual control rights in those cases not covered by the contract. Recent
research on constitutional design has drawn on this literature to assess the effi-
ciency of policymaking institutions. Attention has especially focused on the choice
a government faces between exercising direct responsibility in a policy field and
delegating it to an agency such as an independent central bank or regulatory
authority.
An additional aspect introduced by the external dimension is the possibility of form-
ing coalitions among players (say, between countries on the IMF Board or in the
negotiation of environmental protocols) or of giving a time-bound or subject-specif-
ic negotiation mandate to an agent representing the EU (as for international trade
negotiations). The question then becomes: what rule, if any, should be used to
aggregate member state preferences? When should simple majority, qualified
majority and unanimity be chosen? This is a major issue for the EU in general and
one that has particular implications in the external field.
Frieden (2004) and Meunier (2000) explicitly address the issue in a simple case
where preferences about a policy choice can be represented along a single dimen-
sion and the choice is made by majority voting. They point out that the gain from
pooling votes within the EU depends on the distribution of preferences and that
some EU member states can actually lose out when forming a European coalition
because their own preferences are closer to those of other players (in plain terms,
Britain or Poland would have lost from a European coalition over the war in Iraq
because their preferences were closer to those of the US).
In a case study of EU-US trade negotiations, Sophie Meunier relies on a similarapproach but introduces a further distinction. She shows that in those fields where
member states have an ‘offensive’ or ‘reformist’ agenda, ie when their objective
departs from the status quo, it is efficient for them to give the Commission a broad
mandate so that it can extract more concessions from its partners. On the contrary,
when Europeans have a ‘defensive’ or ‘conservative’ agenda, ie when they intend to
maintain the status quo, it is safer for them to keep the Commission on a short leash
so as to make sure it will not deviate from the status quo. The more conservative a
member state is, the more it favours avoiding delegation.
An example of a ‘defensive’ agenda for Europe was the agricultural negotiation dur-
ing the Uruguay Round, while reciprocity in public procurement is an example of an
‘offensive’ one. The difference between a ‘short’ and a ‘loose’ leash can be expressed
in terms of the extent of the negotiation mandate but also in terms of internal vot-
ing rules: by nature, unanimity is more conducive to conservatism than majority
voting. This is illustrated by Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Voting on the EU common position
There are therefore two dimensions in governance models. The first is the delega-
tion model: should the agent be accountable to the people, or should it be a non-
elected bureaucracy such as the Commission or an independent agency? How often
should the mandate be redefined? The second dimension is the voting ruleused to
decide on the substance of the mandate. We address these two dimensions in turn.
Choosing a delegation model
Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini (2006a, 2006b) and Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole










     = individual countries’ ideal points
U  = common position under unanimity
M = common position under qualified majority
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ment by bureaucrats (or ‘judges’ in Maskin and Tirole’s language). The idea is that
politicians are selected in elections and are motivated by re-election, while bureau-
crats are meant to be technically competent and motivated by career concerns.
Politicians therefore may bend too easily to private interest groups, and the voters
who elect them should (but do not necessarily) have a clear vision of whether they
have the required abilities. As a result, independent bureaucrats should manage the
policies for which social preferences are clear and stable enough to be written down
in a mandate, that are characterised by strong and possibly evolving technical con-
tent, and involve a risk of pandering to special interests (whereby the minority can
inflict large negative externalities on the majority)
19.
This does not directly solve our problem since the choice here is between govern-
ment by states or by an EU agency. But we posit that the same approach can be
extended and that the choice of a model depends, as in the closed economy set-up,
on the nature and effects of the policy and on the (predetermined) structure of the
international discussion. The setting up of an independent agency broadly corre-
sponds to the unconditional delegation model, the ‘bureaucrat’ being the European
Commission or some independent agency. Politicians relinquish all control rights,
with the agent being accountable only ex post. The mandate sets out the obligations
of the agent, and the principals cannot withdraw the authority that has been given
nor monitor the implementation of the mandate
20. As in the Maskin-Tirole-Alesina-
Tabellini set-up, unconditional delegation is to be preferred when technicality is
prevalent, preferences are stable, the risk of pandering to special interests is high,
and overall distributional effects across generations are limited
21.
At the opposite extreme, policies that involve uncertainty about the ex post prefer-
ences, or about large redistributive effects within the population giving rise to poli-
cy tradeoffs, and which face a lower risk of pandering to special interests, are bet-
ter managed by elected politicians. In our setting, this can be implemented either
directly through intergovernmental coordination or by keeping bureaucrats on a
short leash, giving them a mandate that is frequently checked and possibly rede-
fined. This corresponds to the coordination and to the supervised delegation mod-
els (the agent being either the Commission or the Council presidency, or a techni-
cal agency)
22.
Summing up, reasons for unconditionally delegating policy responsibility to a
European agency can be that:
• The field requires technical expertise, and policymaking involves real-time
response (such as crisis management or decisions on rapidly evolving matters);• National governments are excessively sensitive to specific interests, for example
those of national companies
23.
Reasons for choosing instead supervised delegation or coordination are that:
• Policies systematically involve significant redistribution across states and
therefore cannot be decided upon by an agency because there is no mandate
that can give it authority for deciding on equity across states
24.
Finally, reasons for excluding intermediate solutions and for favouring the corner
solutions of decentralisation and unconditional delegation are:
• The changing character of the agenda. In such a case, the cost of constantly rene-
gotiating a common position or a mandate can be high and the resulting inertia
can be detrimental to efficiency.
Choosing a voting rule
As regards the voting rule, Figure 2.7 speaks for itself: unanimity is more conducive
to the status quo than majority voting. This is also true when member states ‘vote
on votes’, as illustrated by the stalemate over the voting rule on tax issues during
the Nice negotiations. It should be noted, however, that rules used to aggregate
member state preferences are not necessarily well described by de jure voting
rules. Majority voting is often postponed until some kind of consensus has been
reached. Under the ‘Luxembourg compromise’, an informal agreement dating back
to 1966, a member state can veto a majority decision if it deems that its ‘vital inter-
ests’ are at stake. Also, the complex rules of the 133 Committee allow case-by-case
decisions on the voting rules for some areas of trade negotiations such as intellec-
tual property (see Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999). In another area, the ECB
Governing Council decides by consensus on monetary policy even though it formal-
ly uses majority voting
25.
The need to adopt a voting rule that facilitates decision-making – QMV rather than
unanimity, straight ballots rather than consensus-building, and double majority
rather than the Nice system – is thus higher where the EU has an ‘offensive’ inter-
est, meaning that its members’ preferences are further away from the status quo
than those of its negotiation partners. A good example here is global warming: a
majority rule that unites Europe around a common position strengthens the bar-
gaining power of the EU vis-à-vis the US and other countries
26. When the EU’s (stat-
ed) interests are defensive – say on agricultural protection – its bargaining position
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is strengthened by an inefficient voting system.
Implementing the approach
Our analysis suggests four empirical criteria for implementation:
• Nature of the task. We distinguish between the negotiation and implementation
of rules and case decisions that can have a judicial or quasi-judicial nature (as
regards competition policy) as well as an executive nature (the IMF Board).
There is more need for autonomy of the representative agent in the latter case.
• Evolving nature of the agenda. We distinguish between fields in which matters for
negotiation are constantly changing and fields in which they are more stable.
Evolving agendas make the defining and renegotiating of mandates difficult and
therefore call either for leaving the representation to the member states, or for
relying on unconditional delegation.  
• European negotiation stance. We distinguish between offensive and defensive
stances. An offensive stance where the majority of the EU advocates changes to
the status quo calls for majority voting, while a defensive stance in favour of pre-
serving the status quo calls for unanimity or supermajority. There is obviously a
difficulty here, as deciding whether European interests are offensive or defensive
in a given field involves judgement, but the EU stance can be observed and doc-
umented.  
• Distributive effects among states. We distinguish between those decisions that
are likely to affect some states disproportionately and those that have little dis-
tributional impact. The stronger the distributional effects, the more the voting
rule needs to preserve the interests of the minority. 
We are not able to quantify all four criteria and we have to rely on qualitative judge-
ment instead, drawing on the answers to our questionnaire (Table 2.4).
Putting together all four criteria, we find that the need for an autonomous agent is
strong in competition, and international macroeconomic policy and finance, which
are characterised both by an evolving agenda and by the prevalence of case deci-
sions over rule-making. The need is somewhat weaker for financial markets, devel-
opment, energy and the environment. Again, we find a surprising outcome concern-
ing trade: the case for an autonomous agent seems to be weak, because the main
responsibility is the negotiation of rules and because the agenda evolves slowly.
This provides an interesting benchmark, as it is hard to dispute the fact that the
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We also find that efficient voting rules are needed most for development and inter-
national macroeconomic policy and finance, as well as for financial markets, ener-
gy and the environment. In those fields, Europe has an offensive agenda and deci-
sions involve (relatively) low distributive effects across member states.
This assessment remains mostly based on judgement and this is a weakness.
Making progress towards quantitative, rather than qualitative analysis of gover-
nance criteria should be a goal for further research.
Putting things together
We now have answers to the three questions:  Is centralisation desirable?  Should
the agent be given some leeway in negotiating with outside partners, or should it be
kept on a short leash?  When deciding on the agent’s mandate, should the voting
rule support the majority or protect the minority?
The results are the following. First, as we have already discussed, we find that the
policies for which centralisation is the most justified are development, followed by
trade and the environment and, further behind, energy, immigration and competi-
tion (Table 2.4). With the exception of competition, those conclusions are support-
ed by the sectoral chapters in this volume
27. 
Second, as regards the governance model, we find it desirable to give at least some
autonomy to the EU’s agent (Table 2.4). This especially applies to competition,
international macroeconomic policy and finance, and to a lesser extent to financial
markets, development, energy and the environment. The main reason is the evolv-
ing nature of the fields under consideration, which calls for flexibility and the ability
to change the negotiation agenda rapidly.
Third, as far as voting rules are concerned, the picture is more mixed (Table 2.4). We
find a need for efficient voting rules for development and international macroeco-
nomic policy and finance, to a lesser extent for financial markets, energy and the
environment. We must admit that this conclusion partly depends on somewhat sub-
jective delimitations between offensive and defensive interests. It would need to be
supported by more objective criteria for determining the nature of the EU agenda in
a given field, which we regard as a topic for future research.
These results do not map existing institutional arrangements. They highlight three
fields where reform of governance would seem appropriate:• Development. The current combination of partial centralisation and loose coordi-
nation is hard to justify on economic grounds. As argued in the chapter by Arne
Bigsten in this volume, its persistence comes from the member states’ desire to
use development assistance as a way to enhance their political influence, and
from dissatisfaction with the way EU development policy is run. Those are not
strong economic rationales. If European development policy is inefficient it
should be reformed, not decentralised.  
• Environment. Climate preservation is the closest possible thing to a global public
good and Europeans exhibit a high degree of unity in respect of it. The complexi-
ty of the current arrangements whereby the Union and the member states com-
pete for competence is hardly satisfactory. The changing nature of the agenda
calls for giving the European negotiator sufficient autonomy, while the offensive
character of the European negotiation stance, which has been illustrated by the
EU’s decision to implement the Kyoto Protocol in spite of widespread resistance
in the rest of the world, calls for an efficient voting procedure. 
• International macroeconomic and monetary affairs. Ahearne and Eichengreen in
their chapter emphasise the case for centralisation in this field. We add that
because of the evolving nature of the agenda, there is a need to delegate repre-
sentation to an EU or euro area representative with sufficient autonomy.  
Conclusion
The chapters in this volume highlight that current arrangements for Europe’s exter-
nal economic relations are both complex and evolving, that their efficiency is ques-
tionable, and that the choice of governance models is inherited from history rather
than being based on efficiency criteria. The question we would now like to address
is whether there is a potential for improving existing arrangements.
Before answering this question, we need to emphasise that reaching normative
conclusions is not easy. As developed in this chapter, economic analysis provides
criteria for choosing between decentralisation and centralisation but the devil is in
the detail of implementation: it is hard to assess empirically the degree to which fur-
ther centralisation or decentralisation is justified and even harder to provide a
robust empirical basis to the choice of governance model. We have tried to make
use of opinion surveys, and we think that this approach provides useful insights,
but we are also conscious of its limits. After all, the history of the EU did not begin in
1950 with a survey asking the French and the Germans whether they would agree
to have a common coal and steel policy. Furthermore, reliance on opinion surveys
rests on the assumption that citizens are able to assess and compare the external-
ities and economies of scales that economists themselves find hard to measure.
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the issue and we do see scope for an empirical approach to issues identified by the
literature as impacting governance choices, such as the evolving character of the
policy agenda, the risk of capture by special interests, or the offensive or defensive
nature of Europe’s interest, but corresponding empirical measures are not provided
in this chapter. Any conclusion must therefore be tentative.
A final limitation of the chapter is that we do not address complementarities across
policies. For example, we do not discuss whether competence assignment for trade
has consequences for competence assignment in some aspects of environment
policy. This is a significant shortcoming, as indicated by the rising number of issues
involving both dimensions. Complementarities also exist between internal and
external policies. The reason why the Treaties do not provide a single template for
international representation might just be the diversity of arrangements for internal
policies. The easiest way to address complementarities across policy domains
could well be enforcement of a single governance template for all those domains, as
is more or less the case in individual nations. Complementarities would then be
internalised at ministerial level. But this is not the nature of the EU. In the absence
of such a single template, the relevant fora to address policy complementarities
across domains are the Commission and the European Council. Whether or not this
is done properly (we are doubtful) would require another paper
28.
Turning to recommendations, we do not see much scope for further unconditional
delegation in the fields we have reviewed. As explained in the text, the conditions for
this model to be efficient are strict and they do not appear to be fulfilled, except
where (competition, monetary policy) authority is already delegated.
In all other domains, the choice is between coordination and conditional delegation.
The case for coordination is generally weak on legal and efficiency grounds. On legal
grounds, as noted above, the ECJ has increasingly taken the view that member
states should be considered (and should behave) as agents of the EU in external
talks that impinge, or might impinge, on EU competences. It can then be argued, on
efficiency grounds, that a single representation minimises transaction costs and
provides for more stability in international discussions. Also, as already noted, the
conditional delegation model is very flexible. In particular, one can get close to
unconditional delegation by granting long-term mandates and by limiting the
agent’s remit to general principles with full operational flexibility, as is the case for
governors of central banks. At the other extreme, short mandates allow member
states to retain and exercise control rights and can be regarded as a way to struc-
ture coordination.
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first issue, not addressed in this chapter, is the choice of agent. We have not dis-
cussed competence assignment between the EU’s two executive branches, the
Commission and (in its executive capacity) the Council. We have argued however
that complementarities across policies suggest moving towards a unified gover-
nance template, as in fact clearly stated in the Treaty.
A second question is the definition of the agent’s mandate. Here, we suggest mirror-
ing what is in the US called the ‘fast-track’ system for trade negotiations
29: the
Council and (depending on Treaty provisions in the field under consideration) the
Parliament would vote and grant the agent (say, the Commission) negotiating
power for a given term and within a given remit.
The term could be longer or shorter depending on the field. The traditional case for
long mandates rests on independence from vested interests, continuity and flexibil-
ity in international negotiations, and the need to build experience and acquire
knowledge in technically complex areas. Incidentally, this favours delegating to the
Commission or to a specialised agency rather than to the Council, unless the
Council finds a way to escape from the rotating presidency and introduce more sta-
bility (as it is the case now for the Eurogroup, which elects its president for a two-
year term).
The remit could be more or less general. It could encompass a given negotiation
only (say, a bilateral energy agreement, or a UN convention on climate change), or
be granted for a full Commission mandate. At the end of the mandate, the agent
should be accountable to the Council and the Parliament for the results obtained or
the decisions taken.
As the EU role evolves with globalisation and moves from internal governance
towards participation in global governance, clearer and more efficient arrange-
ments are required. The approach we propose would bring more clarity and trans-
parency in a domain which has become extremely complex and which provides pub-
lic opinion as well as foreign partners with too many opportunities for confusion.
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1 We are grateful to Jérémie Cohen-Setton for excellent research assistance in the preparation of this
chapter. The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the authors only and not of the insti-
tutions they belong to. We are grateful for comments to Vesa Vihriälä, Barry Eichengreen, André
Sapir, and the participants in the conference of 12-13 October 2006. We also thank the authors of
sector-specific chapters for exchanges on the governance of international relations in their fields,
Nicolas Théry for similar exchanges in the environment field, and Jean-Victor Louis for his observa-
tions and remarks on legal matters. 
2 In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, the ‘EU’ will in many cases refer to the European
Community. We will not enter into the debate on the legal identity of the EU, even though it bears
important consequences for its external representation. Under the EC Treaty, only the Community
has a legal identity and can participate formally in international treaties and conventions. The
areas covered are therefore restricted to the so-called ‘first pillar’ covered by the EC Treaty, ie
economic, social and environmental policies as well as asylum, migration and judicial cooperation,
which have been transferred from the third pillar by the Amsterdam Treaty. The Constitutional
Treaty would have abolished the pillar structure and included Common Foreign and Security Policy
and Police and Judicial Cooperation on criminal matters.
3 We are grateful to Jean-Victor Louis for his remarks on an earlier version of this section. 
4 A negotiation had been concluded by individual member states under the auspices of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva. As similar work had been undertaken at EU
level, a discussion within the Council on the conduct of negotiations within the United Nations had
developed, and the Council had decided to confine itself to taking note of the cooperation estab-
lished between the member states in the course of that negotiation and to express its political
approval of its outcome. This prompted a successful application by the Commission for the annul-
ment of the proceedings of the Council.
5 ECJ Judgement C-22/70 of 31 March 1971.
6 See in this volume the chapter by Marco Becht and Luis Correia da Silva. 
7 ECJ Judgement C-466/98 of 5 November 2002. 
8 ECJ Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006. 
9 ECJ Opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993. Interestingly, labour safety is an area where there is no exclu-
sive competence of the Community, which only sets minimum standards through directives. The
Court nevertheless considered that member states could not undertake additional international
commitments outside the Community framework.
10 Art. 111(4): ‘The Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the ECB, shall decide on the position of the Community at international level as
regards issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union and on its representation’.
Note that one possible application of the enabling clause would be for the Council to delegate exter-
nal representation to the Commission. Note also that any external representation arrangement
should comply with the allocation of powers laid down in the Treaty (eg it may not infringe on the
independence of the ECB).
11 Exchange rate policy is more ambiguous. The Treaty does not identify exchange rate policy with
monetary policy and it even allows the Council to issue ‘general orientations for exchange-rate pol-
icy’ (Art. 111). However, the two main instruments of exchange rate policy, namely official rate
changes and foreign exchange interventions, are in the sole hands of the ECB. Furthermore, the
Council has agreed to use this provision in exceptional circumstances only.
12 Bini Smaghi (2006a) provides an informed and detailed account of those changes. 
13 In a different context, Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005) have also used a quantitative
analysis of EU legislation.
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14 We also thank Nicolas Théry of the European Commission’s DG Environment for having provided
information on this sector. 
15 Remember we implicitly assume that the policy objective is to maximise the welfare of EU citizens,
not that of a citizen of the world. Hence we regard market power as a gain even if has adverse con-
sequences abroad. 
16 At this point it should be noted that it is not at all the same to look at the distribution of preferences
across countriesand among individuals. This is related to the question of voting rules.
17 This possibility was pointed out to us by Barry Eichengreen. Informed citizens could reject central-
isation in a field where they perceive the rationale for it because they perceive that citizens in other
countries have very different preferences and therefore fear to be in a minority, should decisions
be centralised. In that case, the two dimensions could not be considered independent. However, the
correlation between heterogeneity of preference and desire for centralisation appears to be
insignificant. Though theoretically valid, the objection thus does not seem to have empirical rele-
vance. 
18 Only those policies for which we have been able to obtain measures of both the degree of centrali-
sation and the heterogeneity of preferences are plotted in Figure 2.5. However, partial information
is available for a wider range of policies. 
19 An option also envisaged in the literature is direct democracy: people vote at any point in time on
policy decisions. Although it is not institutionally feasible in a European context, this option is
worth mentioning since one could envisage specific instances (such as a trade, energy or environ-
mental crisis triggering widespread public debate) where decision-making would be led by the
tyranny of opinion.
20 A pure example is monetary policy: the risk of pandering to special interests is limited (except per-
haps to banks, which favour low short-term interest rates and high long-term yields), it is fairly
technical and voters are clearly in favour of price stability. This is why monetary policy has been
handed over to inflexible bureaucrats, a.k.a. central bankers.
21 An important aspect which is overlooked in this approach is that external policies imply interaction
with non-EU actors. What would be needed here is a model of strategic delegation by a group of
principals to agents participating on their behalf in a non-cooperative or cooperative game (in
which other participating agents could also have several principals). We are however not aware of
the existence of such a model. 
22 An example is budgetary policy: it is less technical than monetary policy, it has many redistribu-
tive consequences and ex-post preferences of the voters are unclear. Consistent with theory, it is
decided by elected parliaments.
23 Another possible reason is that the agent’s own preferences depart from those of the states in a
way that is efficient. For example, the Commission is probably keener than most member states on
ensuring budgetary sustainability and coordinating fiscal policies. It is also more market oriented
than most member states when it comes to trade and competition. As is well known in the case of
monetary policy (Rogoff 1985), it may be the right thing to do for member states to delegate their
competence to a ‘conservative’ agent to enhance their credibility. However, this motive for delega-
tion raises issues of political sustainability and calls for drastic constitutional protections such as
central bankers’ irrevocability and extended mandates. 
24 It could be argued that the Commission retains some distributive power through its role in the
preparation of the EU budget. However, though the Commission makes the initial proposal for the
Financial Perspectives (the EU’s multiannual budget framework), the negotiation is conducted by
the presidency and the perspectives are adopted by unanimity,
25 Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank. The voting rule is simple majority of the Governing Council (which comprises the six mem-bers of the Executive Board and all euro area governors) as long as the number of euro area mem-
ber countries does not exceed 15. It will then depend on a complex rotation principle (Decision
2003/223/EC of the Council, 21 March 2003).
26 Another example is representation on the IMF Board. Ahearne et al. (2006) point out that moving
to a single EU or euro chair while retaining the Nice Treaty system could reduce, rather than
increase, European influence in the IMF. 
27 We do not have the data that would have allowed us to decide on macro-financial matters.  
28 In a previous work (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry 2004), we have discussed policy complementarities
at the euro area level and the roles of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the Council of Ministers.
29 The name has changed, but the procedure remains.
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Appendix 1: Governance questionnaire
The following questionnaire is intended to provide a framework for the exchange
between the authors responsible for the ‘governance’ chapter and the authors of the
sectoral chapters. This will help in gathering additional information on governance
in the different fields covered by the book. 
Comments on the contents of the questions as well as on the method are welcome.
If there is information you think relevant to add, please feel free to do so. Answers
can be filled directly in the blank spaces provided below.
Definition of the field
What is/are the policy domain(s) you are covering?
Are arrangements for external relations homogeneous in this domain? If not, what
are the relevant subfields? (Please use a consistent field breakdown in your
answers to the questions below).
Competence Assignment
Who has the authority to negotiate international agreements? (eg the Commission,
an agency, the Council presidency, a subgroup of countries, etc.)
What is the legal basis for delegating authority to negotiate to the authorised
agent? (eg explicit Treaty provisions for external representation, extension to inter-
national agreements of Treaty provisions on internal competence assignment,
intergovernmental agreement, ad hoc assignment...).
Is the authority to negotiate unconditional or based on a specific mandate? Is this
mandate time-limited? 
What responsibilities for external representation/negotiation remain within the
remit of member states?
By means of which mechanism(s) do member states agree on a common position?
What is the voting rule (unanimity, qualified majority, consensus) for taking com-
mon decisions? Who is then in charge of representing this position?
How has competence assignment evolved through years? In particular, does it pre-date Community/EU arrangements?
Enforcement
Who is in charge of implementing the policies agreed at international level?
How is the mandate of this ‘agent’ defined?
How would you assess the degree of control exercised by member states over
implementation by the agent?
Do member states enjoy leeway to enforce policies at national level? To what
extent? Does competence assignment between member states and the agent
result from a historical/practical arrangement, or is it legally defined?
Is there a settlement mechanism in the case of conflict between member states
and the agent? Same question in the case of conflict between different norms with
different governance schemes (eg competition versus trade)?
Criticisims and suggestions
What are the criticisms most often encountered towards the decision-making
process in your field? 
To which extent do you consider these criticisms relevant?
What are the main reform proposals of governance in this field? What is your own
view?
Did the draft Constitutional Treaty include specific arrangements that might have
improved governance in your field?
Any other comment
***
Appendix 2: Sources for preference indicators
Economic analysis of competence assignments relies on the notion of heterogene-
ity of preferences in the population. Empirical assessment of this is scarce,
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framework to fill that gap. Following the literature on the ‘European political space’
perspective (Hooghe and Marks 1999, Gabel and Hix 2002, Gabel and Andersson
2002, Hooghe et al. 2002, Imig 2002, Marks and Steenbergen 2002) we rely on
quantitative evidence to shed light on the issue.
More precisely, we aim to answer two questions: Do Europeans agree on compe-
tence assignment? Do they agree on the substantive content of policies? We try to
provide answers for the different policy fields. 
Decision-level dimension
Standard Eurobarometers (EB) are well suited to providing information on whether
a policy area should be assigned to the EU level, because they ask Europeans that
question every year (the exact wording is: ‘For each of the following areas, do you
think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made
jointly within the European Union?’). We exclude other questions on the preferred
decision-making level that are asked in Special Eurobarometers or in certain parts
of the standard Eurobarometers (namely the part concerning foreign policy). The
reason for this is that we fear that emphasising the problems Europe faces on a cer-
tain subject is likely to affect the answer to the decision-level question, whereas the
risk of a framing bias is less pronounced when the question on the decision level is
asked for several areas one after the other. The noticeable stability in the answers
we get for the different decision-level questions (it is especially noteworthy since
the number of countries included in the EU aggregate is all but stable during that
period of time) supports this hypothesis. Following this strategy, we were able to
assemble information on the decision-level dimension for 38 policies over 17 years
(1989-2005). 
Contents dimension
There is no single source we can rely on to assess the contents dimension for pub-
lic opinion. Our strategy has therefore been to gather as much relevant information
as possible for several policy areas. Four main sources were used: the European
Values Surveys (EVS), the European Social Surveys (ESS), studies from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the Eurobarometers. The
German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trend Survey was also used but much less
often. Other international sources are interesting but lack a sufficient number of
observations (typically fewer than 10 European countries) to enter our empirical
strategy (for example the Pew Trends surveys). 
To choose the relevant questions in each policy field, we used when available the
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lines in each field (we mainly rely on Dobbins, Schneider, Zimmer 2005). We then
complement it with our own knowledge of the fields and the sector chapters of this
book.
***
Appendix 3: International dimension of EU law
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Table A: Number of EU legislative acts
Table B: Number of agreements with non-member states and international
organisations
1957-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 1957-2005
ALL 1,467 9,776 23,099 28,114 45,062 105,305
Trade 55 609 2,779 9,692 24,292 37,947
Competition 23 89 229 885 1,763 2,890
Development 20 54 357 1,918 6,052 9,199
Migration 2 2 1 10 98 1,684
Energy 52 58 200 367 667 1,455
Environment 4 37 283 919 2,177 3,180
Macro & Finance 53 183 629 2,019 7,116 10,889
Defence 0 3 16 15 190 232
1957-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 1957-2005
ALL 35 360 858 1,251 967 3,125
Trade 1 51 143 472 411 1,010
Competition 0 1 1 17 10 27
Development 4 1 50 149 148 379
Migration 0 0 0 0 1 1
Energy 7 1 6 21 26 66
Environment 1 2 25 56 88 141
Macro & Finance 0 2 3 31 32 73
Defence 0 0 1 0 8 9
Note: totals in the 8 sectors do not add up to the grand total (‘all’). FRAGMENTED POWER
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1957-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 1957-2005
ALL 2.4 3.7 3.7 4.4 2.1 3.0
Trade 1.8 8.4 5.1 4.9 1.7 2.7
Competition 0.0 1.1 0.4 1.9 0.6 0.9
Development 20.0 1.9 14.0 7.8 2.4 4.1
Migration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8
Energy 13.5 1.7 3.0 5.7 3.9 4.5
Environment 25.0 5.4 8.8 6.1 4.0 4.4
Macro & Finance 0.0 1.1 0.5 1.5 0.4 0.7
Defence - 0.0 6.3 0.0 4.2 3.9
Table B continued: Agreements with non-member states and international 
organisations as a percentage of legislation
Definition of fields (EUR-lex numbering)
0811 Cooperation policy Aid policy, humanitarian aid, cooperation policy
0821 Defence Defence policy, armed forces, military equipment, arms policy
20 Trade Trade policy, tariff policy, trade, international trade,
consumption, marketing, distributive trades
24  Finance Monetary relations, monetary economics, credit & financial institu-
tions, free movement of capital, financing & investment, insurance,
public finance, budget, taxation, prices
2811 Migration Migration, international migration
4031 Competition Competition law, restrictive trade practice, competition policy, restric-
tion of competition
52 Environment Environmental policy, natural environment, deterioration of the environ-
ment
66 Energy Energy policy
Definition of documents
All treaties EU treaty, EC treaty, EAEC treaty, accession treaties, other treaties and
protocols
All legislation
- Secondary legislation Regulations, directives, decisions, other acts
- International agreements Agreements with non-member states and international organisations,
agreements between member states, acts of bodies created by interna-
tional agreements
Case-law Court of Justice, Court of First Instance
Preparatory documents Preparatory acts, other documents from the institutions
Parliamentary questions Written questions, oral questions, questions at question time
EFTA documentsT
he European Union is the world's largest trader, a fact that on the face of it ought
to convert into considerable clout in international commercial negotiations. Yet,
since the World Trade Organisation's (WTO's) creation in 1995, it is difficult to point
to a string of successes for the European Commission's (EC’s) often beleaguered
trade negotiators. Even the enthusiasm associated with the launch of the Doha
Round in 2001 has dissipated as these negotiations have repeatedly stalled, with
many questioning what can feasibly be accomplished at the WTO in the near to
medium term. A 2006 EC decision to abandon its moratorium on negotiating new
free trade agreements [FTAs] seems more of a stop-gap measure to maintain some
negotiating momentum than a systematic strategy to leverage European clout.
Worse, it carries the risk of seriously undermining the multilateral trading system if
EC negotiations with Korea tempt Japan, and in turn possibly even the United
States, eventually to seek preferential access to the European Union's markets.
With so little to show for the last 10 years and the future of the multilateral trading
system decidedly uncertain, a fundamental rethink of the ends and means of
European trade policy is in order.
That rethink needs to take account of the following realities: a shift away from a
bipolar towards a multipolar WTO; recognition of the fact that the principal liberalis-
ing accomplishment to date of the multilateral trading system has been the freeing
of manufactured goods trade between industrialised countries and that many other
potential reforms have either stalled or proved, on implementation, to be highly con-
troversial; substantial opposition among many prominent groups in the leading
trading powers to further trade reform (even in countries experiencing fast
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regional free trade agreements (whose liberalising intent and impact is often high-
ly circumscribed).
Once the superficial attractions associated with the scramble for preferential mar-
ket access in Asia fade, European trade policymakers ought to confront these reali-
ties. At a minimum, the search will then be on for a modus vivendiwith the new trad-
ing powers. This will require thought to be given to the likely future offensive and
defensive commercial interests of all concerned, bearing in mind the differences in
level of development and overseas corporate exposure and organisation. The ulti-
mate goal should be to identify the potential basis for future multilateral trade
accords. Properly conceived, future European trade strategy could contribute signif-
icantly to the renewal of one of the most successful post-war international
economic institutions.
The EU’s evolving trade policy
The EU is the world's largest exporter of goods and services and the second largest
importer. In 2005 approximately $3.6 trillion of goods and services crossed its
external borders, more than any other nation or customs union. With a single trade
policymaker wielding considerable powers of initiative – the European Commission
– representing the interests of 27 nations and more than 450 million people, one
might have expected EU trade policy to have both considerable clout and a string of
recent successes to point to during the past ten years. In fact, the EU has not much
to show for its negotiating efforts. The Doha Round has repeatedly stalled and even
if it is concluded in 2007 – which few experts anticipate – then it will be on terms
that fall far short of the EU's original negotiating objectives. The multilateral trading
system is important to the EU because, despite the numerous preferential trading
schemes the EU has negotiated or created over the last fifty years, approximately
three quarters of imports by the EU still enter on non-preferential terms. For sure,
few policymakers world wide have emerged from the Doha Round with much credit.
Even so, the question does arise as to whether the content and strategy of EU trade
policy require a rethink.
The case for a rethink is all the stronger when one considers how the world trading
system has developed since the signing of the Treaty of Rome fifty years ago, when
six European countries began to pool their sovereignty on commercial policy mat-
ters. Then, European nations and the United States dominated the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and continued to do so for another forty or so
years. Now, Brazil, China and India have come forward to challenge the bipolar dom-
ination of the world trading system. Back in 1957, the liberalisation of merchandiseTRADE POLICY
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trade between industrialised countries still had a long way to go. Now, though some
tariff peaks remain, such liberalisation has almost been completed. Moreover,
throughout much of the post-war period trade liberalisation by industrialised coun-
tries took place within the context of reciprocal trade agreements. Now, many
nations unilaterally lower their trade barriers and appear reluctant to bind their
reforms in trade accords. These and other factors indicate that the multilateral trad-
ing system, which has served European commercial interests well, is moving into
new territory and the question arises what constructive role the EU can play in
shaping its future trajectory. (It is taken as given in this chapter that, by and large,
multilateral measures to reduce discrimination against foreign commercial entities
and to reduce the policy-related uncertainties associated with international com-
merce is decidedly in the interests of the EU's producers and consumers).
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the evolution of the EU's trade policy since
1995, highlighting the changing international trade policy terrain and the arguably
inadequate response from European trade policymakers to those changes. Rather
than gear up for the task of revitalising a multipolar trading system and exploring
the basis upon which future multilateral trade agreements could be signed, an
October 2006 policy paper (‘communication’) from the Commission advocated join-
ing the scramble for preferential access to Asian markets, a proposal which on clos-
er examination is likely to yield far less than some anticipate. Once the challenges
of negotiating with a mercurial India, an inchoate Association of Southeast Asian
Nations [ASEAN], and a weak Korean government become clearer, the alternatives
to multilateral trade accords may seem less attractive. At that point, probably
towards the start of the next term of office of the Commission in 2009, further
attention ought to be given to securing Europe's proper place in a multipolar World
Trade Organisation.
Considerations of space necessitate some prioritisation on my part as to which of
the many facets of the EU's trade policy should receive more attention in this piece.
Developments at the multilateral level and the negotiation of reciprocal free trade
agreements and the like receive more attention here, not least because of the
emphasis on the former in the recent past and the likely priority to be given to the
latter in the near term. Far less attention is given to the non-reciprocal trade initia-
tives undertaken by the EU, to its neighbourhood policies, and to relations with
important countries such as Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine. This is either because
the associated negotiating processes are operating on a clearly established time-
line, such as the negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations,
or because they are driven by a very specific set of circumstances and are likely to
have limited systemic impact.The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly
describes the current allocation of competences and decision-making powers over
commercial policy in the EU. In the third section the major developments in the EU's
trade policy since 1995 are described, as are the underlying factors that have been
shaping the international trade policy landscape in recent years. The most recent
(October 2006) communication from the Commission on its external trade policy is
also described in this section. This communication is assessed and, in short, is
found wanting in certain respects. The fourth section identifies a number of the cur-
rent and future challenges facing European trade policymakers as the bipolar trad-
ing system gives way to a multipolar alternative. Some concluding remarks are
offered in the fifth section.
The allocation of competence and associated decision-making in EU trade policy
At a minimum, commercial policy refers to those state measures and (unilateral,
bilateral, regional, and multilateral) accords between states that influence the
degree of discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods and services or in favour
of domestic rivals. In the EU, as a general proposition, the Commission is said to
have sole competence over the conduct of commercial policy although, as noted
below, this does not mean that the member states play no role in European trade
policy decision-making or in selective areas of commercial policy.
2 The chapter of
the revised Treaty establishing the European Community concerning a common
commercial policy is relevant here, in particular the provisions of Article 133, as
amended.
3Under Article 133(2) the Commission has the right of initiative as far as
trade negotiations are concerned but must seek and obtain a mandate from the
Council of Ministers. Article 133(3) allows the Council to authorise the Commission
to negotiate and obliges the Commission to report frequently to the Council. Article
300 of the amended Treaty sets out the constitutional requirements for the intra-EU
procedures governing ratification and implementation of a treaty which the
Commission has negotiated.
The Commission must seek a mandate from the Council for any negotiation that it
plans on undertaking, which may or may not be time bound. The mandate issued by
the Council gives broad objectives for the negotiation but is not so detailed that the
Commission must repeatedly come back to ask for changes in the mandate. There
is an interesting question how long a given mandate lasts when no time limit has
been set, nor the terms upon which a mandate is superseded by another mandate.
Both the terms of the mandate and the absence of any time limit can thus create
ambiguity which can be exploited by the Commission. The Commission must also




unilateral measures – such as the imposition of anti-dumping duties – that it is in
principle empowered to take. With a few exceptions, all such decisions are made in
the Council by qualified majority voting. The Council can offer interpretations to the
Commission of any international obligations that the latter has signed up to.
There exist a number of venues where the member states can express their views to
the Commission as to the merits of various actions. The so-called 133 Committee
meets weekly with senior officials from the Commission’s Directorate-General for
Trade. On anti-dumping matters a separate advisory committee has been estab-
lished. Informal polls of member state opinions are undertaken in these advisory
groups and committees, providing member states with a way to signal to the
Commission how they are minded to vote on a matter should it reach the Council.
Typically, records of deliberations in these advisory groups and committees are not
made public and it is particularly difficult to ascertain precisely what has gone on
behind close doors. Nevertheless on some trade policy matters, such as anti-dump-
ing, there have been repeated leaks to business newspapers and the specialist
press concerning the positions of various member states and the likely outcome of
a Council vote. With these leaks it has been possible to identify distinctive patterns
in many member states’ voting records and to identify a number of ‘swing’ member
states that may well swap their votes on certain trade policy matters for other quid
pro quos (see Evenett and Vermulst 2005 for details).
Although the member states set the Commission’s negotiating mandate, it would be
wrong to believe that their next official chance to oversee the Commission’s work
occurs at the conclusion (if any) of the negotiation. Member states can and do
express themselves forcefully when they believe the Commission has exceeded, or
is likely to exceed, its negotiating mandate. In recent years nowhere has this been
more apparent than in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round.
4France has
maintained a coalition numbering more than half of the member states which has
repeatedly warned the Commission not to exceed the relevant negotiating man-
date, which in this case refers to the outer limits of the agricultural reforms that the
member states agreed to undertake earlier in the decade. In Evenett (2006a) I doc-
umented the steps taken by France and her allies to shore up this coalition through-
out 2005, when European trade negotiators came under considerable pressure
from their trading partners to liberalise agriculture. With the subsequent accession
of Bulgaria and Romania press reports have suggested that this coalition has been
strengthened. To date, this coalition has been relatively robust. However the ulti-
mate test of its strength may come about when member states see more clearly
what overseas commercial opportunities they will have to relinquish if they persist
in defending their agricultural interests in this manner.
5On a few occasions there have been outright public disagreements between the EU
member states and the Commission over trade policy priorities and measures.
Moreover, members of the European Parliament have not been adverse to engaging
in such disagreements either. Such discord has arisen during the negotiations
between the Commission and the ACP countries over Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs). The Commission has sought, amongst others, to include provi-
sions on investment policies, government procurement and competition law in
these EPAs. The UK government, for one, has repeatedly argued against this negoti-
ating position, often in public
6, as have leading European parliamentarians. One
may wonder what the effect of such public disagreements have on the negotiating
tactics of both the ACP nations and the Commission. Do the former view the latter
merely as an awkward intermediary that can be bypassed by appealing directly to
the member states, some of which were (after all) former colonial rulers and may
have residual affinity for the ACP nations? Or is the concern about not concluding a
free trade agreement under the EPA, with its implied loss of a certain preferential
market access to the EU market, sufficiently strong that the ACP nations view the
Commission as their principal interlocutor?
This brief description of the manner and procedures associated with the delegation
of trade policy competences from the member states to the Commission highlights
both the enormous power of initiative that the latter has and the various means of
oversight, some more subtle than others, available to the former. Given the use of
qualified majority voting and the differences in the levels of economic development
between the first 15 members of the EU and the relatively newer member states,
one factor that may become more important over time is how aggressively the 12
new member states encourage the Commission to pursue their commercial policy
interests over other interests that have received considerable attention in the past.
For example, the new member states may be less interested in supporting meas-
ures to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes abroad and opening
foreign financial markets, preferring instead measures that bolster foreign direct
investments and outsourcing in general and better access to the merchandise sec-
tors of middle-income developing countries. In short, EU enlargement may well
affect the trade-related negotiating priorities of the Commission more in the future
than it has done in the past.
Major developments in EC trade policy since 1995
Charting the major changes along the many dimensions of EU commercial policy re-
quires some organising themes and inevitably some selectivity on the author's part.
Here I seek to identify not only the major trade policy action taken by the EU since
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international trade policy landscape in recent years. Several factors are almost cer-
tain to persist and will influence the options and trade-offs faced by European trade
policymakers in the future, points picked up and developed later in this chapter.
In what follows I start by characterising EU trade policy just after the creation of the
World Trade Organisation in 1995. Then I describe the subtle differences in the ratio-
nales for EU commercial policy advanced by the two most recent predecessors of
current European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, and manifested in official
Commission communications and other documentation from 1996 to 2004. Third, I
discuss developments in bilateral and regional trading fora. Then I describe the prin-
cipal developments in the multilateral trading arena since 1995. Finally, an assess-
ment of the last Commission communication on current trade policy, issued in
October 2006, is presented. Throughout these discussions the goal is to identify the
internal and external factors that appear to have a significant influence on EU trade
policy formation and on the effectiveness of such policy.
EC trade policy at the creation of the WTO and the enduring commercial signifi-
cance of ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) tariffs.
On 1 January 1995 the EU
7 and member states became founding members of the
WTO, and in so doing signed up to the core multilateral agreements of the world trad-
ing system as well as the plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement. The expansion in the EU's
membership in that year to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden required consoli-
dation of their trade commitments with those of the existing 12 member states and
some renegotiation of Europe's WTO commitments with major trading partners fol-
lowed.
8
In the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations concluded in 1993 and
which began to come into effect in 1995, the EU agreed to bind all of its tariff lines.
With respect to agricultural products, the EU agreed to reduce its bound tariff rates
by 36 percent on average (the EU also committed to cut each tariff by a minimum
of 15 percent). The EU made commitments on the use of tariff quotas on the imports
of agricultural products and agreed to cut total financial support for agriculture
(specifically, the so-called Aggregate Measure of Support) and both the value and
volume of export subsidies for agricultural products (WTO 2000).
As far as non-agricultural goods are concerned, in the Uruguay Round accord the EU




Trade policy indicator EU USA Brazil China India
Tariff binding coverage, % 100 100 100 100 73.8
Simple average applied tariff rate for
agricultural goods, %
5.9 n.a. 10.3 15.9 15.4
Simple average applied tariff rate for non-
agricultural goods, %
4.0 3.3 12.7 9.1 37.6
MFN duty free imports, % total imports 53.1 46.8 22.2 34.0 2.1
GATS service sectors with commitments 115 110 43 93 37
Table 3.1: Indicators of trade policy stance for the EU and selected trading partners
Source: WTO Country Profiles obtained from http://stat.wto.org
end of the relevant implementation period. As a result of the Information Technology
Agreement, which was subsequently agreed to at the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Singapore, from 1997 many information technology-related products entered the
EU free of tariffs. This was to lower the average tariff on non-agricultural products to
4 percent. Agreements to eliminate tariffs on pharmaceuticals and on spirits led to
further European market opening after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (WTO
2000). Table 3.1 provides a summary of the trade barriers currently erected by the
European Union and compares them to several of its major trading partners.
The schedule of Specific Commitments made by the EU on services in the Uruguay
Round covers all service sectors except the audiovisual sector and, to some extent,
maritime services and air transport services.
9 Derogations from MFN treatment in
services applied to audiovisual services, transportation services, and subsidies. To
these Specific Commitments were added obligations to liberalise basic telecommu-
nications and financial service sectors, as negotiated in sector-specific initiatives
after 1995 (WTO 2000).
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EU retained the right under prevail-
ing WTO rules to impose quotas on imports of textiles and clothing. Like other WTO
members, the EU agreed to eliminate such quotas by the end of 2004, a commit-
ment it held to. In the interim the average rate of quota expansion was to be
increased from 16 percent on 1 January 1995 to 25 percent on 1 January 1998
(WTO 2000).
Such was the network of preferential agreements between the EU and its trading
partners in 1995
10that the WTO secretariat, in its EU Trade Policy Review, noted:TRADE POLICY
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‘The vast majority of the Union's trading partners qualify for free trade area or
other preferential treatment. Although the EU has no more than a handful of
purely MFN suppliers, the largest value of imports enter under non-preferential
conditions, reflecting the economic weight of the suppliers concerned, limits in
the coverage of the preferential trade schemes, and the high share of imports
qualifying for zero MFN rates. The multi-layered network of free trade, associa-
tion, and other preferential agreements between the EU and its trading part-
ners has consolidated and expanded significantly over the last few years.
Certain preferences have decreased in economic importance as other trading
partners have secured improved access to the Union's markets’ (WTO 1995,
pp. 17-18).
In February 2007, when the last WTO Trade Policy Review of the EU was published,
only nine WTO members
11 conducted their trade with the EU on a purely MFN basis
(WTO 2007). Of these nine, three (Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; and
Singapore) were graduated out of the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
regime on 1 May 1998 and their exports therefore subsequently faced MFN duties.
WTO (2004) notes that these nine WTO members account for 36 percent of the EU's
merchandise trade.
12This report further observes:
‘The [European] Commission estimates that 74 percent of the EC’s trade is
under the MFN regime; this implies that MFN trade with its preferential part-
ners represents some 38 percent of its overall trade’. (WTO 2004, p.22).
Despite the accession of 10 member states in 2004 and two more member states
in 2007, the signing of more Europe and Association Agreements, the Cotonou
Agreement, the Everything But Arms (EBA) Initiative, a reformed GSP system, the
conclusion of FTAs with Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and (essentially) Switzerland,
and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, nearly three quar-
ters of the EU's imports are conducted on a MFN basis. There are, for sure, some WTO
members whose exports to the EU take place overwhelmingly under certain prefer-
ential trade regimes (see Curranet al. 2006 for details), but for most WTO members
this is simply not the case, again highlighting the importance of the multilateral
trading system for Europe's trading partners. In this regard it is worth noting that
the EU is the second largest importer of merchandise in the world (see Table 3.2 for
the magnitude of trade flows across the EU's external borders in 2005).
The evolving rationales and objectives of EU trade policy since 1995
I now turn to a discussion of two distinct yet related official conceptions of the chal-FRAGMENTED POWER
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lenges facing EU trade since 1995, one associated with Sir Leon Brittan's tenure as
trade commissioner and the other with his successor, Pascal Lamy. Arguably both
perspectives partially inform EU trade policy today and, as I will argue later, the lat-
est (October 2006) communication from the EC on trade policy is in many respects
closer in spirit to the former approach.
Although globalisation is much discussed today, it is worth recalling that, in the mid-
1990s, the integration of national economies into world markets was seen as an
important factor too. A 1996 trade policy communication entitled ‘The Global
Challenge of International Trade: A Market Access Strategy for the European Union,’
mentioned the ‘relocation’ of business and the potential for dislocation that this
could cause. The connection between opening foreign markets and the ability of
European firms to exploit their competitiveness was also made (European
Commission 1996). Furthermore, the rising might of Asia was already on the minds
of European policymakers, and the WTO Trade Policy Review of the EU in 1995 noted
that a 1994 Commission paper ‘asserts a need to accord Asia a higher priority than
in the past’ (WTO 1995).
Having painted a global picture of commerce, the 1996 communication charac-
terised the trade policy challenge for the EU as follows:
‘Greater access to markets world wide should be one of the prime objectives
shaping the deployment of Community resources in the months and years
Extra-EU trade flow US$ billions
Ranking in the
world % world total
Total merchandise exports 1,320 1 17.12
Total merchandise imports 1,461 2 18.03
Total services exports 432 1 27.08
Total services imports 384 1 24.39
Grand total exports and imports 3,597 1
Memo.
Total GDP, PPP. 12,097 2
Implied total trade/GDP ratio: 0.297 n.a.
Table 3.2: Extra-EU trade flows, 2005
Source: WTO Country Profiles for the EU (25 member states) obtained from http://stat.wto.orgahead. To achieve significant increases in market access is necessarily a long-
term process. Both in tackling pressing problems under existing rules and in
developing new rules to remove other obstacles to trade and investment, the
Community will be successful if it produces a clear analysis of its own priorities
and works closely with its trading partners, developed and developing alike. We
should concentrate on actions which respond to the demands and priorities of
industry and which result in tangible and direct benefits for our exporters and
investors’ (European Commission 1996, p.19).
This quotation is worth reflecting on for a moment. First, market access is the lens
through which policy instruments are assessed, whether they are directly tariff
related or not. Second, non-tariff barriers receive significant priority. Rules for these
barriers would not be developed for their own sake, but because they constitute an
impediment to market access. (It is noteworthy that in the 1996 communication
the following non-tariff barriers are specifically mentioned: the failure to protect
intellectual property rights, rules of origin, selected government procurement prac-
tices, investment policies, and competition policies). Third, the beneficiaries of this
policy would be exporters and investors, that is, commercial interests only. The
strategy would be market access and demand driven (European Commission
1996), developing bilateral and multilateral approaches as appropriate.
By 2003 Sir Leon Brittan's successor as trade commissioner was characterising the
challenges facing EU trade policy and its rationale in a different light. It may well be
that the high-profile protests by some elements of civil society against the multilat-
eral trading system, and globalisation more generally, had some bearing on the
rationales offered by EU trade policymakers. In a report at the end of his tenure as
trade commissioner, Lamy noted that from the very start he had set himself a goal
of  ‘la globalisation maîtrisée’ (European Commission 2004, p.3). In his view
European trade policy had to be ‘properly integrated’ with the other goals of the EU:
‘And much of the responsibility for that [integration] lies with the European
Commission, not just to regulate trade with third countries but to ensure we
properly manage the interface between our external policy and the internal EU
market, and of course the European Model’ (European Commission 2004, p.3).
Lest anyone be in any doubt about the relative importance of market access in
Lamy's scheme, he went on to argue:
‘But the opening of markets is not an end in itself, but is a way of making pro-




by itself ensure development. Internal policies have to be right too, not least to
ensure that the distribution of its benefits is more equitable’ (European
Commission 2004, p.3).
A broader audience and set of outcomes is conceived, then, for EU trade policy.
Lamy notes that it is ‘critical’ to keep a sizeable majority of the European public in
favour of open trade policies, and opening markets abroad may not be enough in
this respect. He acknowledges that these changes have made trade policymaking
more difficult and affect the assessment of such policymaking. In his view the links
between trade policy and transparency and legitimacy, development and cherished
values and sectors are important too, not just the amount of market opening and
number of trade agreements signed. Arguably, therefore, this perspective reflects a
distinct evolution from the thrust of the 1996 communication discussed earlier,
although some common tenets recur. 
In his assessment of the trade policy-related accomplishments of the Commission
of Romano Prodi, of which he was a member, Lamy argued that the EU was still able
to resist trade policy initiatives that it did not like and to ‘set the international agen-
da’. He argued that the ‘priority given to development in the Doha Agenda, or the
agreement on medicines are evidence of this pivotal European role’. Interestingly,
Lamy's assessment also included the following reflection:
‘Our arguments in favour of a better regulated multilateral world have thus
been less effective. Indeed, arguably as a result, trade policy or the WTO has
too often been the sole focus for efforts to strengthen international gover-
nance, which risks weakening its legitimacy both internally within the Union,
and in the outside world. I don’t believe the WTO can or should remain the sole
island of governance in a sea of unregulated globalisation’ (European
Commission 2004, p.5). 
The experience of the ill-fated Singapore Issues, recounted below, three of which
were eventually dropped from the Single Undertaking of the Doha Development
Agenda in 2004, may well have influenced this judgement. Whatever the motivation
for international rules on non-tariff policies, it is apparent that the challenges
described in the 1996 communication had not been adequately resolved by this
2004 account of EU trade policy.
The principal reason for contrasting the 1996 communication with the 2004
assessment was to highlight the evolution in the perceived purpose of EU trade pol-
icy, from an approach centred on market access to a multi-faceted view that soughtTRADE POLICY
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to address a wide range of matters at a time of considerable public discourse about
the merits of globalisation. That Lamy was instrumental in launching the Doha
Development Agenda in 2001, and the relative consistency with which EU trade pol-
icy has been applied since then, probably accounts for the continuing influence of
some of the ideas expressed above on European trade policymaking. 
Having described the EU's point of departure (in trade policy terms) in 1995 and
two sets of ideas that appear to have shaped EU trade policymaking over the last
ten years, I now turn to a discussion of selected important aspects of preferential
and multilateral trade initiatives negotiated by the Commission since the conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round.
Developments in the EU's bilateral and regional trading relationships since 1995
In developments outside of the multilateral trade arena a distinction has to be made
between agreements negotiated with nations in Europe's so-called neighbourhood,
including those nations seeking to accede to the European Union, and preferential
arrangements with other countries. With respect to the former, as the series of WTO
Trade Policy Reviews of the EU can attest, Europe has been assiduously strengthen-
ing economic ties with almost every country which it borders or is geographically
proximate to. These agreements vary in terms of obligations, where steps to adopt
more or less of the EU's acquis communautaire are often complemented by pack-
ages of aid and technical assistance, and have often been motivated by diplomatic
and security considerations as well as commercial interests.
The EU has also made important changes to the non-reciprocal preferences it offers
different groups of developing countries. On 23 June 2000, the ACP-EU Partnership
Agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin. Apart from the EU, this agreement has 77
developing country signatories, mostly former European colonies from the African,
Pacific, and Caribbean regions, and 40 of which are classified as least-developed
countries (LDCs) by the United Nations. The EU grants these countries duty-free
access to its markets for industrial products, processed agricultural goods and fish-
eries products, but there are exceptions (including separate regimes for sugar, beef
and veal). These are interim measures, however, and are due to lapse on 1 January
2008. By then it is expected (hoped?) that the EU will have completed negotiations
on EPAs with the 77 signatory countries. These agreements are to be reciprocal, to
respect WTO rules, and are expected to include flexibilities concerning the depth of
liberalisation, transition periods, product coverage, and exceptions. In addition to
enhancing market access, the EPAs are supposed to foster sustainable develop-
ment and to promote regional integration among developing countries.
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Changes have also been made to the GSP that the EU unilaterally offers to qualify-
ing developing countries. Over time there has been a tendency to simplify the EU's
GSP programme as well as to sharpen the incentives it contains for beneficiaries to
promote internationally accepted labour standards, tackle specific environmental
concerns, and combat drug production and trafficking. Of particular note is the EBA
initiative that the EU instituted in 2001. This extends duty-free market access to
those LDCs not covered by the Cotonou Agreement, although there are separate
phase-in periods for three sensitive products. Another feature of the GSP regime is
that the EU reserves to right to graduate a developing country which meets certain
criteria, at which point the EU deems that the country's exports no longer need pref-
erences effectively to sell into the EU. As noted earlier, three jurisdictions were grad-
uated from the EU's GSP regime in 1998, implying that their exporters now face MFN
duties. The EU also reserves the right to graduate individual sectors within a GSP
beneficiary even if the beneficiary country is not entirely excluded from the GSP
regime.
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The spread of preferential market access to the EU was the subject of discussion in
Brussels in the mid-to-late 1990s. The WTO's Trade Policy Review in 1997 noted that
preferential market access was ‘the subject of debate within the EU over the last
two years’ (WTO 1997). Furthermore in April 1997 the Council called for close scruti-
ny of new preferential arrangements and argued that ‘the fundamental architecture
of the EU's policy on preferential agreements has been put in place and should be
preserved’, a remark that the WTO secretariat concluded ‘implicitly left little scope
for the further expansion of the current network of agreements’ (WTO 1997). This
effectively led to a moratorium on the launch of new negotiations towards FTAs, a
moratorium that was adhered to until publication of the October 2006 communica-
tion on the EU's external trade policy.
From their launch in 2001 the Doha Round negotiations provided another way to
deflect any pressures for new FTA negotiations. It was often argued that a multilat-
eral agreement would deliver many more commercial opportunities than any partic-
ular FTA. Moreover, there was a concern that concluding FTAs with the largest of the
EU's trading partners would undermine the multilateral trading system. The fear was
that, if the big players can effectively deal with each other outside of the WTO, then
the need for multilateral rules would be much diminished.
In the intervening years, however, the EU was able to conclude a far-reaching FTA
with Chile (in 2002) that included provisions on political dialogue and cooperation
on a wide range of state and non-state matters, as well as the more traditional trade-
liberalising measures. An FTA with Mexico came into force on 1 July 2000 andincluded a range of obligations in the field of tariff and non-tariff measures, includ-
ing rules of origin, technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
safeguards, trade in services, government procurement, competition policy, invest-
ment policy, intellectual property rights and dispute settlement. This agreement
included a liberalisation schedule whereby the EU committed to eliminate its tariffs
on Mexican imports four years before Mexico had to reciprocate. FTA negotiations
between the EU and Mercosur and the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, in
contrast, were not concluded. With the latter negotiations stalled, the focus of the
EU's trade-liberalising efforts shifted increasingly towards the WTO and I now turn to
an account of developments in that arena since 1995.
EC trade policy and the multilateral trading system since 1995
Developments at the WTO have, one way or the other, consumed much of the atten-
tion of senior European trade policymakers since 1995. The EU has played an
active, even central, role in every WTO Ministerial Conference and in the many mini-
ministerials and other events that have come to dominate the WTO timetable.
Initially, the market access perspective provided the lens through which a wide
range of multilateral initiatives were put forward by the EU for inclusion on the
WTO's agenda. But this was to change in the late 1990s and the early part of this
decade, with the EU arguing increasingly that new rules brought their own benefits
to WTO members. In addition to rules on labour standards, the EU made its position
known on the following trade-related matters in preparation for the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Singapore in 1996: competition policy, investment policy, trade and
the environment, intellectual property rights, and technical barriers to trade (WTO
1997). The EU sought to expand the remit of the WTO further, sometimes into areas
where a multilateral agreement existed and sometimes where new rules would have
to be created from scratch. This was in addition to the EU's stated goal of complet-
ing the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round (the so-called Built-In Agenda)
and the timely implementation of multilateral commitments agreed in 1993.
Even though other WTO members, notably the United States, also wanted to expand
the remit of the WTO's rules in the mid-to-late 1990s, such initiatives were not uni-
versally accepted by the WTO's membership. In fact, around the same time many
developing countries asserted that the terms and costs of implementing a number
of the Uruguay Round agreements were so onerous that they sought redress for
these grievances. Outright renegotiation of existing multilateral accords was unac-
ceptable to the EU, the US and to many other industrialised countries. However, con-
cessions were made in the interpretation of provisions and concerning the imple-
mentation of obligations taken on in the Uruguay Round. These concessions went
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the WTO which, having failed to obtain all they wanted, began to oppose more vigor-
ously the negotiation of new multilateral rules. The consequences of such opposi-
tion would become clear for all to see at the three WTO ministerial conferences that
followed (namely those in Seattle, Doha, and Cancun). 
There were a number of significant developments in 1999. First, the EU sought and
received from the Council a negotiating mandate in advance of the third WTO
Ministerial Conference in Seattle. This mandate envisaged launching what was then
referred to as the Millennium Round. Second, sharp disagreements over whether
rules on labour standards should be included in the multilateral trading system led
to the breakdown of the Seattle Ministerial Conference and there was no consensus
on launching a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Third, the European
Commission of President Jacques Santer collectively resigned over allegations of
budgetary mismanagement and fraud. This Commission was replaced by one led by
Romano Prodi and included Lamy as trade commissioner. As noted earlier, the grow-
ing sentiment against globalisation among ‘civil society’, so forcefully expressed on
the streets of Seattle, may well have begun to influence the manner in which the
ends and means of EU trade policy were articulated. Perhaps the calculation was
that if Europe's public was unwilling to support further trade liberalisation at home,
how could European trade negotiators persuade other countries' officials to open up
their markets? An interesting question is whether the year 1999 saw the strength-
ening of domestic policy constraints on the level of ambition of EU trade policy, con-
straints that arguably remain to the present day.
The next round of multilateral trade negotiations was in fact launched in 2001, at a
WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. While some were preparing for the launch
of the round, the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 created the
geopolitical imperative to demonstrate that the world's governments could cooper-
ate at a time of heightened uncertainty. Arguably this was a very important con-
tributing factor to the launch of the Doha Round. So was the commitment, apparent-
ly extracted by developing countries and probably with the fulsome support of
Lamy, to raise the profile of development-related considerations in this round. Not
for nothing was this round of negotiations to be guided by the Doha Development
Agenda. It is unclear whether negotiators had considered all of the ramifications of
this step, not least because the concept of development is so broad. Was the WTO to
become a development institution, similar in some respects to the regional and
multilateral development banks? Did the development focus imply that developing
countries would receive redress for what they perceived as an unbalanced Uruguay
Round agreement? If renegotiation of prior agreements was unacceptable to some,
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gations? What would the ‘development’ label imply for business support for the
round? Without good answers to these questions (which have been posed since
the round's launch) – and arguably trade negotiators have preferred to muddle
through rather than address them head on – it should not be surprising that in
moments of despair many poorer WTO members have concluded that the ‘develop-
ment mandate’ was a ruse. And many business leaders have wondered what stake
remains for them in the multilateral trading system. In the light of these considera-
tions, and after the gestation period of an elephant, the launch of the Doha Round
proved to be a fraught birth, with a barely recognisable sick infant taken off quickly
into intensive care.
At the Doha Ministerial Conference the EU representatives argued for a shorter (in
their view, preferably a three-year) negotiating timetable. Moreover, they called for
proper consideration to be given to matters of sustainability in all aspects of the
WTO's work programme and the right combination of trade and trade-related govern-
ment measures in order to attain the round's broad objectives. The EU also accept-
ed a compromise text on the launching of negotiations relating to the four so-called
Singapore Issues (trade and investment policy, trade and competition policy, trans-
parency in government procurement, and trade facilitation). This text would prove
to be important at, and in the run-up to, the following WTO ministerial conference. 
The years 2002 to 2003 saw three significant developments. First, the budget for
(and by implication the sequence of reforms to) the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) was agreed for the years through to 2013. Included within this agree-
ment was a programme of reform, essentially to cut the cost of the CAP, which would
effectively allow some flexibility to the EU's trade negotiators on agricultural mat-
ters. Proponents of the CAP, however, sought and received assurances that the
Commission's trade negotiating mandate on agricultural matters would go no fur-
ther than the reforms agreed in the revised CAP budget. The proponents were tena-
cious and dogged in holding the Commission's trade negotiators to this commit-
ment from 2003 on, and in particular in 2005 when the EU was under considerable
external pressure to make further reforms on agricultural trade policy matters. One
effect of limiting the Commission's ability to offer concessions on agriculture was
effectively to constrain what the Commission could reasonably demand of its trad-
ing partners in agriculture and elsewhere. These considerations go a long way to
account for the EU’s position, whether it liked it or not, in the camp of WTO members
with relatively lower market access-related ambitions in the Doha Round, whatever




In the years leading up to the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the EU tabled a wide
range of proposals at the WTO. The WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU in 2004
included the following survey of the EU's contributions thus far to the Doha Round:
‘It [the EU] has spearheaded initiatives in the liberalisation of trade, strength-
ening of WTO rules, and promotion of sustainable development. On market
access for goods, it is of the view that liberalisation should be carried out on a
comprehensive basis, rather than in a sectoral manner, and that negotiations
should help developing countries get better access to the markets of devel-
oped countries; and that trade barriers between developing countries should
also be significantly lowered. On agriculture, it proposes to reduce its import
tariffs and trade-distorting farm support by more than a half and has offered to
eliminate export subsidies on a list of products of interest to developing coun-
tries. It also stresses that the negotiations on agriculture must take into
account non-trade concerns as well as the better protection of geographical
indications. Further market access for services is also advocated. The EC has
presented more than 100 initial requests for improved access to third-country
markets and has received several initial requests from third countries. It advo-
cates the need for multilateral environmental agreements to mesh smoothly
with agreements in the multilateral trading system in mutually supportive
ways. The EC has called for tariff- and quota-free access for goods from least-
developed countries, as well as special and differential treatment based on the
level of development and the capacity of developing countries. It has also been
behind initiatives to finance and support trade-related technical assistance
aimed at helping developing countries to accede to the WTO, to implement WTO
rules, and to participate more actively in the multilateral trading system. As
regards trade defence measures, the EC has been advocating stricter mecha-
nisms and greater transparency. It also argues for improvements in trade facil-
itation rules; a more transparent and predictable climate for investment; and
the promotion of fair competition and procurement policies’ (WTO 2004, p. 24).
The next major developments were the Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference and the
so-called July 2004 package. These two events are related as, arguably, the latter
helped get the Doha Round negotiations back on track after the breakdown in talks
at the former. In the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial Conference the EU and the US
were asked by other WTO members to narrow their differences on agricultural trade
matters and to make a joint proposal. The EU and US took up this challenge and pro-
duced a compromise text that was promptly rejected by the G20 (the group of 20 or
so developing countries led by Brazil, China, India, and South Africa). Worse was still
to come, in what proved to be for a variety of reasons an acrimonious ministerialTRADE POLICY
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conference, when the African group of developing countries formally objected to the
launch of negotiations on any of the four Singapore Issues, which was an important
objective of the EU. This impasse arose even after the Commission agreed to drop
two or three (it was unclear precisely how many to observers) of the Singapore
Issues from the Single Undertaking. This impasse was the proximate cause of the
collapse of the ministerial conference and was followed by recriminations between
many WTO members for the remainder of 2003.
In addition to rejecting an expansion of the WTO's remit, perhaps the lasting signifi-
cance of the Cancun Ministerial Conference was the emergence of reasonably
robust groupings of developing countries (the G20, G33 and G90) that sought to
assert their rights in this important multilateral forum. Until this ministerial confer-
ence the EU and the United States (sometimes with the assistance of Japan and
Canada), had by and large dominated deliberations at the WTO. A bipolar WTO had
given way to a multipolar alternative.
15So, on top of the fraught questions concern-
ing what constituted a development round and what are the boundaries of the WTO
came a governance challenge. How to attain consensus in an organisation where
every member has a veto and is more inclined to use it? Problem compounded prob-
lem. Stalemate and frustration ensued.
At a general council meeting in July 2004 WTO members sought to rejuvenate the
Doha Round negotiations. In addition to dropping three of the Singapore Issues from
the Single Undertaking for the duration of the Doha Round and allowing negotiations
on one of them (trade facilitation) to commence, it was agreed that a formula
approach be adopted in negotiations on cutting tariffs on imports of non-agricultur-
al products. This formula was such that larger tariffs would be cut more than small-
er tariffs. Provision was also made for lower cuts by developing countries, consis-
tent with the agreed principle of less-than-full reciprocity accorded to poorer WTO
members. Timetables were elaborated for 2004 and 2005 for the important ele-
ments of the negotiations, and there was still much talk of the need for an ambi-
tious outcome for the round, especially from the United States, Brazil and some
other agricultural exporters.
From the perspective of understanding European trade policy formation, the year
2005 was significant. During that year the EU came under relentless pressure to
make further concessions on agricultural market access and domestic support
(subsidies) to farmers. Elsewhere (Evenett 2006a) I have documented the steps
taken in 2005 by those member states that opposed such external pressure to
expand the Commission's negotiating mandate on agricultural matters beyond the
CAP reforms agreed in 2003. Time and again the external pressure was rebuffedFRAGMENTED POWER
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until the EU's large trading partners began to appreciate (perhaps in
October/November 2005 for Brazil, perhaps later for other trading partners) just
how little room for further agricultural concessions on agriculture the EU had.
Without such concessions on agriculture many of the EU's trading partners (espe-
cially the large developing countries) refused to make more ambitious offers to lib-
eralise their service sectors and tariffs on industrial products that were of direct
concern to EU commercial interests. 
The level of ambition in the Doha Round collapsed faster than a house of cards. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that every previously agreed deadline for set-
ting the modalities for negotiations were missed in 2005 and that the Hong Kong
WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2005 produced limited progress. This
progress included commitments to eliminate the (relatively small in financial
terms) export subsidy programmes on agricultural products by 2013, agreement to
extend duty-free and quota-free access on 97 percent or more of industrial coun-
tries' tariff lines to developing countries (a commitment that was relatively easier
for the EU to meet given its existing non-reciprocal preference regimes), and com-
mitments totalling more than $10 billion on to-be-specified ‘Aid for Trade’ pro-
grammes for developing countries.
On reflection perhaps the most significant event at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial
Conference, if the specialised press reports are to be believed, was the realisation
by Brazil that it would have to choose between its geopolitical ambitions (which at
the WTO manifested itself in its leadership of the G20) and its agricultural trade
negotiating objectives. Apparently, after the commitment to eliminate agricultural
export subsidies was secured, Brazil tried to persuade its G20 partners to push for
greater agricultural market access commitments and was rebuffed. Brazil may well
have concluded, therefore, that its principal vehicle for extracting agricultural con-
cessions from the United States and Europe (that is the G20) could only deliver a
lower level of liberalising ambition. As was to become clear in 2006, once Brazil
allied itself with the low-ambition camp of WTO members, which included the EU and
India amongst others, this effectively left the US alone among the big players seek-
ing an ambitious outcome for the Doha Round. The foundations for the subsequent
suspension of the Doha Round were falling into place.
The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference elaborated another set of deadlines for
negotiators in 2006. The looming expiry of the US Administration's trade negotiat-
ing authority from Congress (deadline 30 June 2007) injected some urgency into
the deliberations. Even so, the sequence of deadlines, each dealing with a separate
negotiating topic, was unable to break the mutually-supporting factors holding theround to a low level of ambition. Worse still, personnel changes at the highest level
of the US trade negotiating team were interpreted as a diminution of interest by the
US Administration in the round's completion, or as a reduction in that
Administration's expectations of a successful conclusion of the round. Moreover,
new US trade representatives cannot be seen back home to be making large conces-
sions at their first major meeting with foreign counterparts, further slowing
progress. As the first half of 2006 went by, the shadow of the US mid-term congres-
sional elections loomed larger, making it harder for US trade negotiators to offer con-
cessions on sensitive agricultural matters without substantial balancing conces-
sions from trading partners on agricultural market access, in particular from the
larger developing countries. 
Senior trade negotiators met in June and July 2006 to discuss the so-called ‘head-
line’ numbers around which a final agreement could be built. They were unable to
narrow their differences sufficiently and WTO Director-General Lamy suspended the
Doha Round in July 2006. It was thought that such a suspension might open nation-
al policymakers' eyes to the possibility of outright failure and that this would result
in more concessions being made to restart the negotiation. In fact, despite protes-
tations of their commitment to complete the Doha Round on the part of the world's
most senior political leaders, no such concessions were made. The US need for an
ambitious outcome within agriculture (and not just across the entire round) did not
square with any of its major trading partners' priorities. Seen in these terms, per-
haps some sort of stalemate in 2006 was almost inevitable, as was the resulting
isolation of the United States. 
After the US congressional elections were held in November 2006 more WTO mem-
bers began to question both the value of suspending the Doha Round negotiations
and just how much progress in negotiations could be made at ministerial level. Soon
after, informal and then formal consultations by the chairpersons of the various WTO
committees were permitted. Moreover, more intensive bilateral discussions at the
level of officials took place in early 2007. US and EU officials, for instance, met reg-
ularly to examine whether a deal on agriculture could be ‘reversed engineered’, that
is, to examine the terms of any of the various exceptions specified so that negotia-
tors could better understand what actual liberalisation would follow from any set of
proposals. Discussions have continued on a bilateral basis, principally among the
Group of Six countries
16that have taken the lead in negotiating this round since the
July 2004 Framework Agreement, and this has caused some consternation among
other WTO members. There is a continuing tension between the apparent need to
make progress negotiating in small groups and having an inclusive multilateral




outcome. Many smaller developing countries, in particular, question whether the
development-related needs are best taken into account in this informal, bilateral
negotiating process.
This account of the European Union's actions in the multilateral trading system has
emphasised a number of factors that have influenced the nature and success of the
EU's initiatives. These factors include: a domestic political climate more sceptical of
globalisation's benefits (and those of open borders, more generally); the launching
of an ill-defined multilateral trade round (both in terms of new issues and priorities,
including the development mandate, and no apparent prior agreement on the
approximate level of liberalising ambition); tenacious EU member states constrain-
ing the concessions offered on agriculture and contributing to the lowering of the
round's overall level of ambition; the rise of several new trading powers that ended
the bipolar domination of the multilateral trading system; and the legacy of the
Uruguay Round agreements, at least as perceived by many developing countries.
The consequence was that much of the rule-making envisaged by Commission offi-
cials, partly as a guard against unfettered globalisation and partly linked to com-
mercial considerations, was jettisoned early on and the traditional market access
objectives of the EU's trade policy remain as yet unfulfilled. Current EU trade policy,
however, was not to be shaped solely by these multilateral developments as the
Commission unveiled a new set of commercial policy priorities in late 2006, an
account of which I turn to now to.
A brief overview and assessment of the European Commission's October 2006
communication on external trade policy
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A communication titled ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’ was issued by the
Commission on 4 October 2006. Significantly, this document was subtitled ‘A
Contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy’, indicating the linkages sought
and contribution of the EU's external trade policy to the Barroso Commission's over-
all economic policy objectives, in particular supporting the renewed Lisbon
Strategy. The communication identifies the following seven steps as being impor-
tant components of future external trade policy:
‘- Maintain our commitment to the Doha Trade Round and the WTO as the best
way of opening and managing world trade.
- Make proposals on priorities in trade and investment relations with China as
part of a broad strategy to build a beneficial and equal partnership.
- Launch a second phase of the EU IPR enforcement strategy.
- Make proposals for a new generation of carefully selected and prioritised FTAs.- Make proposals for a renewed and reinforced market access strategy.
- Propose measures to open procurement markets abroad.
- Conduct a review of the effectiveness of our trade-defence instruments.’
(European Commission 2006a, pp. 18-19).
Beyond affirming its commitment to the WTO and expressing the desire to revive
and conclude the Doha Round negotiations, this communication has very little con-
structive to say about the future of the multilateral trading system.
18With respect to
the proposals for negotiating a new set of FTAs, the communication contends that
‘if approached with care’ these agreements can complement multilateral trade ini-
tiatives. The communication identifies ‘market potential’, levels of protection
against EU exports, the FTA strategies of the EU's major trading partners, and the
potential erosion of preferential market access enjoyed by EU firms as being factors
influencing the selection of countries as potential FTA negotiating partners for the
EU. On the basis of these criteria, the communication identifies ASEAN, Korea, and
The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) as ‘priorities’ for EU FTAs. India, the mem-
bers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Russia are said to have some of the
required attributes and so are included as potential FTA partners. Interestingly,
China is not identified as a potential FTA negotiating partner ‘because of the oppor-
tunities and risks that it presents’
19.
Arguably the 4 October 2006 communication reflects an evolution rather than a rev-
olution in the Commission's thinking about the EU's external trade policy. The promi-
nence given to market access, non-tariff barriers, and other economic considera-
tions (such as jobs and economic growth) indicates a shift in the Commission's
thinking back to 1996. It also represents a shift away from perceiving negotiated
rules as being valuable in their own right and possibly a useful instrument in
strengthening European public support for globalisation and for international mar-
ket integration. This is not to suggest that rules go unmentioned in the 2006 com-
munication, rather that their justification is principally couched in commercial and
economic terms. Perhaps underlying the apparent differences in the perceived role
of rules is the view that European public support for integration will be stronger if the
populace is seen economically to benefit from openness (in terms of jobs, growth,
and prices), rather than the view that rules allay fears about globalisation and its
compatibility with European values.
Also implicit in this communication is an apparent differentiation between Europe's
poorer trading partners. The developing country label is no longer enough to get an
EU trading partner an undemanding non-reciprocal package of access to the EU
market. Large, faster-growing, and relatively richer developing countries can in the
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However not all promising developing countries can assume that they will become
potential FTA partners with the EU, as the case of China shows. Moreover, while the
potential for market growth and the level of existing trade barriers may well be fac-
tors in the EU decision-making on FTA partners, it would not be a surprise if the
capacity of a developing country's exporters to cause adjustment in a sensitive
European sector did not become de facto another criterion. 
Elsewhere (Evenett 2006b) I have presented a more detailed assessment of the
implications of this communication's abandonment of the moratorium on negotiat-
ing new FTAs. I will summarise the main points made. First, the apparent desire of
the EU to join the scramble for market access in Asia is probably unstoppable, but it
is likely to be far less commercially important than some might think. This is not
least because, for better or for worse, the two largest economies in Asia (China and
Japan) are not on the Commission's list of potential partners to negotiate FTAs.
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Second, given the current asymmetries across member states in export perform-
ance to India, Korea and several ASEAN nations, evidence is presented (in Evenett
2006b) which strongly suggests that the boost to the EU's exports from less com-
petitive European firms catching up with their more successful European rivals
would be multiples of the increase in trade that typically follow from signing FTAs.
Therefore, EU firms can make much more of the market access that they already
have and are not beholden to these FTA initiatives to increase their market shares
in the fastest-growing region of the world economy.
21
The third reaction relates to the treatment by the EU of non-tariff barriers and trade-
related domestic policies in its future FTA negotiations. The Commission has rightly
identified many such government measures as potential impediments to European
exporters but what is unclear is how to deal with these challenges. The proliferation
of FTAs in the last ten years ought to have provided a wealth of experience and
approaches upon which to draw – understanding what types of negotiated binding
provisions potentially have bite and which matters ought to be dealt with in other
non-binding international fora. In fact, however, there seems to be insufficient
empirical research on the effects of different types of FTA provisions to guide EC
trade negotiators in this matter.
22 Moreover, the vehement opposition to the
Singapore Issues in the Doha Round and in the ongoing EPA negotiations alluded to
above will almost certainly taint new proposals for further rules on non-tariff barri-
ers and trade-related domestic policies in FTAs. The bitter aftertaste may take some
time to overcome. Here the EU may find that it has to blend incentives (perhaps in
the form of dedicated technical assistance and financial support) with obligations
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these policy areas.
The next set of factors concern the likelihood of successfully completing ambitious
FTA negotiations with India, Korea and the ASEAN nations. India's sheer ambiva-
lence (or worse) during the Doha Round negotiations must raise some questions
about its willingness to sign a FTA with the EU. Now it is true that countries can, and
some have, taken different positions about the commitments they are prepared to
make in FTAs and in WTO agreements. Moreover, it may well be true that India has
made several overtures to the EU, indicating a willingness to sign a FTA. But how
deeply and how widely felt is that conviction, especially in a country whose central
government is relatively weak? A careful reading of articles in Indian newspapers in
2006 and in the first quarter of 2007 reveals that on no occasion has a senior
Indian government minister publicly called for FTA negotiations with the EU.
23
Instead there were plenty of promises to ‘look into’ proposals for a potential FTA
negotiation, but no serious political capital has been put on the line in New Delhi.
There is a substantial risk here of the EU being portrayed as the requesting party in
any FTA negotiation, whatever overtures there have been between technocrats.
Moreover, Indian officials have indicated that they expect this FTA negotiation with
the EU to take five or six years to complete, which if it came to pass would be well
beyond the planning horizon of the current, and possibly the next, college of
European commissioners.
A further source of concern is the large number of exceptions that India has sought
in FTA negotiations with other countries. India sought to put 840 items on a sensi-
tive list (down from an initial demand of 1400 items!) in its FTA negotiations with
ASEAN, and rejected an ASEAN demand that India remove import duties on 90 per-
cent of its product lines by 2011. (The ASEAN-Indian FTA negotiations were sus-
pended on 25 July 2006). Thailand faced similar challenges in its negotiations with
India, with the latter seeking to impose very restrictive rules of origin that would
have reduced the amount of goods able to enter India on a preferential tariff basis.
The EU may be able to strike a far better deal with India than the ASEAN nations
together or Thailand on its own, but no-one should doubt the defensive nature of
India's negotiating position on trade in goods, the most basic trade commitment, let
alone the non-tariff and behind-the-border policies that, according to the recent
communication, are key Commission negotiating objectives. 
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Despite the signing in April 2007 of an FTA between Korea and the US, the former's
offensive interests in automobiles, textiles and electronics are likely to cause diffi-




with the EU to seek changes in Europe's trade defence instruments, which are a very
delicate matter within the EU. There is also a question mark over the capacity of
Korea's government to obtain legislative approval of any FTA (including the one
signed with the US), given that the current (very unpopular) president faces a large
opposition majority in the Korean National Assembly. The next presidential elec-
tions in South Korea, in December 2007, may well clarify the degree of political sup-
port for trade reform in Korea.
Matters in ASEAN are not much better and again the specialised press reports on the
protracted negotiations between the US and Thailand and the US and Malaysia on
their respective FTAs make for sobering reading. (It is worth noting in this respect
that in March 2007 the US abandoned its FTA negotiations with Malaysia). Leaving
aside the 2006 coup in Thailand, which may make some EU member states reluc-
tant to be seen to be negotiating – and potentially rewarding – a military-sponsored
government, it is inconceivable that any Commission negotiations with ASEAN will
involve that latter operating as a coherent, unified group. Some differentiation with-
in the ASEAN grouping will be needed not least to take account of Myanmar, with
whose government the EU member states are most unlikely to allow negotiations.
Taken together, these considerations imply that negotiations with the ASEAN
nations may actually amount to negotiating separately with a core group of coun-
tries (possibly Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and maybe Vietnam). As a result, the
likelihood is slim that emerging from this process will be an ASEAN-wide set of dis-
ciplines that would significantly cut red tape and barriers facing European business.
Again, there is much less here than initially meets the eye.
The purpose of this section was, first, briefly to outline the principal components of
the EU's new trade policy, as described by the Commission in a communication
issued in October 2006. Then several points were made about viability and likely
pay-off of the decision to launch FTA negotiations with several Asian nations. It was
argued that, at least in the near term, this scramble for preferential access to Asian
markets is unlikely to bear significant fruit, in terms of both better market access
for European firms and greater disciplines on behind-the-border measures.
Moreover, little or no thought appears to have been given to the relationship
between these potential FTA negotiations and resolving the impasse in the Doha
Round of multilateral trading negotiations. The very coherence of the near- to medi-
um-term trajectory of EU trade policy can thus be questioned. 
The EU in a multipolar trading system
The multilateral trading system can and should remain the cornerstone of EU tradeTRADE POLICY
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policy, even though the Doha Round of trade negotiations has frequently been at an
impasse. Whether or not these negotiations are concluded satisfactorily in 2007, it
will take a few years for any agreement to be implemented and for a new US
Administration team of trade officials to be put in place. This two-year or so interreg-
num should be used to assess what role the EU can profitably play in a multipolar
trading system. Given the size of the EU's own market and its considerable foreign
investments, there is a strong case for engagement. The alternative – essentially
becoming a veto player over the agendas proposed by others – may seem appeal-
ing to some battered and bruised egos after the difficult Doha Round, but this would
imply foregoing Europe's extensive internal experience in the formation and preser-
vation of coalitions.
The first step in any such assessment of the EU's potential future role must surely
be to identify the current and likely future offensive and defensive interests of the
new trading powers. Direct domestic political constraints are a consideration here
and, if the discussions around the Doha Round are anything to go by, are generally
not well understood abroad. Elsewhere (Evenett 2007b) I have argued that the fast
growth in the number of Indian and Chinese multinationals, along with strong (but
distinctive) ties between big business and government in both of these countries,
may well lead these governments' trade policymakers to identify their future offen-
sive interests with those of their overseas multinationals. As greenfield foreign
investments in Europe are relatively unrestricted, even encouraged in many juris-
dictions, restrictions on takeovers and mergers by foreign firms may well become
more contentious (as the recent takeover of a continental steel company Arcelor by
a nominally Indian company Mittal Steel made clear). The treatment of such trans-
actions, and of multinationals more generally, may well entail that many tradition-
ally domestic measures affecting the national business environment become top-
ics of common interest for the leading trading powers. In trade policy parlance,
stronger and/or wider disciplines on national treatment may well be sought. These
arguments suggest that a rules-based agenda for further multilateral trade
negotiations may well be attractive.
The preservation of existing market access, which underpins the substantial export
growth recorded since 2000 by Brazil, China, and India, may well cause those
nations' governments to seek further disciplines on the various discretionary poli-
cy instruments available to restrict imports. Again, this is only one possibility and
the question arises whether other potential areas of common interest exist. With
respect to a market access-improving negotiating agenda, one challenge that must
be recognised is that the political arguments in favour of reciprocal trade negotia-
tion (with its goal of mobilising export interests to counter the domestic politicalFRAGMENTED POWER
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influence of import-competing firms) may not resonate at all well in the political
systems of the new trading powers. In fact, I have argued previously that neither
China nor India has ever undertaken serious trade reform in the context of a recipro-
cal trade agreement (Evenett 2007b). They have done so as a condition for joining
the WTO or unilaterally.
25 To the extent that this practice continues and domestic
opposition to trade reform can be overcome (without mobilising export constituen-
cies), in the future the market opening role of the WTO may become secondary. A
counterargument is that when average tariff rates fall to low levels, export interests
are needed to back trade reform as the remaining import-competing interests are
particularly strong politically. Chile's experience is sometimes mentioned in sup-
port of this argument. Apparently its switch from unilateral to reciprocal trade liber-
alisation occurred once average tariffs fell to approximately 10 percent.
26 Having
said that, it remains to be seen if in the future the new trading powers see value in
the WTO's capacity to deliver reciprocal trade reform. 
Once the topics of common interest have been identified the next step is to carry
out rough assessments of their commercial or other value to each party. This will
require considerable new work, as the commercial value of many trade rules has
rarely been the subject of serious empirical analysis, and perhaps may account for
some of the scepticism of their value (and preference of some for market access
liberalisation, whose consequences are on the basis of existing tools easier to esti-
mate
27). After that, it will be necessary to explore what permutations of measures
are likely to garner greater support among the leading trading powers, recognising
that the possibility of gains does not guarantee that agreements will be forthcom-
ing. The latter point highlights the continuing need to understand better the combi-
nations of domestic policies and technical capacities necessary to enhance the
benefits of trade-related reforms. With all of this information the potential basis for
different possible future multilateral trade deals might be identified.
One consequence of this analysis is the realisation that certain commercial or other
cherished European goals may stand little or no chance of commanding support
among the leading trading powers, either as stand-alone priorities or as topics
where bargains can be made. International trade rules as they relate to medicines
may well now fall into this category, given the bad odour attached to the associated
WTO rules. This may call for a refinement in either the proposed rules (perhaps
sweetening the proposed obligations with technical assistance or financial sup-
port) or in the constituencies supporting trade reform (and may involve some com-
mercial parties no longer having their interests served as well as before).TRADE POLICY
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Conclusion
It is widely recognised
28that the multilateral trading system has produced substan-
tial benefits to the world economy in the post-war era. By fostering liberalisation (at
least in merchandise goods trade among industrialised economies) and encourag-
ing compliance with rules that help reduce the uncertainty associated with export-
ing and importing, multilateral trade accords have resulted in better allocation of
resources and, if some studies are to be believed, in higher rates of national
economic growth. The EU's member states and the European Commission can share
much of the credit for securing this beneficial outcome as, together with successive
United States administrations, they ran the multilateral trading system for most of
the post-war era.
It is in part thanks to the relatively open markets for manufacturers created by this
bipolar system that several large developing countries have become trading powers
themselves and now seek to influence the trajectory of the world trading system. As
the Doha Round has proceeded, these new trading powers have repeatedly remind-
ed the EU and the US that they no longer jointly determine the trading system's des-
tiny. Various European proposals for new trade rules have been rebuffed and
America's aggressive market-liberalising objectives will almost certainly not be
met. The question is: what next for the multilateral trading system and what role for
the EU?
With an economy producing an annual $12 trillion in added value and with more
than 450 million relatively well-off customers, the EU will be able to remain at the
top negotiating table in the decades to come. The question, then, is to what pur-
pose? Here there may well have to be changes. In the past both the EU and the US
have sought to project their commercial interests and values onto other nations
through bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements. With the rise of at
least three new trading powers, the first order of business is to establish what is the
potential basis for future multilateral deals and the trade-offs associated with such
future deals. Market access liberalisation measures alone are unlikely to form such
a basis, especially if the new trading powers continue to liberalise border barriers on
their own. But if the traditional alternative to market access reform, namely rules, is
to be the basis of a future deal, what rules are likely to be the subject of multilater-
al negotiation? As each of the new trading powers increasingly has an overseas
multinational footprint, then perhaps the new agenda could
29be based on rules that
further restrict discrimination by national governments in the design and imple-
mentation of non-tariff barriers and domestic policies. Stronger and broader nation-
al treatment disciplines could be an area of mutual interest to the current and newFRAGMENTED POWER
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powers of the world trading system. This implies that, despite the setbacks with the
Singapore Issues in the Doha Round, the boundaries of the WTO have probably not
been set in stone. 
An associated question concerns what happens to the multilateral provisions that
Europeans say they value, such as those associated with labour and environmental
standards, but which their trading partners are not interested in. In my view, the
right European response here is not to disengage from the WTO (or worse, raise
trade barriers) because apparently cherished goals do not receive the weight we
might want. Rather, it is to consider alternative combinations of formal obligations,
incentives (both positive and negative), and other international initiatives to
advance those values. Industrialised countries have aid budgets and other meas-
ures available to them to pursue these cherished goals. Moreover, much more could
probably be made of bodies such as the International Labour Organisation.
30Related
considerations probably imply that attempts to extend the WTO's reach beyond
commercial obligations (into, for example, social and environmental policies) are
likely to founder on the opposition of the new trading powers. 
The opposition of the new trading powers to certain types of trade provision, or pro-
posals for such provisions, may call for changes in the business and political coali-
tions that, de facto or de jure, are assembled to support trade reform in Europe. For
example, the window for further improving intellectual property rights through trade
agreements may well have closed for the time being. Or the future price demanded
by trading partners for including new provisions is likely to be so high that the pro-
trade reform constituency may have to be organised without some of the European
corporations that have prominently supported trade reforms over the past 15 to 20
years. Those doubtful of these alternatives might well recall the paucity of accom-
plishments over the last 10 years when one objective after another was piled on to
EU trade policymaking.
31 The watchwords for the future are likely to be common
ground, pragmatism and accommodation, all of which the member states of the EU
and European Commission officials have plenty of experience with.
The policy recommendations in this chapter have focused on the multilateral trad-
ing system, in part because that is where the greatest long-term and systemic chal-
lenges lie and because of doubts about the likely pay-off from negotiating preferen-
tial trading agreements. This is not to say, however, that the European Union will not
need to meet a number of specific and important challenges in managing its com-
mercial relations with certain neighbours in the years to come, in particular with
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. No doubt foreign policy as well as commercial consid-
erations will together continue to influence negotiations and trade policy initiativeswith these countries. Such matters, with their propensity to generate headlines and
to absorb policymakers' attention, should not distract European trade strategists
from the necessary task of establishing a new modus operandi for the multilateral
trading system.
Notes
1 I thank Michael Meier for his dedicated research assistance. I am very grateful to numerous DG
Trade officials, other EC officials, former EC officials, and representatives of European business
interests for meeting with me in September 2006 to discuss the prospects for EC trade policy.
Those very helpful discussions were for background purposes and no direct quotations or refer-
ences are made to them in this chapter. Thanks also to Patrick Low, Jean Pisani-Ferry, and André
Sapir for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. I alone bear the responsibility for the views
expressed here.
2 For instance, certain investment provisions, certain service sectors, and the transport sector
remain in the competence of the member states. 
3 This treaty also specifies the objectives of EU trade policy. As noted on page 19 of WTO (2007):
'The EC Treaty establishes the overall objectives of its trade policy.  Under Article 131 of the Treaty
of Nice, the EC common policy aims to "contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the
lowering of customs barriers";  Article 133 sets out the scope, instruments and decision-making
procedures.  This objective underscores the general aims of the Treaty, i.e. "to promote, throughout
the Community, a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a
high level of employment and social protection, equality between men and women, a high degree
of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of
life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States."'
4 If press reports are to be believed then the European Council met every day of the December 2005
Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference to review the status of the agricultural and other multilater-
al trade negotiations.
5 Optimistic former (European and non-European) trade negotiators have made precisely this point
to me and argue that it may be easier to isolate the French government and its ‘diehard’ allies than
the newspaper reports tend to imply if a credible Doha Round agreement is floated. 
6 See, for example, UK (2005).
7 Unless otherwise specified, throughout this chapter the European Union is referred to and not its
predecessors.
8 Under Article XXIV:6 of the GATT Agreement.
9 In an interesting aside, the WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Union quotes the following
statement from a EC document about the nature of the EC's GATS schedule of Specific
Commitments. The schedule: ‘was a function of progress in the creation of the single market, and
consisted of translating its internal achievements in this field to the multilateral stage’ (WTO 2000,
p. 29).
10 That network included the European Economic Area, the so-called Europe Agreements with many
central European states, FTAs with the Baltic States and others, Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Lomé Convention, the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a Customs Union with Turkey and Association
Agreements with Cyprus, Israel, and Malta and ‘Euro-Med’ Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia.
Closer cooperation agreements that could lead to the negotiation of reciprocal preferential trade
TRADE POLICY
91agreements were also in place with selected Latin American and Asian countries.
11 Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,
and the United States.
12 According to WTO (2007, p. 24) these nine jurisdictions accounted for approximately 30 percent of
the EU's total imports in 2005.
13 As noted earlier, an interesting feature of the EPA negotiations has been the willingness of leading
member states and European Parliamentarians openly to criticise the negotiating stance taken by
EC officials. 
14 For an evaluation of the research on the utilisation and effectiveness of the EU's GSP regime see
Evenett (2007a).
15 For a longer account of the factors responsible for the fall of the bipolar WTO, see Evenett (2007b).
16 Australia, Brazil, the EC, India, China and the United States.
17 For a more extensive assessment of this communication see Evenett (2006b) and the contribu-
tions to the special issue of the journal Aussenwirtschaft(in which Evenett (2006b) is published).
This special issue was published in December 2006.
18 I accept that, with the Doha Round being suspended in July 2006 and the ‘you first’ nature of
negotiations experienced throughout so much of the Doha Round, that the EC may have decided
that the second half of 2006 was not the right time to offer any substantive reflections on the
future and potential reform of the multilateral trading system.
19 In this regard it is worth noting that the EC issued a separate communication on relations with
China on 24 October 2006.
20 As currently conceived of in the 4 October 2006 communication, the plans for future potential FTAs
omit two countries that alone amount to 55 percent of the ‘market potential’ in the Asian region. In
the statistical annex to the communication a table of EU trading partners is reproduced, reporting
the estimated value in euros of their market potential over the years 2005-2025. The total value of
the market potential of the Asian nations in that table (including Australia) is €474 billion. Of that
total €278 billion is accounted for by China and Japan, neither of which are mentioned as possible
FTA partners in the communication. In contrast, India, ASEAN and Korea, which are listed as FTA tar-
gets, have a combined market potential of €160 billion. Now, access to a market potential of €160
billion is not peanuts, but it does represent only just over a third of the total size of the economic
potential of the Asian market. Asia may appear vast and full of promise, but it is important to
remember that the EC's FTA strategy only envisages securing better market access to a slice of it.
21 This empirical finding might lead some to oppose the launch of negotiations on FTAs between the
EC and selected Asian nations, a view with which I have a certain amount of sympathy. However,
the horse has almost certainly bolted and slamming the stable door in disgust has only theatrical
value. Another implication of the empirical finding mentioned above is that, although European
commercial interests may eventually benefit from these FTAs, they are not the only way in which
the EU can make inroads into Asian markets. So the EC should be prepared to walk away from cos-
metic, face-saving FTAs and drawn out negotiations. This point could be communicated to poten-
tial FTA partners at the beginning of the negotiations and, to demonstrate its seriousness of pur-
pose, the EU Council of Ministers should give the EC a fixed two-year mandate to complete the
negotiations of each FTA. Two years is long enough to negotiate a complex deal if the partners are
willing. Foreign prevaricators would, thus, be put on notice. Plus, this timetable would ensure that
any results are secured before the end of the Barroso Commission's term. There may be an instinc-
tive reaction within the EC against the loss of discretion implied by a fixed-term mandate, but con-
sideration should be given to the tactical and strategic value of this constraint as well as to the
harm and bad blood created by never-ending FTA negotiations.
22 There is a growing number of legal analyses, and in some cases even taxonomies, of FTA provisions
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92in selected policy areas but these are not the same as empirical analyses of the effects of such pro-
visions. I make these claims having just completed an in-depth assessment of the available
economic and other literature on the effects of five types of FTA provision dealing with non-tariff
barriers and trade-related domestic policies.
23 These newspaper articles can be readily searched and downloaded from the Factivadatabase.
24 Defenders of India's FTA strategy point to its FTA with Singapore, which includes measures
modestly to liberalise India's service sector. Even here certain restrictions on the establishment of
commercial presence through foreign direct investment have been retained by India. It should be
noted that this agreement also contains numerous exceptions to liberalising goods trade between
the parties. A total of 6551 tariff lines were excluded outright from tariff liberalisation. A further
2407 tariff lines will only see a phased reduction of 50 percent in the applied tariff rates. Together
these exclusions and phased reductions account for approximately 76 percent of India's tariff line
commitments in its FTA with Singapore. In my view the latter indicates a distinct reluctance by
India to commit to across-the-board goods trade liberalisation in the context of a reciprocal trade
agreement with a nation whose economy is less than five percent of the size of the Indian econo-
my (when these economies are measured in purchasing power parity terms). 
25 China's WTO accession is seen here as involving unilateral and not reciprocal trade reform.
26 I thank C. Fred Bergsten for pointing this argument out to me.
27 An analogy with the proverbial drunkard looking for his keys under street lamps – precisely
because that is where the light is – comes to mind.
28 Although not universally accepted.
29 Notice the word is ‘could’ not ‘should’. This wholly pragmatic exercise is about the art of the possible.
30 I accept that, far too often, many of the supporters of international social, labour, and environmen-
tal standards have been fobbed off by trade experts arguing that other international organisations
can take the lead with these matters. What I have in mind is giving serious consideration to
strengthening the ambit and resources of the latter organisations.
31 With Michael Meier, I have made a similar argument with respect to the future of United States trade
policymaking (see Evenett and Meier 2007). More generally, there is probably a strong case for
believing that the trade policies of the leading industrialised countries have been asked to support
a far too diverse set of objectives.
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n recent decades the world has undergone a rapid process of globalisation or inte-
gration. Greater interdependence means that Europe’s development increasingly
depends on the fate of the rest of the world. Europe's main economic relationships
are still with the non-European parts of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), but the weight of poorer regions is rapidly increasing. It
is in Europe’s interest to have functioning and flourishing states in the developing
world to increase the scope for trade and growth, and to reduce risks of instability
and terrorism. Closer links between Europe and the poorer regions also make
Europeans increasingly aware of, and sensitive to, poverty in poorer countries.
There are thus two motivations for European development policy vis-à-vis develop-
ing countries: self-interest in a stable and prosperous world, and solidarity with the
world’s less fortunate citizens. Therefore, European foreign economic policy should
include support for development and poverty reduction in poorer countries.
How should the EU shape its development policy? A key issue is the extent of coor-
dination of foreign aid between the European Community (EC)
1and member states.
Should the EC really be an aid vehicle alongside bilateral efforts? The official argu-
ment is that the EC has comparative advantages in some respects, but this is not
evident in what the EC currently does. The EC does more or less the same things as
its bilateral members, which means that it is just one more aid player making coor-
dination more difficult. The EC does not effectively fill any coordinating function.
Nor is it clear that EC aid is more efficient than bilateral aid – rather the reverse. So
it is hard to see what the added value of EC aid is relative to bilateral aid. One con-




coordination, conditionality and coherenceHowever, there is an alternative route that has some promise: to go in the opposite
direction and let future EC Development Policy Statements also cover the aid pro-
grammes of member states. In the longer term this could even go so far as to let the
bilaterals pool their resources in EC coffers. This would be a huge political challenge,
and it is hard to see that it can be realised in the near future. If EC aid instead con-
tinues more or less on its present scale (the likely scenario in the short term), con-
sideration needs to be given to how coordination can be improved between EC aid
and bilateral aid – and with aid from other donors. Providing more general forms of
aid, such as balance of payments support, would lessen the coordination problem
and increase ownership. To the extent that different donors finance the same proj-
ect or programme, one donor (bilateral or EC) could act as the coordinating agent
responsible for government contacts and follow up.
The EC may also have a comparative advantage relative to the bilaterals and the
international financial institutions (IFIs) when it comes to pushing for democracy
and governance. Since these areas will probably become more important, this may
be a reason not to abandon EC aid.
The EU is committed to providing 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) in aid
no later than 2015, and to support the debt reduction initiatives that are in place.
These commitments need to be taken seriously, but a number of the old (pre-2004)
member states and, in particular, the newcomers (who joined the EU in 2004 and
afterwards) are unlikely to live up to this commitment. Moreover, EC aid allocation
is geared to commercial interests, although it takes a very altruistic stance in offi-
cial proclamations. There is a need to take the EU's aims and the commitment to
achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals more seriously, and to shift coun-
try allocation in favour of the poor countries with, of course, due consideration for
their ability to handle the resources effectively.
Trade is the most important area within the development policy framework. The
economic arguments for eliminating trade restrictions on the exports of poor coun-
tries are obvious, but the political influence of specific groups hinders this extreme-
ly important policy change. The mishandling of the Doha Round and the continued
pursuit of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a disgrace. Both trade-distorting
domestic support measures and trade restrictions distort agricultural markets. Aid
efforts are countered by trade policies locking exporters from less developed coun-
tries (LDC) out of the European market. All EU countries and the EC should change
their policies to make their trade and agricultural policies coherent relative to the
development goals. Since this is an area where the EC handles the WTO negotiations
for all member states, this is a natural area of strong EC involvement. 
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Coherence in this context means that each country as well as the EC should make
sure that they pursue policies that support the stated development goals and do not
undermine them. They need to make sure that aid, debt and trade policies support
each other. The present situation leaves much to be desired!
The remainder of this chapter provides the underpinning of the conclusions sum-
marised above. It starts with a brief review of the changing global economic environ-
ment and then goes on to examine the EU's development policy. The areas covered
are aid, debt reduction and trade. Some policy areas (for example migration and
security), which the EC considers as parts of its development policy, will be covered
by other chapters in this volume. In the light of the results of this review I will dis-
cuss the policy changes that should be made to better equip the policy to achieve
the stated targets. 
The global economic environment
In recent decades the dependence on foreign trade among the countries of the
world has increased (Table 4.1). At the same time the relative weight of the OECD
and the EU in world trade has declined, while the importance of the emerging
economies, particularly East Asia and the Pacific, has increased (Table 4.2). In
other words, Europe is becoming more and more economically dependent on the
economic health of its developing country partners.
Recent economic development in the world's poorer regions has generally been
encouraging. We see in Table 4.3 that East Asia and the Pacific, as well as South
Asia, are catching up, and they represent a very large share of the world population
2.
The economic improvements that many parts of the world have experienced are cer-
tainly related to their successful integration into the international economy (see
Cline and Williamson 2005 for a review of the evidence). There are no countries that
have achieved significant economic success in isolation.
In total, the global incidence of poverty, as measured by the World Bank indicator of
one dollar per day in consumption expenditure, declined from 40 percent to 21 per-
cent between 1981 and 2001 (Table 4.4). Poverty reduction in Asia has been spec-
tacular, but poverty has not declined in sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest
region. Parts of the former eastern bloc have seen poverty increase since the break-
up of the Soviet Union, but most of those countries have seen considerable recov-
ery in the last few years. Latin America has not made much progress in terms of




1990 1995 2000 2004
High income: OECD 17.1 18.8 21.9 *20.4
European Monetary Union – EU12 26.9 29.3 36.7 36.5
East Asia & Pacific 24.4 29.4 36.1 42.9
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 23.7 31.1 40.9 41.9
Latin America & Caribbean 17.1 18.7 20.6 25.7
Middle East & North Africa 26.3 25.9 28.4 33.9
South Asia 8.6 12.5 14.8 19.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 27.2 28.7 32.4 32.3
World 19.0 21.2 24.6 *23.9
Table 4.1: Export of goods and services (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank (2006a). * 2003.
1990 1995 2000 2004
High income: OECD 73.3 70.1 66.6 63.9
European Monetary Union – EU12 35.2 32.4 28.4 31.1
East Asia & Pacific 3.9 6.2 7.7 9.8
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 4.7 5.0 6.8
Latin America & Caribbean 3.9 4.3 5.3 4.8
South Asia 0.8 0.9 1.1 *1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.5
Table 4.2: Share of world exports of goods and services (%)
Source: World Bank (2006a). * 2003.
1990 1995 2000 2004
High income: OECD 100 100 100 100
European Monetary Union – EU12 89.6 89.1 88.6 87.0
East Asia & Pacific 8.0 11.4 13.2 16.6
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 33.4 22.6 22.5 26.0
Latin America & Caribbean 25.7 26.2 24.9 23.9
Middle East & North Africa 17.6 17.5 16.9 17.9
South Asia 7.1 7.6 8.0 8.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.2 6.2 5.7 5.7
Table 4.3: Relative GNI per capita (PPP), current international dollars
Note: High income OECD = index 100. Source: World Bank (2006a).FRAGMENTED POWER
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The economic take-off in large countries such as China and India, as well as most
countries in East and South-East Asia, has also meant a reversal of, or a stop to, the
increase of global income inequality, which began in earnest with the industrial rev-
olution 200 years ago. Global inequality as measured by the Gini-coefficient, and
with countries weighted by populations and ignoring income inequality within
countries, suggests that inter-country inequality actually started to decline in
around 1980 (Table 4.5). Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) have computed the
Gini-coefficient for the world for the period 1820-1992 attempting to allow for
changes in within-country inequality. According to their estimates the global Gini-
coefficient increased consistently until about 1950, while the changes thereafter
have been comparatively small.
The debate on these estimates continues (Milanovic 2006), but it is clear that large
parts of the developing world are growing more quickly than the richest countries.
They are thereby reducing the inter-country income gap. The countries at the bot-
tom of the income hierarchy, however, are slipping even further behind. If we meas-
ure inequality as the gap between the people in the industrialised world and the
poorest 10 percent in the world, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, the gap continued to
increase until the turn of the century. Since then Africa has seen some economic
recovery following the commodity boom, as well as a series of policy reforms that
have improved the policy environment (Pattillo, Gupta, Carey 2005). But Africa’s
plight remains the key development challenge facing the international community.
1981 1987 1993 1999 2001
East Asia & the Pacific 57.7 28.0 24.9 15.7 14.9
(China) 63.8 41.0 28.4 17.8 16.6
(excluding China) 42.0 27.0 16.7 11.0 10.8
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.7 0.4 3.7 6.3 3.6
Latin America & Caribbean 9.7 10.9 11.3 10.5 9.5
Middle East & North Africa 5.1 3.2 1.6 2.6 2.4
South Asia 51.5 45.0 40.1 32.2 31.3
(India) 54.4 46.3 42.3 35.3 34.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.6 46.9 44.1 45.7 46.4
Total 40.4 28.4 26.3 21.8 21.1
(excluding China) 31.7 28.4 25.6 23.1 22.5
Table 4.4: Percentage of the population living on less than $1 per day, 1981-2001
Source: Chen och Ravallion, 2004.DEVELOPMENT POLICY
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Overall it is encouraging that poverty and inter-country differences are declining,
but very much remains to be done and that is why EU development policy remains
important. The needs vary by region, and the policy needs to take this into account.
The structure of EU development policy
EU development policy has gradually changed from a focus on aid to former
colonies, to include global trade issues and efforts to promote peace and stability.
In its relationships with developing countries, the EC considers the political, com-
mercial and social aspects. Apart from discussing EC development policy we will
also touch on the bilateral development policy of the member states. The goals and
policies of the EC and the member states are complex and sometimes contradicto-
ry. Policy coherence and coordination among the European institutions will there-
fore be discussed in this chapter.
EC policy
Many actors are involved in EC development policy. The prime movers are the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, which take decisions on the gen-
eral direction of the policy. The European Commission initiates policy formulation
and implements development policies. Within the European Commission the
Directorate-General for External Relations is responsible for political governance
through country strategies for different regions (except Africa), as well as aid with
political content such as human rights and security. The Directorate-General for
Development deals with policy and formulation of development cooperation and is
responsible for the country strategies for Africa. The European Commission Office
for Humanitarian Support (ECHO) is responsible for the management of humanitar-
Year Gini Year Gini
1900 0.393 1970 0.539
1913 0.427 1980 0.544
1929 0.458 1985 0.531
1938 0.448 1990 0.526
1950 0.530 1995 0.498
1960 0.521 1998 0.496
Table 4.5: World distribution of income (Gini-coefficients) 1900-1998
Note: the numbers are based on data for 49 countries for GDP per capita in 1990 prices adjusted for purchasing power.
Countries are weighted by population shares.
Source: Boltho and Tonniolo, 2000, p.7.ian aid channelled through NGOs and to some extent United Nations (UN) organisa-
tions. Finally, the Directorate-General for Trade and the Directorate-General for
Enlargement are also active in areas that are important for development goals. The
member states provide the funds for the general EC budget and the European
Development Fund. The Court of Auditors is responsible for overseeing how efficient-
ly the money is spent, and the European Court of Justice controls compliance with
treaties.
Article 177 in the Maastricht Treaty spells out that EC policy should foster sustain-
able economic and social development in the developing countries, and more
particularly the most disadvantaged among them. Policy should also smooth the
gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy, and combat
poverty in the developing countries. The EC is to promote democracy and the rule of
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The ambition is that the EC should intervene in areas where it has a comparative
advantage relative to the member states. The areas selected (European
Commission, 2000a)
3 are the link between trade and development, support for
regional integration and cooperation, support for macroeconomic policies, trans-
port, food security and sustainable rural development, and institutional capacity
building, particularly in the areas of good governance and the rule of law. EU inter-
ventions have in practice not been limited to these six focal areas, however. The
Commission is also committed to assisting developing countries in achieving the
UN Millennium Development Goals.
There are two mechanisms for Commission aid. First, there is the European
Development Fund, which is replenished from time to time by member states. This
money is used for aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. It is gov-
erned by the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which lasts for 20 years and guides the
EU’s collaboration with ACP countries
4. The main aim is to help these countries
reduce poverty. The agreement also covers trade, with planned future collaboration
arrangements known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Secondly, there
is the general EC budget that allocates money for development assistance to all
other regions.
The EPAs are a major new feature of the relationship between the EU and the ACP
countries. They differ from earlier agreements in two major ways. First, they are
more reciprocal in nature, to ensure WTO-compatibility. Second, they are not
between the EU and the ACP states as a whole but between the EU and various




regional EPA negotiating blocs. The agreements are intended to cover liberalisation
of trade in goods and services, promote regional integration, provide development
finance and cooperation, and support improvements in institutional rules for busi-
ness (Gasiorek, Winters 2004). The EPAs are scheduled to come into force on 1
January 2008. However, they are controversial and so far no negotiations have
been successfully concluded. Until the WTO-compatible EPAs enter into force, the
non-reciprocal Lome IV preferences will continue to be applied despite being WTO
incompatible. 
Already before the launch of the EPAs, EU agreements with developing countries
generally covered development cooperation, political dialogue, and trade. They are
thus broader than the typical aid programmes of bilateral institutions. The ongoing
programmes are the European Development Fund for the ACP countries, the pro-
gramme for South Asia, external assistance to Asia and Latin America (ALA), sup-
port to Mediterranean and Middle East countries (MEDA), the technical assistance
programme for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (TACIS), EC assistance for recon-
struction, development and stabilisation of the Balkans (CARDS), and the pre-
accession programme for Eastern European countries (Phare).
A new EU Financial Perspective (a multiannual EC budget framework) applies from
January 2007. In the consultations about the EU's future development policy, car-
ried out in 2005, a clear majority of stakeholders agreed that poverty eradication
should remain the main goal of the policy and that there should be a continued
focus on the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (European
Commission 2005). It was also argued that development policy should not be sub-
ordinated to the Union’s common foreign and security policy nor to its migration pol-
icy. Rather other policies, particularly trade and agriculture, should be aligned with
development policy (see the recent proposals in European Commission 2006). The
‘European Consensus on Development’  (European Parliament, Council, Commission
2006) states that ‘the primary and overarching objective of EU development coop-
eration is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development,
including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals’.
Member state policies: the UK example
The member states handle the bulk of EU development assistance (80 percent).
Possibly the most interesting bilateral donor is the UK, where the Department for
International Development (DFID) has been at the forefront of the debate in recent
years and has gone further than most other donors in introducing new thinking. So
we will start by looking at UK policies.FRAGMENTED POWER
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In the late 1990s the UK's Overseas Development Administration was upgraded to
the Department for International Development with its secretary of state becoming
a member of the ministerial cabinet (OECD 2002). This raised the profile of aid
issues and helped to promote the coherence of policies across departments. An
interdepartmental working group on development, chaired by the secretary of state
for international development, was created to help mainstream development policy.
This group includes a dozen departments whose policies affect development. Since
that time, the UK's ambition has been to play a key role internationally. Former
finance minister Gordon Brown pushed development finance concerns in the IFIs,
and former prime minister Tony Blair successfully engaged world leaders for
increased aid, to Africa in particular, at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005.
The UK set out its trade and development policy in its Globalisation White Paper,
which outlined a strategy to enable LDCs to gain from international economic inte-
gration. The UK has actively tried to influence the global trade agenda, and pushed
to make the Doha Round a development round. The UK was also actively involved in
the debate on the EU’s Everything But Arms initiative, to open up to all imports from
the LDCs except weapons
5. As in other countries, there are domestic lobbies active-
ly working against free trade initiatives in some areas (such as sugar).
The UK has followed up the report of the Commission for Africa (2005) and the G8
commitments of 2005, as well as the Paris Declaration, with a white paper on its aid
policies (DFID 2006a). There, it spells out how it will work to increase its develop-
ment budget to 0.7 percent by 2013. It emphasises that its aid will be based on the
recipient committing to reduce poverty, uphold human rights and international obli-
gations, and to improve financial management, governance and transparency. It
aims to work to improve the international system and for improved accountability of
recipient countries. The UK wants to work more closely with its European partners
on development issues. It will participate in multi-donor arrangements in all devel-
oping countries where it has a bilateral programme and it will develop more joint
strategies and co-financing arrangements with the EC and other EU member states.
The thinking in the UK is not unique, but reflects trends within the donor communi-
ty generally. The Nordics and the Netherlands have moved in a similar direction, as
have other European donors, though to a lesser extent.
Aid volumes
The EU is the world’s leading development aid provider. Jointly the EC and the mem-
ber states account for around 55 percent of total overseas development assistanceDEVELOPMENT POLICY
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(ODA). The total volume of OECD Development Advisory Committee (DAC) aid was
about $80 billion in 2004 and $106 billion in 2005. The increase was mainly due to
$19 billion in debt relief granted to Nigeria and Iraq by the Paris Club (World Bank
2006b). Debt forgiveness grants will remain significant in 2006, but then the prom-
ised increases in ODA will have to take the form of transfer of resources, which will
put more pressure on donor budgets. In the last few years we also saw considerable
increases in non-debt private flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI)
6
and inward remittances.
Total aid varies considerably between EU countries. The total contribution of the 15
pre-2004 EU members increased only slightly between 2001 and 2004 from 0.33
percent of GNI to 0.35 percent (Table 4.6). Only Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Sweden reached the 0.7 percent target set by the UN decades ago.
This was reaffirmed as a goal for 2015 at the Gleneagles summit, as suggested by
the UN (2005) and the Commission for Africa (2005). The EU has adopted the goal
of 0.7 percent of GNI for 2015, with an intermediate goal of 0.56 percent by 2010
(European Parliament, Council, Commission 2006, §5). For some countries, such
as Italy at 0.15 percent, it will be a major effort to reach the intermediate goal. The
countries that joined the EU in 2004 so far contribute little. The share of foreign aid
from the old EU members channelled through the EC was 22.6 percent in 2001, but
declined to 20.3 percent in 2004.
Because of the poor performance of Africa, foreign aid has increasingly been con-
centrated on that region, and Africa is by far the most aid-dependent region (Table
4.7). When looking at per capita aid flows in Table 4.8, however, we see that sub-
Saharan Africa does not stand out relative to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, or the
Middle East and North Africa. There have been heated debates about the develop-
ment impact of foreign aid, but the general conclusion is that aid does have some
positive growth effects (in addition to mitigating short run problems) (see Clemens,
Radelet, Bhavnani 2004, and Tarp 2006).
At Gleneagles the G8 leaders promised an increase in aid to Africa by $25 billion per
year by 2010, more than doubling current flows, and DAC members agreed to
expand aid to all developing countries by $50 billion. The EU is expected to provide
the major share of these new resources. This could be done through the EC or by
member states bilaterally. It is not obvious that the donors will abide by their
pledge, and so far not much has happened in terms of increased actual flow. To
speed up the increase Gordon Brown has suggested that donors should use future
aid as collateral for bonds to raise money that could be used in the short term.
However, this kind of frontloading may be risky, since it is shifting money fromFRAGMENTED POWER
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2001 2004








Austria 633 0.34 678 0.23
Belgium 867 0.37 1,463 0.50
Denmark 1,834 1.03 2,037 0.85
Finland 389 0.32 655 0.35
France 4,198 0.31 8,473 0.41
Germany 4,990 0.27 7,534 0.28
Greece 202 0.17 465 0.23
Ireland 287 0.33 607 0.39
Italy 1,627 0.15 2,462 0.15
Luxembourg 139 0.76 236 0.83
Netherlands 3,172 0.82 4,204 0.73
Portugal 268 0.25 1,031 0.63
Spain 1,737 0.33 2,437 0.24
Sweden 1,666 0.77 2,722 0.78
United Kingdom 4,579 0.32 7,883 0.36
EU members total 26,388 0.33 42,886 0.35
(of which through EC) (5,961) (8,704)
Australia 873 0.25 1,468 0.25
Canada 1,533 0.22 2,599 0.27
Japan 9,847 0.23 8,906 0.19
New Zealand 112 0.25 212 0.23
Norway 1,346 0.80 2,199 0.87
Switzerland 908 0.34 1,545 0.41
United States 11,429 0.11 19,705 0.17
DAC members total 52,435 0.22 79,512 0.26
Non-DAC countries total* 1,178 0.13 3,726 0.17
Table 4.6: Net overseas development assistance of DAC and non-DAC members
2001 and 2004
* Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Kuwait, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates
and other bilateral donors. Source: OECD DAC database, compiled in World Bank (2006b).DEVELOPMENT POLICY
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future aid to current aid initiatives. We cannot be sure that there will not be serious
problems in the future when aid may have to be cut drastically.
There has also been a debate on the need for donors to shift from loans to grants for
the poorest countries. It does not make sense to give loans to countries that are
unable to service their loans unless they get more loans. Some International
Development Association (IDA) resources are now actually used for grants rather
than (very favourable) loans. Cline and Williamson (2005) recommend that the
World Bank opens a third window with grants only.
There is at present an increasing interest in aid through so-called innovative financ-
ing mechanisms. The hope is that they can help increase the volume further and
increase the predictability of flows. The International Finance Facility for
Immunisation (IFFIm) is set up as a pilot IFF. Alongside this there is an advanced
market commitment proposal being developed, and some countries are thinking
about using airline departure taxes to finance the International Drug Purchase
Facility (IDPF) as proposed by France. The pilot IFFIm has received pledges from
1990 1995 2000 2004
East Asia & Pacific 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.3 1.1 1.2 0.7
Latin America & Caribbean 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
Middle East & North Africa 1.5 1.0 1.7
South Asia 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 6.2 4.2 5.3
Table 4.7: Total aid (% of GNI)
Source: World Bank (2006a).
1990 1995 2000 2004
East Asia & Pacific 4.9 5.7 4.8 3.7
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 7.6 24.6 23.0 25.1
Latin America & Caribbean 11.8 13.3 9.7 12.6
Middle East & North Africa 46.2 21.9 16.3 35.0
South Asia 5.4 4.2 3.1 4.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.1 32.3 20.2 35.8
Table 4.8: Total aid per capita (current US$)
Source: World Bank (2006a).FRAGMENTED POWER
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some donors and will launch its first bond issue in 2006. So far, the impact of these
initiatives remains uncertain, but they could become useful channels to transfer
non-government resources in a more coordinated fashion than is usually the case. 
One key challenge for EU development policy during the coming years is to increase
aid volumes as promised. Looking back at history there are plenty of reasons for
scepticism as to the ability or willingness of member states to provide so much aid.
Country allocation of aid
The EU and its member states have stated goals for aid, and we will here discuss
whether the aid practice reflects the stated aims. Donor aid allocation may be influ-
enced by their self-interest, recipient needs, and recipient merit. Self-interest may
be either geopolitical (giving aid to like-minded or potential political allies) or com-
mercial. Aid can be used to build up and develop commercial links such as trade and
FDI. The use of aid-tying is one example of own commercial interests influencing aid
allocation. The development motive is first and foremost the desire to help the poor,
that is countries with a low per capitaincome; typically this is contrary to commer-
cial interests (at least in the short term). Merit indicators are typically governance
and the quality of policies and institutions.
In Berthélemy’s analysis of country allocation of aid the most striking result is that
neither recipient needs nor recipient merits play any significant role in the alloca-
tion of EC aid (Berthélemy 2006b). He finds instead that the special relationships
built between the EC and the ACP countries since the 1970s have a significant influ-
ence. Another observation is that the EC aid allocation is strongly influenced by
British commercial interests, which suggests that the UK has been successful in
lobbying for its own commercial interests in Brussels. These features of EC aid sug-
gest that in part at least it is de facto motivated by other factors than the officially
declared aims.
Commercial interests are also important for the bilateral allocation of aid, but there
is considerable variation across EU states. France and Italy are the most selfish and
allow aid allocation to be governed by trade links. The least selfish are the
Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands (Berthélemy 2006b).
Berthélemy (2006a) also notes that France and Italy provide aid to highly indebted
countries, which could be seen as defensive lending to protect outstanding debt.
The bilateral bias in favour of trading partners means that African countries with low
exports in particular lose out (Berthélemy 2006b). Although EC aid strongly favours
ACP countries, bilateral EU member state aid surprisingly does not.DEVELOPMENT POLICY
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Other multilaterals, such as the World Bank, let their aid allocations be influenced
by needs as measured by per capitaincome and debt ratios. In this respect they are
similar to the bilaterals. It thus seems as if the countries that make up the World
Bank are more able to impose their 'home-grown' values on the World Bank than EU
member states are able to do on the EC. 
Table 4.9 shows the broad distribution of EU member state and EC aid across
regions. About one fifth of total EU member state aid is channelled through the EC.
We see that the member states allocate a larger share to Africa than the EC, which
instead allocates more of its aid to Europe (mainly the Balkan states). This may
reflect the fact that the EC has a broader range of objectives with its aid than pover-
ty reduction. Still, the recent EU development policy (European Parliament, Council,
Commission 2006) states that ‘the Community should find ways to increase the
focus on the poorest countries with a special focus on Africa.’ This is a reasonable
emphasis given the state of the world. It is further stated that the EU should use
‘standard objective and transparent resource allocation criteria based on needs and
performance,’ but the evidence provided above shows that the EC is far from this
target. The distribution of donor activity across countries is uneven and country
choices are not coordinated. This has created 'donor orphans' that are helped by
few, while many donors seek to aid the 'donor darlings'. The EU aid agencies should
coordinate to achieve a more sensible distribution of activities by country.
Donor coordination
Coordination of donor activities may be required to manage the inter-country allo-
cation of aid, but the main debate has been about how to coordinate aid to individ-
ual countries (Bigsten 2006). This is because of the desire to avoid coordination
failures (Halonen-Akatwijuka 2004). Since aid activities are often complementary,
EU member states European Commission
Middle East & North Africa 12 20
Sub-Saharan Africa 53 43
Latin America & Caribbean 12 8
Other Asia/Oceania 8 5
South and Central Asia 10 10
Europe 5 15
Share of total EU aid 79.7% 20.3%
Table 4.9: Regional allocation of aid by EU members and the EC, 2004 (%)
Source: EC-OECD, 2006, p.19 and the OECD-DAC database.FRAGMENTED POWER
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donors need to coordinate to avoid inefficient aid allocations. The difficulty of coor-
dinating donors depends on the similarity of their preferences. Donors may have
different views on what matters for development, or different national interests. In
spite of general proclamations about coordination, it has been hard to achieve in
practice. Each donor has his own goals, which he pursues even if they are in conflict
with those of the recipient government or those of other donors. One advantage of
multilateralism is that it may help reduce the influence of vested interests in the
various donor countries (Kanbur 2000, 2003). 
The scope for harmonising activities also varies according to the circumstances of
the recipient country. DFID (2006b) makes a three-way distinction. In well-per-
forming aid-dependent countries, they argue that one can reduce donors' demands,
which overload recipient governments, and give resources with fewer strings
attached. In fragile states with weak capacity, donors need a strategy for interacting
with the government and others to improve decisions and support service delivery.
Finally, in non-aid dependent countries donors may provide policy input rather than
financial resources. 
One important aspect of EU development aid practices is therefore coordination: of
EC activities, between the EC and the bilateral activities of EU member states, and
with the non-EU development community. Is the EU just one more donor creating
coordination problems, or is it a force for better coordination? EU aid aims to com-
plement that of bilateral donors and focus on different aspects. The Maastricht
Treaty states that EC development cooperation is to be guided by the principles of
coordination, complementarity, and coherence. Compared to bilateral donors, such
as Sweden's SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), the EC
has a much broader range of instruments. The Commission has a variety of policy
areas and financial instruments, but coherence between the goals is sometimes
lacking. The general development policies are similar in, for example, Sweden and
the EU, but in the actual implementation there can be substantial differences.
When aid volumes increase, the requirement for coordination also increases
7.
Coordination can take the form of pooled budget support
8as well as pooled capacity-
building efforts. This may require joint programming, joint strategies and possibly
joint offices as well. There should also be a better division of labour at sector level.
Donors can try to overcome coordination problems by better information-sharing.
Disch (1999) found it is easier to reach agreements on policies (at least in princi-
ple), but it is harder to do so with regard to procedures and practices. Differences in
how projects or programmes are implemented generate a huge burden and hightransaction costs for both donors and recipients. Therefore coordination at this level
offers large potential gains.
There are some interesting initiatives under way. For example, in April 2006 EU min-
isters agreed on a new format for EU country programmes, to be adopted on a vol-
untary and gradual basis by member states. The EC will use it for the development
of new country programmes for ACP countries. This might possibly serve as a basis
for joint multiannual programming with the EU member states and other donors.
DFID still expects to develop its own strategies alongside the EC (DFID 2006b). The
Nordic+ donors
9 have set out an agenda to improve the division of labour among
donors. The aim is to delegate responsibility through measures such as appointing
lead donors or delegating authority, and limiting the number of donors operating in
each sector. At country level, the coordination must be based on the Poverty
Reduction Strategy process. Donors tend to say that they need to concentrate their
aid efforts in fewer countries, but de facto this does not happen. The importance of
a global presence seems to weigh more heavily than aid efficiency considerations,
both for the EC and member states. At present the World Bank and the DAC are col-
laborating to enhance the Consultative Group Round Table processes.
The donors are aware of the importance of donor coordination and have recently
issued two declarations
10 on the issue. The EC should be able to act as a coordinat-
ing agency
11, but the evidence available does not suggest that the EC is so far able
to fulfil this role. It is functioning rather as just another aid agency, but one with
more complicated decision-making and more bureaucratic procedures. Much there-
fore needs to be done before one can say that EC aid is coordinated. There does not
seem to be any evidence suggesting that it is more efficient than bilateral aid. One
solution would be to phase out EC aid altogether and thereby reduce the number of
players. On the other hand, if one is optimistic about the ability of the EC to reform,
one could move in the other direction and try to strengthen the role of the EC as the
overall coordinator of EU member state aid policies. The EC could then increase its
scale of activities and really coordinate EU actions. It has a broader range of instru-
ments at hand that can be used to pursue more comprehensive approaches cover-
ing also, for example, trade and security issues, which the bilateral donors do not
normally cover. Mackie et al.(2005) discusses the complementarity of EC and bilat-
eral aid, and considers the possibility of going for a future EU Development Policy
Statement that also covers member states' aid programmes. This would be a chal-
lenging task, and it does not seem to be a likely outcome of the current reform
process. Nor is the likely outcome a complete abandonment of EC aid. Therefore we
will here discuss ways of gradually improving the current system.
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The Paris Declaration (OECD 2005a) provided a comprehensive agenda for aid
processes. It covered five areas:
Ownership: meaning that there should be nationally owned and led development
strategies linked to the budget process in recipient countries. The aim of the new
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) is to give aid recipients more policy
space. There has been a modest reduction in the extent of conditionality relative to
the old structural adjustment programmes. The constraint is that the reduction of
conditions that donors are willing to accept depends on whether recipients are able
to put adequate reporting systems in place. Policy-making in Africa today is based
on the Poverty Reduction Strategy system demanded by the donors. Donors should
provide resources to help implement the national strategies.
Alignment: meaning that aid flows should be aligned with the national priorities of
recipient countries. This means that aid should go through the government budgets.
Donors should work with the recipient government to ensure that procurement and
financial management systems are acceptable. This may require support for nation-
al capacity-building programmes that make it possible for the partner country
effectively to manage aid resources as well as own resources. Donor should strive
to provide joint support to these programmes
12. Donors should use partner procure-
ment and financial systems whenever they have confidence in them
13. They should
also use flexible financing such as budget support to a higher degree. They should
avoid setting up parallel systems for project implementation. They should make aid
more predictable and provide information on disbursement plans in good time for
the budget process.
Harmonisation: meaning that one should use common arrangements and proce-
dures. This would mean a shift of resources from projects to programmes when con-
ditions allow it. Donors should seek joint analyses of joint missions, and shared
documentation, and they should also support country-led analyses.
Managing for results: meaning that donors should work jointly with recipient gov-
ernments and other donors to develop a common framework for monitoring
progress.
Mutual accountability: meaning mutual assessments of progress and a mutual
accountability mechanism. The mechanisms for aid delivery are very important for
how effectively aid is used. Aid recipients still have to deal with dozens of official
FRAGMENTED POWER
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Declaration is strongly reflected in the recent EU paper on aid policies (European
Parliament, Council, Commission 2006).
The quality and effectiveness of EC development collaboration in particular has
been questioned (slow disbursements, bureaucratic procedures, lack of poverty
focus, etc., see eg Dearden 2002), but some reforms have been undertaken in
recent years (Berlin, Resare 2005). The reforms of 2000 and the adoption of the UN
Millennium Development Goals have partly been a response to criticisms of a lack
of poverty focus, but at the same time the share of aid going to countries in the
neighbourhood has increased at the expense of aid going to the poor ACP countries. 
The programming methodology for Commission aid has changed since 2000. When
it comes to budget support there is extensive use of performance indicators. The
structural adjustment lending during the 1980s and 1990s was based on ex ante
conditionality, that is, promises of policy reforms. Since this did not work very well,
there has been an argument that donors should shift to ex postconditionality, that
is to say aid based on recipient performance according to certain ultimate goals.
The European Commission pioneered this type of aid allocation, and since 1999
financing conventions with ACP countries include a ‘variable financing tranche’,
where aid transfers are based on the outcomes of certain social and economic vari-
ables (Adam et al. 2004).  The idea is that performance-based contracts will lead to
better ownership, which in turn is considered essential for good performance. It will
make it possible for the recipient country to define its own policy packages, reduce
the problem of donor coordination, and increase predictability of resource flows.
This new modality was introduced gradually and in several instances existed along-
side conventional conditionality. Adam et al. (2004) evaluate four country cases
where it was more fully implemented. They found first that there was no significant
shift in ownership, partly because the new modality only covered a relatively small
fraction of the aid. It is also noted that in the early stages of the reform the donor
still relied extensively on intermediate indicators rather than impact indicators,
which means that the difference, relative to traditional policy conditionality, was
small. It is also hard for recipient governments in poor countries to collect impact
data. Here is an area where donor efforts would be useful. 
The results of policy reforms in Africa have been limited, although the period since
1995 has seen some improvements in economic growth. Policy reforms, even sen-
sible ones, have not been enough to bring about an economic take-off in Africa.




in the recent literature, poor institutions have generally been found to be the major
growth constraint in Africa
14. An important question in this context is therefore
whether the international community, including the EU, can change institutions
through aid and conditionality. 
When it comes to the analysis of aid impacts it is therefore important to consider
how the donor-recipient relationship is organised and how it affects institutions and
implementation. The EU was successful in influencing institutions in Eastern
European countries by requiring reforms as a condition for EU accession. Since
African and other developing countries are not candidate countries, the EU cannot
exert such an influence. But the issue is certainly worthy of consideration. 
Types of aid
Collier (2006) argues that if we want scaled-up aid to have an effect we need to find
new areas where aid can be effectively used. Moreover, aid packages must be
adapted to different recipient environments. This is clearly a sensible approach. In
Africa, he identifies three different types of countries that need different strategies. 
The first category is resource-rich countries that have large and often corrupt gov-
ernment sectors, since they earn sizeable resource rents which accrue to the gov-
ernment. The key for this group is improving the efficiency of their public spending.
Knowledge transfers and governance conditionality can be used to try to make gov-
ernments more accountable to their citizens. Good systems of public spending can
be supported by appropriate technical assistance. For rents to be effectively used it
is probably necessary that power is widely diffused. This is currently very important
as African countries are experiencing a resource boom. It is crucially important that
this windfall is used well. This requires accountability.
The second category is resource-scarce coastal economies that can develop by
diversifying exports. Their engine of growth will be private exporting firms. What is
needed is an environment that is conducive to new exporters; aid should be geared
to support this. It can support critical export infrastructure and provide guarantees
against expropriation. The customs service, the administration of taxation, the oper-
ation of ports, and the regulation of production has to be brought up to internation-
al standards. Other infrastructure for exports should be put in place. A special con-
cern here is the risk of ‘Dutch disease’, which needs to be counteracted by, for exam-
ple, trade liberalisation. Aid needs to be properly sequenced to help this process.
The third category is resource-scarce and landlocked countries. These have theDEVELOPMENT POLICY
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most serious problem.  They are likely to remain poor for a long time and will there-
fore need aid for their poor populations. There is no clear engine of growth unless
neighbours grow faster. Therefore they need a broad-based development strategy
with emphasis on rural development.
Collier (2006) distinguishes several failures of policy choice in Africa in recent
decades. The first is the corrupt elite that benefits from a dysfunctional govern-
ment. Policy conditionality is one option, but it has not worked very well. The alter-
native is governance conditionality aimed at weakening the dominance of the gov-
erning elite
15.  Unfortunately there is a knowledge gap about how to implement gov-
ernance conditionality. When there is lack of knowledge the key is knowledge trans-
fer. A parallel constraint is a lack of administrative capacity in the civil service,
which needs to be developed by various forms of technical assistance. Already
about $20 billion or roughly a quarter of aid is in the form of technical assistance,
but it needs to be aligned with the new paradigm of ownership and control. 
Democracy has two important dimensions: electoral competition, and checks and
balances.  Resource-rich countries in particular need democracy to avoid elite cap-
ture of rents, but checks and balances are needed to prevent elections from being
converted into corrupt patronage games financed by the resource rents. System
scrutiny is needed to achieve honesty, and other systems are needed to achieve
efficiency. Since scrutiny is a public good, it is subject to collective action problems,
and donors could in this respect help to organise citizens. They could probably also
stimulate peer-group evaluations. The scrutiny process also has a severe agency
problem. To reduce this, donors could help improve information for the principals,
build the capacity to analyse it, and promote incentives for agents to perform. Once
a system is in place, donors have an important role to play by insisting that rewards
and penalties are built in and implemented. Audit systems and parliamentary
scrutiny are key areas for intervention.
A key aim for donors should be to improve governance and implementation capacity
in recipient countries. This requires governance conditionality combined with tech-
nical assistance to build up systems that can handle government resources trans-
parently and accountably. The World Bank has been reluctant to push for account-
able governance, but EU countries and the EC can take the lead because they are
less constrained than the IFIs when making politically sensitive interventions.
Debt reduction
Debt issues have been high on the global agenda in recent years. The HIPC (heavilyindebted poor countries) programme was proposed by the World Bank and the IMF
in 1996 and an extended version came in 1999. The purpose of it was to reduce
debt in developing countries to a sustainable level, that is, a level at which they can
service their debts. Countries that qualify for IDA and Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility can benefit from this. The countries undertake to implement economic
reform programmes, and at the decision point the net present value (NPV)
debt/export ratio is not to exceed 150 percent and the debt/tax revenue ratio 250
percent. Other debts are handled by the Paris Club, which provides debt reduction as
part of debt clean-up operations. The Paris Club consists of governments with large
outstanding debts in developing countries. It is an informal group that attempts to
coordinate solutions to the debt problems for heavily indebted countries. The HIPC
debt relief was expected substantially to reduce debt service ratios. For the 29
countries concerned the NPV of debt is set to decline by two-thirds when they reach
the completion point.
The G8 proposal from June 2005, now called the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI) will cancel 100 percent of the debt that heavily indebted poor countries owe
to the African Development Fund (AfDF), the International Development Association
and the International Monetary Fund. The complete debt reduction will occur when
they have reached the completion point under the HIPC arrangement. This initiative
will give a further reduction of $50 billion. This initiative does not propose parallel
reduction of bilateral or commercial debt. The cancellation is contingent on sound
macroeconomic performance, implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy, and
public expenditure management systems. 
For this initiative to benefit poor countries there is need for additional donor financ-
ing, so that the capacity for IDA, for example, to lend to poor countries is not under-
mined. The idea is that donors will provide baseline funds as usual, plus extra
money to compensate for the reduction in reflows from debtors.
The donors have promised to replenish the IDA funds fully to compensate for debt
reduction. Whether this is additional money or money that is taken from the regular
aid budget remains to be seen, but one would suspect that the latter share may be
significant. This means that spending on other projects will have to be cut back.  It
is not self-evident that the resource flow to LDCs will increase because of this new
initiative, although it seems likely.
Debt reduction will create more fiscal space for those countries to be used for pover-
ty reduction measures. This will require good fiscal expenditure management as
well as sound management of post-relief public borrowing. The MDRI commits donor
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of future support for poor countries. For the 29 countries poverty-related expendi-
tures have increased from about six percent of GDP in 1999 to about nine percent
in 2005.
Most of the increase in aid in 2005 (according to the accounting practices of DAC)
represents debt write-offs. Since what is written off is sometimes export credits
that have not been serviced and were given originally to subsidise the exports of
European firms, it arguably should not be part of the aid definition. DAC EU countries
in 2005 provided $55.7 billion in net ODA. Of that, $14.7 billion was in the form of
debt relief grants (Addison 2006).
A problem with the initiative is that money is shifted from countries that have man-
aged their debt service carefully to countries that have not. One may also ask what
the signals are for the future. Will countries in the future be interested in managing
their debt services well and will people be willing to lend to those countries? Is it
meaningful to undertake these transfers unless there is a guarantee that reforms
are undertaken? Otherwise the money may end up once again in a black hole.
Debt reductions make it possible for governments to shift money to improve their
infrastructure and institutions and/or make it possible to tax firms less harshly, but
they do not change fundamental inefficiencies in institutional systems. This must
be done by the countries themselves and it may be necessary to do it in the face of
opposition from powerful vested interests. The discussion of conditionality above is
relevant also here. 
The EC has contributed to HIPC and other debt relief initiatives. The policy of the EU
in this area should be to continue to support international initiatives and to make
sure that its other activities do not undermine the ambition of achieving sustain-
able debt situations for the poorest countries.  
Trade, the Common Agricultural Policy
16and development
Trade policy vis-á-visdeveloping economies is possibly the most important compo-
nent of the EU’s development policy. Estimates using the linkage model of the glob-
al economy (Anderson, Martin, van der Mensbrugghe 2006, and World Bank 2006b)
suggest that a full liberalisation of merchandise trade would increase world GDP by
$287 billion per year by 2015 with $86 billion of this accruing to developing coun-
tries
17. These estimates furthermore disregard gains from service trade liberalisa-




Saharan Africa would experience an income increase of $4.8 billion or 1.1 percent
of its GDP, which seems modest but still represents a relative income gain for the
region that is double the world average. Two thirds of the gains are due to reforms in
other countries and one third is due to its own reforms. As much as 78 percent of the
gains for sub-Saharan Africa would come from agricultural reforms, and essentially
the whole gain from EU liberalisation would derive from reforms in agriculture. These
reforms would also have a very positive distributional impact in the developing
countries, since it is farmers and unskilled labour that are most likely to gain from
trade liberalisation (Hertel, Winters 2006).
However, full liberalisation of merchandise trade is not likely in the short term. An
attempt has been made during the last five years to reach a multilateral agreement
within the WTO framework. The aim of the Doha Round was to achieve multilateral,
reciprocal, non-discriminatory trade liberalisation. Successful completion of the
round would have implied significantly lower levels of protection, although still
some way from full free trade. Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2006)
simulate various possible outcomes of the negotiations and find that the effect on
global real income by 2015 would be in the range of $75-$120 billion. In these sce-
narios, however, almost all of the gains accrue to the reforming high-income coun-
tries, while the impact on sub-Saharan Africa specifically would be modest. Thus,
the ‘concessions’ that the EU and other industrialised countries are willing to make
would largely benefit themselves. For the Doha Round to benefit Africa, much more
is needed. It would be important to transfer some of the gains from liberalisation
from the EU
18to Africa in the form of more aid, for example, to develop supply capac-
ities in sub-Saharan Africa via improvements in transport and market infrastructure,
training, and extension (see Hertel and Winters 2006).
Computable general equilibrium models capture the static gains from a better allo-
cation of resources, but trade may also be associated with dynamic gains. Cline
(2004) has reviewed the many studies that have been done on the trade-growth
relationship. This is controversial literature since it is hard to show clearly a causal
relationship
19, but it is abundantly clear that the countries that have succeeded in
increasing income levels substantially have also been successful in the export mar-
kets. The gains are partly static gains of specialisation and partly due to dynamic
gains in the form of positive effects on total factor productivity. 
To be able to integrate with the world economy, developing countries need to have
systems in place that make it possible for them to be an arena for outsourcing and
FDI generally. This requires systems that can guarantee quality and timely deliver-
ies. If products are part of process and a marketing drive it is fatal to deliver late.Stability and security are therefore essential for LDCs if they are to benefit from the
forces of globalisation. The World Bank (2006b) notes that a typical import transac-
tion in Africa takes 58 days versus 14 days in industrialised countries, and that
each day of delay reduces exports by one percent. At Gleneagles there was a lot of
interest in ‘aid for trade’, that is support for developing country efforts to expand
their exports. The EC announced in June 2005 an increase in trade-related assis-
tance by €300 million, and the UK has also announced that it will increase its aid-
for-trade rapidly until 2010.
The ACP countries should be the main concern for EU development policy. In recent
decades they have been marginalised in the world market. Their share of world
exports was 3.2 percent in 1970, but had fallen to 1.8 percent by 2003. The fall in
the share of the ACP countries in the EU market was even more dramatic with a
decline from 4.1 percent to 1.0 percent over the same period (Borrmann, Busse,
Neuhaus 2004). Thus, the EU Generalised System of Preferences does not seem to
have had any significant effect. The fact that other parts of the world have done
much better in terms of export expansion suggests that there are major supply-side
constraints in the ACP countries. In the last couple of years the resource boom in
prices of oil and other natural resources has increased export incomes, and sub-
Saharan Africa saw incomes from merchandise exports increase by 27 percent in
2005 (World Bank 2006b). This also reflects ongoing liberalisation including the
elimination of quotas on textile and clothing exports in January 2005. So there have
been some improvements in recent years because of the boom, but how long this
will last is an open question. 
It is hard to measure the overall impact of the full set of trade restrictions, so there-
fore the World Bank has computed overall trade restrictiveness indices (OTRI) in
recent years. An OTRI is the uniform tariff equivalent of different protective meas-
ures observed for a country that would generate the prevailing level of trade. It is
shown that OTRIs are negatively correlated with GDP. The richer the country, the
lower the OTRIs on its imports, as well as on its exports (World Bank 2005). Between
2002 and 2005 the global OTRI fell by two percentage points (Table 4.10), but we
may note that the poorest region, that is sub-Saharan Africa, still has high tariffs.
Still, average tariffs in developing countries fell from 16.3 percent in 1997 to 12.2
percent in 2005 (World Bank 2006b). Sub-Saharan African countries not only face
high tariffs in the developed countries, but even higher tariffs on their trade with
other developing countries (World Bank 2005). So while sub-Saharan Africa
exporters face low barriers in manufacturing, the restrictiveness on export of agri-




The trade restrictiveness confronting exports from low-income countries is above the
world average in spite of the preferences granted. This reflects the continuing impor-
tance of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). For poor countries, the NTBs for agricul-
tural products that matter most. Even sub-Saharan Africa countries face low manufac-
turing tariffs, they face high restrictions in their most important export: agriculture.
Tariffs are still high with the EU for a range of agricultural products that are impor-
tant to developing countries, with tariffs on sugar being as high as 250 percent
(Dimaranan, McDougall 2002).  Table 4.11 shows that there were also considerable
tariffs on textiles and clothing, which means that overall protection against devel-
oping country exports has been substantial. It should be noted as well that the
countries that are eligible for the EU’s Everything But Arms duty-free entry account
for a very small part of EU imports. The numbers in Table 4.11 therefore reflect the
level or protection experienced by the bulk of LDCs trying to sell to Europe.  The CAP
and high level of agricultural protection in Europe are major problems for LDCs. This
has had negative consequences on farmers in the LDCs, and with the recent agree-
ment between France and Germany it seems unlikely that much can be achieved in
terms of liberalisation and deregulation during the current programme period.
Agriculture has been in focus in the Doha Round, but this is a politically sensitive
sector, although it is no longer very important economically in the richer regions
including the EU. The protectionist measures applied within the EU are reducing the
welfare of EU citizens at the same time as holding down incomes in, for example,
Africa. It should be easy to get an agreement between the parties, but the agricul-
tural lobbies in the north are very strong. The Doha Round of negotiations for a mul-
tilateral tariff reduction was suspended in July 2006 and is unlikely now to be
finalised before the US Trade Promotion Authority expires in July 2007. It was sus-
pended because of a failure by the US, the EU, Japan, Brazil, India and Australia to
Importing country group 2005 Change 2002-2005
East Asia & Pacific 16 -5.3
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 11 -1.2
Latin America & the Caribbean 17 -1.1
Middle East & North Africa 27 -4.3
South Asia 19 -4.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 23 0.0
Table 4.10: Developing country overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI) by region
and changes 2002-2005
Source: World Bank (2006b), p.95.DEVELOPMENT POLICY
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agree on three issues, namely market opening in the agricultural sector
(particularly by the EU)
20; cuts in subsidies paid to farmers (by the US); and
increased market openings for industrial goods (in which Brazil and India are key).
This was very disappointing, since the Doha Round represented an opportunity to
make the world trade system fairer for all participating countries. It is too early to
say whether it will be possible to get the round on track again. 
So for the time being the EU will have to concentrate on bilateral negotiations which,
from a development policy point of view, should be focused on Africa and the ACP
countries.  There is a system of trade preferences in place, which matters somewhat
for poor African economies. In 2005 the EC introduced a more generous system of
preferences, offering duty-free access for 80 percent of the dutiable tariff lines to a
set of poor countries that meet certain criteria. Still, one would be able to achieve
better results for sub-Saharan Africa and distort their overall trade less by using
other forms of trade assistance. Such measures should include a drastic reduction
of most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, and other entry barriers to the EU, on goods
and services that sub-Saharan Africa can effectively supply.
The existing system of trade preferences for the ACP countries is against WTO rules.
They discriminate against LDCs that are not in the ACP group, and they lack reciproc-
ity, which is another requirement. The EU and the ACP countries did not manage to
finalise a new arrangement during the Cotonou negotiation, so therefore the WTO
granted them an eight-year waiver that expires at the end of 2007. The EPAs, cover-
ing trade relations and EU assistance measures plus measures to enhance intra-
regional and international integration, therefore needs to be put in place shortly
(unless another extension can be obtained). 
There still remain EU tariffs on, for example, agricultural goods. These are very detri-
mental to African countries in particular, and they should be eliminated. There is
Sector United States European Union
Agriculture 19.9 46.4
Textiles and clothing 10.9 11.6
Other manufacturing 2.1 3.2
Oil, other non-agricultural raw materials 0.9 0.6
Aggregate measure of protection 4.0 9.5
Table 4.11: Aggregate measures of protection against developing countries
(% tariff equivalents)
Source: World Bank (2006b), p.95.also scope for reforms in several other areas, such as rules of origin, technical stan-
dards, quotas and subsidies. The African and other ACP countries should be allowed
to reduce their tariffs on EU exports at a slower pace. Such an asymmetric timetable
will be acceptable to the WTO, but it has to end within a reasonable period of time.
Milner, Morrissey, and McKay (2005) suggest that 10 years would be a reasonable
timeframe estimate, meaning markets would be open by 2018.  Services trade
should also ultimately be included in these arrangements. Regulatory systems
should also be improved to facilitate investment, and institutions that facilitate
trade need to be developed.
Simulations of the effects of EPAs (eg Milner, Morrissey, McKay 2005) find that the
short-run welfare effects will be limited, and it is also shown that African economies
would have relatively more to gain from unilateral liberalisation against all coun-
tries, not just the EU. Such measures would be more growth enhancing since they
would be less discriminatory. 
The LDCs in particular have relatively little to gain, with regard to trade, from enter-
ing into EPAs, since they already have almost free access to the EU market under
the Everything But Arms initiative. They will get even better access in the future as
the remaining tariffs and quotas on bananas, rice, and sugar will be phased out by
July 2009. The LDCs will then have full and free access to the EU market (including
the commodities currently subject to the EU’s commodity protocols with the ACP
countries). However, these countries still face the risk that the EU may use various
safeguard clauses to stem export surges, and countries may be eliminated from the
generous treatment when they graduate from the LDC category.
It may be hard to entice the 39 LDCs in the 79-strong ACP group to enter into EPAs
unless further benefits are offered. These could include simpler and less restrictive
rules of origin, concessions in trade in services, reduction in non-tariff barriers,
financial support to help the LDCs deal with the adjustment costs, and technical
assistance to help them develop their exports (Borrmann, Busse, Neuhas 2004).
The non-LDC members will see larger benefits from entering into the EPAs, since
they do not have the same advantages at present. It would also be more beneficial
than the more restrictive GSP option.
The EPAs will lead to reduced tariff revenues, which often contributes a substantial
share of government revenue in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a concern if the expect-
ed expansion of export incomes is slow in coming, which would be the case in the
least efficient economies. They need to replace the tariff revenues with other gov-




industries, and manage intra-regional trade more effectively (Hinkle, Schiff 2004).
For the EPAs to have major positive effects, they need to be combined with other
types of reforms (as discussed by for example Hinkle and Newfarmer (2006)).
In spite of these adjustment problems the ACP countries need to open up to interna-
tional competition, so the EPA process may have beneficial long-term effects. It
needs to be supported by other measures to facilitate export expansion in ACP coun-
ters. The EPAs should be utilised as instruments of development (Hinkle, Schiff
2004). EPAs should be followed by measures in other areas in sub-Saharan African
countries, such as exchange rate policy, trade facilitation measures, improving the
investment climate, and competition policy and infrastructure investment.
Multilateral liberalisation might be superior, but even if the countries follow that
path, they could still have EPAs as well to get some of the non-trade benefits asso-
ciated with them (Gasiorek, Winter 2004)
21.
Countries that do not enter into EPAs will be left with the GSP, and they may lose the
extra aid disbursements and technical assistance associated with the EPAs. They
will face a considerable erosion of the margin of preferences they will receive on
exports to the EU. They can then avoid making reductions on their import tariffs, but
that is not an advantage since they need to adopt a more outward orientation. The
really poor countries are in any case in great need of institutional, technical and
financial assistance. Regional integration may help to increase export supply, but
the major challenge is to improve domestic policies and institutions.
So the WTO track would be the best option, but given that this is presently stuck, the
current key challenge is to concentrate on agreements with the poorest countries,
largely African countries. This is in accordance with the strategy suggested by Cline
and Williamson (2005) for the US. They recommended that the first track in a
reform strategy should be a ‘deep multilateral liberalisation involving phased but
complete elimination of protection by industrial countries and deep reduction of
protection by at least the middle-income developing countries albeit on a more
gradual schedule. The second track is immediate free entry for imports from ‘high-
risk’ low-income countries (HIPCs, LDCs, sub-Saharan Africa) coupled with a ten-
year holiday from taxes imposed by developed countries for direct investment in
the high-risk low-income countries.’ 
Cline and Williamson also discuss the inclusion of intellectual property rights under
the WTO. They acknowledge that extended rights are a stimulus to innovative activ-
ity, but they note that this comes at the expense of the ease and cheapness of dif-
fusion. The international community eventually accepted the arguments fromdeveloping countries and allowed them access to low-cost generic pharmaceuti-
cals. The Doha Declaration of 2001 recognised the right to grant compulsory
licences to manufacture generic drugs to deal with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics (WTO 2001). This was followed by an agreement that coun-
tries which could not produce the drugs themselves would be allowed to import
them from other developing countries.
The need for policy coherence, that is to say consistency between aid interventions
and other EC policies, has been emphasised for years in EU documents. This
includes coherence between development policy and foreign policy in general, and
trade policy in particular. The three major EU initiatives, Everything But Arms, EPA
and GSP, need to be coherent with other development initiatives.
Still, there are many problems for developing country exporters because of the rule
of origin restrictions, which means that they cannot freely export goods to the EU if
the raw materials going into those goods are largely imported from other parts of
the world. Also the strengthening of WTO rules may make it harder to provide extra
preferences to a certain set of countries. There are also sanitary measures that may
be problematic for African producers. Among WTO members it is now not only tariffs
that are used as protectionist measures. There are also safeguards in case the
expansion is too fast.
After a decade-long transition period, during which Europe should have adjusted its
textile and clothing sectors, imports were liberalised at the beginning of 2005. But
after only a couple of months with rapidly increased exports from China, both the EU
and the US put pressure on China to hold back their exports, and some import
restrictions were re-imposed. This is remarkable after an agreement had been
signed with developing countries and a ten-year preparation period. It is easier to
expand aid a little than to accept free trade, which has consequences for specific
sectors of the economy. The costs of aid are widespread, while the negative effects
of opening up to trade are concentrated on certain groups.
Thus, Europe still has considerable trade protection for certain types of production,
and most developing countries have even higher levels of protection for their indus-
try. Basic trade theory suggests that the static effect of a tariff introduced to protect
the importables sector does indeed protect it, but it hurts exportables production
even more, and so welfare declines. But could there be dynamic effects that more
than compensate for the short-term misallocation of resources? Europe is mainly
protecting agriculture and some less sophisticated industrial activities. These are
hardly the sectors where we expect dynamic effects that will compensate for the
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Europe would gain in welfare from a shift to free trade is obvious. Europe therefore
does not need to be a tough negotiator demanding compensation for sacrifices from
trading partners in the developing world, since Europe is not sacrificing welfare.
Europe is sacrificing the interests of some special interest groups, such as farmers,
but the losses they experience should be handled with compensatory adjustment
measures.
The future development policy of the EU
EU development policy covers several areas, and we have here discussed aid, debt
reduction and trade issues. Here we sum up the recommendations in those areas,
but one really needs to consider them in relation to other aspects of EU development
policy.
Coordination of aid between the EC and member countries:Should the EC be a chan-
nel of aid or should this be left to the individual member countries? Since the EC
mainly duplicates bilateral aid and does not help coordinate the activities of mem-
ber countries, it may be seen as an extra institution that just makes coordination
more difficult and makes it even harder for the recipient countries to manage aid
flows from Europe. Since EC aid is not seen as particularly efficient it may seem
hard to argue for the preservation of EC aid.
Still, there are actually some arguments for a move in the opposite direction. Such a
move could imply that member countries would let future EC Development Policy
Statements also cover their own aid programmes or even channel all EU aid through
the EC. A potential drawback of the abandonment of country programmes could be
that popular support for aid in various EU countries would decline. Still, in the short
term neither the abandonment of EC aid nor the radical option of having all aid in one
pot seem likely, so the immediate practical task is to improve coordination between
EC aid, bilateral aid and aid from other donors. This is very high on the official aid
agenda of most donors, and has been so for many years, but progress has been lim-
ited (Easterly 2006). Still, by shifting aid towards more general forms of aid, such
as balance of payments support, donors may reduce the coordination problem and
possibly also increase ownership. When different donors finance the same projects
or programmes, one donor should be nominated to act as the coordinating agent
responsible for government contacts and follow-up. There is a range of improve-
ments of this type that could be implemented.




selves to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in aid no later than 2015. This will be a major
challenge for many of the old EU members that provide a much smaller share, while
it will almost certainly be too ambitious an aim for the newcomers. This is still a
valid goal for the older members and the EC needs to monitor the progress of mem-
ber countries towards this goal.
Country allocation of aid: EC aid allocations are more geared to commercial inter-
ests and less to the needs of the recipient countries than aid from the bilaterals.
This means that a shift in the allocation of aid from bilateral aid to the EC level may
shift the emphasis of the aid programme away from the more altruistic stance that
EU members tend to take at national level. The EU aid agencies need to coordinate
their decisions better to achieve a more sensible global distribution of activities.
Governance conditionality: We have argued that institutions and governance are
crucial development constraints, and that the impact of aid on those is very impor-
tant. Collier (2006) proposed that there should be a shift from policy conditionality
to governance conditionality. The former undermined accountability to citizens,
while the latter would reinforce it. A good system would be common to all donors,
predictable and agreed. This is an area where the EC could have a comparative
advantage relative to the member states. This would both push European democrat-
ic values, while at the same time improving efficiency. If the EC can perform a use-
ful role here, it is not sensible to abandon EC aid altogether. 
Governance of global institutions: The governance of global institutions has not
been dealt with in this chapter, but it is worthy of serious consideration
22. The EU
should develop a policy on the IFIs. It should review the international aid architec-
ture and evaluate if a better division of labour can be envisaged. One needs a better
system of allocating resources to the multilaterals
23. The EU should also take a
stance on the governance of global economic institutions. On the whole, Europe is
overrepresented in these and if the EC takes over more of the European role, nation-
al representation could be reduced to leave room for important developing countries
like China, India and Brazil.
Debt reduction measures: The conclusion here is simply that the EU should contin-
ue to support the debt reduction initiatives that are in place, and to make sure that
it lends responsibly in the future to the least-developed countries.
Trade: Europe would gain and the poor countries would gain and have a better
chance of taking off economically if Europe would open up its markets even further.
It is hard to find any policy area where the self-interest of Europe and the interestsof solidarity are both served to this extent. Since this is an area where the EC han-
dles WTO negotiations for all EU members, EC involvement is crucial. Within the aid
segment of EC development policy it would be natural to let aid-for-trade be a key
area. 
Coherence: The EU and the whole of the OECD have often reiterated the need for pol-
icy coherence for development (OECD 2003b). Sweden has adopted an official pol-
icy of trying to ensure that all policies are consistent with the desire for global devel-
opment and poverty reduction in poor countries (Sweden 2001). The EU has formu-
lated it as follows: ‘Efforts must be made to ensure that Community development
policy objectives are taken into account in the formulation and implementation of
other policies affecting the developing countries. The way to achieve this is to make
a systematic and thorough analysis of the direct and indirect effects of measures
in especially sensitive areas and to take development problems into account in the
Commission decision-making process’ (OECD 2002, p.43). Policies across various
ministries as well as across various countries should thus support the overall goal
of development in LDCs and create synergies among each other. This ambition to
achieve policy coherence matters both from an altruistic perspective and a self-
interest perspective. 
Action on coherence among decision-makers is limited and there is a lack of capac-
ity to monitor policy coherence. It may be overambitious to seek to take the devel-
opment impact of all policies into account, but EU members should at least try to
improve the coherence of the policies that are most important for LDCs. Of the poli-
cy areas discussed in this chapter, the politically most problematic for policy
change is not aid policy but trade policy and the CAP. This is a challenge to EU poli-
cy makers, since the latter areas are probably the most important to change if we
take our commitment to development seriously.
Notes
1 The term 'European Community' (EC) is used throughout this chapter to refer to the joint develop-
ment effort of the European Union's member states acting as the European Community, and draw-
ing on the Community's budget and the European Development Fund, as opposed to what EU mem-
ber states do individually.
2 A social indicator supporting the notion that the situation for people around the world generally has
improved is life expectancy at birth. Here sub-Saharan Africa is an exception: it actually saw a
decline from 49.2 years to 46.2 years between 1990 and 2004 due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
South Asia is also lagging behind, but life expectancy still saw an improvement from 58.7 years to
63.4 years over the same period. The EU countries saw an increase from 76.2 to 79.4 during the
same 14 years (World Bank 2006a).
3 See the discussion in Maxwell and Engel (2003) and Mackie et al.(2005) for an evaluation of this
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125Development Policy Statement.
4 This replaced the Lome Convention that guided collaboration from 1975 to 2000.
5 This generalised system of preferences was accepted by the EC in 2001 and now covers 49 coun-
tries.
6 Foreign direct investment is an important source of investment, but it still represents less than ten
percent of world investment (except in the boom around 2000). Between 1990 and 2004 the
share of foreign direct investments in GDP globally increased from 1.0 percent to 1.6 percent, in
East Asia and the Pacific it increased from 1.6 percent to 2.5 percent, in Latin America and the
Caribbean from 0.8 percent to 3.0 percent, in South Asia from 0.1 percent to 0.8 percent, and in
sub-Saharan Africa from 0.4 percent to 2.2 percent.
7 Hansen and Tarp (1999) found that there are declining returns to aid and that the positive effect
of aid inflows ceases when aid is about 25 percent of GDP 
8 According to a Strategic Partnership for Africa survey about 28 percent of aid to 14 countries in
Africa comes in the form of budget support (World Bank 2006b, p. 81). It is also noted that memo-
randums of understanding underpinning budget support have helped reduce transaction costs. 
9 The Director-Generals of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK
have presented a joint action plan for harmonisation and alignment of donor practices.
10 The Rome Declaration (OECD 2003a) and the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005a).
11 Donors also coordinate their handling of the debt problems of LDCs through the Paris Club.
12 Kanbur et al.(1999) argued for a common pool approach: ‘The objectives are (i) to reduce day-to-
day interference in the management of the aid program, (ii) reduce fragmentation within and
across projects and policies, (iii) improve “ownership” of the development strategy by the domes-
tic political economy of the recipient country, and (iv) still give donors the right to modulate their
funding based on recipient characteristics. The concept works as follows. Aid flows support the
overall program of the government rather than this or that project. After a period of dialogue, with
the donors but more importantly with its own population, the government puts forward an overall
program of expenditures, with alternative scenarios based on different level of aid flows. The
donors look at this, and put resources into a common pool that will finance the overall program
along with domestic and other resources. At no time is a particular part of the program identified
with a particular donor. All aspects of aid are folded into this structure.’
13 The Commission for Africa (2005, p. 364), as an interim solution, proposed that donors should
mutually recognise each other’s procedures. This has worked within the European Union, where the
members have accepted each other’s procedures as valid without requiring harmonisation around
a specific procedure.
14 An ambitious study trying to explain African economic growth, or rather the lack thereof, has been
undertaken by the African Economic Research Consortium (O’Connell 2004, Collier and O’Connell
n.d.). Four different anti-growth syndromes are identified. First, there is the regulatory syndrome
which refers to excessive government intervention in markets. Second, there is the redistributive
syndrome, where efficiency-reducing resource transfers play a dominant role in the formulation of
government policy. Third, there is the inter-temporal syndrome, which redistributes resources from
the future to the present via for example looting by the elite or unsustainable government spend-
ing booms generally followed by sharp adjustments. Fourth, there is the state breakdown syn-
drome, in other words civil wars or severe political instability. Finally, there are also some countries
that are characterised as syndrome free. The empirical analysis shows that an absence of syn-
dromes increases the growth rate by almost 2 percentage points per year. The main conclusion of
the study is that African growth has faltered due to dysfunctional political-economic configura-
tions or syndromes.
15 DFID wants to reform conditionality and not relate it to specific policy decisions by the partner
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126countries.  Instead they want to monitor progress against agreed benchmarks drawn from the part-
ners’ PRSs. It will consider withdrawing aid when the recipient moves away from commitments to
poverty reduction, human rights and other international obligations, plus sound financial manage-
ment.
16 There is also a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) with similar features, but it is less important than
the CAP.
17 Cline (2004) found that the impact of a complete removal of tariffs on developing countries would
be a long.-run income gain of about $200 billion per year and that about half of this would be due
to removal of developed countries’ import tariffs against developing countries. He also found that
the impact on poverty would be large.
18 EU25+EFTA would gain $65 billion according to these model simulations.
19 See for example the critical review of the evidence by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001)
20 The EU offered some reforms of the CAP in the WTO negotiations. It proposed phasing out of export
subsidies, major cuts in domestic support and improvements in market access. The EU estimated
that the agricultural tariffs would have fallen from 23 percent to 12  percent on average.
21 When it comes to the liberalisation of services, Jansen (2006) concludes that in general the mul-
tilateral route seems preferable. Why only allow EU firms entry, if there are better alternatives avail-
able elsewhere?
22 See the discussion on the international financial architecture in Goldstein (2005).




o the question ‘How does the EU organise its external monetary and financial rela-
tions,’ the immediate answer is ‘not easily’
2. One source of complexity is that inter-
national monetary and financial relations are organised as an overlapping set of
institutions and groupings in which participation and representation are heavily
influenced by political and historical circumstances.
European countries are generously represented in these institutions (see Table
5.1), but their representation bears only a loose relationship to the current condi-
tion of the world economy. European countries have eight members on the 24-per-
son Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (nine when Spain periodi-
cally chairs its predominantly Latin American constituency). This is because a set
of small European countries had a head start in their industrial and financial devel-
opment and figured disproportionately in international trade and financial transac-
tions when the Fund (IMF) was established in 1944, and because representation in
these institutions is slow to change.
The G10 is constituted as it is
3, with seven European members, because a handful of
European countries had substantial dollar balances in the 1960s, making them the
logical parties to address the US gold problem that dominated the international mon-
etary agenda at the time. The G7 is made up as it is, with a majority of European
members, because the states in question were the obvious candidates for the steer-
ing committee for the international monetary and financial system when the latter
entered a period of flux in the 1970s. European countries are therefore generously
represented in all of the venues in which international monetary and financial rela-
tions are considered.
5
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The question is whether this situation is sustainable in a world where the balance of
economic power is shifting toward emerging markets. The increasingly evident
answer is ‘no’. The underrepresentation of emerging markets on the boards of the
IMF and World Bank is the mirror image of Europe’s overrepresentation. The danger
is that emerging markets, having accumulated massive amounts of international
reserves, may set up regional rivals to these multilateral institutions so that they
have more voice in deciding their financial fate. In addition, in September 2006 the
United States and China agreed to conduct regular bilateral consultations. The first
of these talks took place in Beijing in mid-December 2006 and the US delegation
included senior officials such as Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. One can imagine how these consultations could
develop into an alternative to the G7 process, since China – soon to be the world’s
Table 5.1: Selected international forums, member countries*
* European countries listed first.
** The G10 was established in 1962; Switzerland joined in 1964.












































second largest national economy – is unrepresented there. If Europe refuses to
share its place at the table, it may find itself increasingly short of dining partners of
consequence.
The other source of complexity is Europe itself. Switzerland is a member of the G10,
which is appropriate insofar as its policies have an impact on international financial
markets, but it is not a member of the European Union. That Norway is a large
reserve holder and sometime chair of an IMF constituency but not an EU member, is
a source of additional complication. The United Kingdom is a member of the
European Union but not of the euro area
4. In addition, membership is not static: the
composition of the EU and the euro area has and will continue to evolve.
There are a number of different ways of organising Europe’s external monetary and
financial relations:
• Foreign financial and monetary policy could remain, as has traditionally been the
case, a national competence. It is said that there is no more appetite in Europe
for a single foreign financial policy than for a single foreign policy generally
5. This
implies at most updating the prevailing state of affairs to remove the worst inef-
ficiencies but not changing it fundamentally. 
• Member states could more closely coordinate their international monetary and
financial policies in order more effectively to counterbalance the United States
and advance the common European position – on the assumption that there is
in fact a common European position.
• Finally, Europe’s representation in international forums could be unified. This
would entail delegating responsibility for its formulation to the European
Commission and appointing a single EU representative to communicate with the
Union’s interlocutors in the various global forums. 
This is, of course, just a specific instance of the larger debate over which compe-
tences should be assigned to the European Union and which responsibilities should
continue to reside with the member states. The European convention that met from
2002 through 2004 to decide on a draft treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe, and the subsequent difficulties in ratifying the draft treaty, remind us that
Europe has not yet reached the nirvana where there exists agreement on a particu-
lar approach
6.
How then should European countries and their citizens go about reaching such agree-
ment? The theory of fiscal federalism provides the standard tools for deciding how
responsibilities should be allocated across levels of government. It suggestsEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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assigning to the most encompassing level of government, in this case the EU,
issues where tastes are homogeneous and where there exist economies of scale
associated with centralised provision – and, conversely, leaving to lower levels of
government, in this case the member states, issues over which national tastes
diverge and economies of scale are absent. In the present context, the existence of
economies of scale in provision means that Europe’s positions in international
forums can be represented more effectively when representation is centralised;
Europe will be better able to express and achieve its goals. Homogeneity of tastes
means that European countries have similar objectives and foreign policy goals. We
will argue that foreign monetary and financial policy comes reasonably close to
qualifying on both counts. Thus, we conclude that Europe should move toward clos-
er coordination and greater centralisation of its representation in external monetary
and financial affairs.
If this hypothesis is correct, it points to the difficult question of why the EU has not
already delegated responsibility for formulating a common position on monetary
and financial affairs to the Commission. Some will say that its reluctance to do so
falsifies the hypothesis – that either we exaggerate the efficiency advantages of
centralised provision, or else we minimise the extent of preference heterogeneity.
The failure of member states to assign their foreign financial and monetary policies
to the EU is prima facieevidence against the hypothesis. 
An alternative is that the null is correct but there are significant fixed costs of
change. For instance, negotiating a change in EU constituencies in the Bretton
Woods institutions involves negotiating with non-EU countries, which in many
cases cohabit with EU member states in the same constituency
7. It means asking
EU members that presently chair constituencies to give up that privilege in favour
of a single EU chair. Inevitably these negotiations will force governments to expend
valuable political capital. Moreover, policymakers are risk averse, which creates a
status-quo bias. Uncertainty about whether change will really deliver a welfare
improvement lends inertia to existing arrangements. Thus, even though consolidat-
ed European representation would be better, inertia has prevented it from taking
place. Sympathetic as we naturally are to our own hypothesis, we are more inclined
to this interpretation of the facts.
This interpretation points to the need for a strategy for overcoming status-quo bias.
Here we build on theoretical work inspired by the problem of transition from plan to
market in the formerly centrally-planned economies, in the context of which it has
been argued that experience with limited reform may help to convince otherwise
sceptical stakeholders of the positive effects of further reform (Dewatripont andFRAGMENTED POWER
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Roland 1992). This suggests investing first in the development of unified represen-
tation and common policies toward a set of issues and in a venue where the case
for doing so is strongest. If the results convince the sceptics that this enhances the
efficiency and effectiveness of Europe’s voice and influence, without forcing unac-
ceptable compromises in national positions, it may be possible to emulate this
example in other venues and issue areas.
Concretely, we recommend starting by consolidating Europe’s representation at the
IMF. One can imagine consolidating Europe’s representation into a single chair or a
pair of chairs, one for the members of the euro area and the other for other EU coun-
tries. (Our incremental approach emphasising the advantages of learning by doing
suggests starting with a pair of chairs). The rationale for consolidating EU represen-
tation at the IMF is stronger than the analogous rationale for doing so at the World
Bank, G7, G10, G20 and Financial Stability Forum. In the case of the IMF, the infra-
structure needed to establish a single European position is relatively well advanced.
Increasingly, the reluctance of EU member states to give up their seats on the IMF
Executive Board is seen as a major obstacle to comprehensive governance reform
and thus as undermining the legitimacy of the institution
8. Europe is going to have
to negotiate over these issues whether it commits to unified representation or not.
It might as well make the most of the process.
The IMF is also the right place to start because preferences on IMF-relevant issues
are relatively homogeneous. To the extent that the IMF is historically concerned with
issues revolving around exchange rates, the fact that half of EU members have the
same currency and therefore the same exchange rate points strongly in this direc-
tion. That the euro area, not individual member states, has been invited to participate
in the IMF’s first multilateral consultation on the topic of global imbalances is more
evidence of the point.
Finally, the IMF is the right place to start because economies of scale in representa-
tion are strong. Analytical work by Leech and Leech (2005) and Bini-Smaghi
(2006b) suggests that a single seat, or even a pair of EU seats, will make the EU,
with its cohesive block of votes, a key swing voter. The EU will be better able to
achieve its goals, which is precisely what is meant by economies of scale in provi-
sion and representation. Another factor reducing the costs of moving in this direc-
tion is that the EU has already made progress in coordinating national policies in the
Fund by creating SCIMF, a subcommittee on IMF-related issues in the Economic and
Financial Committee, for which the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (‘DG Ecfin’) of the European Commission acts as secretariat, and EURIMF, an
informal committee of EU countries’ representatives in the IMF.EXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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Thus, the three key considerations – negotiating costs, preference homogeneity,
and economies of scale in provision – all have as their starting point the rationali-
sation of Europe’s representation at the IMF
9. If doing so proves successful, EU
member states will then be more likely to contemplate similar reform in the case of
other issue areas and venues.
The state of play
A traditional reason for scepticism that the EU is prepared to cooperate more close-
ly in managing its foreign monetary and financial affairs is that it has not made
much progress in cooperating on foreign policy more broadly. After all, foreign mon-
etary and financial policy is simply a subset of foreign policy generally. Preferences
are heterogeneous. For example, European countries have different attitudes
regarding the extra-European powers: consider the UK’s special relationship with
the United States, France’s long-standing ties with Russia, or Germany’s historical
and current economic connections with Turkey. 
It is tempting to make the same point with respect to monetary and financial affairs.
From the founding of the modern G10, France has been more sceptical than other
European countries about the exorbitant privilege of the United States in the interna-
tional monetary system. Germany has been especially concerned about the moral
hazard and inflationary bias associated with international rescue packages. The UK
has been relatively keen on financial deregulation and liberalisation, seeing this as
giving London an advantage in the competition for international financial business.
The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries have placed a priority on develop-
ment assistance and concessionary finance for the poorest countries. Every EU
country that had colonies feels a special responsibility for its one-time possessions
and feels that monetary and financial policies should be adapted to help meet their
special needs.
At the same time, foreign monetary and financial policies clearly differ from other for-
eign policies. To date 13 European countries share a single currency and they can
only have a single exchange rate against the dollar. They can only have a single for-
eign exchange market intervention strategy. They must take a single decision on
whether to adapt monetary policy to exchange rate developments and to conditions
in the rest of the world. They must reach a collective view on the immediacy of
economic and financial risks and on how the ECB should respond. The very existence
of monetary union is an indication that there exists a relatively high degree of prefer-
ence homogeneity in this domain. The fact that 13 European countries share a single
currency and single central bank shows that there should be economies of scale fromFRAGMENTED POWER
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greater centralisation of Europe’s representation in arenas concerned with interna-
tional monetary and financial affairs.
Not surprisingly, the result is a compromise in which member states and the EU
institutions share competences. The member states remain the dominant players,
reflecting the weight of history and institutional inertia. The Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997), in which the member states sought to take the external monetary and
financial implications of the euro on board, stated that ‘the Council, acting by a qual-
ified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting with the ECB,
shall decide on the position of the Community at the international level as regards
issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union and on its represen-
tation...’ Thus, the Council, where the member states are represented, retains the
power to decide whether or not there will be a common European position, although
the Commission and the ECB both have agenda setting power.
10
At the European convention, the idea of unified representation for the EU was
advanced by the Parliament and the Commission. Pedro Solbes, then EU economic
and monetary affairs commissioner, made declarations both inside and outside of
the convention in favour of a single EU representative on the IMF Board (Louis
2003). The draft constitution sought further to amplify the voice of euro area coun-
tries by authorising the Eurogroup to elect a president for two and a half years to
represent the euro area on the international stage. It proposed to allow euro area
members to decide, voting among themselves, on financial relations with the out-
side world. The Eurogroup would be allowed to decide ‘positions on matters of par-
ticular interest for economic and monetary union within the competent internation-
al financial institutions and conferences.’ But the implications for unified represen-
tation were tempered by other provisions making clear that decision-making
authority still ultimately resided with the member states represented in the Council
of Ministers. In particular, the draft constitution empowered the Council to ‘adopt
appropriate measures to ensure unified representation within the international
financial institutions’ (Corrales-Diez 2003). 
In practice, member states have concentrated on coordinating their policies without
pressing for actively unifying their representation. It was agreed at the informal
Council of Ministers (‘Ecofin’) meeting in Oviedo in 2002 that the EU should rely on
informal coordination in order to develop common positions (Crelo 2005). There are
no ex ante commitments to develop common positions. EU representatives are
encouraged to coordinate their views, but nothing commits them to doing so.
Arguably, soft coordination has increased since Italy’s presidency of the EU in theEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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second half of 2003. Some observers attribute this to officials like Lorenzo Bini-
Smaghi, who long stressed its desirability. The focus of this process is weekly meet-
ings of European executive directors (EDs) in both the IMF and World Bank. Their
goal is to discuss national positions and, where interests coincide, to devise strate-
gies for pursuing them.
The International Monetary Fund
These arrangements are relatively well developed at the IMF. SCIMF prepares the
work of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC: high-level finance ministry
and central bank officials) on IMF and related issues. (SCIMF was set up as a work-
ing group in 2001 and made a permanent subcommittee of the EFC in 2003). It
meets in Brussels roughly eight times yearly and comprises representatives of
each country’s finance ministry and central bank plus two from DG Ecfin and two
from the ECB. The Commission acts as SCIMF’s secretariat, preparing agendas and
minutes, although it does not take an active part in discussions. The two members
of DG Ecfin speak in meetings on behalf of the Commission but do not vote. The
European executive director chairing EURIMF also attends these meetings to ensure
consistency with what goes on in Washington DC. 
Documents agreed by SCIMF go first for endorsement to the EFC and are then trans-
mitted to European EDs at the IMF. However, EDs are not obliged to follow them.
Moreover, the fact that meetings occur at roughly six-week intervals can be a prob-
lem, since SCIMF does not always meet with the timeliness needed to feed opinions
and common positions to members of the IMF Board (Eurodad 2006). This is indica-
tive of the limits of soft coordination. 
Complementing SCIMF is EURIMF, a grouping of all EU countries’ representatives in
the Fund established in 1998 to foster EU coordination. A representative from the
Commission Delegation in Washington and one from the ECB participate in this
group. The core of EURIMF activities is the ‘EU presidency grey mechanism’. Before
each board meeting, each constituency prepares a position paper known as the
‘grey’. On questions relevant to the EU there is a coordination of greys. In addition,
the European ED chairing EURIMF may make an introductory statement at IMF
Board meetings on issues related to the world economy that reflects the common
European view
11.
Finally, there are ad hoc ‘one-per-chair’ or ‘one-per-office’ meetings. These gather
representatives of European countries occupying chairs on the IMF Board. They
function as a kind of mini-EURIMF.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Importantly, the ECB is not represented in these meetings. This situation changes
slightly when deliberations move to the Executive Board, where the ECB has observ-
er status. The ECB is empowered to speak in Board meetings on matters of European
monetary policy – for example, on staff reports on Article IV consultations with the
euro area – but only if it is first admitted to the floor. 
In 1998 the Commission proposed that it should also enjoy observer status – more
precisely, that the executive director of the member state holding the euro area
presidency ‘assisted by a representative from the Commission’ would represent the
euro area in Executive Board meetings. However, the Council rejected the
Commission’s proposal on the grounds that accepting it would be seen as ceding
authority (Corrales-Diez 2003).
Some officials argue that IMF surveillance suffers from the fact that the president of
the ECB has only observer status on the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC), where a number of central banks are represented. At the spring
meetings of the IMF in 2006, Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker
(Luxembourg’s Prime Minister) diplomatically described this as “stupid and ridicu-
lous”
12. The president of the Eurogroup of finance ministers is represented but only
if a place is surrendered (Atkins and Schieritz 2006). To be sure, the finance minis-
ter of the country holding the presidency of the EU Council of Ministers delivers a
speech at the IMFC biannual meetings. But that speech, prepared by SCIMF in
Brussels, is a very general document, since it must reflect the common ground of all
members. Hence it lacks specifics and has little ability to shape the agenda. And the
fact that the EU presidency rotates every six months undermines continuity and the
establishment of durable contacts between the EU presidency and IMF staff (Eurodad
2006, Phillips 2006b).
The World Bank
EU participation at the World Bank is less advanced; no EU institution even pos-
sesses observer status on the Board. While the Commission is an observer in the
joint IMF-World Bank Development Committee, as an observer it does not have the
right to speak nor is it provided with internal documents (Phillips 2006b). Since
2004 the EU commissioner for development has made a speech on behalf of the
European Community to the Development Committee, but again it is not formally rep-
resented (Eurodad 2006).
European representatives at the Bank meet regularly in Washington, but no struc-
ture analogous to SCIMF exists in Brussels. Since 2000 several European presiden-EXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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cies have attempted to organise meetings in Washington focusing on World Bank
board agendas. In November 2003, Europeans signed an agreement stipulating
that such meetings should occur every two weeks and possibly more often. In prac-
tice they have occurred once a week, usually on Fridays. The main function is to
exchange information. An official from the Commission’s delegation in Washington
attends these meetings as an observer (Eurodad 2006).
As at the IMF, coordination is hindered by the fact that some member states are in
joint constituencies, while others have constituencies of their own. Coordination is
further complicated because, compared to the IMF, there is greater heterogeneity of
background among European EDs, about half of whom come from finance min-
istries, a third from development and cooperation ministries, and the rest from for-
eign ministries.
Despite all this, European directors have occasionally issued joint policy state-
ments, such as their statement of support for the Wolfowitz candidacy for the
Bank’s presidency. In November 2003 European EDs agreed on a list of procedural
issues of common interest (Eurodad 2006). However, directors in joint constituen-
cies did not participate (Phillips 2006b).
G7/8
At G7/8 meetings, the ECB represents the European monetary authorities when
monetary and financial issues are discussed. But in the remainder of the meeting
the ECB leaves in favour of the heads of the national banks of France, Germany and
Italy (Truman 2004). The president of the Eurogroup participates, but so do the
three European finance ministers. 
Predictably, the big EU member states that monopolise representation in the G7 are
not keen on sharing it with smaller member states. This creates problems when the
G7 drafts initiatives that commit other member states, as was the case with the
recent Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (Phillips 2006b). Munchau (2006) has
called for replacing the G7/8 with a G4 composed of the US, the euro area, Japan and
China. Kenen et al. (2004) have called for replacing it with a Council for International
Financial and Economic Cooperation with the US, the euro area, China, Japan and the UK
as permanent members and ten other countries rotating on and off.Countries like Italy,
France and Germany (not to mention the UK, in the Munchau variant) that face los-
ing national representation will presumably resist either proposal in the absence of
further steps to establish a common European position and agreement on the desir-
ability of assigning such competences to the euro area or EU institutions.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
The Financial Stability Forum was created in April 1999 in the wake of the Asian cri-
sis to address issues of systemic stability in international financial markets. Its
members include national authorities responsible for financial stability in signifi-
cant international financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-spe-
cific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of cen-
tral bank experts. Of the EU countries, France, Germany, Italy and the UK have their
central banks, finance/economy ministries and securities regulators represented,
while the Netherlands has its central bank. Other European countries are not repre-
sented. The ECB is represented but not the Commission. There is little evidence of
institutional progress toward the coordination of European policies on the FSF.
How has the state of affairs affected particular issues?
We now consider how this state of affairs has affected particular issues such as IMF
policy, exchange rate policy, and the correction of global imbalances.
IMF policy
Compared to the United States, European countries have tended to adhere to a hard
line on the extension of IMF assistance to crisis countries. European directors have
regularly argued that IMF loans should be subject to explicit ceilings as a way of
addressing moral-hazard problems. More recently some have suggested that
exemptions from the conventional 300 percent of quota limits should require an
open letter from IMF staff explaining in detail why an exception is proposed. Various
directors have also suggested that agreement to waive normal access limits should
require a supermajority vote (National Bank of Denmark 2001).
But this scepticism about the merits of large loans has not prevented the granting
of them. Thus, while two European directors dissented from the decision to provide
another loan to Argentina in August 2001, this did not prevent that loan from being
granted, largely on the initiative of the United States (Mussa 2002). One can imag-
ine that things would have been very different had Europe been able to speak with
one voice.
European countries have also been in the vanguard of IMF members pushing for a
more rules-based approach to sovereign debt restructuring. A number of European
countries strongly supported the proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM), which would have specified procedures for officially-ledEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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restructuring negotiations. But the constituency to which Spain belongs opposed
the SDRM, since the views of emerging-market borrowers in that constituency –
Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia in particular – prevailed. The UK was sceptical,
since it was accustomed to a contractual approach to restructuring (through the
use of collective action clauses) rather than a statutory process. One can imagine
that the European view would have carried more weight had all European countries
lined up behind it.
Finally, European countries have punched below their weight in the debate over
reform of the internal organisation and day-to-day operations of the organisation.
The UK Treasury has argued for constructing a firewall between the Fund’s surveil-
lance and lending functions – for making the surveillance function independent so
that it would not be influenced by the loan officer’s familiar tendency to identify
with his customer (Balls 2002). The governor of the Bank of England has called for
greater independence for management as well as staff as a way of insulating the
institution’s operations from national self-interest and political short-termism
(King 2006). Other European countries, in contrast, have argued for the strengthen-
ing of political oversight of staff and management, who have excessive freedom to
set and pursue their own agendas. Similarly, European countries are split over the
debate on how to simplify the Fund’s quota formula, since their voting shares would
be differentially affected by quota revision (see below). These contradictory posi-
tions leave Europe with less influence than it would otherwise have. 
European exchange rate policy
A second case is intervention in foreign exchange markets
13. Traditionally, intervention
has been arranged on the sidelines of G7 meetings, between finance ministers in con-
sultation with their respective central banks. This reflects the uneasy situation in most
G7 countries where central banks are responsible for monetary policy, but finance min-
isters decide on exchange rate policy, including the need for intervention
14.
A problem in this context is that there is no euro area finance minister. The president
of the Eurogroup does participate in G7 meetings, though his mandate is less than
clear. French, German and Italian finance ministers, accustomed to being full part-
ners in G7 meetings, may be reluctant to defer. All this makes it difficult for the euro
area to reach agreement with the US, Japan, the UK and Canada on concerted inter-
vention. It makes it difficult to respond with the speed required to meet events in
foreign exchange markets. It makes it difficult to coordinate the ‘open mouth oper-
ations’ that go along with intervention. Even among the Europeans, coordination to
ensure consistency in public statements on exchange rates is far from perfect. AsFRAGMENTED POWER
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Bini Smaghi (2006a) puts it, ‘[i]n theory only the President of the ECB and the
President of the Eurogroup should speak on exchange rate issues. Such discipline
has not always been easy to implement.’
A complication is the fact that the ECB plays a larger role in the decision of whether
to intervene in foreign exchange markets than other G7 central banks
15. Finance
ministers cannot simply instruct the central bank to intervene
16. The central bank
(more precisely the Eurosystem made up of the ECB and national central banks)
must agree, giving it de factoveto power. Thus, it is not always clear whether the rel-
evant interlocutor for other countries is the president of the Eurogroup of finance
ministers; the president of the EFC, the working party that gathers both finance min-
istry and central bank officials; or the president of the ECB, who was charged with
responsibility for external contacts according to an understanding reached by EU
officials at a meeting in Finland in 1999. This last possibility is particularly difficult,
insofar as other countries’ finance officials preferred to negotiate with elected offi-
cials and those responsible to them rather than with appointed central bankers.
These ambiguities significantly complicated efforts to coordinate intervention in for-
eign exchange markets when the euro fell to 90 US cents in autumn 2000. As
described by Henning (2005), it was not clear to other countries whether their inter-
locutor should be the three euro area finance ministers, the Eurogroup president, the
president of the EFC, or the president of the ECB. It was not clear to the foreign part-
ners whether different euro area agents were responsible for deciding intervention,
drafting the joint statement on it and issuing it to the press, or how to coordinate
negotiations with these separate parties. (In practice, the Europeans agreed that
the Eurosystem was ‘solely competent’ for deciding on intervention, but that the
press statement would be negotiated between the central bank, the EFC president,
and the Eurogroup president). Efforts to enforce what European participants
thought was an international understanding, not only on actual intervention but also
on public statements, ‘began to unravel almost immediately’
17. It is indicative of
these problems that the second time the Europeans intervened, in November 2000,
they did so unilaterally without attempting to coordinate with their G7 partners
18.
The fact that the president of the Eurogroup now serves for a longer period alleviates
these difficulties but does not make them go away. Clean solutions would include
transforming the G7 into a G5 where the euro area and the president of the
Eurogroup replace France, Germany, Italy and their respective finance ministers.
But what is appropriate for finance G7s is less appropriate for G7 meetings con-
cerned with other issues where the euro area is a less relevant entity. The president
of the Eurogroup has less influence than finance ministers over national policies, soEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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that substituting him for the French, German and Italian finance ministers might be
seen as reducing European leverage. France, Germany and Italy may resist this
change even if there are efficiency arguments in its favour. 
Finally, if Europe allows the issue of reconfiguring the G7 to be raised, changes are
unlikely to stop with the substitution of the president of the Eurogroup for three
finance ministers. Bergsten’s (2006) proposal for collapsing the G7 into a G4 made
up of the US, China, Japan and the euro area will surely be placed on the table. Other
countries with a stake, like the UK and Canada, are less certain to go along.
Global imbalances
US and Chinese current account balances have widened alarmingly in recent years.
The threat to stability posed by a possible disorderly unwinding of these imbalances
prompted the IMF to launch in summer 2006 a multilateral consultation process
involving China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The euro
area’s current account has remained close to balance, suggesting to Europeans that
they are not part of the problem
19. Nonetheless, Europeans are concerned that they
may end up bearing a disproportionately large burden of adjustment if the euro ends
up rising sharply against the dollar, curtailing exports to the US, without at the same
time falling against the renminbi, stimulating offsetting exports to Asia. 
Moreover, a sharp fall in the dollar leading to a flight to quality could make it more
difficult for central and eastern European countries that are not yet members of the
euro area to finance their often-large current account deficits. If they allow their cur-
rencies to depreciate in response, they may jeopardise attainment of their goal of
euro-area accession. If, on the other hand, they seek to defend their currencies,
they may court a financial crisis that would have repercussions elsewhere in
Europe (including in the banking systems of the western European countries that
have been providing much of the external finance). Clearly, Europe has a stake in
the orderly resolution of the problem, with unsustainable imbalances wound down
gradually and the dollar adjusting gradually rather than with a crash.
Putting external balances on a sustainable footing will require policy changes by all
the major players, including adjustments to produce higher public and private saving
rates in the US, and a greater reliance on domestic demand in Asia. In particular,
changes in China’s exchange rate regime to allow greater appreciation of the renmin-
bi will almost certainly play a role in reducing China’s enormous current account sur-
plus. Here European countries have sent mixed messages. Moreover, while it remains
underrepresented at the IMF, China will be reluctant to engage constructively in theFRAGMENTED POWER
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Fund’s multilateral consultations process. China’s IMF underrepresentation is the
flipside of Europe’s overrepresentation, as we have shown. Thus, reform of European
representation seems a necessary condition if talks on global imbalances are to
have a chance of success. 
A proposal
How might the situation be rationalised? In this section we argue that it is desirable
to consolidate European representation in international organisations and group-
ings, from the IMF and World Bank to the G7, G10, G20 and Financial Stability Forum,
in a smaller number of chairs. In the Bretton Woods institutions, one can imagine
existing quotas and votes being grouped under two chairs initially, one for the euro
area and one for other EU countries (as in Bini Smaghi 2004). Ultimately these two
chairs might be consolidated into one. The EU could become a single member of the
IMF and the World Bank, with quota formula applied to it formally as if it were a sin-
gle economy. In groups like the G7 and G10, it again makes sense for European
countries to have a unified representation or at most two representatives for a tran-
sitional period, one for the euro area and one for other EU countries.
Such reform is desirable both for Europe and the rest of the world. For Europe, the
preference heterogeneity and difference in outlooks that impede movement toward
a single European foreign policy are more limited in the case of foreign monetary
and financial policies than other foreign policy issues. To be sure, there remains het-
erogeneity of preferences – between, say, Ireland and Italy about the stance of ECB
policy, reflecting different degrees of dynamism of their economies – but this has
not prevented 13 European countries to date from moving to a single monetary and
exchange rate policy, indicating their perception that the advantages of scale
economies in provision dominate. 
Consolidating Europe’s representation would also enhance the continent’s influ-
ence. Voting as a group, the EU or even the euro area would have the single largest
block of votes in the IMF and World Bank. A single EU chair would not need the sup-
port of many other members to form a winning coalition. Bini Smaghi (2006b) and
Leech and Leech (2005) calculate that it would become a critical swing voter in
these organisations. In the G7, the G10, and the G20, the euro area or, even more,
the EU would represent an economic area as large as the United States and larger
than Japan and other members, whether measured in terms of production, trade or
financial flows, giving its arguments weight and giving the member states more
leverage over outcomes.EXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
143
Consolidating Europe’s representation is also in the interest of the rest of the world
insofar as doing so frees up seats for underrepresented emerging markets. The G7
and G10 are poorly configured for addressing a range of important economic and
financial issues because systemically significant emerging markets – China most
prominently – are not represented. While replacing the G7/10 with the G20 has the
advantage of including such systemically significant emerging markets, 20 is too
large a number for efficient negotiation
20. (In a way, the G20 epitomises the irra-
tionality of Europe’s present representation, in that it includes the four European G7
members – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – but also the European Union). What
is needed is a smaller body, for example a G4 made up of the US, Europe, Japan and
China (Bergsten 2006) or a G4 plus, composed of these four entities with a rotating
cast of additional characters, depending on issue (Kenen 2005). 
Similarly, consolidating European representation at the IMF and World Bank into a
smaller number of chairs would make it possible to provide more chairs at the Board
table for emerging markets while not increasing the size of the Board, where the lat-
ter is to be avoided for efficiency reasons. While discussion at the September 2006
annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank focused on changes in quotas and vot-
ing shares (see below), there also was a recognition that giving emerging markets
more voice in these institutions, and thereby enhancing the legitimacy of their
operations, will require giving them more seats on their Executive Boards. With
European countries (including two non-EU members: Norway and Switzerland)
occupying as many as nine out of 24 seats on those Boards, freeing up chairs for
other countries would require some European members to give up theirs. The reluc-
tance of smaller European countries to volunteer is increasingly seen as an obsta-
cle to progress. 
Europe also plays a key role in the redistribution of voting shares in the Bretton
Woods institutions. There was agreement at the IMF-World Bank meetings in
September 2006 on an ad hocincrease in quotas for four underrepresented emerg-
ing markets (China, Turkey, Mexico and South Korea), amounting to an aggregate
increase in IMF quotas of 1.8 percent, with a promise of more comprehensive
quota reform to follow by 2008. It is no coincidence that the US has been a propo-
nent of quota revision, since its current voting share is, in fact, less than implied by
current quotas
21. In contrast, many European countries, especially a number of
smaller ones, tend to be overrepresented. The more comprehensive reform will
utilise an updated quota formula, presumably based on some combination of
country size, openness, and balance-of-payments variability. But the IMF Board
has decreed that the quota formula should be simplified in the interest of trans-
parency, which presumably means an even heavier weight on GDP and less onFRAGMENTED POWER
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ancillary variables. The representation of smaller EU countries will be further
reduced if the revised quota formula reduces the weight attached to the export
ratio
22. Thus, it is not surprising that they are more sceptical about more compre-
hensive quota reform. But without European support or at least acquiescence, it
will not be possible to marshal the 85 percent support needed to push through
quota revision.
Clearly, there is intense pressure for reform of country representation at the Bretton
Woods institutions and in the world’s other economic steering committees. Europe’s
numerical overrepresentation is unsustainable. The alternative to reducing Europe’s
chairs and shares, at the same time consolidating European representation in order
not to lose influence, is for the international organisations and groupings to which
European governments attach importance to continue to lose legitimacy and influ-
ence. Asian countries would set about multilateralising the Chiang Mai Initiative and
strengthening regional surveillance mechanisms as steps toward creating an alter-
native to the IMF. They would likely continue to accumulate foreign exchange
reserves at a rapid pace in order to protect themselves from having to borrow from
the Fund again. European countries would find themselves blamed for blocking
meaningful governance reform and further weakening the legitimacy and influence
of the multilateral financial institutions, or else they would have to agree to having
their shares and chairs reduced without accompanying changes that work to main-
tain their influence.
Incrementalism as learning by doing
If these arguments are compelling, then why is there such reluctance to move in
this direction? Some European countries may fear that consolidated representation
will end up forcing them into positions inconsistent with their national interest. They
may worry that Europe lacks the infrastructure and experience to carve out com-
mon positions and that its influence in these venues will be reduced. 
A logical way of alleviating these concerns is to move forward incrementally, in one
venue. If experience in one organisation reassures the member states that they will
not be forced into uncomfortable positions, that arrangements for reaching such
decisions are adequate, and that reform in this area does not mean that member
states’ competences in other areas related to foreign policy will inevitably be
infringed upon, then there may develop a greater willingness to consolidate
European representation in other monetary and financial groupings. 
As noted above, this incremental approach can be justified in terms of the literatureEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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on gradual policy reform in transition economies, where it is argued that experience
with limited reform may help to convince otherwise sceptical stakeholders of the
positive effects of more broad-based reform (Dewatripont and Roland 1992). If it is
necessary to compensate losers (a country like Belgium that stands to lose its
chair in both the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the profile it enjoys by virtue of
the importance of the G10, of which it is a member), then the cost of compensatory
concessions in other issue areas will be more limited (given that Belgium would be
losing only one of these three prerequisites at a point in time); this may in turn
make such concessions easier to extend for the winners. If the EU follows through on
its promise to compensate Belgium with concessions in other issue areas, then its
commitment to make compensatory side payments in return for agreement on fur-
ther consolidation will become more credible.
The objection to incrementalism in the context of transition was that structural
reforms are interdependent – that one reform will have positive effects only if it is
adopted simultaneously with others. This is less obviously true of reform of
European representation in the Bretton Woods institutions and the world economy’s
other steering committees. Admittedly, the fact that the World Bank and IMF work
together, through inter aliatheir Development Committee, debt reduction initiatives
and financial stability reviews, means that reform of European representation in
one of these organisations without accompanying reform in the other would create
complications. But this general argument, that reforms in different areas are strong-
ly complementary, clearly holds less water in the case of governance reform.
The IMF as the place to start
The logical place to start is with European representation at the IMF. It is not clear
that different European countries have very different preferences regarding country
surveillance, multilateral surveillance, and emergency lending, the IMF’s three core
activities. The major European countries are unlikely to have to resort to the IMF for
financial assistance. To be sure, individual member states may have different atti-
tudes regarding assistance for non-EU countries insofar as there are differential
implications for their residents. Thus, Spain and Italy were more sympathetic to
arguments for an international rescue package for Argentina in the summer of 2001
because their banks and households had high levels of exposure there. But it is not
clear that this heterogeneity of exposures with respect to external financial condi-
tions is any greater than heterogeneity in domestic exposures (some European
banking systems are more exposed than others to, inter alia, European housing
markets), and this has not hindered the adoption or pursuit of a common monetary
policy by around half the members of the European Union
23. As Europe develops aFRAGMENTED POWER
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more integrated financial market with pan-European banks whose shares are held
by residents of all European countries, and not just residents of the country where
the bank was founded, national differences will figure even less in this calculus.
The same point applies to the IMF’s multilateral surveillance and consultations over
issues like global imbalances. Insofar as members of the euro area are concerned
about a disorderly correction of global imbalances, they will be affected through the
same channel, namely, appreciation of their common exchange rate against the
dollar. They thus have a common interest in preventing the euro from appreciating
excessively. That the members of the euro area have this shared interest has
already been acknowledged by the IMF, in that it has invited the euro area, and not
individual European states, to participate in its first multilateral consultation on the
issue of global imbalances. To be sure, European countries differ in their depend-
ence on the US and Chinese export markets (see Table 5.2), but these differences
are not pronounced enough seriously to hinder the adoption of a common policy
stance. 
Indeed, the very existence of the euro provides a rationale for consolidating euro
area representation in the Fund that does not also carry over to the World Bank, the
G7 or the G10. The IMF is fundamentally concerned with the management of balance-
of-payments problems, something that cannot exist within a single currency area.
Historically it has focused on exchange rates, and the euro area has only one
exchange rate vis-à-vis each extra-euro-area country. IMF quotas are traditionally set
using formulas that attach weights to a member’s external trade and payments, and
Table 5.2: Euro area trade with China and the US* (percent of GDP)
* Source: Ahearne and von Hagen (2006). Data for Slovenia are not included.
Exports to Imports from
China US China US
1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005
Austria 0.3 0.8 1.2 2.4 0.4 0.9 1.1 0.9
Belgium 0.7 1.4 3.5 5.4 1.1 3.6 4.9 4.4
Germany 0.5 1.1 2.3 3.1 0.6 1.6 1.4 1.4
Spain 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.7
Finland 1.4 1.2 2.5 2.1 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.1
France 0.5 0.5 1.7 1.6 0.4 0.9 1.6 1.2
Greece 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.8
Ireland 0.5 1.0 9.7 10.3 0.8 1.1 7.9 4.7
Italy 0.4 0.5 1.7 1.7 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.8
Netherlands 0.4 0.7 2.0 2.8 1.9 5.6 4.7 4.5
Portugal 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.7EXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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the advent of the euro suggests removing intra-euro-area trade and payments from
these calculations.
In addition, the infrastructure for reaching joint positions is relatively well
advanced. As described above, SCIMF prepares the work of the EFC on the IMF and
related issues. Documents agreed by SCIMF and endorsed by the EFC are then
passed to European EDs with the intent of defining a common position. There is also
the EURIMF, the grouping of European representatives, which seeks to coordinate
European greys, and the EU presidency grey mechanism in which European EDs
attempt to reach agreement on support for the EU presidency grey. These arrange-
ments can provide a springboard for further moves in this direction.
Finally, the swing-voter analysis of Bini-Smaghi (2006b) and Leech and Leech
(2005) suggests that Europe can reduce its voting share without weakening its
influence if it at the same time undertakes reforms that allow it to vote as a bloc. 
If the advantages of a unified position are so pronounced, why are European coun-
tries not more open to the idea? One factor here is mixed constituencies (see Table
5.3). A number of the constituencies headed by European countries include also
other countries with very different characteristics and preferences. European coun-
tries in such constituencies (Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states) must temper their positions in order to reach
common ground with non-European and non-EU members. This is less of a problem
than it once was, insofar as eastward expansion has brought all members of the
Nordic-Baltic constituency except for Iceland into the EU. The constituency of which
Belgium is the largest member includes ten countries, only three of which (Belarus,
Khazakstan and Turkey) are not EU members. In the constituency of which Italy is
the largest member, only Albania, San Marino and Timor-Leste are not EU members,
and it might be argued that this trio is too small to affect much the position of their
director. But Poland and Spain are both in constituencies with seven non-EU mem-
bers. The Netherlands and Cyprus are in a constituency with 10 non-EU members.
Ireland is in a constituency with 11 non-EU members. Clearly, these countries may
find it difficult to subscribe to a common EU position.
Another factor is that the IMF Articles of Agreement make no provision for admitting
the euro area or the European Union as IMF members; they recognise only individ-
ual countries. But if the Articles of Agreement are an obstacle to sensible action,
then they can be changed. The Articles have in fact been amended repeatedly in the
past. If amendment is difficult, then the Articles can be interpreted flexibly, as was
the case when Egypt and Syria sought to form the United Arab Republic in theFRAGMENTED POWER
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1950s. Finally, it is not clear that meaningful reform requires recognising the euro
area or the European Union as an IMF member. It might simply be possible to reor-
ganise constituencies so that the members of the euro area are all members of one
constituency, which is then free to elect or choose its own chair, while other EU
member states are members of a second constituency with the same prerogative.
The members of these two constituencies could ultimately be consolidated into one
constituency, if the members so chose, without requiring a change in this provision
of the Articles of Agreement. 
Another variation on this theme would be to reorganise Europe not into two con-
stituencies but into six or seven. Truman (2005) has previously suggested that the
consolidation of European representation might be done in stages so as not to over-
reach the development of political will. A first step would be to transfer EU members
(Poland, Spain, Ireland) not presently in EU-headed constituencies to EU-headed
constituencies. The second step would then be to transfer non-EU countries
(Khazakstan, Timor-Leste, Armenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, Macedonia,
Moldova, Ukraine) to other non-EU headed constituencies. Later the EU-headed con-
stituencies could be consolidated. This would be a more modest variation on our
proposal
24. It would also be consistent with the strategy of learning by doing
through incremental reform.
The positions of the members
Although Bini Smaghi (2006b) and Leech and Leech (2005) suggest that the mem-
bers of the euro area, were they to form a coalition, would become critical swing vot-
ers in the IMF, individual member states might lose voice or voting power as a result
of forming such a coalition. Smaller euro area countries that currently possess a
seat at the Board table would be concerned about losing voice, since they would not
have the same capacity to contribute to the formulation of a consensus among
directors on important policy questions
25. They would be compensated, however,
because the single European representative would be even more influential in the
development of that consensus, insofar as voice is correlated with the number of
votes possessed by his/her constituency. 
They could be further compensated by adopting internal voting rules giving heavier
weights to smaller countries for deciding the positions of the European director. In
an extreme case, one can imagine a process whereby all members are weighted
equally – one country, one vote as in the Executive Board of the ECB. Naturally this
is unlikely to be congenial to large European countries accustomed to having more
votes in the Fund than their smaller neighbours. In fact, Leech and Leech (2005)FRAGMENTED POWER
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show that all EU countries would gain voting power in the Fund if the constituency’s
position is determined by simple majority voting using current IMF weights and on
the basis that the single European chair would have the same voting power as the
US
26. Even here, individual EU members would see their effective voting power
strengthened, compensating them in part for giving up their separate seats at the
Board table
27.
Given this, what are the prospects for reform? The European Parliament seems
favourably inclined, adopting in March 2006 a resolution on the strategic review of
the IMF. This called on member states ‘to work towards a single voting constituency
– possibly starting as a euro constituency, with a view, in the longer term, to secur-
ing consistent European representation, involving the Ecofin Council presidency
and the Commission, subject to the European Parliament's scrutiny.’
Ultimately, however, the prospects for reform depend on the attitudes of the mem-
ber states. Italy has probably been the most strongly supportive of coordination in
the Bretton Woods institutions. Phillips (2006b) suggests that it may be inclined
toward more centralised European representation because it is already in a con-
stituency with Portugal, Greece and Malta and therefore has some experience with
cooperative decision making
28.
France and Germany, traditionally the motors of European integration, have been
sympathetic in the past. Phillips (2006b, p.19) reports that both countries ‘have
previously stated a willingness to consider single European representation or a
combined seat in the [Bretton Woods institutions], although these proposals were
perhaps made because they were inherently unlikely to be implemented (and in the
context of enhancing Franco-German friendship rather than in the context of gen-
uine commitment to global governance reform).’ In 1998 the French Finance
Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, publicly floated the idea of a Franco-German
chair at the IMF
29. In 2003 the German Development Ministry proposed a double-
majority voting system for the Bretton Woods institutions, which would give more
voice to populous developing countries (German Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development 2003). A Franco-German contribution to the European
Convention, from 22 December 2002, stated that: ‘With respect to the external rep-
resentation of the euro area, France and Germany share the view that a single rep-
resentation in IFIs such as the IMF will be the adequate voice of an integrated
Europe’ (cited in Eurodad 2006, p.21).
More recently, positions appear to have hardened. German Bundesbank President
Axel Weber recently urged caution about IMF reform, saying: ‘A broad package has toEXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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be found for a more transparent and fair representation of all IMF members. To that
end, European Union countries should not prematurely relinquish their own justified
positions and claims’ (EurActiv 2006). Germany’s seemingly dimmer view of the
notion of a unified European seat brings the German position more in line with the
results of the voting power analysis above, and may also reflect some recent ebbing
of enthusiasm for closer European integration. Following the IMF/World Bank annu-
al meetings in September 2006, German’s Ministry of Finance included Germany in
the set of countries that are underrepresented in the IMF (Steinbruck 2006).
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück told reporters in Singapore that as the
world’s third-largest economy – after the US and Japan – Germany deserved to
keep its influence in the IMF (Deutsche Welle 2006). He balked at US suggestions
that the size of a country’s GDP should be given a predominant role as part of the
planned overhaul
30. Germany was similarly behind the statement prepared by
European Union members for the G20 meeting in Sydney in October 2006. This
argued that any redistribution of voting rights within the Fund should favour only
‘the most underrepresented members’ and warned that ‘it would be premature to
press for changes in the size and composition of the executive board’
31.
The UK’s position is likely to be similarly sceptical, since the country has reserva-
tions about anything that smacks of euro-federalism. But the UK Treasury and Bank
of England have been outspoken about the need for IMF reform, and this makes it
difficult for the country now to obstruct other EU countries’ efforts to consolidate
their representation. Moreover, the precedent of monetary union suggests that the
British government will not stand in the way if other EU member states wish to go
ahead. This suggests that, initially, consolidation will take the form of the members
of the euro area joining together in a single chair. 
But these observations also suggest that consolidating under a second chair repre-
sentation of the UK, Sweden, Denmark and those central and eastern European
member states that have not adopted the euro may be less feasible in the short run.
Even were the UK to be made the permanent representative on the board of that
constituency, it would be unlikely to welcome a switch from exclusive representa-
tion to a constituency in which it would have to reach common positions with other
members, at least in the short run. This suggests that the first step, a single chair
for the members of the euro area, is likely to come more quickly than the second
step, a single chair for other EU members. Again, however, there is no reason why
Europe might not move incrementally.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Conclusion
Europe’s fragmented representation in the arenas where international monetary
and financial policy is made causes it to punch below its weight. Although the US is
no bigger than Europe, it has been able to exert more influence in the operation of
the Bretton Woods institutions, and the other venues where these issues are dis-
cussed, precisely because it speaks with one voice. Europe’s numerical overrepre-
sentation on the boards of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and in
the G7 and G10 is also seen as undermining the legitimacy of these organisations.
Europe’s reluctance to cede seats on these global steering committees causes it
increasingly to be regarded as an obstacle to fundamental governance reform. The
ultimate result of this reluctance may be that Europe will be amply represented on
a set of irrelevant committees, as emerging markets use their international
reserves to set up regional rivals to the IMF and World Bank and the US substitutes
bilateral consultations with China for the G7 process. Together these observations
constitute a compelling argument for unifying Europe’s representation so that
chairs can be freed up for underrepresented emerging markets, enhancing the legit-
imacy of existing global institutions, but without diminishing – and, indeed, with
the possibility of enhancing – Europe’s influence over their operation. 
But the obstacles to progress in this respect remain formidable. The difficulties of
EU member states in attempting to define a single foreign policy carry over to for-
eign monetary and financial policies. Member states with different views of mone-
tary and financial issues are not convinced that their positions would be more
effectively advanced by a single European representative. Smaller member states
that have inherited privileged positions resist calls for self-sacrifice. They are reluc-
tant to give up what remains their most visible link to their historical status as glob-
al powers. But this dilemma is artificial; to repeat, if EU members do not give up their
excessive numerical representation in the institutions of global monetary and
financial governance, those institutions will fall by the wayside.
This lends urgency to the efforts to reorganise Europe’s representation in these are-
nas. We have suggested an incremental strategy. Start with the IMF, where prefer-
ences are relatively homogeneous, and the infrastructure conducive to the harmon-
isation of member states’ positions is relatively well developed. If the member
states discover, as we expect, that their influence is strengthened without forcing
them significantly to compromise their views, then it will be possible similarly to
move forward in other international organisations and groupings. The strategy may
be risky, but the alternative is less pleasant to contemplate.EXTERNAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
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1 For helpful comments we thank our discussant, Thomas Wieser, and other participants at the con-
ference on Europe and the Global Economy, Brussels, 12-13 October 2006.
2 In this chapter, we focus on the EU’s monetary and financial relations with the rest of the world
rather than its economic relations generally, or its trade policies in particular, since EU trade policy
is organised very differently, this competence long ago having been given to the European
Commission. 
3 See Tables 5.1 and 5.3 for membership of selected international forums, and for International
Monetary Fund constituencies.
4 Like Sweden, Denmark, and 11 of the 12 new EU member states at this stage.
5 See for example Mahieu, Ooms and Rottier (2003), who argue that the EU member states would be
prepared to become a full-fledged single member of the IMF only if they were willing to assign to
the Union responsibility for a common foreign policy.
6 We will describe below how the monetary and financial issues that are the subject of this chapter
were treated at the convention.
7 The 180 plus members of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are organised into 24
constituencies or groups of countries, each of which is represented by one member on the institu-
tion’s Executive Board.
8 See eg Phillips (2006a).
9 There are other arguments as well, as we detail in the fourth section of this chapter, notably that the
underrepresentation of Asian countries on the Executive Board, which is increasingly viewed as
the mirror image of Europe’s overrepresentation, poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the institu-
tion. In other words, the rationalisation of European representation that has as a byproduct the
freeing up of additional chairs for other regions would lessen the pressure for Asian countries, in
particular, to set up a rival regional arrangement on the basis of the Chiang Mai Initiative, weaken-
ing the existing multilateral framework. 
10 In practice, things are even more complicated. For example, officials of the European Commission
have dealt directly with the heads of the World Bank and the IMF, without the intermediation of the
Council, to discuss issues such as international financial assistance to the Balkans. The
Commission is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on countering money laundering along
with most EU member states (Truman 2004). On these international economic issues, the
Commission and not the Council appears to take the lead role.
11 Bini-Smaghi (2004) argues that this is made possible by the fact that European countries share
common views on matters of multilateral surveillance of the major economies and the world econ-
omy. But it can also be argued that the EURIMF’s president’s speech is weak soup because it can-
not contain anything objectionable to any of the EU countries represented on the Board. Again, this
is indicative of the limits of soft coordination.
12 Dolan and Bull (2006).
13 A previous analysis of this case, on which we rely here, is Henning (2006).
14 ‘Uneasy’ because only if sterilised intervention is effective, on the grounds that domestic and for-
eign bonds are imperfect substitutes for one another, is it possible for finance ministers to attempt
to move the exchange rate without getting a concession from the central bank to alter monetary
policy. The literature on the effectiveness of sterilised intervention is large. See inter alia
Dominguez and Frankel (1993).
15 Generally speaking, ‘the ECB decides on and carries out operations in the foreign exchange market.
The overall framework in which exchange rate policy is conducted is the competence of the
Eurogroup, in consultation with the ECB’ (Bini Smaghi 2006a). The way that responsibilities forexchange rate policy are shared among the different European institutions is set out in Article
111(1) of the EU Treaty. 
16 As Henning (2006, p.12) puts it, European finance ministers decided that ‘it would not be appro-
priate to attempt to force or instruct the Eurosystem to intervene.’
17 Henning (2006), p.24.
18 Although the decision to proceed unilaterally may have also reflected the approach of the US pres-
idential elections, which left that country’s treasury preoccupied by other matters.
19 Ahearne and von Hagen (2006) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) offer European perspectives
on global imbalances.
20 Some will observe that there are 24 members of the Executive Boards of the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank, as mentioned elsewhere, but this is a much more heavily institu-
tionalised context. Directors meet three times a week throughout the year, which enables them to
routinise their procedures to a much greater extent than G7 principals and deputies. In any case,
a number of authors (eg Truman 2005) argue that the IMF Executive Board could be usefully
streamlined by reducing its size.
21 The US has, in fact, committed to not asking for an increase in its share in the course of the current
quota revision process.
22 It would of course be further reduced if intra-EU transactions were not included in this calculation,
which of course is not likely in the absence of more far-reaching reform.
23 It can also be argued that there exists similar heterogeneity within the US, but that this has not pre-
vented the country from agreeing on a policy toward the IMF. Recall the conflicts between large
money centre banks and smaller banks in the interior of the country over developing country debt
(and the difficult of getting the latter to participate in the Baker Plan). Or recall Paul O’Neill’s criti-
cism of the IMF in 2001 that it was squandering the hard-earned savings of American plumbers
and carpenters. This again alludes to the fact that not all segments of US society felt the same way
about the merits of emergency lending.
24 It is sometimes argued that reorganising the constituency situation so that EU members were rep-
resented in exclusively EU constituencies might also have a downside. The increasing politicisa-
tion of the International Monetary Fund partly reflects the division of the institution into lending
and borrowing countries (Rajan 2006, Mahieu, Ooms and Rottier 2003). Mixed European con-
stituencies have provided at least one counterweight to this. That moderating influence would be
weakened by the move to a single European chair. We are not entirely convinced by this argument.
Which countries are borrowers and lenders in the Fund is not set in stone – Asian countries that
have borrowed in the past but are now flush with reserves are considerably less likely to borrow in
the future, for example – making the design of the constituency system less than ideal for
addressing this polarisation. Others like Kenen et al. (2005) and King (2006) have suggested
alternatives for addressing this problem.
25 Thus, for example, the Dutch have been vocal opponents of any reorganisation of the IMF Board that
might result in their losing their existing chair. See Zalm (2006).
26 A not unreasonable assumption in view of the quota formula and balance of power within the Fund.
27 This is less likely if the EU position is decided by the double-majority voting procedure of the Nice
Treaty, which would require the agreement of a substantial supermajority before the European
chair could take a position. In this case the EU would be unable to act as the decisive swing voter
on many issues (where the requisite supermajority was absent). 
28 But the country has not always been consistent here: Italy encouraged Timor Leste to join its con-
stitutency in 2002, in a step away from exclusive European representation.
29 Corrales-Diez (2003) reports that the French government has also supported the concept of a sin-
gle chair, at least in principle.
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grounds that it would see its voting power diluted. The formula needed to be improved and could
not be prejudged, Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm said.
31 Both quotes are from Swann and Louis (2006).
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hanges in the institutional, technological and economic environment raise new
challenges for European competition policy. First, firms’ behaviour, particularly
through international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and hard-core cartels, could
undermine benefits from globalisation. Together with the evolution towards more
economic liberalisation, markets have been reshaped by important technological
improvements, putting forward new issues in terms of antitrust policy, as shown
recently by the Microsoft case. Lastly, these changes have been progressively
accompanied by a new institutional competition framework. The dramatic increase
in the number of competition authorities incurs a waste of resources for multination-
al firms and antitrust authorities and the risk of conflicting decisions between com-
petition authorities. In parallel to these modifications, the EU has launched a vast
programme of reforms to modernise European antitrust policy. Both the institution-
al framework and substantive laws are under reconstruction. It has notably driven an
ongoing decentralisation process of antitrust law enforcement and the creation of
the European Competition Network (ECN).
In this context, it is timely for European authorities to appraise the external dimen-
sion of European competition policy as well as its link to current internal reforms.
Globalisation can increase the costs of monitoring and seriously reduce the ability
of European authorities to tackle cross-border anti-competitive conducts. In addi-
tion, conflicts are exacerbated by industrial policy motivations – sometimes called
economic patriotism – and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy.
As it is unlikely that the sole application of the territoriality and extraterritoriality
principles to competition rules can yield an optimal international competition sys-
6
Olivier Bertrand and Marc Ivaldi
1
Competition policy:
Europe in international marketstem, globalisation calls for higher levels and types of cooperation. Given that bilat-
eral cooperation, especially the implementation of comity principles, may be of no
value when laws or interests are sources of international conflicts, three main paths
could be therefore encouraged: the continuous harmonisation of rules through the
joint action of OECD and the International Competition Network (ICN) especially in
the context of new-technology-based industries, which are a source of divergence
among antitrust authorities; more cooperation in confidential information
exchange; the establishment of global antitrust institutions. 
However, if the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could serve as an institution to reg-
ulate global markets, especially thanks to its reliable dispute settlement body, it
could certainly be relevant to distinguish trade and non-trade related competition
affairs. Although WTO is legitimate in judging questions related to market access
and entry barriers, it is less equipped to assess international hard-core cartels or
M&A reviews. As a substitute for WTO, a multi-level system, like the EU system,
could be promoted. For political and pragmatic reasons, it could be composed as a
first step of a core of countries like the EU, Japan and the US. It could be associated
with the creation of an international court of justice for competition. In addition to
these external reforms, some internal reforms might be required. Competition
authorities have to develop further competition advocacy to give a higher priority to
competition issues in other EU policies and national regulation. A parallel and com-
plementary reform could consist in making the European competition agency inde-
pendent from member state interference.
Competition policy challenges
Competition policy and its enforcement face new challenges with the world wide
development of trade and investment liberalisation, as well as widespread changes
in technologies and institutions. This chapter has a threefold objective. It describes
this new context; then it explains how European competition policy accounts for
this evolving situation; finally it proposes guidelines which should or could be fol-
lowed in the future.
With the advent of globalisation, market structures and the economic environment
have been deeply transformed. Improvements in transport and communication,
together with the gradual removal of tariff barriers, have lowered transaction costs.
They have also stimulated trade flows, which has tended to reduce domestic prices
and widen the range of goods available to consumers and industries. Coupled with
a less strict foreign investment regime, trade liberalisation has also encouraged for-
eign direct investments (FDI) and the expansion of multinational firms (MNE).
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However, these gains have appeared quite fragile and reversible. In the 1980s, ben-
efits from trade liberalisation eroded with the appearance of less transparent non-
tariff barriers and contingent protection. One decade later the concern that, without
the intervention of competition authorities, firms’ behaviour could in addition
undermine market integration and international competition became more pro-
nounced. State barriers could be substituted by private barriers, especially through
vertical contracts, as in the famous alleged Kodak/Fuji case in 1996
2 (Kojima
2002). In addition to vertical arrangements, companies could be tempted to recov-
er profits and to restore market power, weakened by economic openness, through
cross-border M&A or international hard-core cartels.
Cross-border M&A activity has played an increasingly acknowledged role in the
growing globalisation of production since the beginning of the 1990s. They progres-
sively replaced greenfield investments as a means of entering foreign markets
throughout the 1990s
3. The composition of FDI changed radically.
4During this peri-
od, about 80 percent of FDI transaction value took the form of M&A (UNCTAD 2000).
The 1990s indeed saw a spectacular surge in M&A activity
5 (eg Bertrand et al.
2007, Evenett 2003, and Hijzen et al. 2005). This phase was mainly characterised
by the dramatic growth of cross-border operations. In 1999, the value of completed
cross-border M&A was around $720 billion (UNCTAD 2000). In the 1990s, cross-
border M&A represented more than one quarter of total M&A transactions in deal
value. This wave of cross-border M&A seems to have been induced by economic
openness, although there is a lack of clear-cut empirical and theoretical evidence,
as research on international M&A is still in its infancy
6 (Bertrand and Zitouna
2006b).
Two strands of empirical study are noticeable. First, the welfare impact of cross-bor-
der M&A is considered as ambiguous (eg Horn and Persson 2001, Norback and
Persson 2004 and 2007). However, there are reasons to expect positive welfare
gains. Indeed efficiency gains could be greater for cross-border M&A due to a high-
er complementarity between merging partners, creating for instance a larger diffu-
sion of know-how within the firm. In addition, reduction in competition could be less
prevalent due to a smaller overlap of markets. Second, recent empirical studies
seem to confirm rather positive effects of M&A on productivity or R&D activity (eg
Arnold and Smarzynska 2005, Bertrand and Zitouna 2006a, Bertrand and Zuniga
2006). However, M&A continues to raise many concerns, especially in the public
debate, as shown by the strong reaction of French politicians to the rumour of a
take-over of the French company Danone by Pepsi Co and the reaction of US politi-
cians after the attempt of the Chinese company CNOCC to acquire the American
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competition policies when these operations could entirely or partially fall outside
the control of national jurisdictions. The years 2001-2002 marked the end of the
fifth wave in contemporary capitalism. The very recent years seem to indicate a
recovery in M&A activities, and notably in cross-border restructuring (European
Commission 2006d).
Besides M&A, international hard-core cartels also jeopardise benefits from globali-
sation
7. The presence of international cartels has been highlighted by the condem-
nation of the lysine, citric acid and vitamins cartels. Connor (2004) registers
around the world more than 160 international cartels discovered between 1990
and 2003. All together they were fined an amount of $10 billion. Modern interna-
tional cartels have distinct features (Connor 2004, Evenett et al. 2001, Levenstein
et al. 2004). Their members come mainly from the developed world, ie the US and
the EU, but also sometimes from Asian countries, particularly Japan and South
Korea. They involve large multinational firms, selling products and services made
globally. These companies are fully aware of antitrust rules. Multinational firms are
more frequently in contact. The risk of collusion might be higher
8. They could also be
more readily suspected anyway of anti-competitive behaviour, such as blocking
entry or using predatory pricing. Indeed, multinational firms might be endowed with
higher market power. MNEs are operating in concentrated markets with high entry
barriers (UNCTAD 1997). They usually make huge investments in R&D and market-
ing. These intangible assets confer large scale economies. They sell complex and
differentiated products too. They have deeper pockets and fewer external financing
constraints. They might also manipulate transfer prices to their benefit.
Nevertheless, the clandestine nature of much anti-competitive behaviour makes it
particularly difficult to know if this recently observed trend is a statistical fact
attributable solely to an improvement in the methods and means of detection of
competition authorities or, if not, to understand why international cartels are more
and more frequent. As with international M&A activity, economic literature on inter-
national cartels is also lacking. However, this phenomenon is again doubtless relat-
ed to globalisation. For instance, globalisation improves communication and then
fosters coordination and more collusive market outcomes. There is a conjecture
that, with economic integration, some markets could become more concentrated,
which could also facilitate collusion
9. Most notably, harm to competition, efficiency
and welfare could be substantial, especially for developing countries endowed with
weak anti-cartel regimes. For all these reasons it is not surprising that, for several
years now, international cartel prosecution is a high priority on the agenda of the EU
and US authorities. Without information-sharing and coordination between
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be seriously hampered. As there are major difficulties in collecting the necessary
evidence and interviewing witnesses abroad, as explained by Schoneveld (2003),
cooperation between competition authorities has become crucial.
Together with the trend towards more economic liberalisation, markets have been
reshaped by major technological improvements over the last twenty years. These
technological changes have been partly related to trade openness. Larger product
markets stimulate innovation involving high fixed costs of research and infrastruc-
ture, as they offer larger expected returns. One of the main features of recent tech-
nological progress has been the development of network-based industries (Röller
and Wey 2002, and Evenett et al. 2000). These are characterised by a high level of
concentration. The leverage of market power from one product to another could lead
to global dominance and its abuse, as some parties have argued in the Microsoft
case. Network externalities tend to favour industrial concentration too: the value of a
consumer product depends on the number of other consumers. Firms are then
encouraged to gain first-mover advantage by lowering prices and expanding sales,
reinforcing demand. Consumers can benefit from national and international exter-
nalities and complementarities, but may also be hurt by associated switching costs
and lock-in effects. As network effects can favour concentration and/or cooperation
among firms, eg on standard-setting, product compatibility, or licencing, regulators
need to rethink the economic framework and to adapt the tools of competition poli-
cy. This will constitute a new source of antitrust debate and thereby likely disagree-
ments among academics and competition authorities, as shown again very recent-
ly by the case of Microsoft
10.
The economic and technological changes have indeed been progressively accompa-
nied by a new institutional framework for competition policy. For some years now,
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of competition authorities. In
1989, only eleven developing countries and twenty OECD members had competi-
tion laws (Schoneveld 2003). By 2003, more than one hundred countries had
adopted competition rules. As a consequence, the overlapping of domestic regimes
has entailed duplicate legal costs and a waste of financial and human resources for
multinational firms. It also represents additional costs for antitrust monitoring as a
result of multiple reviews, redundant filing and reporting. Besides, it is a source of
political and business uncertainty. Different authorities’ decisions on a given case
can be contradictory, leading to conflict and even the risk of trade war as in the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case
11. All these drawbacks are amplified when antitrust
rules are different from one country to another and/or when the expected impact of
alleged anti-competitive behaviour differs across countries.
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poses new challenges to current European competition policy, which has been
under continuous reconstruction for several years. It is important to recall that the
beginnings of European antitrust regulation are traceable to the Treaty of Paris and
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. European compe-
tition laws were formally established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Competition
policy basically aims to promote and safeguard competition and the operation of
the market to the benefit of the economy. Antitrust rules are to be found in Articles
81 to 89
12. The core of European competition policy is Article 81 on horizontal and
vertical restrictive agreements and Article 82 on the abuse of dominant positions
13.
Merger regulation was born later, in 1989
14. The European Commission is setting up
one-stop-shop regulation and introducing guidelines with the aim of reducing busi-
ness uncertainty. Both reforms were supported by the business community (OECD
2005b). The increasing number of large European cross-border mergers called for
more transparent and quick scrutiny. The single market programme also demanded
a stricter enforcement of competition rules.
The EU has again launched a vast programme designed to modernise the European
antitrust regime. Both the institutional framework and substantive laws are being
reformed. First, there has been an ongoing process of decentralisation, with joint
responsibility of the Commission and national authorities for enforcing antitrust
laws. It was accompanied by the creation of the European Competition Network
(ECN) in May 2004 and the application of the new 2003 regulation
15,16. Second, the
notification system for agreements has been abolished. The legal exemption regime
shifts from an ex-ante to an ex-post monitoring system. It permits the reallocation
of European resources to the prosecution of hard-core practices. The Commission
has been endowed with new powers in terms of investigation, sanction and deci-
sion. Finally, substantive laws are switching from a more legalistic to a more
economic approach, affecting all antitrust fields.
This policy of reform is driven by the momentum in the liberalisation process of sec-
tors like gas, electricity or telecommunication, and the enlargement to the central
and eastern European countries. It implies the rationalisation and reorganisation of
the antitrust regulation framework. Furthermore, the modernisation of merger poli-
cy through the new merger regulation of 2004 was inevitable since several deci-
sions of the Commission were rejected by European courts in 2002 (as in the case
of Airtours/First Choice, Tetra Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand)
17. These develop-
ments led to the dissolution of the Merger Task Force after 2003 and the hiring of a
chief competition economist. More generally, the evolution of antitrust laws stems
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icy and decision-making.
This awareness of the EU has been stimulated by discussions and work carried out
in different institutional arenas, such as the International Competition Network
(ICN) or the OECD. European competition reforms should also be seen in the context
of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for growth and employment. For a long time, the main
objective of European competition policy was the construction of an integrated
European market. With the progressive achievement of the internal market, the
objective of market integration is less of a priority. It has been progressively
replaced by economic efficiency aims. This new objective was enhanced in 2000
with the agreement on the Lisbon Strategy. The goal is to make the EU ‘the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sus-
taining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ by
2010
18. As clearly underlined by the Commission’s 2004 annual report on competi-
tion policy, the task of the European authorities is to enforce and foster competition
in order to improve economic efficiency, increase productivity growth and promote
the competitiveness of the EU on global markets (Monti 2003, 2004a, 2004b).
In this context of ongoing reforms driven by multiple but convergent factors, the
international dimension of European competition policy is becoming more promi-
nent, raising new issues. It is necessary fully to understand these issues and to
take account of both the external and internal dimension of European reforms. A key
point is that globalisation can increase the costs of monitoring and seriously reduce
the ability of European authorities to tackle cross-border anti-competitive conduct.
In addition, conflicts are exacerbated by industrial policy motives – sometimes
called economic patriotism – and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy. Since the territori-
al and extraterritorial application of competition rules is, on its own, unlikely to lead
to an optimal international competition system, globalisation calls for a higher level
of cooperation. This cooperation involves the adoption of a package of hard and soft
laws, at a bilateral, plurilateral – notably via the inclusion of antitrust provisions in
regional trade agreements – and multilateral level through different institutions
such as the ICN, the WTO or the OECD. This requires a higher degree of neutrality and
credibility of action, as well as the influence of European competition authorities
within Europe.
The second section of this chapter describes the institutional aspects and the dif-
ferent instruments of the external dimension of European competition policy. The
third section recalls the theoretical and empirical arguments presented in the
economic literature that are the basis for designing competition policy in international
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tions for the European competition policy of today and of tomorrow. 
The external dimension of European competition policy
While Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome are the cornerstone of European com-
petition legislation, they do not define the scope of European jurisdiction explicitly,
as noted by Kojima (2002). They state that alleged practices ‘may affect trade
between member states’ and may have ‘an anti-competitive effect in the common
market’. The impact of trade can be ‘direct or indirect, actual or potential’ (Sugden
2002, Hamner 2002).
European rules apply to practices impacting inter-state trade (Grisay 2005).
Abuses of dominant position and prohibited arrangements are subject to EU law if
they affect intra-European trade, irrespective of whether the abuse originates in the
EU or in non-EU countries, ie regardless of the nationality of the parties to the abuse.
It is usually the situation of a company whose activity covers several member
states. It is also required that the anti-competitive impact takes place within the
single market. The rules guarantee free competition within the EU.
This section depicts the institutional and political framework of external features of
European competition policy, in other words the application and interpretation of the
extraterritoriality principle over time in Europe, the bilateral and plurilateral agree-
ments established with main trading partners (mainly through regional trade agree-
ments) and the multilateral negotiations in the framework of the WTO, OECD, ICN and
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
The extraterritoriality principle
Articles 81 and 82 are consistent with the objective of an integrated European mar-
ket, as they define the geographic application of EU law and specify the compe-
tences of the European Commission and the member states. Nevertheless, they are
silent as to the behaviour of companies outside the EU. Thus, the EU was obliged to
use two other principles to solve this question of competence: the so-called
economic unit and extraterritoriality principles (Grisay 2005).
Both in the Dyestuff case in 1972 and in the Continental Can case one year later,
both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Commission refer to the unity of a
group of firms
19(Davison and Johnson 2002). This principle assigns responsibility




located abroad. The parent company has indeed a decisive influence on its sub-
sidiary. The foreign parent is therefore viewed as acting within the EU. Increases in
prices could be decided outside the EU and implemented by affiliates within the
European market. This principle is consistent with the territoriality principle.
The extraterritoriality principle is applied when companies involved do not have
affiliates within the EU market (Falvey and Lloyd 1999). It consists of the prosecu-
tion of firms whose anti-competitive behaviour affects a territory, irrespective of
their country origin. National laws are applied to companies located within the ter-
ritory of another nation. In 1977, the Commission stated for instance that they ‘can
act against restrictions of competition whose effects are felt within the territory
under their jurisdiction, even if companies involved are located and doing business
outside the territory, and of foreign nationality, have no link with that territory, and
are acting under an agreement governed by foreign law’ (Kojima 2002).
In the Wood Pulp case in 1988, the ECJ confirms the use of the extraterritoriality
principle by the Commission
20. In 1984, companies from the US, Canada, Norway,
Portugal and Spain were accused by the Commission of collusion on prices in the
European wood pulp market, breaching Article 81. Defendants claimed that the EU
lacked jurisdiction over them, since they were not established within the EU. Many
of the defendants indeed had no affiliate within the EU. They also explained that one
of the US defendants was involved in an export cartel which was legally authorised
in the US. Thus, they argued, action against the cartel by the EU would have violated
the public international law duty of non-interference. The ECJ rejected both these
claims. First, asserting jurisdiction was justified on the ground that ‘the producers
implemented their pricing agreement within the common market. It is immaterial
whether or not they had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches
within the Community in order to make their contacts with purchasers within the
Community’ (Sugden 2002). The justification for jurisdiction was based on the
effects of their actions, and not on their location or nationality. This has been called
the implementation doctrine
21,22.  What matters is not the place where the agree-
ment or the decision is made but where it is implemented, ie where products are
sold. Here, the pricing agreement was implemented within the EU (Kojima 2002,
and Fiebig 2005). Jurisdiction is grounded on the territoriality principle and thus
recognised by public international laws. Second, the alleged breach of the public
international law duty of non-interference was also rejected. It only occurs when the
duties in one country are prohibited by the laws of another country. The ECJ finds
no conflict in this case, since US laws were not infringed. US laws regulating export
cartels do not include any requirement that firms should be exempt from EU compe-
tition laws (Sugden 2002, and Hamner 2002).There was another judicial step with the Gencor/Lonrho case in 1999
23 (Davison
and Johnson 2002). This case involved a merger between two South African com-
panies. The Court of First Instance examined the geographic scope of the merger
regulation and referred to the Wood Pulp case to confirm that the action of the
Commission was legal
24.
This extraterritoriality principle, as all unilateral economic policy, presents some
important drawbacks. Political limits are clear. Depending on the power of antitrust
regulators, this principle can settle international antitrust issues. However, it can
also amplify conflicts and thereby generate serious tensions. For instance, the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case was accompanied by rumours and speculation of
conflict escalation and retaliation by the US against the EU if the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas merger had been effectively sanctioned
25 (Aktas et al. 2000). There are
also judicial limits. Countries have adopted measures to prevent what they often
consider to be a violation of their sovereignty. We return later to the political impact
of the extraterritoriality principle.
Bilateral agreements and regional trade agreements
The EU authorities have signed bilateral agreements to enhance information-shar-
ing, the coordination of procedures and convergence on substantive issues
26(Röller
and Wey 2002). There exist different levels of bilateral cooperation, ranging from
notification to negative comity (Bode and Budzinski 2005, Haucap et al.2005).
First, cooperation could imply notification. A country aware of some potential anti-
competitive practice notifies it to the relevant competition authority. Second, there
could be consultation. Authorities help each other on the substance of an investiga-
tion, notably through an exchange of information. Two other cooperation mecha-
nisms exist: negative and positive comity. They are less frequently included in
agreements and take the form of non-binding commitments. They aim at preventing
the extraterritorial application of domestic laws. The negative comity principle
states that an authority has to take into account the consequences of its actions on
the other country (Bode and Budzinski 2005). Each authority respects the sover-
eignty and interests of other countries. The positive comity principle states that a
domestic authority acts on behalf of the foreign country against domestic firms
adopting anti-competitive behaviour abroad. The domestic authority refers to its
domestic laws to protect the interest of its partner country.
The EU has signed bilateral agreements with all its main trade partners (Grisay
2005). First, bilateral cooperation has been used to impose upon EU neighbour
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Economic Area and the Porto agreement which was signed in 1992 between the EU
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states. It aims to ensure identical
conditions of competition and design of competition rules. It is based on a one-
stop-shop principle where cases are allocated either to the EU or the EFTA authori-
ties or on deep cooperation in terms of exchange of information or administrative
assistance. A second example is the regional free trade agreement with the central
and eastern European countries, in which competition provisions were included. A
major condition for their accession was respect of European competition rules.
Similarly, the Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreement contains competition provi-
sions designed to promote convergence of laws and cooperation. Note that region-
al trade agreements, which are mainly signed between developed and less devel-
oped countries, have in recent years represented the main channel for disseminat-
ing antitrust rules. Provisions are often expressed in terms of market access. The
purpose is to avoid trade agreements being undermined by anti-competitive prac-
tices (Evenett 2005a). 
Second, links with non-neighbour countries aim to contribute to a higher level of
cooperation and to some degree to convergence (Davidson and Johnson 2002).
The Commission has formal cooperation agreements with Canada, Japan and the
US. The Commission also maintains a relationship with Australia, China, Korea, and
Mexico (OECD 2005b). The most important and comprehensive bilateral agreement
was signed with the US antitrust authorities. Because of its economic importance
and scope, we describe it in some detail.
Cooperation between the US and the EU was established in 1991. The agreement
came into force in 1995 after being accepted by the EU Council of Ministers. In addi-
tion to notification of cases and exchange of information on general matters, the
1991 agreement is based on the traditional concept of (negative) comity, while it
also includes the instrument of positive comity (Bevin and Echevarria 2005).
Articles V and VI respectively refer to the positive and negative comity principle
27
(Montini 1999). None of these two articles implies binding obligations. A second
agreement was signed in 1998. It seeks to give more details about the place of pos-
itive comity (Davison and Johnson 2002, and Bevin and Echevarria 2005). Indeed
the previous agreement lacked a test determining when the positive comity princi-
ple can be implemented by authorities. For this reason Article III of the 1998 EU-US
agreement adopts a new definition of the positive comity principle
28. A party can
request the competition authorities of the other party (the requested party) to
launch an investigation even if the presumed anti-competitive behaviour does not
violate the other party’s competition laws and even if the competition authorities of
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ed party then has a general duty to act in conformity with the request (Montini
1999). Since it was amended in 1998, the positive comity principle has been used
only once, in the Sabre/Amadeus case in 1998
29.
These arrangements have nevertheless facilitated coordination in merger and cartel
cases – especially with simultaneous international cartel investigation and inspec-
tion, as in 2003 in the plastic additives industry (Bevin and Echevarria 2005).
Cooperation has also led to major convergence on leniency programmes. The EU
revised its leniency programme in 2002, making it more transparent and credible
30.
It should be pointed out that the EU-US agreement does not include merger control.
A specific protocol on merger reviews was adopted in 2002. It is designed to facili-
tate cooperation through parallel timing of investigation and sharing of information.
However, the cooperation agreement has proved inadequate because of a limited
exchange of information owing to confidentiality rules and the persistence of ineffi-
ciencies linked to multiple competence and jurisdiction. Besides, cooperation does
not seem to be resistant to serious political and economic turmoil.
Multilateral framework
A first attempt at multilateral cooperation goes back to the Havana Charter in 1946-
1947. The Havana Charter was related to the International Trade Organisation. It
included an important chapter (Chapter V) on restrictive business practices which
could be harmful to trade. Concerns were related to the behaviour of German cartels
and Japanese zaibatsu in the pre-war period. However, the Havana Charter was
never ratified as it was rejected by the US Congress, which did not want to abandon
part of its sovereignty. Part of the charter was integrated into the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947 and applied from 1948. The
GATT, a multilateral agreement designed to provide a framework of rules and a forum
to negotiate lowering of trade barriers among nations, contains no explicit provision
on antitrust issues. Their introduction was discussed before the Uruguay Round in
the 1990s but they were finally removed from the negotiations. However, there
were some indirect references to competition issues, especially in relation to public
procurement, as noted by Messerlin (1995).
The OECD and UNCTAD have been also used as a forum for encouraging multilateral
cooperation on competition matters since the 1990s. The OECD has adopted differ-
ent recommendations over time on anti-competitive conduct affecting trade, as
well as directives on multinational firms’ behaviour (Messerlin 1995). The OECD
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It has been revised several times, such as in 1973, 1979 and 1986. In 1995, the
OECD underlined the need for cooperation among national authorities in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of anti-competitive practices via the exchange of informa-
tion, automatic notification and enhanced coordination of proceedings. It also fos-
tered a voluntary conciliation procedure and the application of the positive comity
principle to prevent and solve conflicts of competence (Grisay 2005). In 1998, for
instance, the OECD issued a recommendation on effective action against hard-core
cartels. As recently as 2005, it adopted a recommendation on merger review best
practice. There was also an active debate within UNCTAD on the behaviour of multi-
national firms in developing countries and the control of restrictive business prac-
tices (particularly the condemnation of international cartels). It resulted in the
adoption of a set of ‘best endeavours’ principles in 1980. UNCTAD’s efforts proved to
be very useful, especially in providing technical assistance to developing countries.
Another instrument of multilateral regulation is the World Trade Organisation.
Following the different GATT rounds, the WTO was set up in 1994. The WTO is now an
important player in multilateral trade policies. It seeks to resolve trade conflicts and
monitor national trade policies. Member states are obliged to respect rules set by
the WTO. There exists an effective dispute settlement system to ensure the legiti-
macy and enforcement of rules. Countries affected by alleged misbehaviour on the
part of other countries can turn to the WTO for a remedy. 
In the early 1990s, the EU launched the idea of including a competition policy
regime in the WTO. It was first suggested by Sir Leon Brittan in 1992 at the Davos
World Competition Forum, and then proposed in the 1995 Van Miert Report (Kojima
2002, and Evenett et al. 2000). The EU proposal contains several elements, as
explained by Grisay (2005): binding cooperation (automatic procedure, exchange
of non-confidential information, introduction of the negative and positive comity
principle); the definition and adoption of minimum standard laws (core principle)
related to restrictive business practices and the abuse of market power (in parallel
with the principle of national treatment and non-discrimination and that of trans-
parency); the implementation of a dispute settlement procedure, but only for
breaches of common principles, and its enforcement. A WTO working group was set
up in 1996 at the Singapore ministerial meeting to examine the EU initiative and the
problems it raised. So far, there has been no progress on these competition matters.
However, new WTO agreements on trade in services (GATS), on intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) and on investment (TRIMS) recognise the need for regulation against
anti-competitive behaviour. But they do not go beyond the status of a simple recom-
mendation. For instance, the services sector, especially telecommunications, could
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GATS therefore includes some provisions to preserve competition and promote neu-
tral regulation of foreign monopolies. State members have to ensure that a monop-
oly supplier will not abuse its dominant position when competing to supply servic-
es beyond the activities of the authorised monopoly. Similarly, intellectual property
rights confer a legal monopoly position. In all these cases, trade might potentially
be affected by anti-competitive conduct. Hence it is relevant to examine the ques-
tion of trade in the context of imperfectly competitive markets. 
While the EU has promoted the WTO and the enforcement of binding laws, the US
supports a less institutional multinational framework via the International
Competition Network (ICN), a multilateral cooperation forum. The ICN was initially
known as the Global Competition Initiative. The idea for such a forum came from the
International Competition Advisory Committee formed in 1997 by the US authori-
ties. At that time, the US authorities were starting to worry about the increasing
number of cross-border merger reviews and the relative ineffectiveness of its com-
petition instruments abroad in terms of scrutiny and enforcement. In September
2000, both the US and EU authorities officially expressed their support for the cre-
ation of the ICN, which was established in 2001.
The ICN consists of an informal network of antitrust agencies from OECD and non-
OECD countries (for instance, Hoekman and Saggi 2005, Bode and Budzinski 2005,
or Todino 2003). The ICN is not an intergovernmental body. It was first led by the US
and the EU, but quickly attracted more than 80 other jurisdictions from all around
the world. Other institutional members such as the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD, as
well as private actors, participate in this network too
31. The ICN seeks to improve
cooperation on a voluntary basis, and thereby to reduce conflicts, by sharing infor-
mation through benchmarking and mutual learning. Its aim is to foster the conver-
gence of national merger review regimes by developing best practice guidelines for
enforcement. The ICN’s role is only to initiate projects on competition issues. It
favours discussion and consensus among its members, especially via the constitu-
tion of working groups. Different working groups exist, such as the working group on
mergers or cartels. The ICN also includes the development of competition advocacy
in order to influence government decision-makers. It should be pointed out that all
proposals to harmonise rules and adopt best practice are, as for instance the OECD
recommendations, non binding and purely voluntary (Jenny 2003, Bode and
Budzinski 2005). They are therefore often called ‘soft laws’. Unlike in the WTO, there
is no sanctions mechanism in the ICN (or OECD) framework.




of  EU competition policy, we now analyse antitrust problems emerging from market
globalisation. The investigation of the pros and cons of the instruments available to
policymakers is mainly based on existing empirical and theoretical evidence.
Which competition policy in international markets?
Interactions, conflicts and efficiency in competition policy: theory
Competition authorities make decisions in order to maximise a general objective
function. Basically, this objective function is composed of the merging firms’ profit
(insider), the non-merging firms’ profit (outsider) and the consumer surplus. The
weight attributed to each of these components is likely to differ from one authority
to another. We return to this point later. The interdependence of antitrust regula-
tions can take two different but related forms, called negative spill-overand distor-
tion effects(Falvey and Lloyd 1999). Negative spill-overs can be defined as the sit-
uation where the action of one country reduces the welfare of another country.
Distortions occur when this intervention also has the effect of reducing world wide
welfare. The non-internalisation of externalities could lead to authorities imposing
either an excessively strict or an excessively lax competition regime as regards the
global welfare criterion. Economic literature thus usually distinguishes ‘type I’ errors
from ‘type II’ errors committed by competition authorities. Type I errors correspond
to the case when a practice (for instance a merger) is wrongly blocked by national
regulators even though it would result in an increase in world wide welfare. Type II
errors occur when conduct reducing world wide welfare is nevertheless approved by
national regulators
32. Fundamentally, these distortions at an international level
come from unequal geographic distribution of gains and losses across countries.
Cross-border externalities and competition regimes
First, we investigate implications for competition policy under the different regimes
of territoriality and extraterritoriality when authorities maximise national welfare
(as assumed by economists in most theoretical models). Second, we consider why
countries cooperate and how difficult it is in practice. It is important to point out the
limited number of theoretical and even more limited number of empirical studies on
this question. In addition, research papers usually focus on M&A only.
The territoriality principle refers to a situation where a country applies its domestic
laws only to its own domestic companies. The design of competition policy in a
closed economy is usually determined by a classic welfare trade-off between
domestic consumer surplus and domestic firms’ profits at home. In the context ofopen markets, the optimal policy is identical for net importing industries (and more
generally a net importing country) to a situation without trade, since the country
has no influence on foreign firms exporting goods to it. It is not able to control for-
eign firms. In net exporting industries (and countries), authorities fully take into
account the anti-competitive effects from domestic firms on domestic consumers,
but not on foreign consumers. As a result, authorities tend to be laxer (Guzman
1998, 2004). Thus, competition policy is often viewed as being too lax compared to
an optimal global policy, irrespective of the net country and industry trade balance.
Export cartels are a perfect example of underregulation and of beggar-thy-neigh-
bour competition policy. Export cartels decrease foreign welfare while raising that
of the home country (Evenett et al. 2001). An export cartel can simply be defined
as a group of exporters allowed to work jointly when selling products abroad. Thanks
to this cooperation, these firms are more likely to be engaged in price-fixing behav-
iour. This could result in a reduction of trade flows and lower consumer welfare
abroad
33. When consumers hurt by anti-competitive practices are foreigners, the
trade-off of competition authorities is reduced to the maximisation of domestic
firms’ profits. Antitrust intervention is deemed irrelevant since export cartels do not
affect domestic consumers.
Note that over the last decade a lot of countries have eliminated explicit antitrust
exemption for export arrangements (Levenstein and Suslow 2004). The European
Commission and most EU members states have abandoned an explicit regime and
adopted an implicit one, while the US and Australia, for instance, continue to main-
tain an exemption (with notification). The US adopted the export exemption in 1918
in the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, which was revised in 1982 by the Export
Trading Company Act
34.
As with export cartels, if an industry exports all its production, authorities have an
incentive to approve anti-competitive national mergers, since they harm foreign
consumers only and favour domestic firms. The assumption of underregulation is
supported by some theoretical research in economics. Tay and Willmann (2005)
conclude that competition policy is too lax without coordination between authori-
ties when mergers are regulated under the territoriality principle. In their theoretical
model, competition authorities have jurisdiction only over mergers located within
their territory. Therefore, they are not able to block purely foreign mergers that neg-
atively impact their home country since these mergers do not fall under their juris-
diction. Territorial regimes are thereby more likely to induce type II errors. This is
confirmed by Head and Ries for international M&A (1997). Some mergers may not
be banned even though they reduce global welfare if the countries whose con-
sumers are harmed do not have jurisdiction over the merger. When consumers and
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Results from Barros and Cabral (1994) confirm this. Competition authorities may
ban domestic mergers that a global authority would allow if the share of domestic
demand exceeds the share of domestic supply (and vice versa). Jurisdictions with
a high (low) share of consumers relative to non-merging firms have more incentive
to enforce strict (lax) competition rules
35. Thus, in net exporting industries, they will
authorise an anti-competitive domestic merger affecting foreign consumers, gener-
ating type II errors. Symmetrically, it could lead to a type I error in net importing
industries. For instance, authorities might not take into account positive efficiency
effects on foreign consumers. It might be the case of domestic mergers decreasing
the cost of supplying foreign markets and lowering competition at home. The main
conclusion from economic research is as follows: an increasing asymmetry in the
distribution of consumers and producers or company headquarters across coun-
tries leads to welfare inefficiency, since authorities do not internalise the cross-bor-
der effects on other jurisdictions.
The government can therefore decide to adopt the principle of extraterritoriality to
remedy cross-border effects from anti-competitive behaviour conducted abroad
(Falvey and Lloyd 1999). It then applies its national laws to companies located
within the territory of another nation. Under a regime of extraterritoriality, competi-
tion policy could on the contrary become too tough (Guzman 1998, 2004). A net
importer country clearly has an incentive to tighten its competition policy to con-
demn alleged anti-competitive practices by foreign companies. It tends to overreg-
ulate to defend its consumers to the detriment of foreign firms. Net exporter coun-
tries continue to apply laxer competition rules. Therefore, when laws differ from one
country to another, the relevant international regime might be a package of the
strictest elements of national laws, as illustrated by the case of Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California involving British companies in 1993 (Guzman 2004).
Certain practices of British reinsurance companies were permitted under UK law,
but prohibited under US law. The US Supreme Court stated that there was no true
conflict between UK and US law. British firms could comply with both US and British
laws. In this case, the US authorities were clearly being encouraged to sanction the
behaviour in question, since it harmed US consumers while benefiting UK firms
only. Thus, under extraterritorial regimes, a country might more frequently prohibit
efficient as well as inefficient practices, generating more type I errors but fewer
type II errors.
This is confirmed by some more formal models. If authorities block every merger
that would be harmful, irrespective of the merging firms’ nationality as in Tay and
Willmann (2005), world wide welfare-reducing mergers will never be allowed. Head
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jurisdiction over it, there will be no merger which reduces global welfare.
Interestingly, the repeated interaction between authorities may reduce type I errors
(Cabral 2005). In a dynamic framework, each country would accept an internation-
al merger proposal that reduced its welfare, but increased global welfare. The loss
from the negative externality would be lower than the cost of being punished when
deviating from a cooperative strategy.
To sum up, global competition without global regulation could lead to too strict and
too lax antitrust rules. However, this conclusion should be qualified because of the
practical difficulty of enforcing the extraterritoriality principle (Grisay 2005, for
instance). First, international public law prevents states from exercising their power
of enforcement on foreign territory. Second, the power of the Commission to obtain
information and documentation abroad is low. It might in some cases be impossible
for a country to detect and/or get evidence of the alleged anti-competitive conduct.
In Europe, affiliates established within the EU must comply with the request for
information, even if the information is located overseas. When companies are locat-
ed abroad, the Commission can request information from them but without using its
coercive power. Information is supplied on a voluntary basis. In addition, some
countries like the UK, Australia, France or South Africa have enacted blocking legis-
lation, mainly to counter US application of the extraterritoriality principle (Senz and
Charlesworth 2001, or Falvey and Lloyd 1999). Some laws prohibit the collection
and transfer of evidence to foreign bodies, the enforcement of foreign judgments or
compliance with orders of foreign authorities. There could also exist ‘claw-back’
statutes. They allow ‘an entity that is the subject of a foreign judgment executed
against its foreign assets to recover the judgment sum against assets of the foreign
judgment creditor that are situated in the local jurisdiction’ (Senz and Charlesworth
2001, p79). In addition, the enforcement of the extraterritoriality principle differs
greatly among countries depending on the size of the business activity of foreign
firms and their assets in this country. The credibility of sanctions for ill-behaved
firms varies from one country to another. Only a government which has a grip on for-
eign firms by seizing their assets or restricting their activity can regulate domestic
and foreign firms equally, independently of the foreign firms’ location. In the EU, the
Commission cannot compel companies outside the EU to pay a fine. They can only
impose monetary sanctions on European affiliates of non-EU companies. The
Commission can only use the power of commandment and not that of coercion to
terminate prohibited practices. Finally, authorities have to bear in mind the legiti-
mate interest of other states to avoid conflicts of competence, as noted by Grisay
(2005).
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amplify conflicts, as shown in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case. It could trigger
retaliation. The extraterritorially principle then represents one useful, but limited,
mechanism for solving the issue of cross-border effects of anti-competitive con-
duct. On the contrary, cooperation through bilateral or multilateral agreement can
constitute a mechanism for internalising negative externalities from competition
policy decisions. It can allow the achievement of higher global welfare to the bene-
fit of all countries. More broadly, it facilitates mutual understanding and discussion.
However, negotiating a deal will be feasible only with a monetary or non-monetary
compensation system, since some countries may lose from an agreement. When
going from an extraterritoriality (territoriality) to a cooperation regime, net import-
ing (exporting) countries are likely to lose from a laxer (stricter) optimal regime.
Asymmetry in the enforcement of extraterritoriality will increase claims for com-
pensation from powerful countries, as predicted by Tay and Willmann (2005)
36. In
addition, transfers can incur some transaction costs as noted by Guzman (1998).
These costs notably stem from agency problems and political pressures exerted by
industrial lobbyists or voters. Besides, imperfect information makes the evaluation
of gains and losses from an agreement difficult. There could also be well-known
free-riding behaviour. Some winners from the agreement might prefer not to com-
pensate the losers. These costs are probably lower when the number of countries
involved is low and their characteristics are similar.
In practice, current cooperation has experienced some major drawbacks. Exchange
of information is very often limited by confidentiality rules (Montini 1999). The US
signed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act in 1994 with Canada.
It waives confidentiality restrictions under some circumstances
37. Exchange of
information has been more limited with Europe because of possible criminal sanc-
tions and the treble damages rule in US civil suits. More generally, it is difficult for
competition authorities to support publicly an improvement in exchange which is
potentially to the detriment of their domestic firms. There is a risk of information
leakage to competing rivals or foreign governments. The difficulty of collecting the
necessary evidence and interviewing witnesses abroad can seriously reduce the
ability of authorities to prosecute and punish international cartels (Schoneveld
2003). The executives of firms can organise the formation of the cartel (meetings,
information exchange) outside their home country. Besides, difficulties linked to
multiple competences and jurisdiction remain. Let us take the example of cartel
prosecution. The non-coordinated accumulation of fines could force the target firm
into bankruptcy, which could have a very negative impact on market structures. The
ECJ thus rejected the principle of nec bis in idem (one single sanction) (Grisay
2005). On the contrary, national laws can be ineffective in deterring international
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a fine and deterrence mechanism based on the domestic market only could be irrel-
evant. The level of fine could prove to be too low to deter firms from engaging in an
international cartel. Leniency programmes could also be less efficient, since a firm
would risk being condemned in other countries if it provides some information at
home. It could lead to an inefficient outcome if the antitrust monitoring process is
not carried out in parallel. The same argument could be extended to structural and
behavioural remedies for mergers and more generally to merger scrutiny.
Procedural disparities (difference in timing of merger review) can hinder effective
cooperation. Lastly, non-binding cooperation on key antitrust cases could prove to
be insufficient and too fragile in some political and economic contexts, as shown by
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell conflicts.
The setting up of a binding global antitrust framework enforced by one single cen-
tralised authority might appear to be a theoretical solution to remove all costs relat-
ed to multiple antitrust reviews and to impose some effective discipline on coun-
tries. But the literature on federalism suggests that responsibility should be
assigned to the level of government that is capable of internalising economic exter-
nalities. It is called the subsidiarity principle. Centralisation would be appropriate
only when the gains from the internalisation of externalities are large enough rela-
tive to the costs incurred by a central authority. This institutional solution may
indeed create new kinds of economic inefficiency. Centralisation may generate
additional bureaucracy costs (Fox 2003). Moreover, authorities would be distant
from the markets they are in charge of monitoring, which would accentuate any
asymmetry in information. The law applied might be less suited to the local environ-
ment. There might also be an accountability concern. Authorities could pursue their
own goals and favour particular interests. This problem may be reinforced by lower
political pressure from less well-informed citizens. There could be a dilution of local
influence in the adoption of laws. Concerted action is also more difficult. There is a
higher risk of capture to the benefit of the business community
38. Finally, the set-
ting-up of a single global authority will de facto imply the absence of any competi-
tion among antitrust authorities and thus the removal of benchmarking practices.
A source of conflict: antitrust objectives and interpretation
There can also be some disagreement between competition authorities not only
because of differences in interests, but also in objectives or economic interpreta-
tion. Let us take the example of the GE/Honeywell case in 2001. This merger conflict
is interpreted by many commentators as the outcome of a different view of how this
conglomerate merger could have affected competitive market structure
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American merger. The European Commission assumed that merging partners would
have been able to drive competitors out by bundling goods and services, to the
detriment of consumers. Competitors would not have been able to match this newly
merging entity. The US authorities thought differently. Efficient mergers by leading
firms benefit consumers, even if they can hurt rivals in the short run. In addition to
a difference in economic doctrine, some economists discern underlying industrial
policy motives (Patterson and Shapiro 2001). For some, the Commission gave too
much weight to the interests of European competitors. This argument was also fre-
quently used to explain the conflict in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in
1997. Note that in all these cases, the EU strongly denies the allegation that it was
preserving the interests of competitors to the detriment of consumers.
In this part of the text, we compare the antitrust regime in Europe and US. The US
antitrust laws were established at the beginning of the 20th century to safeguard
competition in the interest of consumers (Niels and ten Kate 2004, and Kurlde
2005). A major change occurred in the economic doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s
under the influence of the Chicago school, which advocated a less interventionist
policy. The main idea was that antitrust policy had to protect the process of compe-
tition and not competitors. The ultimate goal is consumer welfare, not competition
in itself. Indeed, a market structure can be highly competitive, generating low prices
and high-quality goods and services, even if the number of incumbent firms is low.
Efficiencies benefiting consumers were to be promoted even if they harmed com-
petitors (Kolasky 2004). On the other hand, EU competition policy is based on the
1957 Treaty of Rome and, until very recently, as emphasised in the introduction,
one of the main objectives of European competition policy has been market integra-
tion and the formation of a unified European market. This objective would explain,
for instance, the condemnation per seof firms practising price discrimination tend-
ing to segment European markets. This approach is not necessarily consistent with
maximising economic efficiency and consumer welfare (Motta 2004).
As underlined by Evenett (2005b), competition laws have not just focused on a sin-
gle objective, ie consumer welfare, over time and across countries, but have more or
less explicitly included other objectives, such as the employment level, income
redistribution, small business protection, fairness and equity or the dispersion of
political and economic power (also Motta 2004). Conflicts are most likely to occur
when authorities pursue industrial policy goals. According to the World Bank, indus-
trial policy can be defined as ‘government efforts to alter industrial structure to pro-
mote productivity-based growth’
39 (Evenett 2005b). In this context, the formation
of national champions has often been supported by some countries using dynamic
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threshold to be competitive on global markets. The national champion policy is
assumed to improve the competitiveness of domestic firms abroad. It is frequently
argued that, as a consequence, government should relax competition rules to facil-
itate this restructuring process. Fundamentally, the national champion policy
increases disputes between competition authorities because of political interfer-
ence and national preference. In a theoretical paper, Neven and Röller (2000) point
out that, with market integration, there would be fewer conflicting decisions since
regulators would tend to define the global market as the relevant market.
Regulators assess competitive effects within the same global relevant market
when choosing to ban or to authorise a merger
40. As a result, divergence tends to
occur not because regulators do not protect consumers, but because they pursue
national industry interests. Inherently, the national champion policy has indeed a
discriminatory approach towards foreign firms, which is not really justified by
economic argument
41 (For a comparison of comparative effects of domestic and
cross-border M&A, see eg Bertrand and Zitouna (2006a), and Bertrand and Zuniga
(2006). For a discussion of the industrial policy conducted by individual EU mem-
ber states, see Veron (2006)).
In addition, competition and industrial policy do not inherently diverge
42. They can
be complementary. Competition policy exerts a positive effect on the productivity of
domestic firms by sanctioning non-efficiency practices. Moreover, competition pol-
icy can promote not only static but also dynamic efficiency. It is wrong to assert
that competition policy necessarily hinders the development of R&D activities.
First, the relationship between industrial concentration and innovation activities is
ambiguous. Some studies conclude that there is a positive link between concentra-
tion and innovation, as in Mansfield (1968) or Geroski (1995), while others find a
negative link or a more complex inverted-U relationship (Scherer 1967 and 1980,
Aghion et al. 2002). There is, then, no real robust evidence that laxer competition
policy entails higher innovatory activity. Second, as stressed by Evenett (2005c),
dynamic efficiency has already begun to be considered by major jurisdictions in
their decisions.
Even if antitrust authorities share similar objectives, disputes can also arise
because of differing economic interpretation. It is usually said that the US approach
puts more trust in market forces overall (Niels and ten Kate 2004). On the other
hand, it is said that European authorities are more sceptical about market self-reg-
ulation mechanisms. This would explain why the European Commission pays more
attention to leading firms’ behaviour and dominant practices. In addition, the
Commission’s competition policy decisions have been criticised on the grounds
COMPETITION POLICY
177that they lacked sound economic analysis. For a long time, the role of economists
remained limited in Europe as compared to the US. The appointment of a Chief
Competition Economist was the sign of a new priority given to the economic
approach at the Commission. Now, a real convergence of doctrine between the US
and the EU, as with the new merger regulation and horizontal merger guidelines of
2004, has been the order of the day for several years (Coppi and Walker 2004, and
Walker 2005). In the case of the legal economic test for mergers, the EU has partial-
ly abandoned its standard dominance criterion (the creation or strengthening of a
dominant position) in favour of a test closer to that used by the US (a substantial
lessening of competition).
In the past, the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission used
a structural analysis based on market share and a concentration ratio to test dom-
inance. It is related to the idea that a concentrated market reflects high market
power and weak competition. However, a merger in a differentiated product indus-
try could lead to significantly higher prices over a localised range of products, even
if the merging firms are not the leading firms in the market. This merger could be
prosecuted only with some difficulty using the dominance standard. The new
European merger guidelines of 2004 call for an assessment of the change in prices
attributable to the merger, the so-called unilateral effects (Walker 2005). The con-
vergence of approaches between the US and the EU has been even greater in the
analysis of the coordinated effects of mergers. In the new European merger guide-
lines, the risk of tacit collusion occurs only if four necessary conditions are simul-
taneously met: a common understanding on the terms of coordination (such as
price, quality or market division); a monitoring capability of firms; a sanction mech-
anism when a firm deviates; a lower capacity of non-participant firms to undermine
the coordination (maverick firms and potential entry). This view is now closer to the
US checklist approach. In the past, the European Commission did not consider this
whole set of conditions as necessary. The EU approach on the efficiency defence
has also evolved, although the European Commission attributes less importance to
efficiency gains produced by mergers.
However, there still remain some important practical differences in merger reviews
between the US and EU approaches (Coppi and Walker 2004, and Walker 2005). For
instance, there is little sign of convergence on market delineation issues and mar-
ket definition. Unlike the EU, the US gives a reduced role to the concept of market
definition since concentration tests are considered less important than merger sim-
ulation models. Besides, US market definition is narrower than in the EU method.
The US analysis starts from the product sold by the merging firms, while the
European approach considers more standard industry segmentation. In addition,
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ily the case for the US authority. In other antitrust fields, vertical restraints continue
to be a controversial area (Haucaupet al. 2005). The European approach treats ver-
tical restraints with more suspicion. Some practices like retail price maintenance
may be prohibited per se. In the US, vertical practices are evaluated under a rule of
reason
43. There is a detailed investigation into the price and quantity effect of this
practice. Differences also still persist in competition laws in relation to cartels
44.
Given these differences, the European Commission might tend towards stricter
competition policy, although this fact is questioned by Lévèque (2005).
Differences in the design of competition policy, that is, in the procedural and insti-
tutional framework, can accentuate it (Akbar 2002). Ex ante monitoring is more
likely to be rigorous in Europe since ex postsanctions can be greater in the US com-
pared to EU. So far there has been no possibility of private suits, treble damages or
criminal conviction in Europe
45. The European authorities are therefore more wary
about potential anti-competitive conduct. This could be reinforced by the fact that
referring a decision to the ECJ is possible but usually takes an excessively long
time. Commission decisions prove to be quite irreversible given the number of cur-
rent investigations, although the recent decision in the Sony/BMG case shows that
the ECJ may also overturn an approval given by the Commission. Nonetheless, a
systematic analysis of the effectiveness of competition policy in the US and the EU
is lacking. One may expect differences in approach to shrink with the ongoing
reform of European competition laws.
Meanwhile, the development of the new economy, partly stimulated by globalisa-
tion and the access of firms to larger market outlets, gives rise to new challenges.
Network industries experience a natural trend towards industrial concentration
because they require high R&D expenditures on infrastructure networks. Usual
competition tools to evaluate dominance and horizontal mergers have to be adjust-
ed to take account of the specificity of these industries
46. However, so far, there has
been no clear consensus among economists on the right way to regulate these new
high-technology sectors. As a result, cross-border disputes are likely to increase
(Röller and Wey 2002, and Evenett et al. 2000). The new economy will certainly
represent a new source of divergence on antitrust issues in the near future, as
already suggested by the difference in the behaviour of the European and American
authorities on the very recent Microsoft case. In addition, benefits from cooperation
(eg on standard- setting, product compatibility and licencing) may lead to amplify-
ing of conflicts owing to industrial policy issues.
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The import-discipline hypothesis states that economic openness increases compe-
tition in the home market by increasing the imports of goods (Cadot et al. 2000,
Evenett et al. 2000). Openness creates a pro-competitive effect on market struc-
ture. Exposure to international competition prevents domestic companies from
adopting anti-competitive behaviour. Therefore, it is expected that, as trade liberali-
sation  progresses (ie through lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers), it will become
less crucial to enforce strict domestic antitrust regulation
47. Trade openness could
thus be a substitute for costly implementation of  competition policy. This substitu-
tion hypothesis relies on the robust observation that imports and price-cost mar-
gins of domestic firms are negatively correlated. This inverse relation between for-
eign competition and domestic market power usually seems to be corroborated by
empirical investigation
48. Theoretical models in a static setting also usually confirm
that trade liberalisation and active competition policy could have similar effects in
terms of welfare (Neven and Seabright 1997).
This substitution argument may be particularly relevant for small, open and/or
developing countries that lack administrative competence and financial resources.
It is certainly less appropriate for the European Union, where trade openness might
be insufficient to discipline the practices of domestic firms. Moreover, import disci-
pline is not extendable to non-trade sectors (ie services), which is an essential
industry in our modern economies. Of course, in non-traded sectors, greenfield FDI
could serve as a substitute for imports (UNCTAD 1997). The liberalisation of FDI
regimes (ie lower statutory obstacles to FDI and relaxing of foreign ownership
restrictions) could contribute to the contestability of national markets in services
industries. Nevertheless, the disciplining mechanism could be limited in its effect,
since start-up fixed costs could be too large to induce foreign firms to enter a
domestic market only because of a moderate increase in prices, at least in the short
run. In addition, companies can attempt to protect themselves from foreign rivals
using various private strategies: product differentiation or vertical arrangements
between distributors and manufacturers
49. In other words, trade regulation by the
state might be replaced by private barriers to entry. In this case, trade and compe-
tition policy should be viewed as complementary rather than as substitutes.
Vertical arrangements as a strategic private tool to restrict foreign market access
have been well known since the Kodak case and the related conflict between US and
Japanese competition authorities
50. Vertical restraints can take different forms,
such as exclusive distributors (distributors cannot sell foreign products), exclusive
territory (distributors cannot sell outside a specific geographic area) or different
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(Levinshon 1996, and Nagoaka 1998). Exclusive dealing, vertical integration and
refusal to deal may be used to increase the cost of rivals’ entry, and then to reduce
competition on the product markets (inter-brand competition). Restricted access to
distribution networks, or barriers to setting up supplier-producer linkages (to get
local credit, for instance) could block the entry of foreign companies. Territorial con-
straints (via the prohibition of parallel imports) could be used to operate discrimi-
natory prices between countries (intra-brand competition). In this context, lax com-
petition policy towards the practice of vertical agreements could harm internation-
al trade.
Two main points directly stand out in the debate about the import-discipline hypoth-
esis. First, trade affects domestic competition, and reciprocally. Trade liberalisation
has some implications for antitrust authorities since it affects competition. Trade
and FDI competition could be a new source of competition. The actions of foreign
exporters and investors have to be evaluated by antitrust authorities, as is usually
the case, when delineating the relevant market in antitrust issues
51. Voluntary
export restrictions as well as trade-restrictive measures (product standards, gov-
ernment procurement etc) can facilitate anti-competitive practices (like collusion)
on domestic markets. Second, without any competition rules, trade can be greatly
affected by anti-competitive conduct linked to vertical arrangements, but also for
instance M&A and cartels.
Conflicts over the objectives
Trade and competition policy can enter into conflict. For instance, vertical arrange-
ments could be welfare- improving and beneficial to consumers. Indeed, incumbent
firms can use vertical restraints to improve their efficiency. Price discrimination can
also be beneficial to consumers. An antitrust policy focusing on consumer welfare
might accept such practices. Trade policy would refuse them if they impede trade
flows and market access.
Protectionism and competition policy can also diverge. Trade policy mainly shelters
the producers’ interests, while competition policy aims to protect national con-
sumers. Anti-dumping measures are an interesting example of a clash between
trade and competition policy
52. Anti-dumping measures can consist of compelling
exporting firms not to sell below an agreed price or of imposing anti-dumping duties
equal to the dumping margin (Brülhart and Matthews, 2003)
53. As for antitrust
rules, anti-dumping seeks to control price discrimination strategies in segmented
markets. They might be considered as complementary if anti-dumping rules were
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iour
54 (Wooton and Zanardi 2004). Actually, their real objectives prove to be differ-
ent, since anti-dumping measures shield industrial businesses and are very often
motivated by political considerations.
The EU has frequently resorted to anti-dumping measures. From 1991 to 2001,
there was a slightly increasing trend in EU anti-dumping cases. The relationship in
the EU between competition principles and anti-dumping policies is rather weak, as
explained by Messerlin and Reed (1995). Bourgeois and Messerlin (1998) show
that less than 10 percent of anti-dumping cases investigated by the European
Commission relate to predatory anti-competitive behaviour
55. Anti-dumping proce-
dures play an increasing role in trade policy as a substitute for tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade. Indeed, the likelihood of success in an investigation is high,
notably in Europe (Messerlin and Reed 1995). In addition, the cost of applying for
anti-dumping measures is low compared to alternative strategies (a price war, for
instance). Anti-dumping measures raise rivals’ costs by increasing the production
cost of foreign firms or the risk related to the export activity (Messerlin 1995). It
may thus produce a lower level of domestic competition. It may in particular facili-
tate the survival of cartels
56. Cartels sometimes seek state intervention and anti-
dumping duties to block entry
57 (Levenstein et al. 2004). For instance, companies
producing ferrosilicon from the US (one of them a subsidiary of a Norwegian firm)
wanted to use anti-dumping laws in the US and Europe to block entry.
Competition law as an instrument of trade policy
As trade liberalisation progresses, competition policy becomes more and more
important. Influenced by political pressures and lobbying activity, competition pol-
icy can be used as a strategic trade policy to promote national, but also industry,
interests. It is a well-known fact that companies are much more organised in their
efforts to alter policy decisions compared to consumers. The US has often been
accused, notably by the United Kingdom, of using competition policy as a trade
instrument to facilitate foreign market penetration, which goes against the non-dis-
crimination principle of the WTO. Export cartels are another example.
With trade liberalisation, countries are not able to use trade policy to improve their
domestic welfare. Competition policy may then be used a substitute to achieve the
same goals. While competition policy controls the market power of domestic firms,
strategic trade policy attempts to shift rents away from foreign countries by using
the market power of domestic firms (Levinshon 1996). Decisions in competition
matters can raise the market share of domestic producers and shift rents.
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tion policy when it consists of determining the optimal industrial concentration.
Trade barriers affect competition policy. With open markets, foreign firms can sell in
the home market, and domestic firms can export. Under some conditions, authori-
ties could be persuaded to operate a stricter competition policy (ie to increase the
number of domestic firms) in order to increase export market shares. Governments’
behaviour can thereby invalidate the substitution hypothesis. Richardson (1999)
comes to identical conclusions in a similar theoretical framework
58. However, these
authors emphasise that it is quite difficult to expect any clear and robust relation
between trade and competition policy
59. It is unclear if trade liberalisation encour-
ages beggar-thy-neighbour competition policy and if such a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy induces stricter or laxer competition policy. For instance, in a different frame-
work, De Stefano and Rysman (2004) come to the inverse conclusion that govern-
ment could have a bias towards laxer competition policy, to encourage the emer-
gence of a national champion. A less competitive market structure induces the
other country to choose less aggressive taxes
60.
We have described the current institutional and political situation of the EU regard-
ing competition issues in international markets. We have also dealt with questions
arising from market integration and have provided potential answers to the issues
raised. The next and last section provides some related guidance for policymakers
against the backdrop of the current internal and external reform of European com-
petition policy. 
International challenges to European competition policy
External reforms of European policy
The deepening of market integration brings new challenges which call for both
external and internal reforms of European competition policy. The extraterritorial
application of European competition rules is a way to remedy the cross-border
effects of anti-competitive behaviour. However, as explained by many commenta-
tors, it is certainly not sufficient for regulating the world wide strategies of multina-
tionals and exporting firms, even for a powerful antitrust authority. Besides, as
explained in the previous section, the extraterritorial principle is often viewed as an
infringement of national sovereignty and can thus be a source of international polit-
ical instability and conflict. Policymakers guided purely by national welfare maximi-
sation should therefore be very careful if they wish to avoid harmful retaliatory
measures. Nevertheless, the benefits of improving the application of the extraterri-
toriality principle should not be overlooked. An enhanced capacity to enforce EU
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and will allow EU authorities to defend their position more credibly.
Cooperative solutions are, however, very clearly to be preferred. For instance, coop-
eration between the US and the EU has produced numerous successes over the last
decade, especially during merger investigations
61. But present bilateral or plurilater-
al agreements do not seem fully satisfactory. They do not appear able to prevent
beggar-thy-neighbour policy and conflict whenever key interests of countries are at
stake. Because of differences in antitrust frameworks and unequal distribution of
gains and losses across countries, sharing information and communicating is not
enough. It does not remove the different costs from multiple antitrust reviews
either. Global rules and/or a global supervisor with enforcement power could be the
answer. Unfortunately, the idea of world wide regulation sounds politically unfeasi-
ble at this point in time. Even with political support, designing an optimal competi-
tion policy would be particularly tricky, all the more so as there can be contradic-
tions between trade, competition and other policy objectives, as explained previ-
ously. No clear consensus has been reached.
In the future, three main objectives must be pursued: harmonisation of rules, espe-
cially with the emergence of the new economy; closer cooperation in the confiden-
tial exchange of information; the creation of international institutions and mecha-
nisms to tackle antitrust cases which generate international spill-overs. These three
elements are of course not exclusive. In practice, besides bilateral and plurilateral
agreements, there are usually two main institutional proposals (eg Bode and
Budzinski 2005). The first one consists of building upon the WTO. Some support this
option since the WTO already possesses dispute settlement procedures which
might be extendable to antitrust issues. Besides, in the Doha Declaration (2001),
governments agreed to enter negotiations on antitrust matters. The second propos-
al is to promote more informal discussion, mainly through the International
Competition Network.
With harmonisation and convergence of antitrust laws, competition rules become
more closely aligned, which should remove conflicts related to antitrust goals and
interpretations (Gerber 1999, Kudrle 2005). As underlined before, efforts to har-
monise should not be relaxed because of the risks of antitrust divergence related to
the new economy. Convergence can be achieved by unilateral reforms or (binding or
non-binding) cooperation and the adoption of common (minimum or not) stan-
dards. This was the case with the spread of leniency programmes. Frequent contact,
discussion and acknowledgement of best practice facilitate this process. However,
the objective of perfect convergence may just be an illusion, and thus even more
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62. This process is not irreversible, even without adjust-
ments in substantive rules. It could vary with the composition of antitrust authori-
ties and courts and thus varying interpretations of antitrust provisions.
Government authorities have some discretion in the enforcement and interpreta-
tion of laws, which they can use for their own benefit
63. More importantly, one-size-
fits-all competition law could prove to be harmful. Law has to be tailored to the local
political, cultural and historical environment in order to be really effective (Jenny
2003). In addition, antitrust analysis and theories about market structure and
firms’ behaviour change over time. Especially in new technologies, best practice
could evolve rather quickly, requiring frequent adaptation. Cooperation basically
implies communication, consultation and information-sharing (Kudrle 2005).
The effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in relation to foreign conduct is highly
dependent on transfers of information. For instance, information-sharing is
particularly crucial in large-scale cartel investigations. Unfortunately, confidentiali-
ty of business activity has been a serious impediment to real cooperation so far
64.
To facilitate the exchange of information, agencies need to obtain waivers from pri-
vate parties. Companies can profit from information-sharing if it reduces the cost of
submitting evidence to several authorities and avoids contradictory decisions. But
firms are frequently reluctant to share information on account of the risk of infor-
mation leakage and misuse
65. Therefore, a new international legal framework, espe-
cially involving the US, is a high priority in order to promote the exchange of confi-
dential business information. This point was underlined by European Competition
Commissioner Neelie Kroes in 2005. It should be clarified when information-shar-
ing is permitted and how the exchange of legally protected information can be
developed under secure conditions
66. It could replicate the exchange of information
in the field of tax and financial securities or in criminal matters. The mutual assis-
tance agreements allow the exchange of highly confidential information but for
criminal activity only. The US-Australia agreement is one of the rare agreements
which facilitates the exchange of confidential information.
In practice, in addition to bilateral and plurilateral agreements, the convergence of
substantive laws and the exchange of information could be encouraged by the ICN
mechanism. The ICN is designed to simplify cooperation, facilitate voluntary conver-
gence and develop best practice guidelines (Haucap et al. 2005). Another instru-
ment could be used more in order to overcome informational limits. Based on the
positive comity principle, a country can refer a case to another country’s authority.
Investigation of the alleged conduct may be more straightforward since the coun-
try in charge of the enquiry has better access to relevant information. The positive
comity principle presents other advantages. Competition enforcement could be
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competitive conduct. Positive comity also serves to avoid some duplicated costs
and reduces conflict by giving sole responsibility for the investigation to the coun-
try where the anti-competitive behaviour takes place. It substitutes for the applica-
tion of the territoriality principle. However, positive comity relies on a high degree of
trust. From practical experience, public officials (like R. Pitofsky) have tended to be
much less enthusiastic about this tool. It is of no value when laws or/and interests
are in conflict, as shown in the main conflicts of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,
GE/Honeywell or the Microsoft case (Klodt 2001). Domestic authorities cannot
prosecute domestic firms when they respect national laws, but not foreign laws.
Moreover, comity clauses are non binding, which is insufficient to prevent real con-
flict of interest (Haucap et al. 2005). In this context, a further and logical step will
be to integrate more binding elements into existing agreements. Nevertheless, it is
important to bear in mind that, so far, this type of agreement has tended to exclude
small, less developed countries from cooperation agreements, generating potential-
ly harmful discrimination.
In order to tackle these different aspects, the real cornerstone of any reform of inter-
national relations is to set up some form of supranational regulation. Theoretically,
a global antitrust supervisor would allow economic externalities to be internalised
across frontiers and thus a higher level of global welfare. Unfortunately, countries
are not ready to abandon part of their sovereignty in competition matters. Besides,
enforcement of global rules may require a compensation system, which would be
very difficult to set up. For instance, in M&A reviews, in addition to the stochastic
nature of M&A, there is no tradition of compensation in antitrust policy, in contrast
to international trade issues
67 (Tay and Willmann 2005, Evenett 2001). Therefore,
in order to succeed negotiations on competition issues must be placed in a wider
multilateral framework. Countries losing out in antitrust fields could be compensat-
ed by beneficial measures in other areas, such as in trade or the environment.
In this context, the WTO might appear to be the most suitable existing instrument.
Its competence is well recognised by the international community. Given its credi-
bility and legitimacy, the WTO could facilitate the adoption and monitoring of mini-
mum binding competition rules. This would reduce the likelihood of divergent and
conflicting decisions between countries (Bode and Budzinski 2005). Furthermore,
the WTO already includes a reliable dispute settlement body, which is gaining cred-
ibility over time. This institutional mechanism for settling trade disputes consti-
tutes a credible threat to WTO members. However, this institutional solution does
not seem plausible in the near future after the failure of WTO ministerial conferences
in Cancun in 2003, Hong Kong in 2005 and, in general, the difficult and drawn-out
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number of members and conflicts of interest. Developing countries are in particular
very sceptical about inclusion of competition rules within the WTO
68. Besides, it
should be noted that the proposal of the EU in this field is limited in scope. It does
not consist of establishing a supranational body to enforce international competi-
tion rules and to monitor cross-border cases. Private firms would not be able to
lodge a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The body would only
check that domestic competition laws respect core principles stipulated in the WTO
agreement or that national authorities have made a genuine effort to investigate
alleged cases. Therefore, costs from multiple reviews would not entirely disappear.
Perhaps more importantly, the WTO is still dominated by a mercantilist approach
and is usually criticised for lack of expertise in antitrust regulation
69 (Bode and
Budzinski 2005). Issues on market access within the WTO mainly focus on produc-
er interests, and welfare or efficiency. As emphasised by US officials (such as J.
Klein), by attributing antitrust responsibilities to the WTO, there is a danger of politi-
cising international antitrust policy even more (Hurdle 2005).
The ICN, on the other hand, has been founded only very recently. Because of its
young age, it is said that the ICN has less credibility and reputation than the WTO
70.
In addition, it relies on non-binding and voluntary mechanisms. Cooperation main-
ly depends upon peer pressure and the credibility of the authorities involved. On the
basis of an empirical study on the degree of national conformity with four merger-
related recommended practices of the ICN, Evenett and Hijzen (2006) doubt that
soft laws will lead to widespread convergence of national merger regimes because
of resource constraints and political pressure faced by many authorities (Evenett
2005d). Moreover, like the WTO, the cost of multiple reviews will not be reduced to
zero even if laws converge. But the ICN has the major advantage that it focuses on
competition matters. Countries are more likely to engage in a dialogue within the
ICN because of its informal and soft nature. In this perspective, the ICN could be
seen as a useful complement to the WTO. It could constitute a first step before sign-
ing a more formal and binding agreement. Binding commitments can be negotiated
more easily once countries get more experience in antitrust issues. With experi-
ence, the expected size and distribution of the costs and benefits of any reforms
appear less uncertain (Hoekman and Saggi 2005). However, because the ICN main-
ly promotes best practice between professional antitrust authorities through pro-
posals, the action of the ICN needs to be complemented. ICN initiatives could use-
fully be linked to OECD intervention. Indeed, the OECD involves inter-state discus-
sion leading to the adoption of recommendations. The importance of inter-state
negotiation should not be understated in the political context of decision-making.
Because the OECD assigns a less important role to less developed countries, joint
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and less developed countries.
However, if the WTO is to serve as the global markets regulator, it will certainly be rel-
evant to distinguish trade and non-trade related competition affairs. The WTO is
more qualified and has more legitimacy in judging market access and entry barri-
ers, but less in carrying out hard-core international cartel and M&A reviews.
As a substitute for the WTO a multi-level system, such as that of the EU, could be pro-
moted. This supranational institution could be coupled with an international court of
justice guaranteeing the rights of defendants. It might be composed as a first step
of a nucleus of countries such as the EU, Japan and the US. With the intensification
of economic relations, this solution appears politically feasible in the long run. In
particular, the US authorities might agree to more cooperation, as the cost of non-
cooperation would rise, just as they did in the past when they recognised the limits
of the extraterritoriality principle. The design of a supranational body could be anal-
ogous to the relationship between the Commission, the member states and the
European Court of Justice in the EU model. Powers would have to be allocated
between national jurisdictions and a global authority depending on the amplitude of
cross-border effects. Such one-stop-shop regulation would eliminate the costs of
multiple reviews and internalise the externalities of competition policy within the
area covered by the arrangement.
This system would be a useful step towards the introduction of a global welfare cri-
terion into antitrust regulation. Of course, the decisions of this antitrust authority
could be detrimental to outside countries, especially less developed or developing
countries. Nevertheless, this problem of discrimination could be dealt with sepa-
rately. Indeed, more generally, the impact of competition policy on developing coun-
tries would need to be debated, especially the question of poverty reduction in poor
developing countries. To be coherent with European aid policy towards developing
countries, European authorities should take into account the interests of these
countries when making decisions, even though this incurs costs – a direct cost
such as for enforcement and an indirect cost such as a reduction in domestic wel-
fare when helping developing countries sanction and prosecute European compa-
nies. Moreover, with the threat of failure of WTO negotiations, progress on interna-
tional antitrust issues has mainly been in the form of bilateral agreements or the
inclusion of competition provisions into regional trade agreements (Evenett
2005a). These forms of cooperation necessarily entail discrimination.
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As we have seen, the achievement of European competition objectives depends on
external instruments. Conversely, internal policies affect the economic relationship
of the EU with its partners and thus its external influence. Internal and external pol-
icy have therefore to be coherent
71. The internal relationship between the
Commission and EU member states must also be aligned with the external dimen-
sion. With the decentralisation of European competition policy to national agencies,
interpretation of substantive laws could differ within the European Union. It could be
a new source of divergence within the EU and between the EU and the US authori-
ties
72. In addition, reforms are needed in order to make the international policy of
Europe more coherent and to reconcile different objectives. As previously shown,
competition and trade policy can prove to be contradictory. For many years, trade
relationships and common trade policy were virtually the only instruments of EU
foreign policy (Brülhart and Matthews 2003).
To address these different points, one important first internal reform could consist
of creating more awareness of, and giving greater weight to, competition issues in
other decisions taken by EU bodies and national regulators, through the instrument
of competition advocacy. Because other government policies may affect European
market structure, because various policies are not under competition authority
supervision, notably trade and FDI policy (with the exception of cross-border M&A)
and because some firms or sectors could benefit from exemptions to antitrust leg-
islation, competition authorities should in such circumstances go beyond enforcing
competition law in order to ensure competition. Competition authorities have to
develop competition advocacy further. By ‘competition advocacy’, we refer to ‘those
activities conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion of a com-
petitive environment for economic activities by means of non-enforcement mecha-
nisms, mainly through its relationships with other governmental entities and by
increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition’ (ICN 2002). Recently,
competition advocacy has been extensively discussed in international forums (at
OECD, WTO, ICN). It mainly consists of issuing reports on, and performing reviews of,
existing and proposed laws and regulations, providing advice on potential anti-com-
petitive state measures, educating the public and policymakers and making them
aware of competition issues through seminars, newsletters, the media etc (ICN
2004, Evenett 2006c).
When addressed by other state bodies, competition issues should be dealt with in a
way that is consistent with competition regulation. Competition authorities are
confronted in some cases with sector-specific regulators. These regulators may
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telecommunication sectors
73. Although their decisions are mainly based on techni-
cal expertise, these regulators might adopt different objectives than those of com-
petition authorities, notably in terms of industrial policy (Jenny 2003).
Competition authorities should be entitled to comment on regulations governing
trade and FDI. The European Union still maintains in place strong barriers to shelter
some sensitive sectors (Brülhart and Matthews 2003). For instance, trade in the
services sector still remains to be liberalised fully. Anti-dumping should be better
controlled in regard to antitrust matters too
74. Competition should not override all
other objectives, such as the preservation of jobs, the promotion of exports, or
national security. But the trade-off between objectives has to be made clear and
transparent (Bannerman 2002). Second, trade or sector-specific regulators might
be beholden to particular interest groups. Competition issues might also fall under
the influence of lobbyists owing to their redistributive impact. Authorities are more
likely to be subject to criticism when the control of the business community
becomes stricter and fines more substantial. In any case, the role of competition
advocacy could be important to counter and neutralise anti-competitive measures
initiated by the business community. It could discourage lobbying, which will
decrease wastage of resources and the risk of regulatory capture.
Of course, competition advocacy is not the panacea. It needs to be well designed if
it is to play an important and effective role (ICN 2004, Evenett 2006c, Clark 2004).
The role and scope of the competition agency in regard to other state bodies should
be clear and codifed in law to avoid competition advocacy being ineffective. This
means that institutional rules must be laid down to compel other bodies to dialogue
and take into account the view of the competition agency, which is not the case
today. In this context, the role and legitimacy of competition will need to be dis-
cussed and debated, especially in relation to other social or political objectives. The
competition advocacy policy must also be entirely independent of political influ-
ence and and properly funded in order to be legitimate and credible vis-à-vis work-
ers, consumers and business (Clark 2004). There are many other practical ques-
tions. Which state measures should be covered by competition advocacy? What
proportion of available resources should be dedicated to enforcement and advoca-
cy? How to rationalise the procedures and screening of the legislative process
75?
How to quantify the impact of competition advocacy and then improve it
76? In spite
of all these questions, competition advocacy would prove to be a real complement
to competition policy enforcement
77. By promoting competition, competition advo-
cacy would reduce the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct and thus decrease
economic inefficiency. A full enforcement of competition rules would give more




in the last few years, the Directorate-General for Competition has increasingly been
screening proposals from other departments of the Commission (OECD 2005b). But
the Commission’s competition department does not have a separate unit for com-
petition advocacy. Each sectoral department of the Commission is in charge of
drawing up the impact assessment for its own draft legislation, including an evalu-
ation of the consequences of the initiative on competition. It would certainly be bet-
ter to give the entire responsibility for assessing competition aspects of new laws
to the the competition department because of its greater expertise in competition
matters. Moreover, making more transparent the opinions and comments of compe-
tition agencies and the response of other bodies would increase the cost of political
interference in antitrust decisions.
A parallel and complementary reform could consist in making the European compe-
tition agency more independent. Different factors may hinder the effectiveness of
competition policy: insufficient institutional and budgetary independence; overlap-
ping jurisdiction with other regulators and unclear division of responsibilities; a
complex set of relations between the courts and competition authorities; insuffi-
cient investigatory or enforcement powers; inadequate human and financial
resources. In the past, some decisions of the EU competition authorities have been
heavily criticised. They were adjudged to lack transparency and be influenced by
political pressure from member states (Sleuwaegen 1998). This seems to be less
true today, according to the OECD (2005b), while other econometric studies tend to
show that European regulation is protectionist (Aktas et al. 2004). The channel of
political influence can be direct when a higher level of administration gives recom-
mendations or instructions, but it can also be indirect. Independence can be struc-
tural or operational (Clark 2004). Structural independence means a separate body
(ie not part of a ministry) directly responsible to parliament for its budget.
Operational independence relates to the capacity of authorities to comment freely
and to participate in government business. This relates to competition advocacy.
Nevertheless, the optimal design of a competition agency is a complex issue. There
is a wide range of institutional arrangements which might be suitable and provide a
form of independence. These will vary according to the political and historical con-
text. For instance, in the case of total structural independence, the competition
body could in some circumstances lack access to information and government
decision-making. Some experience tends to show that even where they are under
the responsibility of a minister and form a part of government, competition author-
ities can achieve a form of independence (OECD, 2003c).
EU commissioners are politically connected to governments. There is a persistent
risk of political interference. The independence of a European competition agencyFRAGMENTED POWER
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would improve its market credibility and legitimacy at international level. By
decreasing the likelihood of interference from industrial interests and beggar-thy-
neighbour action, it could lower conflicts generated by the application of the
extraterritoriality principle and introduce a sound economic approach to antitrust
issues during negotiations with foreign partners. It could take the form of an inde-
pendent agency separate from the Commission, based on the model of the
European Central Bank. The London-based European Medicines Agency is another
example of the allocation of EU functions to an outside agency (Bannerman 2002).
It would be reinforced by competition advocacy prerogatives. Note that enhanced
independence should go in hand with the greater transparency in the work of the
competition department. An efficient internal sanction and control mechanism
should be implemented to prevent internal private interests from influencing deci-
sions. It is also important to say that this discussion about the independence of
antitrust authorities is not directly related to the question of the role of the judge in
antitrust issues. This question will become particularly important where criminal
sanctions are imposed for antitrust practices. Even in a US-style system, the
Commission’s competition department, in its role as a public prosecutor, would
have to make independent choices.
Conclusion
Changes in the economic, technological and institutional environment pose new
challenges to European competition authorities.
With the advent of globalisation, economies and market structures have been
deeply transformed. Globalisation has stimulated trade and FDI, generating pro-
competitive effects in host countries. However, firms’ behaviour, particularly in the
form of international M&A and hard-core cartels, could undermine the benefits of
globalisation. Together with the trend towards more economic liberalisation, mar-
kets have been reshaped by major technological improvements, raising new issues
in terms of antitrust policy. These changes have been progressively accompanied
by a new institutional framework for competition. The dramatic increase in the num-
ber of competition authorities incurs duplication of costs and a waste of resources
for multinational firms and antitrust authorities.
Over the last few years, the EU has been conducting a vast programme of moderni-
sation of the European antitrust regime, mainly driven by the liberalisation of new
sectors and enlargement of the EU to the central and eastern European countries.
The gradual deepening of market integration calls for new internal and external
reforms of European competition policy. COMPETITION POLICY
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The extraterritorial application of European competition rules proves to have its lim-
itations as a means of remedying the cross-border effects of anti-competitive
behaviour, although a greater ability to enforce EU laws abroad might increase the
bargaining power of the EU in the international arena. The EU must clearly support
cooperative solutions. But past experience shows that bilateral cooperation, and
especially the implementation of comity principles, may be of no value when laws
or interests conflict significantly. Three main ways forward should be encouraged:
the continuous harmonisation of rules through the joint action of the ICN and the
OECD, especially in the context of new technological industries, a source of diver-
gence of antitrust opinions; closer cooperation in the exchange of confidential infor-
mation; the setting-up of global antitrust institutions. A multi-level system, such as
the EU architecture, could be promoted. For political and pragmatic reasons, it might
be composed as a first step of a nucleus of countries such as the EU, Japan and the
US. It should then be decided how to allocate competences between national juris-
dictions and a global authority, depending on the amplitude of cross-border effects.
The creation of an international court of justice for competition should also be dis-
cussed.  One-stop-shop regulation would eliminate the cost of multiple reviews and
internalise externalities of competition policy within the area covered by the
arrangements.
In addition to these external reforms, some internal reforms may be required.
Higher priority should be given to competition issues in other EU policies and
national regulation. Competition authorities must further develop competition
advocacy. To support this process, internal institutional reforms should lead other
EU departments to take account of competition concerns as articulated by the
Commission’s competition department. A parallel and complementary reform might
consist of making the European competition agency independent from member
states’ interference. The EU bears great leadership responsibility for designing com-
petition rules world wide. It should serve as an example to other competition
authorities. Last but not least, the new challenges faced by the European authori-
ties call for a new research agenda focusing on the effectiveness of competition pol-
icy in international markets. There is a clear lack of empirical and theoretical inves-
tigation, which could provide some guidance to policymakers in the design of com-
petition policy. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether the dif-
ferent fields of competition policy (abuse of dominance, mergers, hard-core cartels)
are affected differently by globalisation and, if so, what implications this may have.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Notes
1 We are very grateful to Laetitia Driguez, Sean Ennis, Frédéric Jenny, Georges Molins-Ysal, Gunnar
Niels, Valérie Rabassa and André Sapir for their insightful comments and suggestions.
2 In the Kodak/Fuji case, US authorities accused Japan of not sanctioning vertical restraints. Fuji’s
control of the local film distribution system would have restrained the access of the US firm Kodak
to the Japanese photographic film market.
3 A greenfield investment can be defined as the establishment of a new production facility in con-
trast to cross-border M&A where a firm purchases shares of an existing foreign firm. We do not dis-
tinguish between the terms merger and acquisition.
4 The surge in cross-border operations has been parallel with the outsourcing strategy and the frag-
mentation of the production process across countries. (Evenett et al.2000). With trade and FDI lib-
eralisation, the number of available input buyers increases, which diminishes hold-up behaviours.
Vertical disintegration has some implication for antitrust authorities, since inter-firm transactions
are indeed more exposed to antitrust scrutiny than intra-firm transactions.
5 While the 20th century witnessed several waves of M&A activity, the latest merger wave is
unprecedented in terms of its size, sectoral coverage, and the number of nations whose firms par-
ticipated in this wave (Evenett 2003). M&A activity peaked in 1999 when its total value amount-
ed to an equivalent of 8 percent of world GDP. In comparison, this percentage was 0.3 percent in
1980 and 2.0 percent in 1990 respectively, these two years being the peaks of the last two waves
of M&A. (UNCTAD 2000.)
6 It is beyond the object of this chapter to examine international M&A. For empirical papers, see for
instance Bertrand et al. (2007), Hijzen et al. (2005), Di Giovanni (2005), Gugler et al. (2003) or
Raff et al. (2006). Theoretical aspects have been addressed for example by Bertrand (2005),
Bjorvatn (2004), Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999), Lommerud et al. (2006), Qiou and Zhou (2006)
or Neary (2004).
7 International M&A and cartels could be related. M&A by reducing the number of competing rivals
could facilitate the formation of cartels. It is also frequently emphasised that sanctioning cartels
heavily could encourage firms to merge (or form joint ventures) in order to restore market power.
(Evenett et al.2001.)
8 See the literature on multi-market contacts, for instance Scott (1989 and 1991) and Bernheim
and Whinston (1990).
9 Higher transparency enables buyers to search for the best product, which can undermine collusive
discipline. However, more blurred frontiers make the natural geographic division of markets less
obvious.
10 See The Economist, ‘Microsoft on Trial’, April 28th, 2006.
11 Conflicts are of course not confined to US-EU relations. South Africa complained in 1996 about the
prohibition of the merger between Lonrho and Gencor. US authorities also blocked mergers
between European companies approved by the European Commission, eg the BOC/Air Liquide
merger in 2000.
12 Note that Articles 87 and 88 refer to state aid. The Commission’s Directorate-General for
Competition ensures that state aids do not distort intra-European competition. A complete analy-
sis of the impact of state aid and its enforcement by DG Competition and other European bodies is
beyond the scope of this text. 
13 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) were replaced by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
of Amsterdam (1997). 
14 Before 1989, merger regulation was based indirectly on Articles 81 and 82. The first prohibition of
a merger took place in 1971 with the Continental Can acquisition.COMPETITION POLICY
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15 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (OJ 2003, L1).
16 The ECN Is a network of EU competition authorities exchanging information, allocating cases and
undertaking joint investigations. It is designed to guarantee homogeneity of application of EU
rules.
17 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 (OJ 2004, L24).
18 In this chapter, we do not provide a full account of the interaction between competition policy and
the intellectual property regime. (Crampes et al. 2005.) The EU grants no intellectual property
rights, expect trademarks. These rights are enforced at member-state level. It is complemented by
the European patent convention signed in 1973. The European Patent Office permits one-stop-
shop review by proposing a bundle of national patents.
19 Imperial Chemical Industries Limited v European Commission, case 48/69, 1972, ECR 619.
Continental Can, case 6/72, 1973, ECR 215. See Grisay (2005).
20 A Ahlström Osakeytiö and others v Commission, case 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125, 1988, ECR
5193. See Grisay (2005).
21 The implementation doctrine is called the effect doctrine in the US. In practice, these two concepts
are rather similar even if there is no clear consensus. According to Kojima (2002), the Commission
adopted the effect doctrine, while the ECJ used an objective territorial principle. Differences
between the effect doctrine and the implementation doctrine may exist when an agreement imple-
mented outside the EU produces some effects on the EU market. (Davison and Johnson 2002.)
22 The US Supreme Court examined the extraterritorial principle for the first time in 1909 for the
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. This principle was denied since actions did not occur with-
in the US. A US-based trader in Costa Rica accused another US-based trader in Costa Rica of anti-
competitive practices on the Costa Rican banana trading market (Sugden 2002 or Kojima 2002).
The US applied the extraterritorial principle the first time for the Alcoa case in 1944. It fines an
agreement by companies outside the US which has the effect of reducing exports to the US (Kojima
2002). The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976 prosecuted foreign behaviours that
have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on US commerce. This is the theory of
intended effect discussed by Kojima (2002). In the 1980s, US antitrust authorities used the con-
sumer welfare approach in international issues. Jurisdiction can pursue foreign firms involved in
imports for conduct that hurts US consumers. In the 1990s, the enforcement policy was officially
extended to harmful practices to US exports of goods and services, ie to US companies. (Falvey and
Lloyd 1999). This extension first appeared in the 1980s in a context of trade deficit and tension,
notably with Japan. This extension was criticised by the EU. It is important to emphasise that the
EU has refused to extend the extraterritorial principle to the defence of EU exporters and to intro-
duce motivation in terms of market access.
23 Gencor Ltd vs. Commission, case T-102/96, 1999, ECR II-0753.
24 It was more complex to define the geographic scope of jurisdiction in this Gencor/Lonrho case
because of the already existing test of the EU dimension. A concentration has an EU dimension only
if the combined aggregate world wide turnover of all the undertakings involved exceeds €5 billion
and the aggregate EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings involved exceeds
€250 million, unless each of the undertakings has more than two-thirds of their EU-wide turnover
within the same European member state. This criterion applies to all firms irrespective of the place
where they are registered and produce.
25 Boeing agreed to give up its exclusive contracts with airline companies. Note that the Commission
could not have prohibited this operation, but only imposed a heavy fine (up to 10 percent of
turnover). Purchase of Boeing or McDonnell Douglas aircraft by European companies could have
been forbidden too.
26 See the website of the European Commission Competition Directorate-General for a complete list ofbilateral and multilateral agreements.
27 ‘If a party believes that anti-competitive activities carried out in the territory of the other Party are
adversely affecting its important interests, the first Party may notify the other Party and may
request that the other Party’s competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement.’
28 Article III states that ‘The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the competi-
tion authorities of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anti-competitive
activities in accordance with the Requested party’s competition laws. Such a request may be made
regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting party’s competition laws, and
regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or
contemplate taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws.’
29 The US Department of Justice formally requested the European Commission to investigate alleged-
ly anti-competitive practices by European airlines against US enterprises.
30 Cooperation on merger reviews is more active than on cartels or other anti-competitive practices
because of the firms’ lobbying. Companies support more coordination among authorities in M&A
transactions since they have to face several procedures from different regulators. Firms are more
reluctant about such coordination for cartel prosecution.
31 There exist some clear differences between the OECD and the ICN (see discussion in Kudrle 2005).
The ICN only focuses on competition issues and is open to all countries, contrary to the OECD. The
ICN has no permanent secretariat. While the OECD makes recommendations, the ICN guides coun-
tries towards best practices through reports and proposals only. The ICN is more a complement
than a substitute for the OECD forum.
32 As remarked by an attentive reader, the mechanisms that we describe are not really ‘errors’, but
rather conscious decisions only to address domestic welfare and not to take into account external-
ities.
33 Export cartels can however enhance efficiency. By cooperating in the marketing and distribution
of export products abroad (eg through a common sales agency), firms are able to share the fixed
costs of exporting. Thus, the effect of export cartels could be positive, even for foreign consumers.
Efficiency considerations and the promotion of export abroad were questioned in the past, espe-
cially in the US. Export cartel exemption was very often employed by multinational firms in the
1950s and 1960s, and not by small and medium-sized firms. Today, this issue is less clear and
should certainly not be overstated (Levenstein and Suslow 2004).
34 There exist three different regimes as discussed by Levenstein and Suslow (2004): explicit (with
or without notification and authorisation), implicit and no statutory exemption (no mention of the
geographic market). There is an implicit exemption when export cartels are not subject to national
laws.
35 Barros and Cabral analyse the external effects of mergers, ie the impact on consumers and non-
merging firms – called outsiders in Shapiro and Farrell (1990). Effects on merging firms (called
insiders) are neglected, assuming that these firms decide to merge only if the operation is profitable.
36 Since developing countries are usually net importer countries, they should be compensated for a
loss in developed countries, which is not realistic because of wealth constraints.
37 Companies have some interest in authorising the discussion and the exchange of confidential
business information, especially for M&A investigations (as in the WorldCom/MCI case investigat-
ed by both the US and the EU authorities). It alleviates some costs from multi-jurisdictional merg-
er review (conflicting analyses and remedies, time and money commitments, etc.). Companies are
much more reluctant to waive these restrictions in cartel prosecutions.
38 However, it is not clear why this risk could be higher with an international rather than a national
regulation office. In addition, a powerful interest group from one country could be counter-balanced
by a more powerful interest group from another country (Guzman 2004).
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19639 The concept of industrial policy and of its instruments is not very well defined (Evenett 2005b). For
example, some people underline that industrial policy seeks to facilitate the structural transforma-
tion of industries. Instruments of industrial policy are not clearly defined. This could include invest-
ment subsidy, tax credit, import protection etc. The European Commission provides its views on the
definition and contents of industrial policy in different documents. See for instance
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/industry/com_2005/com_2005_474_en.pdf.
40 In their theoretical framework and under the assumption of an extraterritoriality regime, conflicts
emerge when authorities define an excessively narrow relevant geographic market.
41 In some sectors, foreign takeovers can be forbidden (eg for security reasons) or be reviewed more
strictly by competition authorities. 
42 In addition, exemptions from competition policy can be granted as (and particularly) in the regu-
lation of state aid.
43 It can be illustrated by the Virgin/British Airways case in 2001. According to Niels and ten Kate
(2004), the US did not declare British Airways guilty of restraint of trade and attempted monopoli-
sation. Virgin would have failed to prove any anti-competitive effects on price, output and product
quality. Also, it did not show the existence of predatory behaviour. On the contrary, the European
Commission concluded an abuse of dominant position. The EU would have condemned the incen-
tive scheme per se of British Airways on travel agents, without evaluating the effect on competi-
tion.
44 There could be some differences in competition laws on cartels among countries in terms of justi-
fications (deterrence, punishment, compensation for damage), sanctions (pecuniary fines, prison
for executives, action for damages and disqualification of executive from running the company)
and mitigation of sanctions via leniency programmes (immunity from fines and imprisonment)
and authorised cartels (exempted export cartels) (Schoneveld 2003).
45 In recent speeches, EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes advocates the development of
mechanisms by which individuals and companies could be compensated for the negative effects
of antitrust activity. These mechanisms would be part of competition policy as devices to fight
anticompetitive practices.
46 Consumers indeed can benefit from a concentration in an industry where network externalities and
complementarities play an important role. However they can be harmed by the presence of switch-
ing costs and lock-in effects.
47 See for instance Cadot et al.(2000) for an exhaustive review of the literature.
48 See Jacquemin and Sapir (1991), Levinshon (1993), Roberts and Tybout (1997) or eg Thomson
(2002). For instance, Jacquemin and Sapir measure this effect in Europe. The disciplinary effect of
imports seemed to be more important for extra-EU imports than intra-EU imports. Thomson (2002)
gets more mixed results in the 1970s in Canada. There is no clear evidence of pro-competitive
effects from trade. 
49 Trade liberalisation could also induce domestic mergers (on this point see for instance Ben-Ishai
2005).
50 See also for instance the case of Airbus. Airbus has been allegedly engaging in vertical arrange-
ments with its European suppliers (via eg standards discrimination against foreign suppliers). It is
claimed to have restrained sales of non-European suppliers.
51 For instance, the Korean government blocked a merger in a chemical industry because of the
excessive level of trade barriers, preventing foreign competition. Similarly, the US took into account
the US quota policy which limits the capacity of foreign firms to increase their production in the
case of an anti-competitive merger.
52 See for instance Niels (2000) for a review of the literature.
53 See Bourgeois and Messerlin (1998) for a more detailed description of the institutional anti-dump-
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197ing framework in the EU.
54 There is some confusion between predatory dumping and normal dumping commonly used in price
discrimination. Dumping is not in itself an anti-competitive practice. Dumping is a component of
international trade. Because of competition, domestic prices could be lower to the benefit of con-
sumers. Foreign firms have indeed to accept smaller margins abroad due to trade costs. Predatory
dumping could drive competitors out of the market and thereby reduce competition. It should be
kept in mind that price differences might not be due to an asymmetry in productive efficiency
only.
55 See also for instance Deardorff and Stern (2004).
56 Consistent with WTO rules, the complaint in the EU should be supported by EU industry, ie ‘by those
Community producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 percent of the total pro-
duction of the like product produced by that portion of the Community industry expressing either
support for or opposition to the complaint’ (Bourgeois and Messerlin 1998). This rule favours col-
lusion.
57 Cartel members may also use tariff barriers or non-tariff barriers (quotas) to sustain collusion over
time by preventing entry or punishing deviating firms (use of trade and statistical reports and
import surveillance). For instance, the citric acid cartel members asked the government for tariff
protection from China (Levenstein et al.2004).
58 These models are related to horizontal consolidation and practices. They overlook vertical arrange-
ments and the foreclosure of domestic markets.
59 The presence of foreign consumers gives an incentive to increase the degree of concentration
(assuming that there are no foreign firms). Collusion is then good. With the presence of foreign
competitors, the relation is now ambiguous because of rent-shifting between foreign and domes-
tic competitors. In addition, there is a third effect taken into account by authorities: industrial con-
centration affects home country welfare too.
60 See also for instance Dixit (1984) or more recently Saggi and Yildiz (2006). Dixit analyses how
domestic welfare is related to the number of home and foreign firms, as well as export tariffs and
import subsidies.
61 It is frequently noticed that cooperation was close and efficient in the cases of Gencor/Lonrho,
Exxon/Mobile, Worldcom/MCI, MCI WorldCom/Sprint, BT/AT&T, Air Liquide/BOC, AOL/Time Warner and
Oracle/People Soft.
62 For instance, according to Jenny (2003), it is not so obvious that US-EU cooperation has really fos-
tered convergence only because agreements on antitrust affairs are observed. It could simply be
explained by no or symmetric effects across US and EU.
63 In the Kodak case, the US authorities reproached Japan for not applying existing competition rules
on vertical integration for keiretsu.
64 Authorities are even less free to share and release information in cartel cases because of local laws
strictly controlling information during investigations. For instance, in the US or the EU, the identity
of amnesty applicants or information provided without the authorisation of the applicant cannot be
disclosed.
65 EU companies fear for instance private civil prosecution in the US.
66 The prosecution in cartel cases requires more past information on firms’ activity than information
on future strategic plans as in M&A control. Information required in cartel cases is less confiden-
tial. Pre-merger reviews could require materials on sensitive trade secrets or prospective business
plans.
67 For instance, there is no package where a merger reducing the domestic welfare but increasing the
global welfare will be accepted by a country in exchange of compensatory measures (over time or
not). Each case is evaluated seperately.
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antitrust issues (Mehta 2003). They worry that their interests will not be fully considered during
this negotiation (Bode and Budzinski 2005). They see it as an attempt to achieve even greater
access for foreign multinational firms to their markets. Others think that the non-discrimination
principle would undermine their industrial policy, notably the national champion policy.
69 As pointed out by another attentive reader, WTO negotiations are more dominated by the mercan-
tilist approach than the settlement of trade disputes.
70 However the action of ICN is progressively gaining respectability due to its effective role in promot-
ing cooperation.
71 For instance, the leniency programme should be revised to allow firms to be immunised in several
markets simultaneously based on damage in all markets (Schoneveld 2003). Transparency of
European decisions facilitates the convergence of rules at an international level since it allows
authorities to better understand similarities and differences in antitrust procedures.
72 For example, the relationship between the EU leniency programmes and national agencies has to
be clarified (OECD 2005b). There is no one-stop-shop companies can address. Some member
states do not have a leniency programme, or programmes differ from one country to another.
73 Recently, in 1995, the Competition Directorate-General initiated investigations in finance and
energy to detect potential private constraint and public regulations.
74 Antitrust laws could be included in the anti-dumping procedure (Hoekman 1997). As proposed, a
two-tier approach could be adopted. Alleged anti-dumping practices could first be judged using the
antitrust criteria (Wootong and Zanardi 2002).
75 Proposals can be numerous during a legislative session. Competition agency resources are limit-
ed and should be focused on antitrust issues of importance only (Clark 2004).
76 It is difficult to assess the effect on legislators and/or regulators. Institutional effects could be vis-
ible or occur only in the very long run.
77 In parallel to competition advocacy, the OECD is currently supporting the self-assessment of com-
petition issues by non-competition bodies through the development of ‘assessment toolkits’
(OECD 2006b). Indeed, unsolicited advice from competition authorities could imply a hostile reac-
tion from other bodies. Besides, it could absorb excessive competition authority resources.
However, let us stress again that this step of self-assessment should be formally codified in law to
be effective, and requires an active role on the part of competition authorities as promoter, advis-
er, and designer of the assessment toolkit.
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he European Union of 27 (EU27) as an economic grouping has the largest bank-
ing sector, the largest insurance sector and the largest payments system in the
world (see Table 7.1). It also has the largest private sector fixed income market. Its
derivatives and equity markets are starting to rival or merge with those of the
United States. The EU27 is a sleeping financial regulation giant. As financial integra-
tion deepens, the EU could become the world’s leading financial services regulator.
In some areas this is already happening. The EU is promoting international stan-
dards it has adopted itself for the prudential regulation of banks and for accounting.
These standards are being adopted in Asia and Latin America. The standards have
not yet been adopted in the US and the resulting regulatory duplication and incom-
patibility are hampering global market integration. 
To understand why it is so hard to develop a common approach to international
financial regulation we develop a simple taxonomy based on the economic analysis
of standard-setting in the presence or absence of externalities. We augment this
analysis by considering the need for supervision and enforcement in home as well
as in host countries. We use our framework to classify existing regulatory arrange-
ments at the European and global levels.
Financial regulation is complex because it includes many different types of ‘regula-
tion’. Each type of regulation has its own economic trade-offs. We distinguish
between prudential regulation standards, investor protection standards, technical
standards, supervision of institutions and market participants, enforcement and
ancillary regulation, for example financial regulation designed to combat crime. 
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Prudential regulation seeks to prevent macroeconomic crises caused by micro level
market failures. It is comparable to safety regulation designed to protect vital
economic infrastructure. The key economic issues are cost and moral hazard.
Investor protection regulation seeks to overcome the inability of unsophisticated
investors (‘widows and orphans’) to protect themselves from financial manipula-
tion and fraud. It has much in common with consumer protection legislation. The
central economic issue is the trade-off between the level of protection and its cost. 
Technical standard setting regulation is crucial whenever interconnectivity is
required, such as  in clearing, settlement and payments systems. This type of finan-
cial regulation is closely related to industrial standard-setting for mobile phones,
the internet or satellite communications. The main economic issues are network
externalities, the optimal choice of quality and natural monopolies. 
The supervision of market participants and service providers is the financial servic-
es equivalent of on-site meat-packing plant or restaurant inspections. Enforcement
entails complex legal issues rooted in administrative and private international law. 
The economics of regulation suggests that in the presence of strong externalities
the adoption of harmonised international rules is desirable. In general we can apply
the insights from industrial standard-setting with network externalities. Critical
Indicator EU US Japan
Bank assets 7,628 2,689 461
Insurance premiums 1,385 1,189 335
Non-bank payments 177,215 47,336 18,129
Derivatives 14,287 25,944 n/a
Equity market capitalisation 7,082 11,677 5,181
Equity turnover 10,151 17,047 3,227
Bond market capitalisation 8,638 665 6,551
Bond turnover 7,590 1 5
Debt insurance 5,692 2,428 189
Table 7.1: The comparative size of financial markets (euro billions for the year
2005)*
Note: Bank assets – External positions of reporting banks vis-à-vis all sectors, Derivatives – Notional amounts of over-the-counter
and exchange-traded derivatives, Debt issuance – All papers, all issuers, by nationality of issuer. Bond market data for the US is
New York Stock Exchange only. 
* Except insurance premium data, which is for the year 2004.
Source: Bank of International Settlements, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Federation of
Exchanges, Datastream.mass matters, and when the EU adopts a common standard it has the potential to
become a global standard. At least, the EU is in a good starting position to negotiate
a compromise standard internationally.
In practice, this rarely happens because the EU is incapable of adopting Union-wide
financial regulation. We single out two main factors that are responsible for this.
First, there is widespread disagreement within the EU over the adoption of any com-
mon standard. Member states have heterogeneous preferences and pay-offs.
Standards battles are as likely between states as between private companies.
Some member states might even see a competitive advantage in adopting their
own or a non-EU standard. Second, when prudential, technical or investor protection
standards are inseparable from supervision, European regulatory standards also
require a common approach to supervision and enforcement. This is only feasible
when enforcement power can be vested in an EU body and member states are pre-
pared to give up sovereignty.
As a result the EU adopts less harmonised regulation than a pure externality analy-
sis suggests it should. Consequently the EU plays a smaller role in global standard-
setting than suggested by the size of its financial systems. In practice this results
in the adoption of a non-EU standard by some EU market participants or member
states, leading to fragmentation, incompatibility and duplication.
When externalities are weak, economists generally favour local regulation with
mutual recognition over uniform standards. Unfortunately full mutual recognition in
financial services is only feasible in sectors or for products that require little super-
vision and enforcement in host countries. In these exceptional cases the EU is well
represented externally through bilateral agreements between individual member
states and non-EU countries. 
In most cases supervision in the home and host country is required, if not for prac-
tical then for political reasons. Mutual recognition does not work and internal regu-
latory policy has extraterritorial consequences, particularly when it comes to
enforcement. This situation is typical for securities regulation within the EU, but
also in the global context.  The regulators and US courts will seek to investigate and
prosecute anybody suspected of having defrauded US resident investors, no matter
where the suspect resides.
To complicate matters further, even when it is feasible in principle, regulatory com-
petition with mutual recognition is rejected because it allegedly leads to a ‘race to
the bottom’ or an ‘uneven playing field’. In these cases there are calls for minimum
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al regulation in the country of destination designed to ‘level the playing field’ or ‘pro-
tect the public interest’. In these cases it is hard to distinguish between market fail-
ure and protectionism.
In all areas of financial regulation, the keys to enhanced international cooperation
are intensified dialogue and cooperation with the US, the international enforcer of
its own, transatlantic and global regulatory standards.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The second section sketches
the current international institutional framework. The third section analyses in turn
prudential regulation, investor protection, technical standard-setting, the supervision
of market participants and enforcement. The fourth section provides conclusions.
Institutional arrangements
In practice, regulators set product standards. They define who can buy and who can
sell financial products, determine who can operate in financial markets, define rules
of conduct for markets, market participants and service providers, maintain regis-
ters of supervised entities and products, monitor the conduct of the various enti-
ties, are often (but not always) the repository of disclosure documents, vet the
content of disclosure documents, provide guidance, supervise and bring enforce-
ment action. As we will show, it is the complex interaction of these elements that
makes it difficult to design an integrated international financial regulation framework.
Regulators and politicians are aware that financial systems are in principle inte-
grated at the global level. If there was any doubt, the Asia-Russia-Brazil crisis of
1997 and 1998 convinced even those who remained sceptical that financial stabil-
ity and contagion are international concerns. The Asian crisis was important
because it extended traditional financial stability cooperation in monetary policy at
the macro level to new areas like fiscal transparency, accounting, auditing, pay-
ment and settlement, corporate governance, market integrity and insolvency.
The new thinking was reflected in the creation of the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF), which held its first meeting in April 1999 in Washington. Currently the FSF
brings together representatives of government ministries, central banks and finan-
cial service regulators from eleven countries
1, along with the European Central Bank
(ECB) and international organisations and committees
2. The FSF is hosted at the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, but meets regularly
in different locations. 
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Global thinking on financial stability and regulation after the Asia crisis is enshrined
in twelve standards published by the FSF
3(see Table 7.2). These cover the tradition-
al areas of macroeconomic policy and data transparency, as well as institutional
and market infrastructure and financial regulation and supervision. The issuing
bodies of the standards are the ‘Who's Who’ of international standard-setting in
financial systems regulation. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is
responsible for the macro-standards, as one would expect, the World Bank has the
lead on insolvency, the OECD on corporate governance, the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) on accounting, the International Federation of Accountants
Area Standard Issuing Body
Macroeconomic policy and data transparency
Monetary and financial
policy transparency
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies IMF
Fiscal policy transparency Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency IMF
Data dissemination Special Data Dissemination Standard/
General Data Dissemination Standard* IMF
Institutional and market infrastructure
Insolvency (pending)** World Bank
Corporate governance Principles of Corporate Governance OECD
Accounting International Accounting Standards (IAS)*** IASB****
Auditing International Standards on Auditing IFAC****
Payment and settlement
Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems
CPSS
CPSS/IOSCO
Market integrity The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force/
9 Special Recommendations against Terrorist Financing FATF
Financial regulation and supervision
Banking supervision Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision BCBS
Securities regulation Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation IOSCO
Insurance supervision Insurance Core Principles IAIS
Table 7.2: Financial Stability Forum (FSF) Regulatory Standards
* Economies with access to international capital markets are encouraged to subscribe to the more stringent SDDS and all other
economies are encouraged to adopt the GDDS. 
** The World Bank is coordinating a broad-based effort to develop a set of principles and guidelines on insolvency regimes. The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in
1997, will help facilitate implementation. 
*** Relevant IAS are currently being reviewed by the IAIS and IOSCO. 
**** The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) are distinct from
other standard-setting bodies in that they are private sector bodies.
Source : http://www.fsforum.orgEXTERNAL FINANCIAL MARKETS POLICY
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(IFAC) on auditing, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) on
payment and settlement and the CPSS and the International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) jointly on market integrity. Banking supervision is
dealt with by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), securities regu-
lation by IOSCO and insurance supervision by the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
The governance of the various institutions differs substantially (Table 7.3).
Institutions like IAIS and IOSCO have as members public sector regulators from more
than 100 countries. In contrast, the BCBS only has 13 members from Canada, the
US, Japan and the EU; the CPSS has 14 members from Canada, Hong Kong, Japan,
Singapore, the US and the EU. The IASB and IFAC are altogether different: IFAC is a
professional organisation and has 163 member organisations from 120 countries;
the IASB has 14 members appointed by the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC) Foundation, which has 22 mainly private sector trustees from
Europe, North America and Australasia.
The interaction between international standard-setting, the EU’s financial integra-
tion efforts and regulation – including enforcement – at the level of the EU member
states is complex and slightly different for each FSF standard (see Figure 7.1). In
the case of banking, for example, the BCBS has no formal authority. The standards it
publishes are not binding and they are not necessarily adopted by all countries with
a seat on the committee. In the EU, the practical implementation of the BCBS stan-
dard takes the form of an EU directive, but many member states will not wait for the
EU to agree on a directive and instead immediately implement the international
standard.
The type of regulation matters. Next we analyse in turn prudential regulation,




There is agreement among policymakers that prudential regulation is required to
avoid crises in financial systems with negative consequences for the real economy.
Policymakers also agree that there is a risk of a domino effect with financial crises
spreading rapidly throughout the global financial system (‘contagion’)
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Country G8 G10 FSF BCBS IASB* IAIS IOSCO CPSS CGFS
Austria x x
Belgium x x x x x x
Bulgaria x x
Cyprus x x




France x x x x x x x x x




Italy x x x x x x x x
Latvia x x
Lithuania x x
Luxembourg x x x
Malta x x
The Netherlands x x x x x x x x





Spain x x x x
Sweden x x x x x x
United Kingdom x x x x x x x x x
European Commission
ECB x
Australia x x x x
Brazil x x x
Canada x x x x x x x x x
Hong Kong x x x
India x x x
Japan x x x x x x
People’s Republic of China x x x
Russia x x x
Singapore x x x
South Africa x x x
Switzerland x x x x x x x x
United States x x x x x x x x x
Table 7.3: EU representation in international standard-setting organisations


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In banking the main prudential regulatory standards are capital adequacy require-
ment standards for banks developed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS)
5. The ‘Basel I’ standard or ‘Basel Capital Accord’ was developed
in 1988 and has been adopted by almost all countries with banks. The ‘Basel II’
standard is a revision proposed in June 1999. Following a long period of consulta-
tion with the international financial community and regulators, the final standard
was published in June 2004. It has not been adopted yet by all OECD countries. 
The Basel II standard illustrates two fundamental problems in the development of
international standards. First, the required level of the standard can differ across
countries and sectors. During the consultation phase for Basel II, smaller banks
complained that the standard was too onerous for them. Second, standards that are
proposed by an international committee like the BCBS are not automatically adopt-
ed by all countries. The BCBS cannot even force the member countries of the com-
mittee to adopt the standards it proposes.
Despite these difficulties in the world wide implementation of the Basel II standard
there is little to worry about in prudential standard-setting. There tends to be wide-
spread agreement among European banks, insurance companies, governments and
regulators that the EU27 needs a single prudential regulation standard and that
such a standard should be set at an international level, without any obligation for
adoption for individual countries. The EU’s size helps in persuading the internation-
al community that the prudential standard proposed internationally should be
adopted as the global standard. The difficulty here is not the standard-setting but
the supervision and enforcement. We return to these points below.
Technical standards
Technical standard-setting regulation is crucial whenever interconnectivity is
required, for example in clearing, settlement and payments systems. The main
economic issues are network externalities, the optimal choice of quality and natu-
ral monopolies. Standard-setting is political because electorates might have differ-
ent quality preferences and rival networks might use their political connections to
try and win standards battles.
One problem is the choice of the ‘correct’ standard in terms of quality and user pref-
erences (Farrell and Saloner 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1985, Besen and Farrell 1994,
Liebowitz and Margolis 1996). Even more relevant are lock-in effects and path
dependence caused by network externalities (Arthur 1989, 1990, David 1985,
Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 1995). It is very hard to persuade national regulators
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ber of users is large. 
If standard-setting is left to the market, inferior or inappropriate standards can be
chosen. The outcome is the result of a bargaining game. Depending on the pay-offs
the game is a variant of the prisoners’ dilemma or the 'battle of the sexes' (Katz and
Shapiro 1994). Even though it would be globally desirable to have the same techni-
cal standard this is not the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game. In the ‘bat-
tle of the sexes’ both governments would prefer to have one standard, but each one
has a national favourite. The bargaining process is usually entertaining but does not
guarantee an agreed outcome.
To illustrate these points, consider a simple technical standard like identification
numbers for securities such as  publicly traded stock and bonds. These numbers are
a technical standard because they are used by information technology systems to
identify a single issued security. There are clear network externalities because the
larger the number of data vendors and investors who use the number, the more use-
ful the number is for the vendors and the investors. If there are competing numbers
there is a chance that the market might ‘tip’ with one number becoming the domi-
nant standard. If the standard is owned by a company this company has market
power and can charge users for the use of the number
6. The case becomes compli-
cated if the company has a clearly identifiable national base and political influence.
In normative terms it is clear what should happen. Securities identification numbers
should be assigned as an international open standard. The tricky question is: whose
numbers will be used? Here the installed base matters. If Europe has one particular
type of number system, rather than 27 different types, it has a better bargaining
position vis-à-visthe United States or other large countries
7.
In practice Europe hardly ever agrees on a common technical standard in financial
services. The first reason is internal reluctance to abandon national standards in
favour of an EU standard. It would be extremely difficult, for example, to persuade
European countries to introduce a single postcode system. Member states would
not want to bear the cost and there would be popular objections for sentimental rea-
sons. An even more powerful reason is vested interests. Network externalities in
combination with a large national installed base gives market power that tends to
escape the scrutiny of the competition authorities. Member  states and private
companies are extremely reluctant to give up such privileged positions.
A remarkable exception is international accounting standards. The EU promoted the
EXTERNAL FINANCIAL MARKETS POLICY
209FRAGMENTED POWER
210
creation of the international (private) institutions that issue the standards.
Exceptionally, the EU also managed to make the international standard compulsory
for all EU-listed companies. Finally, the international body successfully persuaded
other countries to adopt the multilateral standard. The installed base is so large that
it will be very hard for other countries to refrain from adopting the standard, even
countries the size of the US.
A second area with great potential is payment standards. There are substantial net-
work effects that arise in the development of financial systems for bank payments.
The service offered by a bank payments system is the transfer of funds. As such,
the value of a bank payment network is dependent on the number of other parties
that can make and receive transfers. With such strong network effects, it is efficient
to have a single network for bank payments at the European and international level.
Bank payment systems are a good example because a key factor is the standard
used for communication. The system developed to handle bank transfers relies on
these standards. As such, these are the most important consideration in terms of
the internal and external competence of bank payment systems.
The development of bank payment systems in Europe has been a significant issue
with the launch in 2002 of the single European payments area (SEPA) and the
European Payments Council (EPC). These initiatives have focused on integrating
the bank payment systems across Europe for the three types of service originally
considered: credit transfers, direct debits and card transactions. The SEPA initiative
was launched by the European Commission, with its high-level requirements and
implementation timelines defined by the European Central Bank. The EPC was cre-
ated to monitor the development of SEPA. Since 2004, the EPC has developed the
bank payment systems framework, publishing rulebooks on credit transfers and
direct debits, and developing frameworks for cards and cash.
In terms of the standards implemented within SEPA, the EPC has decided to imple-
ment ISO 20022 – the Universal Financial Industry (UNIFI) message standard.
Furthermore, the EPC has appointed SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication) to develop the messages for the SEPA credit transfer
and SEPA direct debit. ISO 20022 is the international standard for inter-bank trans-
fer messages. It was and continues to be developed by the ISO. Within this frame-
work, SWIFT is the registration authority for ISO 20022, and participates actively in
the ISO committees that affect the development of ISO 20022.
SWIFT was established in 1973 by 239 banks from 15 countries. It is an industry-owned limited liability cooperative society established under Belgian law. It current-
ly serves 7,400 financial institutions in 198 countries, although 66.6 percent of
SWIFT FIN messages are within Europe.  Oversight of SWIFT is carried out according
to a special agreement between the central banks of the G10 countries, which
appointed the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) as the central bank in the country in
which SWIFT is based, to act as the lead overseer of SWIFT, with the support of the
G10 central banks. The Bank of International Settlement’s committee on payment
and settlement systems is briefed on the oversight regime and may provide direc-
tion on the focus of the NBB’s oversight activities.
Therefore, both internal and external competence within the EU lies with the three
pillars underlying SEPA – the European Commission and ECB and, most significant-
ly, the EPC. However, with regard to standards, the EPC has adopted the internation-
al ISO standards, although these were principally developed by SWIFT, the oversight
of which is undertaken by the NBB and the other G10 central banks. 
SEPA will have a large installed base compliant with an international standard, cre-
ating critical mass. The EU has also agreed that non-banks can use the standard,
making the system highly competitive. If SEPA is successful, it is likely that other
countries will follow, leading to the creation of a truly international payment system
with substantial cost saving for users.
Investor protection standards
Investor protection standards are closely related to prudential regulation. Some
economists have argued that prudential regulation is best understood as investor
protection (Dewatripont and Tirole 1993). Depositors in banks and policyholders of
insurance companies may be widely dispersed and might not take collective action
against a bank or insurance company. Indeed, even if they decided to take action it
could be difficult because they may not have voting rights and their only recourse
would be the courts. To resolve this problem, regulators step in and act on behalf of
these dispersed investors. The same logic applies to other financial sectors, such as
publicly traded companies with widely-dispersed shareholders, and investment
companies with dispersed fund investors.
However, investor protection standards are more complicated analytically and from
a policy perspective than prudential regulation. In prudential regulation there is
widespread agreement that a meltdown in the banking system or insurance sector
in one country can have negative spillovers (externalities) for the real economy and
other countries (contagion). Hence, there is general agreement about the overriding
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need for international prudential regulation standards. This is not true for investor
protection regulation.
The principal source of disagreement is the level of investor protection needed in
each instance. Differences in market structure across jurisdictions can lead to gen-
uine disagreement over the type of investor protection standard needed. One cur-
rent example is equity markets. Following the corporate governance scandals in the
US and Europe (Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat) the US Congress passed legislation
seeking to increase the protection of dispersed investors in widely held, publicly
traded stock corporations in the US.  In Europe and other parts of the world there is
a feeling that the US has gone too far and that the cost of the new investor protec-
tion measures outweighs the benefits. Europeans like to argue that equity investors
are more sophisticated because most publicly traded shares in Europe are owned
by institutional investors. Provided that institutional investors are given sufficient
contractual rights they can protect themselves. US regulators respond that most
shares in the US are still held directly by households, stressing the need for stronger
investor protection. Another current example is hedge fund regulation. Hedge funds
like to argue that they do not need to be regulated because they contract directly
with sophisticated institutional investors. Regulators worry that, through funds of
funds and other channels, hedge fund products are directly sold to households who
need representative protection. 
Disagreements over the appropriate level of standards are also common in pruden-
tial regulation, as we saw in the case of Basel II. In the case of investor protection
there is an additional consideration that adds a further level of complexity. As with
technical standards there can be strong externalities that should lead regulators to
adopt common protection standards. The most prominent example is disclosure. 
Enforcement
Enforcement and supervision pose the most challenging problem in international
financial regulation
8. Enforcement is either public or private and is dealt with
through an administrative procedure or the courts. Public enforcement through an
administrative procedure is typically carried out through a regulatory agency that
has been granted executive power. The US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for example has the power to launch investigations, call witnesses and freeze
assets. Public enforcement can also take the form of public prosecutors or regulato-
ry agencies bringing cases before court. Similarly, in private enforcement, a plain-
tiff can lodge a complaint with public authorities or bring a case to court.In international comparisons of securities regulation enforcement, the US is a glob-
al outlier. Jointly the SEC, the state securities commissions, the Department of
Justice, the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock
Exchange brought an average of 5,103 enforcement actions per year between 2000
and 2002 with fines of $1,864 million, 2,146 suspensions, expulsions and cen-
sures and 13,509 incarcerations and probations (Jackson 2005, Table 3). There
were 2,214 private enforcement actions resulting in fines of $2,027 million
(Jackson 2005). No European country brings this level of enforcement to bear on
the securities industry, not even when adjusting for population or gross domestic
product (Jackson 2005).
The economic consequences and desirability of the level of US enforcement zeal is
subject to debate and has been the subject of recent high-level policy reports (the
‘Paulson report’ and the ‘Bloomberg report’, see Coffee 2007). In the international
regulatory policy context, the difference in enforcement levels across countries and
regions poses a major political challenge and has resulted in friction between the
EU, the US and other countries. While the prudential and investor protection stan-
dards on the books might be converging, the level of, and attitude to, enforcement
are clearly not. This explains the reluctance to accept home supervision without
host supervision and enforcement in the international context, as well as the
‘extraterritoriality’ tendencies of US securities enforcement action.
A recent example is accounting standards and auditing. Even if international
accounting standards were to become the global norm they still require verification
and enforcement. There is great reluctance in particular on behalf of the US after
Enron to accept accounts that have been certified by auditors who are not regis-
tered and have not been vetted by the new US Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB)
9. The PCAOB will happily work with other regulators but
reserves the right to send its own inspectors to monitor the implementation of its
guidelines and to enforce its rules if necessary. The motivation is largely political. It
is very hard for US politicians to place the supervision and enforcement of regulato-
ry measures intended to protect US investors into the hands of non-US officials. In
the EU case it is not even clear in whose hands to place them. The PCAOB has held
extensive discussions with the European Commission but these have been mostly
on protection standards and enforcement rules. The actual enforcement and super-
vision of auditors continues to rest with individual member states. Since the EU
authorities cannot guarantee the quality of enforcement locally it appears reason-
able that agreements are bilateral in nature. 
Even within the EU there is no clear solution to the enforcement issue. Pan-
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enforcement takes place in the home as well as the host country. Exactly the same
logic applies. It is hard for politicians from country A to explain to local investors that
a common EU standard will be enforced as vigorously by the regulator in member
state B against an operator from member state C as by the regulator in country A.
Extreme cases
The preceeding analysis showed that the EU might have the potential to become a
global regulator in terms of its economic size, but that its potential is limited by the
difficulty it has in agreeing common standards, and its reliance on member states
for supervision and enforcement. In this section we provide two further examples to
illustrate the point. The first case shows under what conditions the EU is well repre-
sented externally by a single member state. The second case shows that an inter-
nationally desirable regulatory agreement is almost impossible to reach when all
four of the elements of financial systems regulation we have identified are involved.
The first case analyses Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities (UCITS). UCITS are a rare case where approximation of European rules
has led to full mutual recognition of an investment product. The EU is well represent-
ed externally by Luxembourg and Ireland, the ‘market leaders’ for UCITS within the
EU. The external representation works because UCITS require relatively little super-
vision and enforcement in the destination country.
The second case is clearing and settlement, which combines all four elements of
financial system regulation we have identified. There are strong technical standard
externalities, but agreement is required on investor protection standards, on home-
versus-host supervision and on enforcement. In addition there are complicated
competition policy issues associated with the technical standard-setting. Currently
there is no agreement on clearing and settlement regulation within the EU and no
agreement at international level.
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS)
Collective investment schemes are used globally within the asset management
industry as a means of financial intermediation for retail investors. Collective
investment schemes have proved to be an effective means for a large number of
people to invest in a range of financial instruments. Globally, there is a wide range
of different collective investment schemes, reflecting the investment needs and
regulatory concerns of different countries.
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within the EU. UCITS were initially elaborated in 1985 as part of the development of
the EU internal market. As such, UCITS benefit from a ‘passport’ that allows any reg-
istered and authorised UCITS fund to be offered, subject to notification, to retail
investors in any EU member state. However, the regulatory framework for UCITS has
required some revision since 1985, as witnessed by  the recent implementation of
the UCITS III directives.
In addition to the ‘passport’, and to ensure the effectiveness of a single European
market in transferable securities, UCITS benefit from increased investor protection.
This is achieved through stricter investment limits, capital requirements, disclosure
requirements, asset safe-keeping and fund oversight. 
The UCITS market has, relative to other financial systems, few externalities. There are
no significant network effects in UCITS. Although certain markets have gained sub-
stantial UCITS market shares – ie Luxembourg and Ireland – this does not appear to
be due to network effects. The attraction of these domiciles for UCITS is attributable
to the characteristics of these locations and their fund management industries,
rather than to the attraction of locating to the same domicile as other UCITS.
Similarly, there are low fixed costs or sunk costs associated with UCITS, again
particularly relative to other financial systems. Although investment in various IT
systems would be necessary for the operation of UCITS, these are predominantly
based around accessing other networks to enable transactions to be executed. The
most significant sunk costs would occur in terms of the marketing of the UCITS.
The majority of the UCITS market is made up of domestic funds, ie funds that are
registered and offered in the same country. In terms of the number of funds, exclud-
ing ‘round-trips’ (funds operated in country A, domiciled and registered in country B
and then sold back into country A), in 2003 only 16.1 percent of the UCITS market
was made up of cross-border funds. However, the proportion of cross-border funds
has been increasing, from 13.2 percent in 2002 to 16.1 percent in 2003.  The major-
ity of these cross-border funds are domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland. 
Table 7.4 shows the make-up of the European UCITS market and the international
equivalent. This table also shows the breakdown of the domiciles of UCITS in both
the European and international markets. Almost 70 percent of the European market
for UCITS is domiciled in four countries: Luxembourg (27.5 percent), France (22.4
percent), the UK (10.0 percent) and Ireland (8.9 percent). Along with the US, these
four countries make up 71.6 percent of the international market for collective
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investment schemes by domicile. Table 7.4 also shows the ratio of the assets under
management to gross domestic product and the ratio of the international market
share to share of global GDP. This shows that, in the global market for collective
investment schemes, both Luxembourg and Ireland are significantly more impor-










market share to share
of GDP
Austria 113.1 2.0 0.7 460.41 0.96
Belgium 115.4 2.1 0.7 385.99 0.81
Czech Republic 5.1 0.1 0.0 50.53 0.11
Denmark 66.8 1.2 0.4 319.75 0.67
Finland 43.5 0.8 0.3 275.83 0.58
France 1,244.4 22.4 7.5 727.29 1.52
Germany 273.0 4.9 1.6 121.54 0.25
Greece 27.2 0.5 0.2 149.73 0.31
Hungary 5.6 0.1 0.0 64.05 0.13
Ireland 492.1 8.9 3.0 3,046.46 6.36
Italy 372.9 6.7 2.3 262.55 0.55
Liechtenstein 13.4 0.2 0.1 N/A N/A
Luxembourg 1,526.1 27.5 9.2 51,924.44 108.34
The Netherlands 82.2 1.5 0.5 162.29 0.34
Norway 35.9 0.6 0.2 150.74 0.31
Poland 17.3 0.3 0.1 70.77 0.15
Portugal 26.6 0.5 0.2 179.99 0.38
Slovakia 2.8 0.1 0.0 73.99 0.15
Spain 278.4 5.0 1.7 307.13 0.64
Sweden 123.1 2.2 0.7 426.37 0.89
Switzerland 118.9 2.1 0.7 402.01 0.84
Turkey 17.8 0.3 0.1 61.13 0.13
United Kingdom 557.7 10.0 3.4 310.93 0.65
All EFAMA members 5,559.2 100.0 33.6 479.26 1.00
United States 8,024.4 48.5
Japan 463.3 2.8
Canada 430.2 2.6




International total 16,545.3 100.0
Table 7.4: Assets under management (AuM) of UCITS by country of domicile (Q1 2006)
Note: All EFAMA members shown.
Source: EFAMA, ‘Quartely Statistical Release No. 26’, Sept 2006, ‘International Statistical Release 2006: Q1’, IMF, World Economic
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Table 7.5 shows that the French and UK market share is largely domestic, while
Luxembourg and Ireland serve the European market as a whole. This table also
shows the market share of foreign sellers – ie those domiciled in a different coun-
try – within different European countries. Foreign sellers have a substantial market
share of the collective investment schemes market in Belgium, Germany and Italy.
Table 7.5 also shows the countries in which these schemes are principally domi-
ciled. Throughout Europe it is clear that the principal domicile for foreign collective
investment schemes is Luxembourg, and that the secondary domicile for foreign
collective investment schemes offered in Germany and Italy is Ireland.
UCITS domiciled in Luxembourg are sold into 150 countries around the world, includ-
ing both the US and Japan. UCITS domiciled in Ireland are sold into 60 countries
around the world, including the US. These countries trust the UCITS investor protec-
tion standard and its enforcement by Luxembourg and Ireland. However, in the case
of the US this does not preclude private or public enforcement against fund issuers
based in Luxembourg or Ireland if there is a suspicion that securities fraud has been
committed involving ‘US persons’ (US-based investors). Hence even here mutual
recognition with the US at the enforcement level is limited, which is why most UCITS




Clearing broadly includes all functions that occur between agreeing a trade and the
settlement of that trade, and it is generally undertaken by clearing houses acting as
central counterparties (CCPs). The key function of CCPs is to perform the legal role
of standing between the two parties to a trade, acting as buyer to the seller and as
seller to the buyer (a process called ‘novation’). In the CCP structure, appointed
clearing members take over the default risk faced by the original trading parties in
respect of the other side of the original transaction (the trading parties are often
also the clearing members). This is an efficient form of risk management in securi-
ties trading markets, which reduces total transaction costs and increases market
liquidity. 
An additional way in which many CCPs reduce transaction costs is by netting trans-
actions before settlement. The lower number of post-netting settlements required
for a given volume of trades not only reduces direct settlement costs, but also
eases liquidity constraints on participants in the settlement process and helps to





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Settlement constitutes the completion of a transaction whereby the seller transfers
securities to the buyer and the buyer transfers money to the seller. The central secu-
rities depository (CSD) undertakes settlement of securities transactions by moving
securities from the seller’s account in the CSD to the buyer’s account in the CSD. The
corresponding money transfer from the buyer to the seller usually takes place out-
side the CSD (via appointed settlement banks and/or national central banks), but
the CSD plays an important role in sending and receiving payment instructions and
confirmations.  Ensuring finality of these movements is a key role for the CSD and
its infrastructure.
It is important to note that access to CCPs and CSDs is, in general, only offered to
institutions, namely clearing members and custodians. Retail investors and institu-
tions that cannot (or do not wish to) access CCPs and CSDs use other intermedi-
aries directly, creating a multi-tier intermediary structure. The overall efficiency of
the clearing and settlement process therefore depends on efficiency of operations
in all tiers of the system, including CCPs, CSDs, clearing members and custodians.
Clearing and settlement functions are characterised by significant network exter-
nalities, and they play an important role in ensuring the stability of financial sys-
tems. Overall, post-trading activities in securities and derivatives markets are asso-
ciated with significant network externalities. The way in which these externalities
arise, however, differs between different post-trade functions. In clearing of securi-
ties, network effects arise because increasing the number of transactions in a given
security/asset class cleared through one CCP increases the potential for netting of
trades and efficiency of risk management services.
Netting economies means that the more trades that are cleared by the same CCP,
the greater the potential for netting efficiencies. These economies of scale are secu-
rity by security or within an asset class (since netting is usually done at the level
of individual securities or asset classes). On the money side, economies of scale
are even larger since money netting usually occurs across securities and asset
classes. These scale advantages are potentially indefinite. On the security side the
optimal solution may be to have all trades in a particular security cleared by a sin-
gle CCP. This minimises the number of settlement transactions requiring post-net-
ting. On the money side, the optimal solution may be to have all trades in all securi-
ties cleared by the same CCP. This minimises the amount of money that needs to be
set aside for the settlement process.
Risk management economies means increasing the number of participants and vol-
ume of clearing, thus providing better diversification of replacement cost risk facing
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achievement of the same overall risk protection with lower collateral margin require-
ments and default funds, thereby reducing total costs of clearing operations.
In settlement of securities, network effects arise because it is less costly to make
settlement on the accounts of the same CSD than settlement involving accounts of
two CSDs. Therefore increasing the number of market participants that settle their
securities in a given CSD increases the cost-efficiency of that CSD.
A well-functioning clearing and settlement system provides efficient and uninter-
rupted servicing of trading activity, mitigates counterparty risk and reduces poten-
tial for contagion, thus ensuring stability in financial markets.
Although CCPs eliminate bilateral counterparty risk, they can act as a channel for
contagion in financial markets. Systemic risk in this context can be understood as
the risk that activities in a wide range of markets will face disruption, with the CCP
acting as the channel of contagion. In the extreme case of a CCP failure, trade in a
wide range of markets would cease, and open positions in a large amount of assets
would be unable to close. Even where outright failure does not occur, extreme
and/or unexpected margin calls in one market (a requirement that members
increase their collateral to cover variations in prices beyond the initial margin) can
put pressure on members to sell assets in another market, driving down prices in
that market.
The practices adopted by different CCPs – including membership requirements,
margining requirements, and collection of supplementary default resources –  can
thus affect the ability of financial systems to withstand financial shocks (eg the
failure of a large market participant, or significant movements in asset prices in a
particular asset class).
Integration of European markets potentially increases the importance of post-trade
services in ensuring stability of the financial system. In particular, increased con-
solidation and development of interlinkages between clearing and settlement infra-
structures can potentially increase the likelihood of contagion of financial market
shocks across countries. For example, with respect to integration of CCPs, establish-
ing inter-CCP links is likely to introduce inter-CCP risks, whereby the failure of one
CCP could potentially result in financial losses for related CCPs (and, in an extreme
case, result in their failure). The nature of these cross-market risks will depend on
regulations, operational procedures and other features of inter-infrastructure
agreements. 
FRAGMENTED POWER
220Securities clearing and settlement in the EU has historically evolved at a national
level, whereas cross-border activity has been limited. Taking advantage of large net-
work externalities and economies of scale, clearing and settlement providers in dif-
ferent countries have gone through a consolidation process, which has generally
resulted in the establishment of domestic monopoly providers. Some of these infra-
structures fulfil only one function (ie either clearing or settlement),  while others
are organised in vertical silos that simultaneously provide clearing and settlement
(and trading) services. 
Although domestic clearing and settlement services in the EU are generally recog-
nised as relatively efficient, significant inefficiencies remain on a cross-border
level. In its 2001 assessment of post-trading markets in the EU, the Giovanni Group
identified fifteen barriers (so-called ‘Giovanni barriers’) to efficient cross-border
activity in the EU :
• Diversity of IT platforms/interfaces;
• Restrictions on the location of clearing or settlement;
• National differences in rules governing corporate actions;
• Differences in the availability/timing of intra-day settlement finality;
• Impediments to remote access;
• National differences in settlement periods;
• National differences in operating hours/settlement deadlines;
• National differences in securities issuance practice;
• Restrictions on the location of securities;
• Restrictions on the activity of primary dealers and market-makers;
• Withholding tax procedures disadvantaging foreign intermediaries;
• Tax collection functionality integrated into settlement system;
• National differences in the legal treatment of securities;
• National differences in the legal treatment of bilateral netting;
• Uneven application of conflict of law rules.
Following identification of these barriers, the European Commission started work on
a variety of practical initiatives aimed at eliminating them. The work is being done
together with the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the
European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA) and other parties.
In its January 2003 resolution, the European Parliament acknowledged that clear-
ing and settlement arrangements that exist in the EU do not enable efficient and
safe cross-border activity. Since then, the Commission has engaged in a variety of
practical initiatives aimed at eliminating Giovanni barriers and generally improving
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the environment for cross-border trading activity in EU security markets.
Regulatory/supervisory framework
A key aspect of the European securities clearing and settlement industry is the
absence of an agreed common regulatory and supervisory framework. At a nation-
al level, regulatory authorities have responsibilities for protecting the safety of the
clearing and settlement industry, both from the point of view of investor protection
and financial market stability. In the context of cross-border activity, supervisory
bodies also need to ensure that all activity across markets satisfies the safety and
stability requirements that apply at a domestic level.
The Commission and various stakeholders have identified the lack of common reg-
ulatory and supervisory arrangements  as a potential concern (eg in the absence of
a common framework, it is more difficult to establish an efficient cross-border link
between infrastructures). In order to mitigate potential problems associated with
the lack of a common regulatory framework, the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) have
launched a working group (the ESCB/CESR Working Group) to develop common
standards for EU clearing and settlement providers.
In 2004 the ESCB/CESR Working Group issued its report on ‘Standards for securities
clearing and settlement in the European Union’. The report focused on adapting to
the EU environment the recommendations for securities settlement systems
issued by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
Importantly, these standards are not mandatory and do not supersede national leg-
islation, thereby affecting implementation of these recommendations by national
authorities. Although the standards do not have EU  law status, it is envisaged that
the relevant regulators, supervisors and overseers will, within their respective com-
petencies, monitor the implementation of the standards.
Notably, in addition to their recommendations for settlement (which were used by
the ESCB/CESR Working Group), the CPSS and the IOSCO have more recently issued
recommendations for clearing. Their report aims to set out comprehensive standards
for CCP risk management, providing a basis for the design of internal procedures by
CCPs. These standards are intended for CCPs and national authorities, to serve as a
basis for the assessment of whether the CCPs in their jurisdiction have implement-
ed the recommendations, and for developing implementation plans wherenecessary. The standards are voluntary and do not supersede national legislation.
Implications
As long as the enforcement power of European institutions in financial services is
limited, the EU has externally to rely on member states.  When supervision and
enforcement standards diverge within the EU, this arrangement will continue to
cause substantial friction with the EU’s international partners. There is a clear con-
tradiction between the EU’s desire to integrate its financial markets and the need
for bilateral supervision and enforcement agreements with the rest of the world.
The policy implications of our analysis are that technical standard-setting is a
particularly promising area of international collaboration where Europe has an
important leadership role to play. Critical mass is important in these cases and the
EU has the required size to prevail in case of disagreement, provided member states
can agree among themselves, which can be difficult.
In most other areas, there is a need for supervision and enforcement in the host
country. Even when prudential and investor protection standards can be har-
monised at the global level, enforcement is typically local. Regulation is a bundle
consisting of standards, rules, supervision and enforcement. Even when the rules
are the same, the overall bundle is not. This imposes a cost on international finan-
cial institutions, stalls competition, contributes to the fragmentation of financial
markets and can lead to diplomatic tension. In the absence of a global enforcement
agency the concept of ‘lead regulator’ appears promising and could be applied more
often in the international as well as the European context.
Collective investment schemes and other financial services that require little super-
vision in the host country are exceptional. The current arrangements work well and
will work even better when the single market is complete, for example in the case of
prospectuses. Paradoxically some level of harmonisation is required to make mutu-
al recognition feasible. Even here the scope for mutual recognition at the interna-
tional level is limited by host country enforcement through litigation. Further legal
agreements in the area of private as well as international public law are required.
In practical terms, European representation in international institutions – with few
exceptions – lacks coherence and design. A fundamental discussion of Europe’s
representation in these institutions will be required. The related discussion of IMF
membership discussed in chapter 5 of this volume is indicative.
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To a great extent the EU’s potential for becoming a global financial services regula-
tor depends on the future evolution of its internal regulation. There are a few exam-
ples where the absence of a common EU approach does not matter from an interna-
tional perspective, because regulation and its external dimension can be left to
member states. The most prominent cases we present are collective undertakings
in transferable securities and prospectuses. Yet even here a common EU minimum
standard was needed to achieve mutual recognition.
EU prudential and investor protection and technical standards will have an impact
internationally when there are externalities and the EU achieves critical mass. This
will only happen if the EU overcomes internal divisions and diverging interests. To a
large extent this will depend on the attitude of the major EU players, in particular
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The potential of the EU to play a major
role also depends on the attitude of other large economies like Japan and, in the
future, China and India. Japan and the EU27 combined outweigh all other OECD
country groupings. Yet Japan has been remarkably timid when it comes to global
financial standard-setting, at least in public. China and India are underrepresented
on most international standard-setting bodies, at least on a per capitabasis.
To play a major international role in supervision and enforcement the EU would have
to develop a 'Community interest' approach and place the supervision of financial
institutions and markets with an EU-wide dimension into the hands of an EU insti-
tution, as it has for competition policy. This European enforcer would be in a posi-
tion to enter into cooperation agreements with enforcers in other countries, as does
the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Notes
1 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong special administrative region, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States.
2 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Organisation of Securities Committees (IOSCO),
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Committee on the Global
Financial System (CGFS).
3 http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html.
4 The consensus among policymakers is frequently challenged by the financial intermediation liter-
ature, but there is hardly any danger that international cooperation in prudential regulation will be
abandoned as a result. For a comprehensive recent survey of the financial intermediation literature
see Gorton and Winton (2004). The authors cite numerous articles to show that despite the pres-
ence of prudential regulation, financial crises still occur. For example Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal
(1996) study financial ‘crises’ in IMF member countries between 1980 and 1995. They find that133 of the 180 member countries experienced an significant problem in the banking sector,
despite the presence of prudential regulation.
5 The equivalent standards for insurance companies are referred to as ‘Solvency I’ and ‘Solvency II’.
6 The same analysis applies to postcodes and it is a fact that the UK Post Office charges a hefty price
for a full electronic database of UK postcodes.
7 The United States has a single postcode system, the EU does not. Most webpages will have address
registration templates that follow the US ZIP code system. The size of the installed base matters.
8 For a general survey of enforcement in law see Polinsky and Shavell (2006).
9 The PCAOB website is very instructive because it clearly illustrates the division between registra-
tion of entities that are supervised, standards, rules, inspections (supervision) and enforcement.  
10 The situation is similar to other types of securities issuance, for example prospectuses for publicly
listed equity securities.
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ithin the borders of their own country, citizens can generally travel without inter-
nal checkpoints and move to wherever they want. By 2014, European Union cit-
izens will enjoy a similar freedom to travel and move within the entire EU27, almost
as if the EU were one country. But there are no plans to extend this freedom to the
EU’s neighbourhood countries, let alone world wide, in the foreseeable future. The cit-
izens of the world will continue to be restricted in their travel.
Those citizens of the world who are not EU citizens – we shall call them third country
nationals – are subjected by the different EU member states to a restrictive and
diverse set of immigration policies. But does this heterogeneous yet restrictive set
of national migration policies make sense? Might not the same logic that supports
fully harmonised and totally unrestrictive migration rules for EU citizens call for more
harmonised and possibly less restrictive rules for third-country nationals? 
These are by no means purely academic questions. The matter is firmly on the polit-
ical agenda as the EU tries to develop a common immigration policy by 2010
2. The
time has arrived to review migration policies for third-country nationals. The benefits
of coherent migration policies and the costs of haphazard migration policies are
increasingly apparent for at least two reasons. 
First, migration policies in Europe are exposed to rising migration pressures. Those
tens of thousands of Africans risking their lives on dangerous boat trips to enter the
EU are a humanitarian tragedy. At the same time, they are only the tip of the iceberg
as far as the underlying economic forces are concerned. A growing proportion of the
8
Herbert Brücker and Jakob von Weizsäcker
1
Migration policy:
at the nexus of internal and external migrationworld’s population has access to the necessary information and the funds to engage
in economic migration. A major proportion of the world’s poor population lives on the
EU’s doorstep and proximity plays a significant role in migration decisions. While the
EU is ageing rapidly, the number of young people in prime migration age (most peo-
ple migrate between the ages of 20 and 35) continues to increase in the EU’s greater
neighbourhood.
For better or for worse, the ‘wall called the Mediterranean’
3made some implicit migra-
tion policy choices for Europe in the past. In the future, Europe will need to rely more
on explicit policy choices. The US experience, with high levels of illegal immigration
from neighbouring Mexico, could be reproduced in the EU and its neighbourhood, pre-
senting a major policy challenge.
The second reason why the benefits of a coherent EU migration policy are becoming
apparent is the phenomenon of reduced barriers to migration within the EU. This nat-
urally increases the need for coordination among EU member states. For example,
where border controls have been abolished as part of the Schengen agreement, third-
country nationals can now – like EU citizens – freely cross intra-EU borders. In some
areas, like the control of external borders, this can lead to a need to coordinate on
more restrictive policies. But it is often overlooked that failure to coordinate on migra-
tion may also lead to overly strict policies. For example, there is a risk of a downward
spiral with regard to the decent treatment of irregular migrants. With open internal
borders, member states might be tempted to drive irregular migrants away to neigh-
bouring EU countries by treating them poorly. Individual countries which treat irreg-
ular migrants decently anyway might end up attracting more than their expected
share of irregular migrants. 
In view of this need for greater coordination and harmonisation of migration policies,
member states have equipped the EU institutions with greater decision-making pow-
ers in recent years, and are set to continue to do so. But the creation of a common
immigration policy requires more than a stronger institutional mandate. It also
requires is a solid conceptual basis, which still appears to be wanting. The political
and scientific controversies continue about what is desirable migration and what is
not. As a consequence, there is also little agreement to what extent differentiated
national migration policies are needed to cater for the different dimensions of hetero-
geneity among the 27 member states. This makes it difficult to agree which aspects
of migration policy can and should be harmonised at EU level.
The aim of this chapter is to provide insights regarding the conceptual foundations




economic case for free migration, which is similar to the better known arguments for
free trade and free capital mobility. Economic migration allows people to move from
places where they are less productive to places where they are more productive.
Global economic output is thereby increased. Furthermore, migration helps to decou-
ple economic opportunity from place of birth. Global equality of opportunity is
improved as a result. 
Economic historians have underpinned the argument for free migration by showing
that relatively free migration during the nineteenth century contributed more to
income convergence across the globe than trade. Looking forward, freer migration
can help substantially to increase global output since dramatic geographic produc-
tivity differences persist across the globe. These productivity differences are often
linked to poor institutions or simply poor geographic location. Clearly, free trade, free
investment and generous development assistance can help to smooth some of
these differences. But it appears certain that, for hundreds of millions of people
around the globe, migration will remain the best option for achieving a decent liveli-
hood in the foreseeable future.
The optimistic view is that the potential gains from free migration will make it an irre-
sistibly attractive proposition
4. According to that view, any adverse distributional
consequences could be dealt with by redistributing some of the gains from migration
to potential losers. However, voters in the EU are somewhat more sceptical when it
comes to the benefits of free migration. In a recent FT/Harris poll on migration atti-
tudes
5, 40 percent of the respondents in France and more than 60 percent in the
other countries surveyed (United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany) replied that there
were too many immigrants in their country and that their country’s immigration pol-
icy was making it too easy for migrants to enter legally. Why is the call for more
restrictive immigration so widespread despite the advantages outlined above? 
Clearly, there are concerns about failed integration and the risk of an ethnic under-
class emerging in a number of European countries. Because of recent terrorist
attacks and incidents involving Muslim immigrants, there are worries about Muslim
fundamentalism among immigrant populations. Negative personal experiences with
immigrants, sometimes too readily generalised when undercurrents of xenophobia
are present, can also play a role. But perhaps the most important reason for the neg-
ative public response to immigration is widespread uncertainty about the conse-
quences of substantial further immigration. What will be the impact on employment
and wages? What will be the impact on the budget and welfare systems? What will
be the impact on local communities, on public institutions and on the identity of the
host country in the long run? That uncertainty leads to caution when it comes to immigration policy. As a result,
the prevalent approach to migration policy in most European countries today is
restrictive. But by restricting legal immigration to the human rights essentials, non-
economic immigration such as family reunion and humanitarian migration have
come to dominate. Since the migrant stock is already relatively low-skilled in most EU
countries because of previous guest worker programmes and immigration from for-
mer colonies, family reunions in particular often have a low-skill bias. 
Furthermore, low-skilled jobs are more readily organised than high-skilled jobs in the
informal economy. This gives rise to significant inflows of low-skilled economic immi-
grants on an irregular basis, as seen in the US and increasingly in Europe. By con-
trast, high-skilled potential immigrants are less likely to engage in irregular migra-
tion. Not only would it be more difficult for them to find a suitable job in the informal
economy, high-skilled migrants also have better legal alternatives. Traditional immi-
gration countries such as Canada and Australia welcome high-skilled migrants with
open arms. 
As a consequence, the EU’s present legal restrictions on economic migrants, which
may appear skill neutral or even marginally favourable to high-skilled immigration, in
reality act as a skill filter that favours low-skilled immigration. We see a danger that
this low-skill immigration bias might result in a repressive downward spiral for
European migration policies. As we will argue, the net benefit of immigration to the
host country is generally lower when the skill-mix of immigration is lower. Therefore,
the low-skilled bias of our immigration policies makes it politically more difficult to
argue the economic case for immigration in host countries. As a result, policies might
become even more restrictive, potentially increasing the skill bias further while plac-
ing reduced political emphasis on the decent treatment of migrants. 
We believe that a harmonised approach to welcome high-skilled immigration to the
EU would not only make good economic sense but also help to immunise the migra-
tion discussion in Europe against such a political downward spiral. At the same time,
we find that a considerable degree of heterogeneity of national immigration policies
for low-skilled and, to some extent, mid-skilled immigration may well be justified on
account of the heterogeneity of member states. But since it would be difficult to sus-
tain differentiated policies if all third-country nationals were granted full intra-EU
mobility, we caution against the rapid further extension of intra-EU mobility rights for
low-skilled immigrants. 
Finally, we identify a need for more EU harmonisation regarding the regularisation of




ity within the Schengen area. Therefore, member states may have an artificially
reduced incentive to treat them decently and create a humane and dependable path
towards regularisation that would seem desirable for humanitarian, security and
economic reasons. In order to deal with that coordination problem, more generous
and harmonised regularisation rules combined with substantially delayed integra-
tion into European welfare states for regularised immigrants should be considered. 
These building blocks for a common immigration policy could help improve the skill-
mix of immigration into the EU while leading to greater openness towards legal immi-
gration overall. According to our simulation, such an outcome could not only be
attractive for the EU but would also benefit developing countries on account of a
greater openness to migration overall.
In the next section, we lay the groundwork for our argument by providing an overview
of the EU’s governance of migration, and the stocks and flows of different categories
of migrants across the EU. Our primary focus is on immigration from outside the EU.
However, intra-EU migration of EU citizens and third-country nationals is also dis-
cussed in some depth. The reason is that intra-EU migration flows have the potential
at least partially to offset external migration flows to any one EU member state. For
a discussion of nationally differentiated external migration policies, it is important to
understand to what extent such offsetting of migration is to be expected.
In the third section, we then develop the argument why the migration impact on the
host and the source country may vary significantly by skill level, and how this might
impact migration policies. In particular, we explore the skill effects of immigration
through a general equilibrium simulation that models the impact of immigration on
wages, unemployment and public finances in both source and host countries. The
simulation suggests a fairly uniform positive impact of high-skilled immigration on
the host country. By contrast, the impact of low-skilled immigration is less positive
and differs greatly as a function of the institutional set-up in different host countries.
At the same time, the impact of migration on developing source countries is found to
be generally positive due, not least, to remittances. But it is more positive for low-
skilled than for high-skilled emigration.
Finally, the fourth section develops policy conclusions on the basis of the findings.  
Migration status quo
The migration policies of the EU are presently characterised by a dual approach.
Internal migration of EU nationals has been harmonised at the EU level, becomingessentially free by 2014 for the whole EU27. By contrast, external migration rules
are not harmonised as they generally fall within the responsibility of each individual
member state. In this section, we first explore the institutional arrangements that
govern migration within the EU and from outside the EU. In a second step, we explore
the scale and structure of internal and external migration as captured by the avail-
able migration statistics. This contributes to our understanding of the differentiated
effects that the present migration regime has across the EU. 
Migration rules and governance
The control of external borders and the decision on who is allowed to enter and who
is refused entry is traditionally considered one of the core elements of state sover-
eignty. Against this background, it was a bold vision by the founding fathers of the EU
that citizens from any EU member state should be allowed to travel without border
controls and migrate across the entire EU with hardly any legal restrictions. The
implementation of that vision is now nearing completion. Implementation rests on
two pillars: free mobility for EU workers and the Schengen agreement. By contrast,
national policies with regard to the external entry and lateral movement within the EU
of third-country nationals remain diverse. Only in recent years have efforts towards
greater coordination and harmonisation in this area intensified.
Free mobility for EU workers
Free mobility for workers within the EU has been a basic principle since the 1957
Treaty of Rome. Over the decades, numerous directives and court decisions have
strengthened the implications of this right, which is now central to the legal definition
of EU citizenship
6. In recent years, free mobility for EU workers has increasingly been
extended to include strong mobility rights for inactive EU citizens. In particular,
Directive 2004/38/EC ‘on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members
to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states’ has gone a long
way towards establishing free mobility for EU citizens, whether economically active
or not. One of its key provisions establishes that, after five years’ residence, even
inactive EU citizens are eligible to full welfare benefits in any member state
7.
When countries join the EU, their citizens also become EU citizens and, as a conse-
quence, also benefit from the right freely to move, reside and work anywhere in the
EU. If the state joining the EU is substantially poorer than the average, this can initial-
ly trigger significant migration flows. During the 2004 and 2007 enlargement
rounds, there were concerns in old member states about the prospect of mass immi-




plus-three-plus-two’ rule was agreed as a transitional arrangement governing labour
mobility from new member states. According to the agreement, old member states
were allowed to delay the introduction of free movement for workers from the new
member states in eastern Europe
8 for a period of up to seven years in total. Any
restrictions would have to be reviewed after the initial two years and then after
another three years with a view to lifting the restrictions should they no longer be
deemed necessary. A third extension to the transitional period by a final two years is
permissible in the presence of serious domestic labour market imbalances.
Germany and Austria are particularly reluctant to lift restrictions, possibly on
account of their geographic proximity to eastern Europe as we shall see below. But
irrespective of whether these restrictions may have made sense for some old mem-
ber states, they will have to be lifted soon. All restrictions on citizens of the eight new
members states in eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 (NMS-8: Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) will be
lifted by 2011 at the latest. For the two new member states that joined in 2007
(NMS-2: Bulgaria and Romania) restrictions will be lifted by 2014 at the latest. Since
the focus of this chapter is on the future challenges posed by immigration from out-
side the EU, we will in the following take the internal mobility for EU workers as given,
although it will technically only be achieved by 2014.
The Schengen Agreement
In 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries signed the Schengen
Agreement with a view to abolishing controls at their joint borders. To address some
of the potential problems of such a move, not least with regard to third-country
nationals, the Schengen Agreement includes a number of additional provisions on
the harmonisation of external border controls, on policy cooperation between signa-
tories, and on the creation of the common Schengen visa for the Schengen area.
By 2001, all member states of the then EU15 with the exception of the UK and Ireland
had joined and implemented the Schengen Agreement. It is expected that by 2010
almost all of the new EU member states (and all EFTA countries – Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland and Liechtenstein) will have fully implemented the agreement.
Therefore, travel without controls at all land borders is rapidly becoming a reality
throughout the entire EU27
9. 
Mobility of third-country nationals
The legal admission of third countries nationals as economic migrants to the EUremains largely the responsibility of individual member states. The admission rules
of member states are characterised by great diversity. The great variety of admission
schemes for high-skilled migrants may serve as an example that admission policies
in different countries often have relatively little in common. 
Virtually all EU member states have special immigration schemes in place for highly-
qualified third-country nationals. Around half have schemes that go beyond highly-
specialised categories such as researchers, artists, and intra-corporate transferees.
Among those with more extensive schemes, some use minimum salary thresholds
(which vary enormously between countries), others use skill criteria such as aca-
demic degrees or past work experience. Some use a mix of the two. At least four
member states have several categories of high-skilled workers for which different
entry and/or residence conditions apply. The existence of a firm job offer or job con-
tract is not required in the UK but is in all other member states. Some countries
require that the employer demonstrate that no local can be found to fill the job, oth-
ers do not. Also, some countries admit those high-skilled immigrants who qualify for
admission on a temporary basis only or at least initially, while others admit them on
a permanent basis. However, there is one important common feature of these differ-
ent schemes. They are generally so restrictive that the immigration inflow under
them tends to be only a small faction of total immigration. 
Member states are also relatively free to decide on the conditions governing status
changes for their migrants from third countries. Specifically, it is up to member
states to decide on the regularisation of irregular migrants, on the extension of tem-
porary work permits and on the conversion of temporary to permanent work permits.
However, there exist some EU-level rules governing status transitions. Perhaps most
significantly, legal migrants are to be accorded permanent residence after five  years
in a member state
10. Finally, member states set their own naturalisation rules. 
But to what extent can migrant status, once it has been established in one member
state, be transferred within the EU?  A stylised summary of transferability of migrant
status in the EU is given in Figure 8.1. 
Irregular migrants can easily migrate from one country in the Schengen zone to
another, where they will still be irregular migrants. In that unusual sense, their status
is fully transferable. By contrast, third-country nationals with a legal work permit
generally cannot transfer that permit within the EU. Their residence and work permit
only have validity for the member state where it was issued. This limits their mobili-
ty inside the EU, unless they are prepared to relinquish their legal status and start




However, this option may become relevant when their legal stay is about to expire.
But this scenario has, in essence, already been captured by the observation that
irregular migrants enjoy status transferability within the Schengen area. 
By contrast, for third-country nationals with permanent work permits, an important
element of transferability of status has been introduced. Third-country nationals with
long-term resident status are to enjoy transferability of their status when they move
from one EU country to another, according to Directive 2003/109/EC. However, this
directive will only become fully effective once transitory restrictions on worker
mobility for EU citizens from new member states have been lifted by 2014. The legal
reason for this is that no third-country worker must be given greater rights of mobili-
ty than, say, an EU citizen from Romania whose mobility may be restricted until
2014. Even after 2014, member states may impose restrictions on the mobility of
workers from third countries with long-term resident status, on grounds of labour
market imbalances. It appears likely that a number of open questions in this area will
have to be resolved in the courts over the next decade or so. Ultimately, the only legal
third-country migrants who enjoy full portability of status in their own right (and for
their close family members who may not be EU citizens) are naturalised EU citizens. 
EU migration governance
For future coordination and harmonisation of the EU’s diverse migration policies
















































Figure 8.1: Transferability of migrant status within the EUMIGRATION POLICY
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have been substantially strengthened in recent years and stand to be further rein-
forced if qualified majority voting on migration is retained in a compromise solution
for the stalled Constitutional Treaty. 
Before 1993, European cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs policy
(including migration) had essentially to be dealt with at the intergovernmental level
outside Commission and treaty structures. In 1993, justice and home affairs policy
was formally included under the so-called ‘third pillar’ of the Maastricht Treaty and
therefore continued to be dealt with in practice at the intergovernmental level. Not
least due to dissatisfaction with progress under the weak structures of the third pil-
lar, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 subjected the area of border controls and migra-
tion policies to a decision-making procedure that is essentially in line with normal
Community procedures (after a five-year transition period). The Amsterdam Treaty
also incorporated the Schengen Agreement into the EU framework. However, Ireland
and the UK retained their right to adopt Schengen provisions selectively, while
Denmark opted out of substantial parts of the Amsterdam Treaty while continuing its
Schengen participation on an intergovernmental basis.
In 1999, the European Council met for a special meeting in Tampere in order to pro-
vide the initial guidelines for the work in the area of freedom, security, and justice
during the first five years under the Amsterdam Treaty. This Tampere programme
called for the development of a common EU migration policy. It also suggested that
the legal status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the EU
should receive mobility rights similar to those of EU nationals, resulting in the corner-
stone Directive 2003/109/EC that has already been mentioned. 
The Hague programme for 2005 to 2010 is very much a continuation of the Tampere
programme, aiming to develop a common migration policy by 2010. In the frame-
work of that current work programme, the European Commission plans to present
five proposals for directives in the area of migration, covering the admission of high-
skilled migrants, remunerated trainees and intra-corporate transferees. 
Under the Constitutional Treaty that did not enter into force, the unanimity require-
ment for decisions on border controls and migration policy only partially amended by
the Nice Treaty was to be fully replaced by qualified majority voting. Further, the
Commission was to be granted the sole right of initiative in this area. This stream-
lined decision-making process would certainly make it easier to coordinate and har-
monise EU migration policy and, as such, would appear to be a desirable feature of
any rescue package for the Constitutional Treaty. FRAGMENTED POWER
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Migration numbers and trends
In this section, we first explore the overall migration patterns of the EU member
states. After that, we attempt to disaggregate those numbers into different cate-
gories to assess their relative importance. Furthermore, we explore the future migra-
tion potential from the EU’s greater neighbourhood.
A simple migration typology of EU member states
The most important quantitative measures of migration are the stock and flow of
migrants. Using these, the migration experiences of member states can be described
by six different categories as indicated in Figure 8.2. Those countries with a high
stock of migrants (above 10 percent of the total population) are grouped into three
different categories according to their net migration inflows. Dynamic immigration
countries (Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, and Luxembourg) rapidly add to their already ele-
vated stock at net immigration rates of around eight per 1000 per year. Classic immi-
gration countries (Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, France, and the Netherlands)
have low but positive immigration rates of around two per 1000 per year. And legacy
immigration countries (Estonia, Latvia) have experienced a large influx of migrants
in the historic (Soviet) past but are now experiencing modest net emigration of
around one per 1000 per year. 
The EU countries with less than 10 percent foreign population are also grouped into
three categories. Emerging immigration countries (Portugal, Greece, Malta, UK,
Denmark, Italy) have net immigration inflows scattered around three per 1000 per
year. Source countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland) display net emigration
of around one per 1000 per year.  The remaining EU countries do not currently display
a very pronounced migration profile, with foreign-born populations below 10 percent
and net immigration rates at around one per 1000 per year.
As a next step, we attempt a breakdown of migration by country of origin and by skill
level. Due to data limitations, we shift in migration definitions between foreign-born
and foreign citizens. The difference is significant as a result of different approaches
to naturalisation and differences in the numbers of foreign-born expatriates return-
ing home. Also, the numbers that we present have different base years, which can
lead to substantial deviations, especially for emerging and dynamic immigration
countries where stocks have been rapidly increasing over recent years. Despite



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decomposing immigration by country of origin
The stock of foreign citizens in the EU15 makes up roughly six percent of the total
population in the EU15, as summarised in Table 8.1. It reveals a surprisingly simple
decomposition of the population with foreign citizenship by region of origin. Roughly
one third of foreign citizens in EU15 countries come from the EU27. One third origi-
nates from the broad EU neighbourhood that includes the Balkans, Turkey, EU neigh-
bourhood countries around the Mediterranean and eastern Europe, and Russia. The
final third comes from the rest of the world. 
This also leads to an important observation regarding the historic propensity to
migrate to the EU15 from different regions. The EU27 and the EU neighbourhood each
have a population of just below 500 million. Since their contribution to the EU15’s for-
eign resident population is also comparable, the propensity of their inhabitants to
migrate to a (different) EU15 country is also comparable. Broadly speaking, this is
attributable to two factors. First, mobility inside the EU is not particularly high,
despite the absence of legal barriers, not least because of relatively small income dif-








foreign residents in % of total population
Austria 2.6 1.6 1.1 5.6 1.2 9.4
Belgium 5.6 5.5 0.1 2.1 0.9 8.6
Denmark 1.3 1.1 0.2 1.2 2.5 4.9
Finland 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 2.1
France 2.0 1.9 0.1 2.2 0.9 5.1
Germany 2.7 2.0 0.7 4.0 2.1 8.8
Greece 1.4 0.5 0.9 4.9 1.8 8.1
Ireland 1.8 1.8 N/A N/A 4.4 6.2
Italy 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.9 1.4 4.1
Luxembourg 36.3 33.2 3.1 N/A 2.7 39.0
Netherlands 1.4 1.3 0.1 1.4 1.5 4.3
Portugal 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.3
Spain 2.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 3.9 7.8
Sweden 2.4 2.1 0.3 0.8 2.2 5.3
United Kingdom 1.8 1.6 0.2 0.2 3.1 5.0
EU15 2.0 1.6 0.5 2.1 2.1 6.2
Table 8.1: Foreign citizens in the EU15 by region of origin of migrants (2005 or nearest
available year).
* Neighbouring regions: Balkan countries, Turkey, EU neighbourhood countries in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, Russia.
Source: Eurostat population statistics, European Labour Force Survey, calculations by the authors. Totals may not necessarily add
up as a result of rounding.legal restrictions, not least because of geographic proximity and the substantial
income differentials. 
The rest of the world has a population of just above five billion. Hence, the implied
propensity to migrate to the EU is only roughly one tenth of that from the neighbour-
hood. This crude arithmetic confirms that distance is an important determinant of
migration. But of course the distinction between the EU neighbourhood and the rest
of the world is evolving. Thus, there are two important scenarios leading to greatly
increased migration to Europe. First, the legal and de factobarriers to migration from
the EU neighbourhood might decrease. Second, a number of countries in the greater-
EU neighbourhood who currently fall into the ‘rest of the world’ category might
increase their emigration rates to Europe to levels that make them in effect EU neigh-
bourhood countries for our purposes. In particular, this might occur for a number of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East.
Of course, it should be borne in mind that this simple picture of migration to the EU15
is the outcome of very varied circumstances in different member states, as can be
seen by breaking down the data to the country level. For example, the bulk of foreign-
ers in the UK come from the rest of the world, resulting largely from old colonial ties.
In Germany, most immigrants hail from the neighbourhood region, not least due to
Germany’s former guest worker programme. And in Belgium foreign citizens from the
EU15 dominate in part because of the role of Brussels as the capital of Europe.
One important aspect of immigration that is not properly captured by these statistics
is irregular migration. While precise numbers are not available for obvious reasons,
some four to eight million irregular migrants can be expected currently to be living in
the EU27, with as many as half a million arriving each year
11. It seems plausible that
rising immigration pressure from the EU’s wider neighbourhood, detailed in the sec-
tion on proximity and income differences below, could result in further increases in
the stock and flow of illegal immigrants.
Decomposing immigration by skill
Another breakdown of migration that is critical to our argument is breakdown by skill
presented in Table 8.2, which compares key immigration countries in Europe with
North America and Australia. It shows that classic immigration countries such as
Australia and Canada both have a much higher percentage of foreign-born population
than the classic immigration countries in Europe such as France and Germany, and
a much higher percentage of foreign-born with tertiary education. It is worth noting




France and Germany while their native population is also significantly more skilled. 
Sometimes, it is argued that Europe is not attracting high-skilled immigrants
because it already has enough high-skilled locals, whereas manual labour is lacking.
But are the skill requirements of the Australian and Canadian economies really that
much higher than in Europe? 
It would appear more plausible that the numbers of high-skilled immigrants are to a
considerable extent influenced by immigration policy. Australia and Canada organise
their economic immigration through points systems that favour skilled immigration.
By contrast, France and Germany have restrictive immigration policies that, as dis-
cussed above, imply a low-skill bias. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the high percentage of high-skilled immigrants
into the UK, where immigration policies have for some time been more favourable
towards high-skilled migrants. In addition, it is obvious that English, as the world’s
international language, is an important asset for anglophone countries attempting to
attract high percentages of skilled migrants. What is less clear is why France and
Germany respond to this disadvantage by offering less rather than more attractive
conditions for high-skilled immigrants than anglophone countries.
It is suggestive qualitatively to reference the skill-mix of immigration to the political
difficulties with immigration in recent years. In Table 8.2, Germany, the Netherlands
and France stand out as countries with particularly low percentages of the tertiary
educated among the foreign-born population. These would also appear to be the
countries where the political discourse on immigration has been the most tense in
recent years. By contrast, Canada and Australia have been able to sustain a much
higher inflow of high-skilled and of low-skilled immigrants as a percentage of their
Country
Foreign born in %
of population (15
years plus)
% with tertiary education High-skilled foreign
born in % of popula-
tion (15 years plus) Among natives
Among foreign
born
United Kingdom 8.3 20.1 34.8 2.9
France 10.0 16.9 18.1 1.8
Netherlands 10.1 19.5 17.6 1.8
United States 12.3 26.9 25.9 3.2
Germany 12.5 19.5 15.5 1.9
Canada 19.3 31.5 38.0 7.3
Australia 23.0 38.6 42.9 9.9
Table 8.2: International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration
Source: Dumont and Lemaître (2004).MIGRATION POLICY
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total population with fewer political difficulties. And the US and the UK would fit this
pattern as intermediary cases here. The notion that the skill-mix of immigration
might influence the economic benefits and thus the political acceptability of immi-
gration in the host country is underpinned by the general equilibrium simulation of
the impact of immigration in the next section. 
Internal migration and enlargement
In Table 8.1 we have seen that internal EU migration is relatively small. One reason is
that numerous small legal obstacles remain for migration within the EU. For example,
the differences in the organisation of social insurance and welfare states across the
EU can turn portability of social entitlements into a nightmare. At the same time,
income differences within the EU15 are relatively small, and one would expect this to
reduce migration. Where income differentials within the EU are larger, as is the case
between the EU15 and the new member states, fairly substantial migratory move-
ments can be observed (Table 8.3).
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1000 persons
Austria
i 60.4 44.6 41.0 53.7 80.5 78.9
Belgium
i 9.3 12.2 9.5 15.6 25.6 59.9
Denmark
ii 8.7 10.0 10.2 10.5 11.3 13.3
Finland
iii 12.9 14.8 15.8 16.5 18.3 17.8
France
i 37.8 44.9 35.1 43.0 46.8 29.6
Germany




i 13.8 14.9 16.4 15.2 20.6 20.1
Ireland
v 6.4 8.6 49.1 54.1 58.5 58.5
Italy
vi 34.4 41.5 42.2 55.6 67.8 79.8
Luxembourg
i 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7
Netherlands
vii 9.4 11.2 12.2 13.1 17.9 23.2
Portugal
viii 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3
Spain
i 10.6 30.0 41.5 46.7 61.8 74.3
Sweden
ix 23.0 22.9 21.4 21.1 23.3 26.9
United Kingdom
x 52.7 62.0 78.6 81.4 180.8 328.6
EU15 697.3 772.3 841.1 909.0 1,053.4 1,293.5
Table 8.3: Residents from the NMS-8 in the EU15, 2000-2006
See footnotes for information on structural breaks and extrapolations.
Notes: i) Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006.--  ii) Statistics Denmark (population statistics).-- iii) Statistics Finland (population
statistics), 2006: Eurostat LFS.-- iv) Statistisches Bundesamt (population statistics), all data refer to 12/31 of previous year.
2006 and 2005 not comparable to previous years due to data revision.--  v) 2002: population census; 2005: LFS, other values
estimated.-- vi) 2004-06: ISTAT (population statistics); 2000-03: Council of Europe, recent demographic developments in Europe.-
- vii) Statistics Netherlands (population statistics).--  viii) 2000-02: Eurostat Labour Force Survey; 2003-06: estimates and
extrapolations.-- ix) Statistics Sweden (population statistics), 31.12.-- x) Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006; national LFS data
report for 2005 240,000 and for 2006 365,000 citizens from the NMS-8.-- Statistical break (data revision).
Sources: National population statistics and Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006.The changing regional pattern of migration from the new member states in eastern
Europe suggests that the selective application of transitional periods across the EU,
and in particular the fact that Germany has taken a restrictive stance, has triggered
a substantial diversion of migration flows towards the UK and Ireland. Interestingly
enough, this does not hold true for the Scandinavian countries. Although Sweden has
opened its labour market completely, and Denmark to a great extent, net migration
flows into these two countries have been  – at some 6,000 persons – almost negli-
gible in the two years since enlargement. Language, and perhaps differences in
labour market institutions, might have played an important role in shaping the direc-
tion of east-west migration flows.
It is striking that there has also been a substantial migration flow from Bulgaria and
Romania into the EU15 during the past few years, although both countries were not
part of the EU before 2007. Based on bilateral agreements, Spain admitted roughly
360,000 migrants from Romania and Bulgaria between 2000 and 2005. The number
of foreign residents from Bulgaria and Romania has also substantially increased in
Italy, but to a lesser extent than in Spain. Again, we see a diversion of migration flows.
In Germany, which was the main destination for migrants from these countries in the
early 1990s, the number of residents from Bulgaria and Romania declined from
260,000 to 130,000 during the last decade.
The diversion of migration flows has influenced two subsequent policy decisions.
First, even those countries that opened their labour markets to workers from the
NMS-8 at the beginning of enlargement were reluctant to extend this free movement
to Bulgaria and Romania on their accession in 2007. The fear of receiving an extraor-
dinarily high share of migrants from these countries has certainly affected the deci-
sion to keep the doors closed to Bulgaria and Romania in countries such as Ireland
and the UK. Second, a number of EU15 countries decided to open their labour mar-
kets to workers from the NMS-8 when the first two-year period of the transitional
arrangement expired in May 2006
12. The rationale behind these policies is that sec-
ond-mover countries, ie countries that open their labour markets after the others,
receive only a relatively small share of migrants. Given that regional migration pat-
terns are relatively stable over time – due in part to network effects, language barri-
ers and so on – this expectation is not unreasonable.
Although the key decisions on the transition towards full labour mobility in the entire
EU27 by 2014 have now been made, the recent enlargement experience is not only
of historical interest. It illustrates well the possible pitfalls of coordination failure. And
it warns that if immigration from those highly educated and culturally close new




may be even more controversial from still nearby but much poorer countries in the
EU neighbourhood. 
Box 8.1: Were the forecasts of the potential for east-west migration wrong?
The large number of migrants from the NMS-8 moving to UK and Ireland has trig-
gered a public debate about whether migration forecasts made before the EU’s
eastern enlargement underestimated the migration potential. These studies relied
as explanatory variables on extrapolations of south-north migration in Europe dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, surveys among the population of the new member
states or econometric estimates considering inter aliadifferences in income levels
and labour market conditions across countries. Under the counterfactual assump-
tion that free movement would be introduced in all EU member states at the same
time, the majority of these studies predicted a long-run migration potential of 3-5
percent of the population from the NMS-8, and a short-run net inflow of about
300,000-400,000 persons per annum (see eg Boeri and Brücker 2001, Alvarez-
Plata et al. 2003, Krieger 2003, Layard et al. 1992, Bauer and Zimmermann
1999). There also exist studies which have obtained significantly lower (Fertig
2001, Fertig and Schmidt 2001, Dustmann et al.2003) or higher projections (Sinn
et al. 2001)
13.
Thus, the aggregate scale of east-west migration within the enlarged EU does not
contradict the predictions of most migration projections, albeit the migration con-
ditions in the first two years following eastern enlargement do not allow a verifica-
tion or falsification of the forecasts. However, the net increase in foreign residents
from the NMS-8 in UK and Ireland has been well above the projections before
enlargement (10,000-20,000 persons per annum, see Dustmann et al. 2003,
Alvarez-Plata et al. 2003). It is worth noting that those projections relied on the
counterfactual assumption that all EU member states would open their labour mar-
kets at the same time. It was already anticipated before enlargement that coun-
tries that  opened their labour markets before others would attract a substantially
higher share of migrants than projected under this counterfactual assumption (eg
Alvarez-Plata et al. 2003). However, there have not been any quantitative esti-
mates of those diversion effects, since no historical precedents exist, and even
today it is hardly possible to quantify the scale of diversion. Altogether, there is still
a considerable amount of uncertainty surrounding all estimates of migration
potential from the NMS.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Proximity and income differences as drivers of migration
This type of proximity migration from much poorer countries in the neighbourhood of
the EU, similar to the massive influx of migrants from Mexico to the US, might well
play a much more important role for the EU in the future. It is estimated that there are
currently some 12 million Mexican immigrants living in the US, of which roughly 60
percent are illegal. The illegal inflow from Mexico may exceed 400,000 migrants per
year. Geographic proximity and the income gap with Mexico appear to be key drivers
of that development. As we have seen above, the EU numbers of between four million
and eight million irregular migrants and an annual inflow of up to 500,000 may
already be comparable. 
In order further to assess the similarities with the US-Mexico situation, Figure 8.3
compares the income gaps of the EU15 and of the US with their respective neigh-
bourhoods using a synthetic conversion rate that is an average of the current
exchange rate and the purchasing power parity. The reason for this unusual choice of
conversion rate is that migration decisions are in part driven by purchasing power
parity comparisons, but also in part by current exchange rate comparisons in view of



























































Figure 8.3: Income gaps of the EU15 and US with their respective neighbourhoods
Data: IMF 2005.
Note: the unweighted average of current exchange rate and purchasing power parity is used for comparing GDP per capita.abroad. Figure 8.3 shows that the income gap between the US and Mexico is signifi-
cantly greater than between the EU15 and the 12 new member states that joined the
EU in 2004 and 2007. 
However, the US-Mexico gap of roughly a factor of five is very similar to the gap
between the EU15 and the average of EU accession and neighbourhood countries
around the Mediterranean and in eastern Europe. But Mexico only has around 100
million inhabitants, roughly one third of the US population. By contrast, the EU acces-
sion countries, the neighbourhood countries and Russia taken together have rough-
ly 500 million inhabitants, which is about the same as the population of the entire
EU27. In that sense, the migration challenge in the EU neighbourhood for the EU can
be said to be three times as large as the migration challenge from Mexico for the US.
Looking further to Latin America from the US and to western, middle and eastern
Africa from EU15, the comparatively greater immigration potential for the EU is also
apparent.
Yet Figure 8.3 does not capture the important effect of actually having a common
border which increases migration pressures further, as the example of the US and
Mexico illustrates. But even in that respect, migration exposure is not equal within
Europe. In particular, migration exposure between neighbours Spain and Morocco is
extreme. However, some other countries in Europe are clearly much less exposed to
income differences with immediate neighbours. Figure 8.4 presents a classification
of the migration exposure of the EU27 by looking at both the income difference with
the poorest adjacent country and the GDP per capita level. 
Countries with high income levels but without poor immediate neighbours like the UK
or Denmark can be thought of as less exposed immigration countries. They are
attractive to migrants because they are rich, but they are not particularly exposed to
neighbourhood migration pressures. Countries with high GDP per capita and compar-
atively poor neighbours like Spain, Finland, and Germany are exposed immigration
countries. The reluctance of Austria and Germany to open their labour markets to cit-
izens from the new member states neatly illustrates this fear of greater exposure.
However, the migration diversion experience of the UK and Ireland suggests that
shielded countries may still attract many migrants if exposed countries in between
refuse to admit migrants. This leapfrogging of exposed but closed immigration coun-
tries is greatly facilitated by the availability of cheap air travel in the EU. 
Then there are relatively poor countries such as Poland and Romania bordering poor-
er countries still, like Ukraine and Moldova. These are potential immigration and emi-




simultaneously. These countries are also likely to be popular transit countries.
Finally, there are the countries with below-average income but without extremely
poor neighbours where likely migration pressures are more difficult to predict. 
Figure 8.4 also shows that very large income differences between neighbouring
countries within the EU (as indicated by the squares) have already become the
exception within the EU. They mainly concern Germany and Austria. By contrast,
large income differences across external borders of the EU (as indicated by the dia-
monds) abound. This underlines the importance of developing a common policy for
the immigration of third countries nationals. This is where the main net migration
flows of the future are to be expected, which will outpace those from the new mem-
ber states by far. If mishandled, these pressures could turn into large-scale illegal
immigration inflows, accompanied by growing public resentment in host countries.
These illegal immigrants might then further increase the need for coordination and
harmonisation within the Schengen area.
In sum, it appears quite certain that proximity and income differences will be impor-
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Figure 8.4: Exposure of EU member states to income differentials with neighbouring
countries
Data: IMF 2005.
Note 1: The unweighted average of current exchange rate and purchasing power parity is used for comparing GDP per capita.
Note 2: Countries separated by less than 100 km of sea were treated as neighbouring countries.for the future of immigration to Europe than Europe’s demographic crisis, which is
frequently also cited as a major factor. Econometric research suggests that the
reverse demographic development, namely the baby boom, did have some impact on
wage levels of different age cohorts
14but that this impact was minimal compared to
international wage differences. We should therefore expect that the changes in
cohort size due to the ‘baby bust’ will also have a significant impact on wages. But
again, these effects are likely to be small compared to existing international wage
differences.
It may even be that Europe’s demographic crisis develops into a deterrent for immi-
grants. As we have already seen in many parts of the European countryside, ageing
can accelerate the exodus of young people. And at least for young high-skilled immi-
grants, it may not be particularly attractive to move to European countries that
impose a high burden on the young through unreformed pension systems. In that
sense, Europe should perhaps address its demographic crisis in order to attract
migrants rather than attempting to attract migrants in order to avoid the difficult
reforms necessitated by its demographic crisis.
Winners and losers: a simulation of the migration impact
Immigration policies are largely driven by real or perceived benefits and losses from
migration, which to an important extent depend on the human capital endowments
of the migrants. This section explores the economic benefits and costs of migration
by skill type in two steps. First, we provide a basic conceptual framework for thinking
about the issue. Second, we use a simple general equilibrium model to simulate the
economic implications of migration for the host country, the source country and the
migrants themselves. In particular, we explore how institutional differences among
EU member states might translate into heterogeneous preferences with regard to
migration.
Disentangling the migration impact by skill type
To analyse the impact of migration, it is useful to distinguish three perspectives: the
perspective of the host country, of the source country and of the migrants. 
Host country perspective
In the host countries, immigration will typically increase economic output. In that
sense, immigration is a source of GDP growth. However, only part of that increased
output will accrue to local workers and local owners of capital. A substantial portion
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247of the increased output will go to the migrants. Another portion of the gains will go to
foreign owners of local capital. Only the remainder will accrue to native workers and
native owners of capital. The impact of migration on wages and employment in the
host country is likely to be negative for those native workers who have skills similar
to those of the immigrants. By contrast, the impact on wages and employment is
likely to be positive for the native workers who have skills that are different and com-
plementary to those of the immigrants and for owners of capital.
Most empirical studies find that the wage and employment effects of immigration
are relatively small, and many find no effects at all (Longhi et al. 2005, 2006). At the
upper end of the range, Borjas (2003) estimates that an immigration influx of one
percent of the population in the host country reduces the wages of local workers who
are similar to the immigrants for labour market purposes by 0.3 to 0.4 percent. But
when are immigrants similar to locals with respect to the labour market? In pursuing
that question further, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find that the labour market treats
locals and immigrants as near substitutes only for low-skill groups. By contrast, the
labour market profiles of mid- and high-skilled migrants and locals appear to be suf-
ficiently different so that they generally do not hurt each other’s employment and
wage prospects. In other words, the wage and employment impact of high-skill immi-
gration appears to be relatively unproblematic. However, the empirical literature has
not been able comprehensively to dispel the distributional concerns regarding low-
skill immigration. The fact that European labour markets for low-skilled workers are
generally less flexible than the labour markets for high-skilled workers may further
aggravate any adverse impact of low-skilled immigration.
Fiscal and social policies in rich host countries tend to redistribute from the rich to
the poor and from the working-age population to the inactive population and pen-
sioners in particular. Hence, the net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant tends to
be substantially more favourable than the net fiscal impact of low-skilled immi-
grants. But because immigrants are overwhelmingly young adults when they
migrate, even relatively low-skilled immigrants may have a positive net fiscal impact.
Bonin (2002), for example, finds that the average immigrant has a positive net fis-
cal impact in Germany across his or her lifecycle, despite the high proportion of low-
skilled immigrants. However, a similar study by Roodenburg et al. (2003) for the
Netherlands finds a negative net impact of immigration on public finances. Overall,
there is little doubt that Europe is fiscally more vulnerable than the US to a large scale
influx of low-skilled immigrants on account of Europe’s larger welfare state. This
potentially reduces the EU’s optimal degree of openness to low-skilled immigration
compared to the US. 
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host country would tend to be positive for high-skilled immigration while the net
impact of low-skilled immigration is less clear.
Source country perspective
By moving a factor of production abroad, migration is likely to decrease the economic
output of the source country. In that sense, emigration may slow GDP growth in the
source country. However, that decrease in output will, to a large extent, be borne by
the emigrants who expect to be better off abroad and may send remittances back
home. Some of the decrease in output is likely to be borne by local and foreign own-
ers of capital. 
Low-skilled emigration or ‘brawn drain’ would tend to increase the wages and
employment of low-skilled workers in the source country by making low-skilled work-
ers relatively more scarce. By contrast, the wages of skilled workers would probably
be reduced since they are becoming relatively more abundant. Taken together, the
effect would be to reduce inequality. High-skill emigration or ‘brain drain’ would tend
to increase the wages of the high skilled and reduce the wage of the low skilled,
thereby increasing inequality in the source country. To the extent that wage inequal-
ity is undesirable, the effect of low-skilled emigration would appear to be somewhat
preferable to that of high-skilled emigration. Moreover, brain drain could have a neg-
ative impact on the growth potential of the source country’s economy by depriving it
of its innovation potential.
But brain drain may not be entirely negative for the source country. The option to
emigrate may substantially increase the expected returns on education, thereby
improving private education incentives. Also, if migrants return to their country of ori-
gin, and many of them do, the skills and savings that they have acquired abroad
become a powerful force for development. Moderate levels of brain drain, therefore,
may actually be beneficial for the source country as is argued, for example,  by Beine
et al. (2003).
Finally, there are altruistic links between migrants and locals in the source country.
Migrants feel altruistic towards their families back home and help them by sending
back remittances on a grand scale easily exceeding development aid budgets. But
altruism is also relevant in the other direction. Many parents in poor countries would
welcome it if their children found a better life abroad, even in the total absence of
remittances. This last aspect is often overlooked but may offer an important explana-
tion why so few attempts are made by source countries to impose at least some
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back their education subsidies.
Migrant perspective
Migrants migrate because they expect to be better off as a result of the move. And
despite some disappointments because of exaggerated expectations or plain bad
luck, the overwhelming majority of migrants can be regarded as winners in the migra-
tion process. 
Figure 8.5 summarises the arguments: from a host country perspective, it seems
likely that high-skilled immigrants would tend to have a net positive impact on the
locals in the host country, as indicated by a ‘+’ in the impact matrix. The case appears
to be somewhat less clear cut for low-skill immigration, as indicated by a ‘?’. In con-
trast, it seems plausible that low-skilled emigration would tend to have a positive
impact on the locals in the source country, as indicated by a ‘+’ in the impact matrix,
while the impact for high-skill emigration is ambiguous, indicated by a ‘?’. Finally,
both low- and high-skilled migrants are prospective winners from migration, indicat-
ed by a ‘++’ in the impact matrix.
A simulation of the migration impact
Having established the basic structure of the argument, we now explore it further by
simulating the impact of migration on output, wages, employment and public
finances in host and source countries. For this purpose, a highly stylised general
equilibrium model is used that builds on Boeri and Brücker (2005)
15. Each country
(initially just one host country and one source country) produces one good with
skilled labour, unskilled labour and physical capital with a standard constant elastic-
ity of substitution (CES) production function. The framework is comparative-static.














Figure 8.5: A simple impact matrix of migration by skill levelIn the short run, it is assumed that the physical capital stock is fixed, while in the long
run we assume that the capital stock adjusts perfectly such that the interest rate
remains constant. 
In contrast to the overwhelming share of the literature, the simulation incorporates a
model of wage rigidities which would appear to be an essential feature in the
European context. Within the framework of the simulation, migration can therefore
result in unemployment. The labour market module is based on the right-to-manage
model where trade unions and employer federations collectively bargain over wages
and where firms hire workers until this set wage equals marginal productivity. Both
parties in the wage negotiations are aware of this. In this setting, wages adjust to
migration in- and outflows, albeit imperfectly. As a consequence, migration involves
falling wages and increasing unemployment for workers of the same skill type. The
(semi-)elasticities between the wage and the unemployment rate have been taken
from the empirical literature (see Blanchflower and Oswald 1995). 
For convenience, we assume that individual labour supply is fixed. Following the over-
whelming share of the literature, we model the native and foreign labour of the same
skill type as perfect substitutes. The alternative assumption, namely that migrant
labour of the same skill type is an imperfect substitute (or even a complement) for
native labour would mitigate the wage and employment impact of migration on
natives (eg Ottaviano and Peri 2006). In this sense, the actual impact of migration
might be more favourable for natives in host countries.
The model takes into account that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers is
typically higher than that of skilled workers. Consequently, a higher elasticity of the
wage rate with respect to the unemployment rate is used for skilled workers.
Moreover, the model assumes that the unemployment risk of migrant workers is
twice as high as that of natives in the same segment of the labour market. This
matches current conditions on average in EU15. 
The model also reflects the impact of migration on the welfare state by assuming that
unemployment benefits exist. Unemployment benefits are financed by a proportion-
al tax levied at the same rate on skilled and unskilled labour. Initially, we assume that
the net replacement rate for the unemployed stands at 60 percent in the destination,
and at 30 percent in the source country. This broadly matches the average propor-
tions in the EU and the typical countries of departure.
The parameters of the model are chosen in such a way that they match the economic
conditions between the EU15 and the average of the source countries of European
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parameters of the model together with the technical details are presented in Brücker
and von Weizsäcker (2007). 
Overall, migration has an impact on native incomes through three channels when a
(semi-) rigid labour market is assumed. First, by a change in the pre-tax wage and
interest rate, second by a changing unemployment risk and, third, by variations in
the tax rate required to fund unemployment benefits. 
Simulated migration impact by skill mix
Using this model, we simulate the migration impact of a migration shock of one per-
cent of the population of the host and the source country. As a benchmark, we con-
sider the textbook example with flexible labour markets and a fixed capital stock. In
this case, the aggregate GDP of the host and the sending country increases substan-
tially by around 0.33 percent. But there are important distributional implications.
Earnings of capital owners increase by more than 0.3 percent in the host country and
fall by up to 0.46 percent in the source country. The net earnings of blue-collar work-
ers after transfers fall by between 0.1 and 0.9 percent in the host country, with
greater losses if the skill mix of immigration is lower. The impact on white-collar work-
ers can be positive or negative, with low-skilled immigration favouring high-skilled
natives. Labour generally wins in the source countries. The main winners however
are the migrants themselves: their income increases by between 230 and 300 per-
cent (see Table 8.A in the Annex).
Next, we introduce wage rigidities. In that case, a one-percent migration shock
increases the unemployment rate in the host country by between 0.1 and 0.2 per-
centage points. At the same time, unemployment declines by between 0.1 and 0.25
percentage points in the source country. The overall unemployment rate in the region
tends to fall since, by assumption, the source country has a higher unemployment
rate than the host country to start with. The aggregate GDP gain is marginally small-
er than for flexible labour markets since some of the migrant labour now remains idle.
In the presence of wage rigidities, natives in the host countries tend to lose between
0.05 and 0.08 percent of their aggregate earnings. By contrast, natives in the source
countries tend to gain. The size and the distribution of gains and losses between the
different types of labour depend on the skill mix of the migrant population.
The assumption of a fixed physical capital stock may be relevant to describe the
short-term adjustment of migration to an unexpected migration shock. The long-run




international capital mobility or domestic capital accumulation, is much more bene-
ficial. Simulating such an influx of migrant labour and foreign capital, we find that
GDP in the host country rises by between 0.8 and 1.0 percent, and the aggregate GDP
of the sending and receiving country is raised by some 0.6 percent. This roughly dou-
bles the gain in GDP compared to the case with a fixed capital stock. 
Again, the native population in the host country wins if the migrant population is suf-
ficiently skilled and the gains from migration in the source country decline with the
skill level of the emigrants. But, as is to be expected, the impact of migration on
wages is reduced once the capital stock adjusts. 
Remittances
Up to now, the impact of migration on natives in source countries has been ambigu-
ous, while the earnings of migrants increase substantially. The distribution of the
benefits and losses from migration changes however if remittances from the migrant
population are added to the picture. In order to analyse the effects of remittances, we
make the relatively generous assumption that migrants uniformly remit 10 percent
of their income to their relatives in the source country. We assume furthermore that
the families of migrants belong to the same group in the home country, ie unskilled
migrants remit income to unskilled, and skilled migrants remit to skilled natives in
the source country. These simple assumptions allow simulation of the effects of
remittances on the distribution of income (Table 8.B in the Annex).
With remittances, the aggregate income of natives in the countries of departure
increases unambiguously. The aggregate income of the native population increases
by between 0.2 and 0.4 percent for an emigration shock of one percent of the source
country population. Both high-skilled and low-skilled labour will generally win in the
presence of remittances. Losses can only arise under the extreme assumption that
all migrants are either skilled or unskilled. In this case the non-migrating group does
not receive any remittances while suffering from the exodus of a complementary fac-
tor of production.
However, despite these generally encouraging findings of the distributional impact of
remittances, it should not be forgotten that they increase the inequality of income
within the groups of unskilled and skilled labour because not everybody is lucky
enough to have a remitting relative. Moreover, remittances do not necessarily com-
pensate for the adverse fiscal impact of high-skilled immigration since remittances
are often difficult to tax.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Taxes and transfer payments
Since we have established that migration can produce both winners and losers, the
next natural question concerns the size of transfers that would be needed to assure
that everybody wins from migration. In order to organise such compensating trans-
fers, redistribution within the three groups (natives in source country, natives in
host country, and migrants) may not always be sufficient. Instead, redistribution
between groups may be required, for example via a special tax on migrants to com-
pensate natives in the receiving country or a Bhagwati tax (Bhagwati and Dellafar
1973) on migrants to compensate the source country.
In order to analyse the magnitude of redistribution which would be necessary to cre-
ate a win-win situation, we consider two cases. First, we assume that a perfect tax-
transfer system exists, which allows redistribution of income from migrants and
other groups without any costs. Second, we assume that redistribution involves
costs, ie that 25 percent of the tax-transfer payments are lost through administrative
costs and economic distortions. Migration may actually aggravate this 'leaky buck-
et' phenomenon as an increasingly mobile tax base is ever more difficult to tax.
For the calculation of the tax-transfer requirements we have to make an assumption
about the groups whose rents will be taxed, since there are several winners from
migration. We assume that all rents within the native population of the host and
source countries are redistributed first, and only if this has been exhausted and los-
ers remain will the migrants be taxed. While this is of course hardly realistic, we use
this as a benchmark (see Table 8.C in the Annex for details).
In the short-term scenario with semi-rigid wages and a fixed capital stock, the
required tax burden on the gains of the migrant population to compensate the host
country would be substantial. Low-skilled migrants would have to transfer 22 per-
cent of their income to natives in the receiving country in order to compensate them
for their losses, while skilled migrants would have to transfer seven percent of their
earnings on the assumption of a perfect tax-transfer system. If we assume that 25
percent of the transfers are lost, these numbers increase to 26 and eight percent,
respectively.
However, if we assume that the physical capital stock adjusts to the in- and outflow
of migrants, the requirement for income redistribution shrinks substantially. Low-
skilled migrants would have to transfer 14 percent of their income to the native pop-
ulation in the host country, whereas no transfer from high-skilled migrants would be
required as they generate a surplus for the host country population. MIGRATION POLICY
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Thus, in order to create a 'win-win' situation a redistribution of migrant earnings to
natives particularly in the receiving countries may be needed according to our simu-
lations. The tax-transfer systems of many European countries may already to some
extent act in this way. As already mentioned, Bonin (2002) finds that immigration
creates a substantial net fiscal gain in Germany. Although migrants pay lower taxes
than average workers and are more than proportionally affected by unemployment
and welfare dependency, they create a substantial surplus for the pay-as-you-go
pension system which outpaces other losses for the welfare state by far. 
Heterogeneous host countries
So far, we have modelled the EU as one homogeneous region. However, in reality there
are substantial differences across European countries with regard to their economic
characteristics, the flexibility of their labour markets and the institutions of the wel-
fare state. Moreover, we observe that process of integration of migrants into the
labour markets differs substantially across the EU. Consequently, the migration
impact differs. This in turn has important implications for European migration poli-
cies: the more heterogeneous the migration impact, the more difficult it is to har-
monise European immigration policies.
Hence, we examine the impact of these differences in the framework of our simula-
tion model. We consider country differences in five relevant dimensions: (i) the GDP
gap between the receiving and the source countries, (ii) the degree of labour market
flexibility, (iii) the unemployment rate, (iv) the unemployment risk of the migrant
population, and (v) the replacement rate for unemployed individuals. Table 8.4 gives











Luxembourg 2.4 4.5 4.0 85.0
United Kingdom 1.1 4.8 1.8 45.0
France 1.0 9.6 2.1 73.0
Germany 1.0 9.5 1.7 61.0
Italy 1.0 7.7 1.6 54.0
Greece 0.8 10.5 1.2 48.0
EU15 1.0 7.1 2.2 61.0
Table 8.4: International comparison of the extent and skill composition of migration
i) Index: EU15 = 1.-- ii) Unemployment rate in % (ILO-Norm).-- iii) Unemployment rate in the foreign labour force divided by the
total unemployment rate.-- iv) Replacement rate in intial phase of unememployment for single earner household with 100 % of
average income in 2004.
Sources: World Development Indicators 2006; Eurostat; OECD; calculations by the authors.FRAGMENTED POWER
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Using these different country parameters, we have simulated the differences in the
migration impact in the EU15 in the long run, ie with the capital stock adjusting to the
migration influx. For ease of presentation, Figure 8.6 only displays the simulation
results for the two extreme cases in the EU15, Luxembourg and Greece, and for the
four largest EU countries only. The findings confirm that the impact of high-skilled
immigration is generally positive for the host country while the impact of low-skilled
migration tends to be less favourable. But, in addition, the simulation suggests that
there is substantially greater variation between countries regarding the impact of
low-skilled migration compared with that of  high-skilled migration. 
Policy recommendations
In the previous section, the simulation found that the heterogeneity of migration
preferences between member states is likely to be more pronounced for low-skilled
migration than for high-skilled migration. This is plausible since the impact of differ-
ences in the welfare state and a different organisation of the labour market is more
pronounced for low-skilled than for high-skilled immigration.
Furthermore, the second section pointed to the importance of proximity for migration
outcomes. Differences in proximity to likely source countries add an additional layer
of heterogeneous preferences regarding migration policies, especially concerning





















































































Figure 8.6: When do natives in EU countries benefit from migration?
Source: authors’ calculations.low-skilled immigration, even if preferences on migration outcomes were identical
(which they are not).
At the same time, the importance of spill-over effects between EU member states is
more pronounced if there are no restrictions on intra-EU mobility for third-country
nationals. This observation is reinforced by the low labour mobility of EU citizens
(with the exception of one-off enlargement episodes), which would only partially off-
set restrictions on third-country nationals through increased mobility of EU nation-
als. These insights on the importance of spill-over effects and the heterogeneity of
preferences for different categories of migrants are summarised in Figure 8.7. 
Within the EU context, those policy issues where spill-over effects are low and hetero-
geneity of preferences is high should be decentralised to member states. That is like-
ly to be the case for low-skilled immigration without intra-EU mobility for those immi-
grants. By contrast, if spill-overs are important and the heterogeneity of preferences
is low, then a harmonised, EU-level solution is called for. This would tend to be the
case for high-skilled immigration in the presence of intra-EU mobility. 
The situation is politically most challenging when the heterogeneity of preferences is
high while spill-over effects are significant. In principle, it may be possible to cooper-
ate by devising sophisticated incentive mechanisms to deal with any spill-over
effects. In practice this often does not work and one is left with a dilemma: either to













Figure 8.7: Heterogeneity of preferences and spill-over effects of immigration

















migration policiesdespite spill-over effects. According to our logic, this policy dilemma is likely to sur-
face with low-skilled immigration in the presence of intra-EU mobility, and in particu-
lar with irregular migration. 
Differentiation of intra-EU mobility by skill level
It should be noted that the decision on how mobile third-country immigrants are to
be within the EU is itself an EU policy choice. Current EU policy is described by the
mobility U-curve from Figure 8.1. Irregular migrants have full transferability of sta-
tus within the Schengen area. Third-country nationals with a legal but short pres-
ence in a member state have no transferability of status within the EU. Longer-term
residents enjoy partial transferability of status. Finally, naturalised citizens benefit
from free movement for workers and thus have fully transferable status. 
Setting aside the special but important case of illegal immigration, intra-EU mobili-
ty rights are thus essentially a rising function of the duration of the legal stay of the
migrant. In principle this makes good sense. In the short run, the spill-over effects
of immigration are reduced by mobility restrictions. Hence, there is less scope for
regulatory arbitrage, and the effects of national migration policy choices are better
internalised. As time goes by, the immigrants get used to their host country which
increases the costs to them of further moves inside the EU. These higher de facto
migration costs kick in as the de jure restrictions diminish with length of stay.
Hence, spill-over effects between national policies remain limited, while some of the
economic benefits that come with internal mobility are gained.
In particular, the internal mobility of third-country migrants is important to allow for
an efficient adjustment to regional economic shocks. Take the hypothetical exam-
ple of the closure of a manufacturing plant in an EU member state. If the local labour
market cannot absorb all displaced workers, then cross-border migration will be a
helpful adjustment mechanism to cope with the shock. And the plant’s migrant
workers would tend to have less pronounced local ties than native workers.
Therefore, an efficient migration regime would allow migrant workers to move
abroad so that more local workers can stay at home where they like it best. In other
words, the economic rationale for granting third-country nationals intra-EU mobility
is made stronger precisely because many EU citizens are so reluctant to move, as
witnessed by the low migration rates of EU citizens. 
But further initiatives to relax intra-EU mobility constraints require care. As Figure
8.7 shows, free intra-EU mobility for low-skilled third-country nationals could make




conditions for intra-EU mobility of high-skilled workers could be more readily accom-
modated because of lower heterogeneity of preferences with respect to high-skilled
migrants. At the same time, the efficiency gains from intra-EU mobility may be
particularly important for high-skilled migrants. An improved match-up of highly
specific demand and supply in the typically thin markets for highly specialised
human capital is likely to lead to significant benefits for the EU economy. 
On this basis, we recommend that a further relaxation of intra-EU mobility should be
differentiated by skill. While high-skilled migrants could be granted full intra-EU
mobility upon legal entry, intra-EU mobility for low-skilled migrants could for the
time being be kept at the current five-year waiting period.
The Blue Card proposal
A simultaneous harmonisation of high-skilled immigration rules and more generous
intra-EU mobility for this category of third-country nationals would be an attractive
EU policy. It could be implemented through the introduction of an EU-wide ‘Blue
Card’ (von Weizsäcker 2006), granting high-skilled workers comprehensive access
to the entire EU labour market without the current five-year delay. This European
version of the US Green Card could be allocated through a harmonised points sys-
tem that takes into account various characteristics of potential immigrants, includ-
ing their education, their age, and their language skills. 
The Blue Card would help to attract more highly skilled migrants to the EU than pure-
ly national schemes because of its greater option value for subsequent employ-
ment. Accepting a first job in Vienna is more attractive if the search space for the
next job is the whole of the EU, not only Austria. In addition, this Blue Card scheme
would result in greater economic gain for the EU per high-skilled worker admitted, by
securing a better match of their talent with the requirements of the EU economy.
But how would the expected net increase in high-skilled immigration through a Blue
Card system be distributed over individual EU member states? Small member
states stand to benefit most since the difference in option value of any national
scheme compared to an EU scheme would be greatest. But large member states are
also likely to benefit as they would gain in attractiveness compared to key competi-
tors for top talent such as the US, Canada and Australia. The European Commission
was preparing a draft directive on high-skilled immigration for September 2007.
This opportunity should be used to participate more effectively in the global compe-
tition for talent. The Blue Card also has an important development aspect. By granting high-skilled
migrants from developing countries permanent residence status immediately, brain
circulation is encouraged. The Blue Card would act as an insurance policy for high-
skilled migrants wanting to return to their country of origin. If a high-risk career proj-
ect at home does not work out, they would still have the option to return to Europe. 
Skill mixing and irregular migration
High-skilled emigration or brain drain need not substantially hurt the country of ori-
gin because of remittances and because of better incentives to invest in human
capital. But it also seems clear that the development impact of low-skilled emigra-
tion is likely to be more benign than that of high-skilled emigration. In addition to
improved development assistance, not least in the area of education, it may there-
fore be desirable to provide for a skill mix of migration that balances the interests of
source and host countries. In this context, it is sometimes proposed to introduce
temporary work permits for low-skilled migrants from developing countries
16.
But such a scheme would require a substantial administrative effort to overcome
the experience-based observation that there is nothing more permanent than tem-
porary migration. And even if the temporary scheme could be made to work, it would
raise a number of problems. In particular, new investments in training and in basic
integration would be required every time the old temporary migrants are exchanged
for new ones. Finally, the hope that such a scheme would help substantially to
reduce the inflow of irregular migrants may prove unfounded. The total migration
potential from the EU neighbourhood is likely to remain substantially greater than
total irregular migration and the envisaged temporary migration combined. Thus,
irregular migration pressure may not be impacted in a major way by the temporary
migration scheme. 
It would certainly appear paradoxical to set up an administratively challenging
scheme of low-skilled temporary migration from developing countries while, in par-
allel, investing increasing amounts in the equally challenging task of controlling
irregular inflows of migrants. For the time being, it may instead be preferable to use
any political room for manoeuvre regarding the increased admission of low-skilled
immigrants to ease the challenge of irregular immigration. 
However, finding a good solution in the EU context for irregular migration is far from
straightforward. We have seen that spill-over effects are considerable for irregular
migration in the Schengen area and the heterogeneity of preferences among mem-




is likely to increase over the coming years, so that the coordination problem is like-
ly to get worse. The underlying economic forces driving irregular migration are sim-
ply too powerful for it to be stopped by acceptable means. Increased expenditures
on border controls, reinforced efforts to fight human trafficking and closer collabo-
ration with transit countries can slow the increase in irregular migration somewhat
but probably no more than that.
Heterogeneity of preferences among member states may be even stronger for irreg-
ular than for legal migration for non-economic as well as economic reasons.
Concern about the corrosive effect of tolerance of obviously illegal phenomena may
be more pronounced in some member states than in others. The human rights impli-
cations of cracking down harshly on irregular immigration may be interpreted differ-
ently in different member states. Finally, the economic benefits derived from irreg-
ular migration may vary subtly between member states. For example, countries
with strong tax distortions that provide excessive incentives for high-skilled women
to engage in home production of household services might find the economic
impact of irregular migration more beneficial than countries where such tax distor-
tions are weaker. The reason is that in countries where such tax distortions are
strong, irregular migration is likely to increase more substantially the supply of
high-skilled (female) labour in the official labour market.
Because of highly heterogeneous preferences, a harmonised approach to irregular
migration is likely to remain elusive for some time to come. But increased coordina-
tion should still be possible. 
First, more stringent standards governing the treatment of irregular migrants could
be agreed. With open internal borders, some member states might otherwise be
tempted to drive irregular migrants away to neighbouring EU countries by treating
them poorly. Individual countries that treat irregular migrants decently might in any
case end up attracting more than their expected share. Stricter standards for the
decent treatment of irregular migrants could help resolve this problem. 
Second, a basic framework for regularisation procedures could be defined, recognis-
ing the advantages of timely regularisation. In particular, it is often overlooked that
irregular immigrants who are regularised in one member state have a strong incen-
tive to stay there because their legal status is not transferable. This provides an
incentive for migrants to build themselves a local network and to learn the local lan-
guage. In doing so, the effective mobility costs of those regularised migrants
increase substantially. In that sense, a country that regularises irregular migrants
to some extent locks them in, thus reducing spill-over effects.FRAGMENTED POWER
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This effect may have been overlooked in the debate regarding Spain’s recent mass
regularisation. France was concerned that a substantial part of these regularised
migrants would stay in Spain for five years only in order to obtain long-term resident
status and then move to France. However, because of the lock-in effect outlined
above, it would be surprising if this movement turned out to be very strong, espe-
cially compared to how many irregular migrants might have moved from Spain to
France had Spain not provided attractive conditions for them. 
A more proactive regularisation policy stands to alleviate future integration prob-
lems. It took European societies too long to acknowledge that their guest workers
were immigrants who required an integration investment. There is a risk that we are
today making a similar mistake with irregular immigration. Regularisation schemes
could in fact be used to encourage integration by providing accelerated regularisa-
tion for those irregular migrants on the basis of language skills and similar integra-
tion achievements. 
The principal negative effect the proposed policy direction on irregular migration is
that it makes irregular migration ex ante more attractive to potential migrants.
Hence, for any given enforcement level, the inflow of irregular migrants could be
expected to increase somewhat as a result of these policies. This is precisely the rea-
son why, in our view, it makes sense to reform policy on irregular immigration, using
the limited political room for manoeuvre for increased low-skilled immigration gener-
ated by successful high-skill immigration schemes.
In sum, the proposed policy recommendations could help to improve the skill mix of
immigrants into the EU while helping to defuse the challenge of irregular immigra-
tion. The developing countries also stand to benefit on account of the greater open-
ness to immigration overall that the proposal entails.
Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Alexandre Janiak for his excellent research assistance. 
2 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 5 November 2004 (includes the Hague Programme, the
EU’s work programme on migration policy 2005-2010).
3 Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post, 30 April 2007, p. A15.
4 See Legrain (2007) for a forceful argument along these lines.
5 George Parker and Jimmy Burns, Financial Times, 20 October 2006.
6 Free mobility for workers has proved so attractive that European Free Trade Association [EFTA]
countries such as Switzerland are also joining in.
7 Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 16(1).
8 The new member states were also given the right to impose restrictions on old member states,
although such reciprocal restrictions have mostly symbolic significance. 9 Although the UK and Ireland have opted out of Schengen, their only land border has been without
formal border controls ever since Ireland became independent in 1922.
10 With the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark who have opted out of this regulation.
11 See Düvell (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of the various estimates.
12 Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain opened their labour markets completely, and some other
countries increased quotas and removed barriers at the sectoral level (Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands).
13 For a detailed review of these studies and a test of the forecasting performance of different estima-
tion techniques see Brücker and Siliverstovs (2006).
14 Macunovich (1998).
15 See also Levine (1999); Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) for similar models.
16 eg Pritchett (2006), World Bank (2007), European Commission (2007a).
MIGRATION POLICY
263Annex






Share of skilled labour in migrant
population
flexible labour markets semi-rigid labour markets
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7
Change in % at immigration (emigration) of 1 % of labour force
Total GDP Host country 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.82 0.90 0.98
Source country -0.75 -0.84 -0.94 -0.60 -0.71 -0.82 -0.88 -1.05 -1.21
Total region 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.54 0.58 0.62
Total income Host country 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Natives Source country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.02
Total region 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
of these
Manual labour
Host country -0.68 -0.39 -0.09 -0.70 -0.43 -0.17 -0.43 -0.15 0.14
Source country 0.14 -0.08 -0.29 0.31 0.06 -0.19 0.11 -0.17 -0.46
Total region -0.42 -0.29 -0.16 -0.39 -0.28 -0.17 -0.27 -0.16 -0.04
Non-manual 
labour
Host country 0.02 -0.15 -0.32 -0.15 -0.27 -0.40 0.12 0.02 -0.08
Source country 0.14 0.48 0.82 0.32 0.64 0.97 0.12 0.41 0.70
Total region 0.04 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08 -0.15 -0.21 0.12 0.07 0.03
Capital owners
Host country 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source country -0.43 -0.48 -0.54 -0.34 -0.40 -0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total region 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income of
migrants
219.86 201.88 186.85 248.04 228.72 212.59 249.08 229.80 213.70
Change in % at immigration (emigration) of 1 % of labour force
Unemployment
rate
Host country - - - 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.03
Source country - - - -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.06
Total region - - - -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
Manual labour
Host country - - - 0.41 0.25 0.09 0.30 0.13 -0.04
Source country - - - -0.16 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.18
Total region - - - -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.06
Non-manual 
labour
Host country - - - 0.03 0.09 0.15 -0.03 0.03 0.08
Source country - - - -0.14 -0.29 -0.43 -0.10 -0.24 -0.38
Total region - - - -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12
Source: authors’ calculations. See text for assumptions.MIGRATION POLICY
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Table 8.B: The impact of remittances
Source: authors’ calculations. See text for assumptions.
Semi-rigid labour markets and capital stock adjustment
Without remittances Remittances as 10% of income
Share of skilled labour
in migrant population
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7
Native income in source country 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.34 0.33 0.31
Of these:
Manual labour 0.11 -0.17 -0.46 0.51 0.11 -0.29
Non-manual labour 0.12 0.41 0.70 0.42 0.91 1.40
Income of migrants 249.08 229.80 213.70 214.18 196.82 182.33
Perfect tax-transfer system 25% leakage
Share of skilled labour
in migrant population
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7
Transfer (tax) requirement of/for
Migrants (to/from host country) -16.87 -13.61 -10.62 -21.09 -17.01 -13.28
Migrants (to/from source country) 5.43 4.35 3.35 6.79 5.44 4.19
Manual Host country 0.68 0.43 0.17 0.85 0.53 0.21
Labour Source country -0.31 -0.06 0.19 -0.39 -0.08 0.24
Non-manual Host country 0.15 0.27 0.40 0.18 0.34 0.50
Labour Source country -0.31 -0.63 -0.95 -0.39 -0.79 -1.19
Capital Host country -0.24 -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.33 -0.36
Owners Source country 0.34 0.40 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.59
Memo item
Leakage in % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06
Migrants (to/from host country) -7.66 -4.06 -0.76 -9.57 -5.07 -0.95
Migrants (to/from source country) 3.30 1.97 0.74 4.12 2.46 0.93
Manual Host country 0.43 0.15 -0.14 0.54 0.18 -0.17
Labour Source country -0.11 0.17 0.46 -0.14 0.22 0.58
Non-manual Host country -0.12 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 0.10
Labour Source country -0.12 -0.41 -0.70 -0.15 -0.51 -0.88
Capital Host country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Owners Source country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Memo item
Leakage in % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
Table 8.C: Tax-transfer requirements if native income remains constant
Source: authors’ calculations. See text for assumptions.E
nergy has shot up the national and European Union political agenda and a propos-
al is now on the table to create a common energy framework which enables the
member states to address the long-term policy goal of creating a competitive and
low-carbon European economy. To this end, the Commission advocates an ordering
of priorities for energy policy at EU level: reasonable price, security of supply and
environmental sustainability. The EU is already competent for the internal energy
market, which is the main policy instrument for achieving reasonable prices. The EU
is also responsible for climate change policies and thus carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sion levels. However, security of supply and the national energy mix have so far
remained within the field of competence of the individual member states. The
Commission now proposes to include security of supply in the common EU energy
framework, so that the EU can ‘speak with one voice’ in its energy diplomacy with
third-country producers. Will member states play ball?
These proposals are not new. In earlier periods of EU policymaking, notably in the
1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, the Commission attempted without much success
to unify the member states’ energy security policies. National member states’ inter-
ests stood in the way of progress. The liberalisation of EU energy markets was the
first breakthrough. The international energy market circumstances from the late
1980s onward – a buyers’ market – helped convince the member states to reform
their energy markets and reap the benefits of widely available international oil and
gas flows and more efficient organisation of the EU market. Energy security was not
a issue, or at least was not deemed to be an issue which the market could not deal
with. With the liberalisation process underway, the switch to a sellers’ market at the
turn of the century forced the member states to rethink energy security matters. The
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growing dependency on imported oil and gas, the declining energy production in
member states and in other ‘safe’ producer countries, and the climate change agen-
da rekindled old fears and, as a result, created new dilemmas for the member states. 
The sense of urgency in both EU energy and climate matters has been boosted by
energy security concerns. The widely expected dash for gas as a result of climate
change policies has increased dependency on gas imported from only a few export-
ing countries. In the expected rapidly globalising world where international relations
are increasingly driven by privatised economic interests, these import dependencies
were apparently not viewed as problematic. But in the emerging new international
political relationships after 2001, where competition for resources has replaced the
situation of widely available energy flows and where energy-producing countries
have re-emerged as strategic and national players, energy security matters.
The switch to a low-carbon economy is driven both by climate concerns and by ener-
gy security concerns. Diversifying away from fossil fuels will cut CO2emissions and
reduce the structural dependency on oil- and gas-exporting countries. However, this
strategy provides only a long-term solution to what are also more immediate prob-
lems and does not relieve the pressure on member states to address energy secu-
rity problems in the short and medium term. The presidency conclusions of the
European Council of 8-9 March 2007reflect these dilemmas. The discussion about
implementation and organisation of this strategy has only just begun. 
This chapter attempts both to analyse the development of energy policymaking in
the EU and to discuss the energy security dilemmas that confront the member
states in the short and medium term. The central issue here is how security of sup-
ply and a sustainable energy system can be achieved in a market environment,
which is the main thrust of the Commission’s proposals, while at the same time
government intervention in international energy markets is on the rise.
It is suggested that the mismatch between the level of government involvement and
the market model in the international energy sector has become more pronounced
lately and impacts upon the security of supply and demand policy toolset of con-
sumer and producer countries. Arguably, the switch from an international oil and gas
buyers’ market to a sellers’ market has not only rekindled resource nationalism in
producer countries but also stimulated a certain preference for bilateral energy rela-
tions over multilateral ones in some consumer countries in an attempt to secure sup-
plies. Chinese energy diplomacy in Africa and elsewhere is a good example of bilater-
alism, while some member states also deem the Nordstream pipeline project to be an
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a trigger for the current EU proposal on external energy relations, encouraging mem-
ber states to ‘speak with one voice’. However, it will be argued in this chapter that the
asymmetry in import dependency among the member states,  the preference of
member states for a certain energy mix, the member states’ competitive position in
world markets and different foreign and security approaches, will make ‘speaking
with one voice’ a lot harder to achieve than in climate change matters. 
This chapter first gives some facts and figures about European energy. It then dis-
cusses  both past and current energy policy in the EU. The issue is raised whether
the strategic energy interests of the member states are best achieved at the nation-
al or at the supranational (EU) level. In the following section, recent developments
in international energy markets and in oil and gas value chain management serve
as the stepping stone for an evaluation of the current internal and external energy
policy proposals of the EU. The final section is a conclusion.
Some facts and figures 
The EU energy economy’s dependence on fossil fuels is still very large. In 2004, the
primary energy mix was 80 percent dependent on fossil fuels (18 percent on solids,
38 percent on oil and 24 percent on gas, see Figure 9.1), while electricity generation
was 54 percent dependent on these three fuels (European Commission 2007b).
Source: European Commission
Figure 9.1: EU25, total primary energy supply (baseline scenario)EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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In the primary energy mix, nuclear contributed 14 percent and renewables six per-
cent, while in electricity generation the shares of nuclear and renewables were 31
percent and 14 percent respectively in 2004. The contribution of domestic EU pro-
duction to the primary energy mix (54 percent of the solids, 37 percent of gas and 18
percent of oil) in 2004 is still significant but will decline in the coming decades.
Although the figures presented here are based on a baseline scenario and do not
include the recently contemplated additional measures to stimulate renewables, it is
clear that despite these efforts the EU energy mix will remain largely dependent on
fossil fuels up to 2020 and beyond. This is partly the reason why new energy and cli-
mate strategies include clean fossils. But the technology to capture CO2 in aquifers
and old oil and gas fields is far from developed. In general, the combined energy and
climate strategy as promoted by the Commission and the European Council depends
on quite a few technology breakthroughs and cost reductions.
Import dependence is already substantial and will continue to grow in the period to
2030 (see Figure 9.2). The import dependence on oil (mainly for the transport sec-
tor) is already very high, and with the modest resources in OECD countries in decline,
will not only increase further but oil supplies will also become more concentrated.
The combination of declining domestic supplies and growing demand results in a
rapidly increasing import dependency on natural gas. Despite growing liquified natu-
ral gas (LNG) supplies, gas imports are also predicted to remain very concentrated












2000 2010 2020 2030
Figure 9.2: EU25, development of import dependence to 2030 (baseline scenario)
Source: European CommissionFRAGMENTED POWER
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for large parts of the EU. The concentration of suppliers is already relatively high for
the EU as a whole, but is very concentrated indeed for the north-west and eastern
European gas markets where Russian pipeline supplies dominate. LNG development
will only marginally relieve the structural import dependence because the line of arbi-
tration between Russian pipeline gas and LNG will be unlikely to shift that far north
and east to include large parts of the German, Austrian and Swiss markets, let alone
those of the eastern European member states.
The EU imports from a relatively small number of fossil fuel suppliers, particularly in
gas and oil (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4). Some countries are important suppliers in all
three fossil fuels (see Figure 9.5). For instance, in 2004, Russia supplied eight per-
cent of the EU’s coal imports, 29 percent of its gas imports and 26 percent of its oil
imports, while Algeria supplied 13 percent of gas imports and three percent of oil
imports. Norway supplied 17 percent of gas imports and 13 percent of oil imports.
Saudi Arabia is an important oil supplier with nine percent and South Africa an impor-
tant coal supplier. In general, coal imports, despite the projected increase, are not
considered a problem with regard to security of supply. This is due to the larger
domestic supplies, the wider variety of suppliers and the national policies of most of
these exporting countries.
























Figure 9.3: EU 27, origin of oil, 2004
Source: European CommissionEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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supply (concentrated on a few net exporting suppliers of which most are economical-
ly and/or politically unstable in the short or longer term) are the main drivers for the
proposed structural changes in the energy economy of the EU and its member states.
In the case of Russia, both the uncertainty about the internal developments in the


































Figure 9.5: EU 27, origin of hard coal, 2004
Source: European CommissionFRAGMENTED POWER
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with the EU in the past few years. Energy has played a major role in this development,
in which the Russian-Ukraine dispute was taken as a cue for some EU countries to
steer away from a larger dependency on Russia. However, the imports from Russia
will be very difficult and costly to replace by alternative flows and fuels. The longer-
term drive to achieve a more sustainable energy system, not only on account of cli-
mate change but also in terms of structural political and economic dependence,
could be at the source of short- and medium-term problems in energy security. In
addition to a possible reluctance of producing countries to invest in fossils to provide
sufficient capacity in the short- and medium-term, the difficulty of the EU strategy is
that this new public interest should be achieved in a manner that does not impede
the EU and its stakeholders in their global competitive position. International fossil
energy prices, the price for CO2 and the organisation of the energy sector, among
other things, therefore play an important role in achieving these policy goals.
Energy policy in the EU
The run up to the new initiatives
Recent increases in energy price levels on world markets, partly due to high political
risk premiums on energy, increasing demand in newly emerging economies, under-
investment in all parts of the value chain, the rising cost of new oil and gas flows,
access to resources and markets, and renewed sentiments of energy or resource
nationalism and a renewed sense of urgency concerning climate change have con-
tributed to the intensifying international and European energy debate. 
Since 2005 a certain degree of willingness among the member states has begun to
develop in favour of closer cooperation on energy policy issues. Security of delivery
and security of supply are issues which have gained prominence as a result of
increasing energy trade flows among the member states and growing import depend-
ency on third-country supplies, in addition to the environmental agenda. The idea
that market forces alone could provide the member states with sufficient security of
supply began openly to be doubted against the background of the renewed emphasis
on national interests by producer country governments. They raised the issue of
security of demand against the background of investment requirements and intensi-
fied transition plans to include more sustainables in the energy mix in consumer
countries, such as the EU.
Moreover, the liberalisation of the EU energy market had not from the outset been
properly accompanied by crisis policy mechanisms, such as the International
Energy Agency (IEA) mechanisms for oil, which gave rise to doubts about the policyEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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direction. At the same time, the implementation of the internal market itself required
more coordination than merely taking away barriers to trade and regulating natural
monopolies. Coordination of security of supply policies also proved to be more diffi-
cult, particularly in gas, where the dedicated infrastructures and trade depend on
long-term commercial and government relations between member states and third
countries. The absence of a structural crisis, such as the 1973 oil crisis, made mem-
ber states more reluctant to trade their long-term bilateral energy relations with rela-
tions managed from Brussels that would not necessarily benefit the security of the
individual member states. Moreover, nervousness was growing about the liberalisa-
tion agenda regarding the position of national champions and the future organisa-
tional structure of the sector. In general, these uncertainties in turn created an unsta-
ble investment climate.    
At the EU’s Hampton Court European Council meeting in autumn 2005, a paper was
presented that invited the member states to tackle some of the outstanding issues on
the internal energy market, and to examine how progress could be made with regard
to the environment. This debate kick-started the current energy policy discussion. At
the meeting, the Commission was invited to prepare a green paper, which was pub-
lished in March 2006. While the Commission was preparing the paper, the impact of
the January 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis emphasised the urgency also to
include a view on external energy relations. The 2006 Commission Green Paper, ‘A
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’ and Commission
Directorate-General for Competition’s sector enquiry, were the stepping stones for the
energy discussions leading to the Strategic Energy Review 2007 (SER 2007), also
referred to as the ‘energy package’. On 10 January 2007, the Commission presented
‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ (European Commission 2007c). With this energy pack-
age the Commission calls on the member states to tackle the triple challenge of future
energy security and an environmentally sound energy system, while also embracing
the Commission’s view on how to realise or complete the internal energy market.
These proposals include wider competences in energy for the EU both in internal and
external energy policymaking. From the EU presidency conclusions of 8-9 March
2007 we learn that the competency issues have not been resolved and that the
Council continues to take a much more evolutionary approach.
The EU market model is not yet set in stone. Policymakers, politicians, regulators,
academics, companies and other organisations differ in what they see as the pre-
ferred market structure or market model and the way in which security of supply and
environmental policies and the costs they incur should fit into this framework. More
importantly, member states are still uncertain how the framework will deal with the
asymmetric security of supply risks and different energy mix preferences. FRAGMENTED POWER
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The differences of opinion are strengthened by the different national interpretations
of the directives on national market models. Among the member states and other
stakeholders, the preferences vary between those that are proponents of de-integra-
tion of the value chain and those that favour more integration of the value chain, and
they vary between those that prefer a national champion and those that do not.  Very
often in the EU debate, those that are proponents of a certain level of integration of
the value chain are denounced as being anti-competitive, thus denying the merits of
models of competition in which, for instance, vertically integrated firms compete for
markets. The level of integration or de-integration (or unbundling) can be particularly
important for the efficiency and reliability of the European energy sector. Particularly
with regard to the dependency on foreign supplies in markets that are very concen-
trated and/or suffer from resource nationalism, a certain degree of purchasing power
on the part of companies can help secure flows for the European market. Such a
model, with larger companies competing for international resources and markets, is
possible within the rules and regulations of the EU. It is clear that some member
states prefer this model over a market structure that is more atomised. 
The discussion about the preferred organisational structure of the market also
reflects the desire to capture both short-term and long-term benefits in an industry
that has typically longer-term cycles. The outcome of this struggle also impacts on
the way external energy relations are conducted because of the apparent attempt
to move the long-term costs on to third countries. Both consumer and producer
countries are engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. The producer countries are aware
of this process of offloading the long-term costs of security of supply onto them and
respond with strategies that secure their return on investment in production and
transport. Forward vertical integration and producer cooperation become options in
the face of developments in consumer markets which suggest that the costs and
benefits of energy trade are becoming unbalanced. 
In order to understand the longstanding debate about a European energy policy, it is
important to understand the national interests of the member states, but more
importantly also the role of the state in the organisation of the (international) ener-
gy sector. In energy, the state (or government) has always been involved, often as
an owner but also as a regulator. Regulation of the energy sector is not only about
creating a level playing field, efficiency, a certain market structure or about the low-
est possible prices for consumers, but is also important from a national security per-
spective. Energy is a sector with high economic rents that not only attract compa-
nies but also governments (van der Linde 2000). Energy is a major contributor to tax
incomes of producer, transit and consumer countries. For that reason alone, govern-
ments will continue to intervene in the energy sector. Before turning to energy policyEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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developments, the role of government (the state) and the role of companies in the
political and social construction of the member states should be analysed. 
State versus market
In energy, the state and the market cannot easily be separated. Energy touches on
the core functions of the state. Energy is not only a crucial and basic input to our
economies, determining the competitive position of nations and its industries and
welfare, but also a crucial element in the security of the state (law and order, interna-
tional, foreign and security interests). The intervention in the market to reduce mar-
ket imperfections by way of regulation or ownership (for instance to overcome natu-
ral monopolies), is different from state intervention for national security reasons (for
instance to guarantee energy supplies for military purposes and in general to pro-
mote geopolitical and geo-economic prominence). Often these functions can be
combined when sufficient energy supplies can be delivered to the consumer markets
without the political threat of supply disruptions. However, in a situation where
geopolitical and geo-economic tensions are increasing, or where energy resource
regions are deemed unstable, the security of the state imperative will compel the
government of consumer countries to intervene to secure supplies. 
Even in resource-rich countries the security of the state can compel the government
to take charge of the energy sector. In Russia, for instance, the oligarchs were
deemed a risk to the interests of the Russian state when they challenged the gov-
ernment (and in the eyes of certain elites, the integrity of the state) with their
amassed riches. Since the intervention in the oil sector in the Yukos affair, but also
with the restructuring of Gazprom, the government has consistently reduced the
grip of the first generation of oligarchs on the economy and replaced them with
managers considered more loyal to the state’s interests. (Finon and Locatelli 2007,
Stern 2005) Moreover, energy riches can also promote a state’s geopolitical impor-
tance, as is currently evidenced by the countries in the Middle East, the Caspian Sea
region and Russia. For his reason, states will not easily leave security of supply to
the market.  
After the limits of the centrally planned economies were reached in the late 1980s, a
general sense of optimism about a global market-led economic system prevailed. At
the end of the cold war, free trade and free capital movements were expected to
include the previously non-integrated nations into the world economic market sys-
tem. The foundation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as a successor organisa-
tion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), underlined this expecta-
tion of global integration. In a world where international relations can becomeFRAGMENTED POWER
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economised and as a result fairly de-politicised, an economic or market approach
would also deliver an efficient model for organising the (international) energy sector.
The drive to liberalise the energy sector in Europe is, in addition to specific internal EU
dynamics, part of this wider international political and economic process. However,
recent energy-related geopolitical conflicts suggest that the economisation of inter-
national relations has been arrested and security of supply risks have increased.  
More often than not, energy is part of the political and strategic function of the state
where the market approach (partly) fails to deliver the type of security the state
needs or wants to achieve. Governments can then opt to play an active role, to vary-
ing degrees, in tweaking market players to produce security for the state. The state,
for instance, can facilitate deals for its domestic companies with friendly producer
countries (and conversely the producer state can facilitate access for its companies
to markets of friendly consumer countries), the state can subsidise domestic com-
panies to create a competitive edge in investments, a state can deliver substantial
fringe benefits to resource-rich countries ranging from roads, telephone networks,
technologies and military equipment, a state can bestow preferential political and
economic treatment on another country, and a state can facilitate inclusion of anoth-
er state in the international community despite human rights or other political fail-
ings. A state will thus opt to use the full range of economic, political and strategic
instruments. Energy policy, both in producer and consumer countries, is therefore
about balancing the economic and political-strategic interests of different stakehold-
ers across national borders. In our market-oriented societies this reality is often for-
gotten, or at least not openly acknowledged. 
Energy is also a high economic rent industry in which governments have been success-
ful in capturing rents through taxation or ownership. In return, market players in the
energy sector need governments to secure their long-term investments at home
and abroad. The energy industries are for that reason an important part of the polit-
ical and socio-economic model of the member states (Finon and Locatelli 2007). An
economic approach to energy policymaking will leave important issues of security
of the state unaccounted for and explains the ongoing reluctance to bundle energy
interests in the EU. It is in the strategic and symbiotic relationship between energy
(and the players) and the state that the EU must convince the member states that
it can deliver. But even if the EU is kitted out with all the necessary competences in
energy, the absence of competence in the foreign and security policy field, and the
absence of strong state institutions, prevents the EU from performing as a state.
The EU was simply not designed to perform as a state but is rather an economic
project with institutions for removing barriers to trade and the free flow of produc-
tion factors. The question is, therefore, how much sovereignty and which powersEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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could or should be elevated to the EU level and which policy instruments can be
used to optimise the value of EU policies to the member states, without giving up
control over the security of the state? 
The rationale for a common energy policy
With the implementation of Economic and Monetary Union, the final stage of
economic integration, it is logical to include sectors of the economy that had
remained largely in the realm of member states’ policymaking. The energy sector
was one of those sectors where national policies prevailed. In particular, the gas and
electricity sectors were public utilities, mostly run by local authorities. Large efficien-
cies were possible with a different organisation of the sector, not only in individual
member states but also in the EU. In a period where government intervention was
reduced to regulatory functions in many public utility or (previous) natural monop-
oly sectors and where competition across EU borders was introduced, the gas and
electricity sector also became part of this effort. This process of implementing the
internal energy market began in earnest the 1990s. In this period energy supplies
were amply available in Europe and on world markets and security of supply risks
were considered low.
Early on in the internal market implementation process, member states first tackled
the reorganisation of their domestic sectors, in order to ready themselves for open-
ing to EU competition. The approaches and choices governments made in reorgan-
ising the sector differed widely among the member states. In the UK, public utilities
were first privatised and only later was the market liberalised, while in most other
countries the process was exactly the other way around. In France, the sector was
already centralised in two large companies, while in other member states assets
first needed bundling into larger entities to gain the economies of scale and scope
for this effort. The market structure and the size of the companies were first and
foremost geared towards domestic market needs. Moreover, the restructuring
process was part and parcel of the political and socio-economic model of the mem-
ber states and, although the European market played a role in the choices about
how best to shape the sector, they were still national choices. In Germany, for
instance, the unification of the country also played a role in the efforts to restruc-
ture the sector. The previously East German assets were bundled with West German
interests and readied the newly formed companies for a strong European position.
National choices thus play a major role in the discussion about market design
today, and competition among member states to push their market model for copy-
ing at the EU level is understandable. The current unbundling discussion is promot-
ed by the UK, where the sector and its regulators would gain an edge in competitiveFRAGMENTED POWER
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information and experience over other member states if they were to follow that
model. Understandably, larger member states resist certain changes to their market
model, particularly when the measures are unpopular with the domestic players
and voters appear reluctant to embrace (more) changes.  Moreover, the appetite for
change depends on a proper balance between benefits and costs. 
The Strategic Energy Review 2007, however, failed to show clearly enough how to
strike the balance between competition, sustainability and security, except by stat-
ing that this balance is important. The fact that the Council embraced the 20-20-20
goal (20 percent reduction in CO2and a 20 percent share of energy production from
renewables by 2020) reflects political direction but the devil in this case is in the
detail of implementation and distribution of cost. Insufficient analysis is included to
show exactly what trade-offs exist between the approaches to the internal market,
environmental policies and external energy relations. For instance, high prices are
helpful in energy saving and the introduction of cleaner fuels, but do not serve the
consumers’ short term interests. A stable and intense relationship with a large ener-
gy supplier which supplies a large share of the market may help security of supply,
but may limit diversity of resources and competition on the market. Member states
are aware that the internal market approach alone will not secure results in the
other policy areas. The market is a coordination mechanism for scarce resources
but cannot by itself produce the transition to a larger sustainable fuel base nor gen-
erate a consistent crisis policy mechanism or other public goods such as long-term
security of supply (Helm 2006). The large time lag between investment and con-
sumption, the dedicated assets in an energy system and the life of the capital
goods creates a different market organisation and development than a market for
consumer goods (Helm 2005a). The interaction between the market and govern-
ment intervention should reflect these dynamics.
EU energy policy must seek positive trade-offs among these policies rather than
approaching them predominantly from the angle of internal market powers alone.
Just as competition policy does not suffice as a single all-encompassing solution,
the strategic energy review does not provide alternative answers (Helm 2005b,
Henningsen 2006). The current proposals do not reflect sufficient awareness that
internal energy policy and external policymaking require a fundamental willingness
to weigh the costs and benefits of balancing the policies, to consider adapting poli-
cies to developments in international markets, to accept that there are more mod-
els of competition and that policymakers should also attempt to synchronise poli-
cy with sector developments in order to let markets evolve. On weighing the costs
and benefits of policymaking, the past, rather unyielding, approach to long-term
contractual arrangements, for example in the interests of the consumer, is at vari-EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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ance with the cost of obliging all member states to maintain strategic gas reserves.
Other flexible options, such as stimulating dual-firing capacities, are considered for
security of supply policies but are not considered to be part of crisis management
policies. It all comes down to creating a proper mix of market and government
instruments to optimise the balance between the market and public interest issues,
such as security of supply, and understanding that the asymmetries in fuel mixes
and import dependencies require different local policy mixes. In a recent study, an
attempt was made to quantify security of supply measures in a market environ-
ment (de Jonget al.2006). Although this approach and discussion is only a begin-
ning in tackling this complex issue, it is clear that a more thorough understanding of
the interlocking dependencies within our energy systems, the costs and benefits of
various policy options, and the impact at the member state level will greatly help in
finding balanced trade-offs. 
Progress in the implementation of the internal energy market since the 1990s has
created interdependencies among the member states that require coordination of
the security of delivery policies.
1 Obviously, the increase in transborder energy
trade and the more intense linkage of networks creates new vulnerabilities when
the system fails. The recent electricity disruption originating in Germany managed
to spread very quickly through large parts of the European market. Technical and
operational cooperation among system operators on protocols and early warning
systems can help reduce the impact of a power failure somewhere in the system.
With more interconnections, supplies can more easily reach other member states’
markets, while prices will converge to the marginal connected power plant in the
larger system, reducing the price differences between national markets. 
The targets of the Kyoto Protocol regarding CO2 emission reductions are another
major reason to cooperate. In general, coordination or perhaps harmonisation of
energy policies regarding renewables is logical because these industries are in an
early stage of development.
2 Like the Euratom Treaty, which was concluded before
the nuclear sector got off the ground in Europe, it was relatively easy with few
embedded interests and the wish to create a level playing field to agree on a com-
mon framework. The new sustainable energy industries are not yet as embedded in
the socio-economic structure of member states. The window of opportunity will
close rapidly when initiatives get underway. However, policymaking at the EU level
should not yet be seen by governments and companies as a threat to existing poli-
cies. With the sense of urgency driving achievement of a low-carbon economy, poli-
cies at the EU level are attractive to create a level playing field among the member
states and the main stakeholders. FRAGMENTED POWER
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With regard to security of supply, coordination is more difficult, particularly where
gas is concerned. Gas depends on dedicated infrastructure and gas trade is part of
long-term commercial and diplomatic relations between producer and consumer
countries. In oil, the nationalisation of the upstream oil assets by OPEC countries
had already enforced a fundamental restructuring of energy relations, and therefore
paved the way for a coordinated oil crisis policy in the IEA. Because such a crisis has
not materialised in the international gas business, member states are much more
reluctant to trade their long-term bilateral energy relations with relations managed
from Brussels, particularly when pressure to change the relations is mounting, as is
the case with Russia. EU enlargement is currently driving a more assertive relation-
ship with Russia than certain member states would like. 
Finon and Locatelli (2007, p.28) eloquently emphasise the essence of the dispute
among the member states and the Commission about the market model and secu-
rity of gas supply by stating: 
‘(...) But if the major gas companies would be weakened in the name of the
principles of short-term competition, their bargaining power and their financial
capacity to handle larger import operations would be reduced. This is the basic
conflict between the Community’s objective of promoting competition at all
costs and its goal of guaranteeing long-term security of supply. There is
undoubtedly a certain logic in wanting to disperse gas company assets in the
name of market principles on the one hand and to create a single European
negotiating authority on the other. But member states are bound to wonder
how such institutional choices might improve their national gas supply when
local buyers would be able to achieve his more easily by falling into line with
government objectives.’
For a common energy policy to emerge, member states must become convinced
that energy policymaking at the EU level is more effective in achieving results in all
three priorities of energy policy – reasonable prices, security of supply, and envi-
ronmental sustainability – than policymaking at member state level.  In the face of
rising resource nationalism and more intense competition for resources from other
consuming countries, the argument for the bundling of external energy policies is
that it would lend more traction to the EU’s position in the world, representing a large
consumer market. For the EU to make a difference in international energy relations
it must have something to offer in negotiations. The problem is that access to the EU
market is already open to third-country companies and reciprocity in opening up
thus cannot be used as a market power tool to negotiate access to supplies.
Moreover, the EU no longer represents a dynamically growing consumer market forEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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oil and gas, particularly not given the enhanced efforts to achieve sustainable ener-
gy, reduced CO2emissions and energy efficiency. The importance of the EU market
for oil and gas producers has weakened compared to other more dynamic markets.
And given the rising share of other consumer countries in world energy demand, the
EU’s importance will continue to weaken. 
The EU’s market power exists by virtue of its efforts to reduce the carbon content of
its energy mix. The speed at which the EU is prepared to generate, and the cost it is
willing to incur to replace cheaper oil and gas with initially more expensive fuels,
does create a position of power in energy diplomacy. The low-carbon economy is a
direct threat to producer countries that eventually stand to lose market share to
new fuels and new companies that compete for their traditional markets. Many pro-
ducer countries are also dependent on oil and gas export income and feel threat-
ened. The intense debate about security of supply and demand is about the securi-
ty of the state and the longer term geopolitical and geo-economic landscape.
The rationale for maintaining national competence
The battle for future geopolitical and geo-economic dominance is partly played out
in the international energy markets. Energy policy, both at member state and EU
level, should not only be concerned with the longer-term perspectives for new ener-
gy systems and new fuels but must include the creation of circumstances in the
short and medium term to make a transition away from oil and gas or to avoid such
a switch. It is in this aspect of energy policy where member states are reluctant to
trade their stable energy relations for more uncertain relations at the EU level, where
a different agenda - the longer-term one - is being promoted. The member states
realise that as long as the low-carbon economy has not materialised, their depend-
ency on imported oil and gas (and coal) remains very large. At the same time, pro-
ducers are also tied into their traditional markets, despite their maturity, in order to
stabilise income from energy exports. The markets of Europe, Japan and the US can-
not be replaced overnight by new consuming countries. 
For the member states it is important to determine whether the international politi-
cal and economic muscle of the EU, which is based on the low-carbon strategy and
a competitive market structure, gains any strength when it is bundled with a unified
voice in security of oil and gas supply matters or whether these issues should, for
geopolitical, domestic political and socio-economic reasons, rather be separated
and pursued as a two-pronged approach. This would leave those elements of energy
policymaking where the interests of the state are at stake firmly in the member
states’ realm, and would leave the EU with partial competences in energy matters.   FRAGMENTED POWER
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Competence
The EU’s energy competences are incomplete, in particular security of supply poli-
cies, but management of domestic resources and the energy mix also fall within the
realm of the member states. In reality, the EU’s competence in energy is mainly
based on  internal market and competition powers. In the fifty years of the European
integration project, energy has always managed to stay within the domain of mem-
ber states’ national policymaking. The Commission’s Green Paper ‘Towards a
European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply’ had already concluded in 2000
that: ‘The European Union must take better charge of its energy destiny. We are
obliged to acknowledge that, despite the various crises besetting the European
economy in the last thirty years, there has been no real debate on the choice of
energy resources and even less an energy policy regarding security of supply.’
(European Commission 2000b, p.3) The March 2006 green paper made a renewed
attempt to elevate energy policy to EU level. When European leaders called for ‘an
energy policy for Europe’ after discussing the March 2006 green paper (European
Commission 2006e), which at least suggests that national energy policies should
be made more coherent, they were reluctant to move on the competence issue.
From the Austrian EU presidency’s statement at the conclusion of the meeting, it
was clear that the energy policy for Europe had to be realised within the confines of
the current competences of the EU. Furthermore, the Austrian presidency
3stressed
that national sovereignty on key strategic decisions such as the choice of energy
mix – including nuclear – would be preserved at the member state level. The mem-
ber states evidently wished to keep the right to intervene in the fuel mix, in addition
to their right to employ their own depletion policies. The consequence is the
absence of a real and open debate about a common energy market framework. Such
a debate is a prerequisite for understanding the current and future dilemmas at the
EU and member state level, which in turn should be an important input for policy-
makers to make the trade-offs between market, security and environment and
between the national and the supranational levels. Despite the reservations of the
Council, the Commission has again proposed to widen the competences of the EU,
in particular with regard to external energy policy and oil and gas crisis mecha-
nisms in its strategic review (European Commission 2007c).
The issue of sovereignty over energy policy has cropped up repeatedly in the histo-
ry of European integration.
4 A 1994 EU directive allows member states the right to
deny access to upstream activities in the member states to third countries or third-
country nationals on the grounds of national security. Moreover, the primary ener-
gy mix of the EU member states varies substantially and member states also differ
widely on what their preferred energy mix is for the power sector. Moreover in termsEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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of import dependency there are persistent structural differences among the mem-
ber states, which have also led to different approaches to security of supply.
Diverging energy systems have made energy discussions at the EU level a delicate
and intricate issue, which has only been further complicated by the different foreign
policy approaches after EU enlargements. How do member states thus intend to
shape energy policy in the context of the new internal and external challenges? And
how does this relate to the Commission’s latest proposals laid down in the strategic
review?
Europe’s long road towards a common energy policy
The European energy debate and attempts to agree on a European energy policy
have a long history (Lefeber and van der Linde 1987, 1988). In the run up to the
establishment of the European Economic Community [EEC] at the Messina confer-
ence in 1956, negotiators from the six original member states discovered an impor-
tant flaw in the draft Treaty of Rome. The Suez crisis of 1956 had uncovered the
growing dependence of the founding member states on oil imports. Yet neither oil
nor gas were specifically covered by the Treaty of Rome, nor was there a separate
treaty in the making covering oil and gas, such as the European Atomic Energy
Community Treaty and the existing European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. The
founding fathers of the EEC, taking perhaps a too technologically confident view of
the future, believed that the EEC would rapidly develop from a coal-based economy
into a nuclear economy. They had not envisaged that both oil and gas would become
dominant contributors to the European fuel mix. Neither could they have foreseen
that in the future a variety of sustainable energies would enter the energy picture,
each with its own value chain management and international peculiarities that also
need to be accounted for by energy policy.
However, when the Spaak Committee indicated that oil would become important for
the European economy, the treaty negotiations were too far advanced to include a
part on those energy sources which were not yet covered in the sectoral treaties. It
was thus decided that, immediately after the Treaty of Rome was ratified and when
the implementation process had started, negotiations to remedy the situation
would commence. However, the six member states never managed to overcome the
deep differences in make-up and interests in their energy sectors. The importance
of the coal sector for the economy in Germany and the choice of France, Italy and
the Netherlands, with smaller and less efficient coal sectors, to switch rapidly to oil-
based economies in the late 1950s, could not be translated into a coherent
European energy policy. The discovery of gas in the Netherlands and the develop-
ment of the gas market in the 1960s based on these resources further separatedFRAGMENTED POWER
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the member states on energy policy issues. These issues have persisted ever since.
The preference for intergovernmental crisis management
When the member states, except for France, decided in 1974 to join the International
Energy Programme (IEP) of the IEA and run their oil crisis policies through this new
agency, the need for a common external energy policy dissipated. The decision to join
the IEP (November 1974) was made just prior to a Council meeting in which a common
energy policy was to have been adopted (December 1974) and member states had
expressed a preference for intergovernmental over intragovernmental policymaking in
the energy field.
5 Thus the common energy policy as imagined by some in 1974 never
got off the ground and, in 1984, the Commission announced that it would no longer pur-
sue this policy.
In the 1980s, governments began to review their role in the economy. The recession
of the early 1980s, after the second oil price crisis, left many member states’ pub-
lic finances in arrears. Governments ran up against the limits of the demand-man-
agement model of the economy. Cutting public expenditure would rule out invest-
ments in an economy that needed to be revitalised in order to compete effectively
with newcomers on the international trade and investment scene. Liberalisation
and privatisation became the new mantras of besieged governments. The demand-
management model of government began to give way to more market-based mod-
els of the economy or, perhaps more accurately, regulation-based economies,
because governments never really withdrew from the scene.
In the market-oriented economy, the role of government as an owner and producer
had to be replaced by a government that would define and manage markets, includ-
ing sectors that were natural monopolies or had natural monopoly segments in the
value chain, through regulation. This process of redefining the role of the govern-
ment in the economy was, and still is, uneven in pace and scope among the mem-
ber states, because the reinvention of the economy was not so much a European
but a predominantly national process with European influences.
The EU was often no more than a tool in the national process, and was designed to
be a determining factor in the national outcomes. The fact that leaders such as
Margaret Thatcher in the UK, François Mitterrand of France and Helmut Kohl of
Germany were united under the market model banner should have been a warning
that, when it came to the detail of implementation, the inevitably huge ideological
differences would surface about how exactly this internal market would be defined
and would work.EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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Nevertheless, in its resolution of 16 September 1986
6the Council identified an inte-
grated, barrier-free internal energy market with a view to improving security of sup-
ply, reducing costs and improving economic competitiveness as an objective of the
energy policy of the EU and the member states. In the context of the mid-1980s,
with energy prices rapidly declining after a period of high OPEC oil prices and with
diversification away from oil starting to show in member states’ energy mixes, free-
ing up energy trade among the then 12 member states was the next step in benefit-
ing from the new diversity in energy mixes and thus helping security of supply.
Large flows of gas had been secured from the Soviet Union by Italy, France and
Germany, and France had built up a large nuclear capacity. Moreover, the UK,
Norway and the Netherlands provided substantial European supplies of gas, and the
North Sea also produced sufficient amounts of crude oil to limit, in the new market
circumstances, the power of OPEC to set prices. In general, the security of supply
risk at that time was predominantly a security of oil supply risk. Diversification into
gas, coal and nuclear, in addition to diversification of oil suppliers, was deemed a
successful solution for the strategic dependence on oil in the 1970s.
However, the gap between freeing up energy trade among the member states and
creating an internal market with some organisational coherence was large, because
organisational structure varied widely among the member states and among the
various parts of the energy sector, such as gas, coal, oil and electricity. Not only the
size and scope of the energy companies varied but also public ownership struc-
tures. In some countries regional and/or city authorities owned local gas and
electricity companies, while in others ownership rested with the central govern-
ment. Freeing energy trade required not only removing barriers between member
states but also a certain degree of reorganisation of national sectors, while
arguably oil trade was already free. Particularly member states with small, locally
organised gas and electricity companies realised that they needed some
rebundling of their energy sectors which would allow the new, larger entities to par-
ticipate in cross-border trade and benefit from economies of scale and scope. This
rebundling took place predominantly at a national level. At the same time gas
imports already required companies of substantial size, or close cooperation among
the smaller entities, in order to conclude large long-term contracts with gas
exporters such as the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and Algeria.
It is clear that the initial concept of the internal market was designed in an energy
buyers’ market, which with hindsight created favourable conditions for the structur-
al changes envisaged. At the time, domestic oil and gas production levels were sub-
stantial and in electricity production spare capacity was available. In such circum-
stances, it is easy to imagine that with ample supplies available, energy industriesFRAGMENTED POWER
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could become more efficient by removing barriers to trade and by ensuring compe-
tition in and between member states. However, ample supplies are a precondition
for competition in the mid- and downstream to produce the price levels for con-
sumers that reflect the efficiency gains. It is in this context that there is a call to
break up long-term contracts and destination clauses arise, because consumers do
not have to pay for long-term security of delivery and supply, nor for the investment
risks. However, in a sellers’ market, particularly when at the same time domestic
supplies are declining, ample supplies are no longer available and competition for
scarce resources can actually produce higher prices when security and investment
risks become priced in again. An important precondition for the internal market, as
it was politically imagined, is now missing from the equation. The gas market, like
oil, has also changed into a sellers’ market, and gas-producing countries seem care-
ful to avoid investing in speculative export capacities. Competition has now moved
from the mid- and downstream part of the value chain to the upstream part of the
value chain and has changed from competition for consumers to competition to
secure enough supplies to the market. It is in such a market that the conditions
which suppliers wish to attach to their deliveries become important again,
particularly when certain consuming parties are keen to secure long-term supplies
and it is harder to play producers off against each other. 
Ownership of reserves is significant too because national depletion policies, invest-
ments and demand and supply developments do not necessary match the needs of
the EU market. Most of the oil and gas reserves in the world are preserved for devel-
opment by national oil/gas companies and only about a third is available for foreign
direct investments. The current debate between the EU and its external suppliers is
a debate over who can capture the economic rents, where end-user taxes compete
for the consumers’ wallet with premiums on prices. In a buyers’ market, it is usual-
ly the consuming countries that capture these rents (through taxes and excise
duties and the benefit of low prices) and in a sellers’ market it is usually the produc-
er country that can capture a large share of these rents. 
The producer countries have no interest in creating oversupply, which is very cost-
ly, and therefore wish to assure market access for their product, security of
demand, either through long-term contracts or the ability to vertically integrate into
the consumer market. The (partial) state ownership of many producer-country oil
and gas companies, and the idea that foreign governments will use their ownership
to further national interests, run counter to the idea of open markets with a level
playing field (European Commission 2006f). The resistance to mergers and
takeovers by (partly) state-owned companies can be explained by the fear of for-
eign political pressure. The paper of the Commission/SG/High Representative forEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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the European Council (European Commission 2006f) states their fears in the fol-
lowing way: ‘Increasing dependence on imports from unstable regions and suppliers
presents a serious risk. Some major producers and consumers have been using
energy as a political lever. Other risks include the effects on the EU internal market
of external actors not playing by the same market rules nor being subject to the
same competitive pressures domestically’. Although not specifically articulated in
such terms, this citation summarises the discussion about Russia after the gas cri-
sis at the beginning of 2006. The distrust of Russia was further kindled by the
recent oil and gas disputes with Belarus and does not bode well for a positive and
expedient outcome of the discussions on the new partnership and cooperation
agreement between the EU and Russia. From this perspective, long-term gas con-
tracts between upstream suppliers and mid- and downstream companies in the EU,
endorsed by member state governments, and where price and volume risks are
shared, could suddenly become an attractive alternative to the potential political
arm-wrestling between the EU and Russia.
Steps towards an internal energy market
Ironically, declining energy prices in the late 1980s and 1990s created new pres-
sures on governments to restructure their energy industries to improve their compet-
itive strength and reduce government costs.  Oil by then was predominantly used in
the transport and chemical industries, while gas was rapidly replacing coal as a com-
petitive and clean feedstock in new power plants. In Germany, the government con-
tinued to protect the coal industry to maintain a certain market share, while in the UK
the growth of the domestic gas industry was used to break the political hold of the
coal industry on the economy (Helm 2003). Both commercial and environmental
arguments were used to phase out domestic coal when privatisation of the British
electricity sector came with the freedom to choose the input fuel. The outdated coal
industry very quickly lost its market share to gas, which was coming on stream mas-
sively in the North Sea. The efficiency gains in the British power sector were large,
although it was never clear how much of these efficiency gains were due to the dif-
ferent organisation of the sector and how much was due to the switch to gas. In
France, with its large nuclear capacity, the discussion about restructuring the energy
sector was not really an urgent issue. After the accidents in Harrisburg and later in
Chernobyl, the urge to place the nuclear industry on the market was low, and only the
oil industry was restructured and privatised. In Italy, the state oil company ENI was
also privatised with 63 percent of the shares on the market and Spain also privatised
its oil industry. Germany followed a national approach to energy restructuring, under-
pinned by German energy and industrial policy. As a result, Eon Ruhrgas, RWE and
Vattenfall emerged as dominant companies on previously very localised electricityFRAGMENTED POWER
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markets. Both RWE and Eon Ruhrgas have also developed dominant positions in the
German and European gas markets through acquisitions. With national expansion
exhausted, electricity companies have embarked on European expansion.
European electricity companies are expanding their interests in mid- and down-
stream gas markets, including in eastern Europe, while some have also moved down-
stream in both Europe and abroad to create a certain percentage of own supplies. The
consolidation in the European gas and electricity markets is still underway. The con-
solidation of energy interests in large, often multi-energy companies, thus creating
an oligopolistic market model, and the efforts of the European Commission to pro-
mote competition in gas and electricity markets, have not converged yet in a shared
vision of the internal and external energy policy needs of the EU.  While German,
French, Dutch and Italian companies, with mostly open or implicit support from their
governments, have secured long-term gas supplies from Russia in partnership deals
along the value chain with Gazprom, and while Norway has bundled Norske Hydro oil
and gas interests in Statoil, further underpinning the oligopolistic and vertically inte-
grated market structure, the EU Commission is, according to the recent strategic
review, still focusing on horizontal unbundling of the mid- and downstream part of
the value chain to promote competition. 
Companies and some member states governments have apparently already decided
that competition in the coming years will predominantly be focused on securing
third-country supplies. In this, the renewed focus of governments on security of sup-
ply and the companies’ efforts to spread their risks by gaining a wider European mar-
ket share and diversifying their supplies through both vertical and horizontal integra-
tion, seem to converge. Government-to-government relations are used to secure
business-to-business deals on both supplies and the infrastructure to facilitate
these supplies, as both the Nordstream and Bluestream II projects show. That said,
the active role of government required in these deals is a far cry from the ideal
expressed in the 1990s that only markets would provide sufficient flows of energy.
The energy sector is a typical example of where government and markets meet con-
tinuously, for instance to issue permits for pipelines, generation capacity, LNG termi-
nals, influence the energy mix and negotiate complex gas trade deals with govern-
ments and companies from third countries. The market and government do not have
strictly defined spheres of operation but rather function in a dynamic relationship,
where the market is introduced where government previously ruled and vice versa,
depending on the prevailing political and economic conditions. The boundaries are
therefore unclear and need to be confirmed or adjusted continuously, while at the
same time maintaining a stable and predictable investment climate.EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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European energy in a new international context
Paradigm change
As we have seen, the current European energy discussion must take place against
a different background than the discussions in the 1990s leading to the process of
energy market liberalisation. In the 1990s energy markets were amply supplied
and, after the break up of the Soviet Union and with the weakness of the OPEC
economies, optimism reigned about the chance to renew the link between the
upstream and downstream markets in oil and gas through foreign direct invest-
ment. Globalisation would reduce government involvement in the energy sector and
help advance an internationally competitive market structure. It was against this
backdrop that the member states, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, embraced
the internal energy market.
The privatisation of the European oil sector was largely completed in the 1990s.
Majority holdings in large international oil companies, such as BP, Total and ENI,
were sold in the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s. Yet liberalisation of the EU ener-
gy market has never focused on the oil industry. Access to oil pipelines and refiner-
ies was never an issue in the policy debate, partly because oil (product) transport
is less dependent on one mode, as in the case of gas and electricity, although the
cost structure of certain modes of transport could arguably pose a barrier to entry.
The consolidation of some American oil companies and the subsequent sale of refin-
ery capacities and distribution networks in Europe allowed newcomers, including
national oil companies from producing countries, to enter the market.
Cross-border trade in oil and oil products in the EU was not a problem. Traditionally
the oil industry has been an international, vertically integrated industry, with com-
panies active in many countries. After the large reserve assets in the OPEC coun-
tries were to a large extent nationalised, international trade in crude oil replaced the
traditional long-term contracts and inter-company crude oil flows. Trade in oil prod-
ucts among the vertically integrated oil companies became increasingly competi-
tive when capacities in refining and petrochemicals were reorganised in the 1980s
and companies began to run the distinct parts of the value chain much more as
separate profit centres.
From 1984, international competition for crude oil was quite strong, despite OPEC’s
efforts to manage the market. Oil prices are internationally arbitrated and the inter-
national oil and oil product markets are very liquid. Backward integration in foreign
upstream activities was welcomed as an efficient way to provide sufficient andFRAGMENTED POWER
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secure supplies. Vertical integration of European oil companies was seen as useful
for the EU and other consuming countries. Moreover, the EU and member state gov-
ernments actively supported initiatives to open up the upstream sectors in Russia,
the Caspian Sea region, the Middle East and other producing countries to foreign
direct investment. At the same time, the market for new refinery and pipeline capac-
ity was limited, initially due to overcapacity and later because of cumbersome
licencing and permit procedures for greenfield petrochemical sites, and companies
from third countries could in principle only enter the downstream market through
mergers or takeovers. Such operations  took place to a limited extent in the 1980s
through national companies from Venezuela, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and some
independent refiners. Yet these national  companies pursued only a limited forward
vertical integration strategy, which was predominantly focused on the US market.
Developments in the oil value chain, and particularly in the way companies man-
aged their own oil interests, offer interesting insights that can be valuable for under-
standing the gas value chain, despite the differences between these two fossil
fuels. Currently, there is renewed interest on the part of producing countries in for-
ward integration in both oil and gas markets. In an attempt both to manage the large
investment risks and secure the benefits from these investments, producer coun-
tries or their national companies are interested in accessing the main consumer
markets. In the oil industry, the maturity of the traditional markets has made fur-
ther forward integration less attractive in comparison to the expanding markets of
the emerging economies. Also, the process of forward integration into the US and
European markets by national oil companies was arrested in the 1990s when oil
prices were low, and some governments required their companies to increase
domestic (non-oil) investments to compensate for lower government income and
expenditures. Tight government budgets in producer countries from 1985 to 1999
also led to the expectation that international private oil companies would increas-
ingly regain access to oil reserves through joint ventures with the national oil com-
panies. In the 1990s, Iran and Kuwait’s offshore developments were opened for for-
eign direct investment, and Venezuela, until Hugo Chavez became president, was
making similar moves. After 1999, when crude markets became tighter, this
process was arrested and national companies are once more in a process of over-
seas expansion, concluding long-term contracts with countries such as India and
China. Their focus is mainly on gaining access to the new Asian markets, where
greenfield developments are possible and where governments are open to invest-
ment by national companies from large net exporting countries in order to under-
pin their security of supply policies. Concurrently, national companies from these
same Asian countries are also actively seeking access to upstream developments
in producer countries.EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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The rationale for the strategy of producer and certain consumer countries to meet in
long-term contracts and forward and backward integration strategies of their nation-
al companies is to be found in the large investment costs. Security of supply and
demand concerns are thus matched without having to address ownership issues
that the private international oil companies bring with their investments. At the same
time, the investment opportunities for large international oil companies in new oil
fields are in decline, reducing not only their future prospects of profitability in oil,
which are mainly in upstream activities, but also their role in safeguarding the sup-
plies of consumer countries such as EU member states. Increasingly they will face
competition in downstream markets from vertically integrated national companies.
The dependency of the transport sector on oil is far from resolved, and will increas-
ingly put pressure on governments in turn to push energy and car and truck compa-
nies to reduce reliance on oil products.
In the gas industry, long-term take or pay contracts fulfilled the role of sharing risks
and benefits between the producer and consumer, until these contracts were ques-
tioned by the authorities of consuming countries when they engaged in the opening
of their energy markets. The rapid expansion of LNG in recent years, combined with
the prospect that these new LNG projects would be developed by the international
oil companies, often in joint ventures with national companies, stimulated the
belief that new and diversified flows of gas would reach the market and that the
terms of pipeline flows could increasingly be adjusted to the new supply reality. The
development of some large LNG projects in the late 1990s without underlying con-
tracts in consumer markets fed this optimism. However, the modularity of LNG proj-
ects and their limited size compared to large export pipelines, and the emerging
tight market for gas, very quickly dampened the optimism that LNG could rapidly
break the long-term supply contracts open without risking supply security. The fact
that LNG terminals in consumer countries fell under the third party access (TPA)
regime made it hard for LNG suppliers to link up the various parts of the value chain.
Suppliers that developed new LNG projects began to worry that consumer countries
would not be able to provide the required gasification capacities to match their
upstream developments. In the US, the Hackberry decision has removed this obsta-
cle for investors that want to bring their own gas to the market and in the EU exemp-
tions have helped the first projects on their way.
Nevertheless, the EU cannot expect LNG to be a panacea for its gas market liberali-
sation or its security of supply problems. Dependence on imported pipeline gas will
continue to grow
7. Uncertainty about long-term contracts for gas and potential com-
petition from LNG has stimulated the traditional pipeline gas suppliers to the EU,
Gazprom of Russia and Sonatrach of Algeria, to look closer into forward integrationFRAGMENTED POWER
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options to maintain their share of the EU market - a tried and tested strategy in oil.
The political uproar surrounding a rumour that Gazprom was interested in buying
Centrica of the UK in February 2006 was telling for the state of relations between
the EU and Russia, but also for the growing wider distrust between certain consum-
ing and producing countries. In Norway, developments are underway to maximise
gas and oil export options by creating internal arbitrage between oil and gas export
prices through both pipeline and LNG options and the ability to inject gas into oil
fields when oil fetches a higher price in the market. This is designed to provide the
country with more security of demand and reduce the position of being a captive
producer to the UK and Continental Europe. The recent bundling of oil and gas assets
by merging the gas assets of Norske Hydro into Statoil will help to realise this strat-
egy of optimalising their oil and gas assets in the longer term. In the run up to the
G8 meeting in St Petersburg, where energy security was prominent on the agenda,
security of supply and security of demand interests could not have been further
apart. In the conclusions of the meeting on energy the wording of the statement can
be seen as a reflection of consensus among the countries but, in reality, the word-
ing delicately leaves room for individual interpretation.
Thus, at the turn of the century, it became clear that the expected international
competitive market structure was not going to come about. The buyers’ market that
had prevailed since the mid-1980s turned into a sellers’ market when investment
levels, both foreign direct investments and domestic investments in producing
countries, had not kept up with increasing demand. Low energy prices, uncertain-
ties about the investment climate in producing countries and surging demand in
certain emerging economies such as India and China quickly reduced spare capac-
ity in the international energy market. As a result, energy prices began to increase
and producer governments were in such circumstances less keen to embrace the
globalisation-inspired energy policies in order to promote their national interests.
A new sense of urgency began to develop in Europe about managing the energy
agenda as a result of the higher oil and gas prices, the race with other consuming
countries for scarce resources, the changing geopolitical climate, the emerging
resource nationalism in some producing countries, the continued instability of the
Middle East (a resource-rich region), the expected decline in non-OPEC production
after 2010 and the consequent greater dependence on OPEC, and the EU’s increas-
ing import dependency in oil and gas (CIEP 2004, Hoogeveen and Perlot 2005, van
der Linde 2005). The 2000 EU Green Paper on security of supply and the subse-
quent conclusions had already unearthed many of the challenges that lay ahead for
the member states. Any subsequent green paper would have to respond to the
raised expectations of an integrated approach to the internal market, security ofEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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supply and the environment, and inconsistencies of approach in these three policy
areas would have to be tackled. An intense energy debate was then suggested to
help overcome member states’ reluctance to create a common energy framework
that would be equipped with the necessary competences. Such a debate would not
only have to involve discussing internal market design and would have to include a
thorough analysis of the value chain of energy, its organisation, the dynamics with-
in and between the various energy resources and the interaction with demand and
supply management. With more and more energy imported from third countries
(International Energy Agency, 2005), energy policy in the member states and the
EU would increasingly require an external relations approach with regard to secur-
ing non-EU primary energy supplies for the EU. The lack of a consistent external
energy policy and the weaknesses still prevalent in EU foreign policy pose addition-
al challenges to the Commission’s recent energy policy initiatives (AER/AIV 2006).
These issues have not become easier to tackle following the 2004 and 2007 EU
enlargements, with the entry of the eastern European countries that were highly
dependent on Russian resources. 
At the same time, third countries also have reason to worry about the developments
in the EU and about their ability to manage their own interests. In many ways, the
new strategies of gas-producing countries to reduce their position as a captive pro-
ducer of the EU market on the one hand and the interest in vertical integration in the
EU market on the other hand are ways of deflecting the impact which EU policies
may have on them (van der Linde et al.2006).
Third-country producers that mainly derive their political and strategic importance
from their energy resources seem, at the moment, particularly sensitive to energy
policy measures by consumer countries that could thwart their ambition to play a
more prominent role in managing the value chain. At the same time, consumer coun-
tries are sensitive to changes in the organisation of the upstream sector that would
increase security of supply risks. The latter’s call for more access for FDI is not only
based on their belief that competitive conditions throughout the value chain create
efficient energy industries, but is also derived from their preference for suppliers
without political affiliations. The reality is that the international political and
economic system, and the rules of the game belonging to that system, are less a
given than previously thought (van der Linde 2005). It is not certain that important
producer countries, under more uncertain international relations, will soon fully
embrace the market as the coordination mechanism but may prefer for the time
being a more politically controlled attempt at reforming the economy. The political
experience in Russia with liberalisation of the oil sector is, among other things, likely
to have resulted in a backlash against market reforms in the energy sector and theFRAGMENTED POWER
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wish of the central government to exert greater control. In this sense, the proposed
strategic partnerships offer opportunities for dialogue that bridge these different
approaches in the coming years. Building trust and recognition of sometimes oppos-
ing interests in value chain management must be an important element in EU exter-
nal energy policymaking. The wish ‘to build up a wide network of countries around
the EU, acting on shared rules or principles derived from the EU energy policy’
(European Commission 2007c, p.18) could, if trust is lacking, easily be seen as a
way to impose a regulatory and market structure model on third countries which
does not lead to ‘mutual benefits’.
With EU oil and gas production declining and the consequent growing dependency
on third-country energy supplies, a new approach to matching internal and external
energy policy is required (AER 2005). Merely bolting on external energy policy to
the existing internal energy policy, which is basically competition policy, will not
overcome the existing inconsistencies but, on the contrary, risks reinforcing them.
Internal EU energy policy has up till now been mainly concerned with facilitating
efficient distribution, conversion and sales of energy, which really implies a focus
on the mid- and downstream part of the value chain, while upstream policies - and
more importantly connecting the upstream and downstream parts of the value
chain in terms of organisation and regulation – have not been addressed. Upstream
policies were either left to national member state level, at the member states’ insis-
tence, or left to international market developments, in other words relying on large
international oil companies to supply the market. But international oil companies
encounter increasing difficulties accessing new reserves and, even if successful,
access comes at a much higher cost than before. Unfortunately these issues were
tackled neither in the 2006 green paper nor in the 2007 strategic review, leaving
crucial inconsistencies in the proposed policy approaches unaddressed.
Globalisation and national approaches to energy security
In autumn 2006 the Japanese government first expressed its concern about the
changing role of international oil companies in their security of supply policies. As a
result the Japanese government intends to promote Japanese energy companies
or a Japanese national energy company to gain a share in upstream developments
elsewhere in the world, a strategy similar to Chinese and Indian companies. These
companies offer, in addition to upstream investments and access to the domestic
market, a wide-ranging package of investments in producing countries which are
actively supported by the government. These consumer governments thus engage
in government-to-government bilateral deals to facilitate both private and national
companies’ access to oil and gas. This more specific support for certain companiesEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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replaces the more general support of OECD consumer governments to international
oil companies to gain access to upstream developments as part of the globalisation
drive of the last two decades.
In the EU, there is also movement in the security of supply strategy, the most promi-
nent example being German involvement in the Nordstream pipeline project. This
project also involves the forward and backward integration of the activities of part-
ner companies along the value chain. This development seriously challenges the
role of international oil companies in member states’ future security of supply poli-
cies. The French and Italian governments have recently moved in a similar direction,
concluding long-term supply contracts for Russian gas. The Dutch are expected to
follow soon. The contracts for gas, transport etc all involve companies rooted in the
domestic market of these countries and governments negotiating on behalf of their
(joint) domestic companies interests. Efforts to include international oil companies
have failed because this would have run counter to the interest of the producer
country company seeking access to the market themselves. The inclusion of a
direct upstream competitor would not have made any strategic sense.
European governments have not yet openly admitted that they are beginning to
doubt their own reliance on international oil and gas market principles alone to pro-
vide security of supply. But the recent bilateral deals can certainly be seen as a
hedging strategy in case globalisation or the free market approach fail to deliver this
pubic good. This is particularly true for the gas market but in the international oil
market bilateralism is also increasingly being used to match security of supply to
security of demand.
Moreover, from the IEA projections we learn that OECD energy supplies are expected
to decline, and that resources that can be developed through FDI elsewhere cannot
be expected to compensate for this. Instead, oil and gas supplies are increasingly
offered on the international market by national oil/gas companies. The latters’
assertions of sovereignty over energy resources was one issue, but increasingly
they also assert value chain management through forward vertical integration. This
is most pertinent in the gas sector, but national oil companies also engage in these
practices. It is therefore important to review the approach to internal and external
energy policies in this new context.
Competition and market structure
Part of the ‘crisis’ in EU energy policymaking that has emerged in the past year or so
is a crisis in the belief that competitive energy markets would provide lower pricesFRAGMENTED POWER
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but would also provide security of supply by offering an attractive market for ener-
gy. The fact that prices have increased rather than declined as a result of liberalisa-
tion is usually seen as proof of the incompleteness of liberalisation and competi-
tion. The discussion on interconnection capacity but also on deep unbundling are
based on this notion. However, the diversity of cost to generate electricity and the
fact that electricity prices are set at the level of the marginal producer is a better
explanation for rising electricity prices. The cost of electricity generated in new
electricity capacity is high compared to existing capacity. The incumbents have a
large stake in the older, low-cost capacity (despite CO2 pricing), while new compe-
tition must come from higher cost (gas-based) producers. Prices for electricity are
determined by the marginal supplier to cover final demand, in the case of EU gas-
based electricity. The higher prices for gas therefore greatly benefited the producers
of nuclear, coal and hydro-based production, because the price of gas sets the
electricity price. The reality that liberalisation itself has increasingly decoupled pro-
duction costs from price formation in electricity is, according to Henningsen
(2006), not properly addressed.
The re-emergence of security of supply as an important policy issue, together with
growing concerns about the environment, has refocused energy policy on these
public goods. In addition to national strategic industrial interests, the realisation
that the market alone cannot produce these public goods has taken some of the
zeal away from those supporting the efforts of the Commission to break up nation-
al incumbent interests. The deal, as it appears now, is that the Commission can pur-
sue the longer-term goal of the low-carbon economy, within the constraint that the
member states remain free to pursue of their own security of supply policy in the
widest sense of the word. Some of the proposals in the strategic energy review are
at variance with member states’ preferences. For instance, the continued emphasis
on transport and distribution unbundling immediately led to firm opposition from
France but admittedly led to a somewhat more subtle answer from Germany. The
solution is to be found in the recommendation to work with independent system
operators. Also, the recommendation to unbundle storage facilities, without provid-
ing any clarity about what type of storage is meant (seasonal or not), and to re-reg-
ulate access to these facilities, will be very unwelcome for those companies that
have built the facilities to store their long-term gas or domestically produced gas.
Moreover, these proposals go against the grain of the complex long-term German,
French and Italian arrangements with Gazprom.
The Commission’s conclusion that regulators are not equipped with sufficient inde-
pendent powers and are sometimes seen as too close to incumbent interests could
be true from a market perspective. The Commission’s drive to unbundle theEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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electricity and gas value chain into the smallest possible unit of organisation in
order to deplete the rents and manage the profits at every stage in the value chain,
thus using competition policy as the only energy policy instrument, is however
flawed in the current context of international energy markets. The short-term
approach that competition policy entails runs counter to the new long-term strate-
gies of some large member states to serve the public interest to secure supply and
protect the environment in this new international context. Although every govern-
ment is interested in capturing energy rents through taxation, and has been suc-
cessful in doing so, managing the rates of return on transport and storage reduces
the incentive of energy companies to invest if they are no longer allowed to mix
high-risk investments with lower-risk investments. These risks are usually bal-
anced along the value chain.
The fact that the upstream and part of the transport sector in third countries does
not fall under EU regulatory control is a fundamental flaw in the Commission’s
approach. Rents can shift in the value chain as world energy markets have found to
their cost in recent years. Third-country producers and their companies are now
focused on strategies that prevent too many rents from being captured in the mid-
and downstream part of the value chain. Producer, transit and consumer govern-
ments are involved in rent-seeking behaviour, which has led to somewhat irritated
debates at the EU level and has perhaps been an additional stimulus for the recent
intensified national approaches. In an approach where security of supply policies
rest on a complex system of government-to-government agreements to facilitate
the business-to-business deals with multi-faceted commercial paybacks, the con-
flicting recommendations of the Commission in the strategic energy review will be
fortunate to survive the internal discussions in the February 2007 Energy Council
meeting and the March 2007 European Council meeting.
Oil and gas value chains
The point of departure in creating the internal energy market has been the gas and
electricity end-consumer market as it was organised in most member states by
local public distribution companies. Taking the relatively small public distribution
companies as a point of departure for regulation, the gas value chain in particular –
as far as that chain falls under the jurisdiction of the EU, ie foreign production and
sovereignty over production and depletion policies in member states – is complete-
ly different than the one prevalent in other fossil fuel markets.
The oil value chain is largely self regulating. Risks, investments and competition are
managed through international vertical and horizontal integration, and mergers andFRAGMENTED POWER
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take-overs along the value chain.  Why gas is not treated like the other fossil fuels,
particularly because international oil companies also perceive gas as their core
business and develop business models based on their experience in the oil indus-
try, is increasingly hard to understand against the background of the development
in the international gas market. The differences between the power sector and the
gas sector are also interesting from a market organisation point of view.
Electricity production is relatively local to the market it is to serve and can take gas,
oil, nuclear, bio-fuels and coal as an input. Some plants have dual-firing capacities.
The markets for input fuels, except for gas, are largely self regulating or at least are
not part of the internal energy market regime. The inputs can compete for access to
the power market. This competition depends on the price, CO2 emissions, invest-
ment cost and output flexibility, depending on which market segment the plant
seeks to serve. Electricity networks were and are mainly a national affair, with few
interconnections. These interconnections are and need to be enlarged to allow
electricity to be traded across member state borders and increase efficiency. Other
differences that warrant special regulatory treatment of electricity are that
electricity cannot be stored, and therefore requires a different value chain manage-
ment, and electricity cannot be transported over long distances as compared to pri-
mary fuels.
The ‘revolution’ in the organisation of the electricity sector in the past thirty years is
that local, sometimes city-specific, companies were linked in larger national net-
works and are now increasingly integrated in cross-border networks to capture
economies of scale and scope. TPA helped to connect consumers to markets for
power production outside the local and, increasingly, the national network. In this
case, taking the end-consumer as a point of departure increased efficiency.
Gas is increasingly produced outside the EU and the value chain of gas has many
similarities with the oil value chain, albeit with oil at an earlier stage of development
of the oil market. Gas has recently been developing, because of the growing impor-
tance of LNG, into an international market. Prices will increasingly be determined at
international level. At current prices, LNG from any source can be delivered anywhere
in the world, although producers will remain sensitive to the length and cost of the
trading route. This sensitivity exists because the cost of setting up an LNG train is still
high compared to oil tanker trading. The flexibility of oil trading is partly due to the
availability of oil tankers and existing widespread capacity for oil processing. Any
tanker can be diverted to any market to fetch a higher price.
In the oil sector, the value chain is to a large extent part of vertically integrated com-EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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panies that prospect, produce, transport, process and distribute oil products in
many countries around the world and thus also manage their risks in the oil value
chain. The international oil sector is considered competitive and there is, rightly, no
intention in the EU to separate oil production and export transport from processing.
Crude oil is traded before and after processing, and refineries can be built without
asking the Commission for exemptions, at the risk of the investor. Furthermore, the
international oil companies are considered important market participants that help
secure flows of oil to the EU market and that have become experts in dealing with oil
market-related risks. As a matter of fact, access to the reserves of these companies
is a main issue in external energy relations in relation to supporting the efforts of
international oil companies.
Compared with oil, gas is still a relatively young international market and LNG a very
young offshoot. Gas transport used to be very inflexible and depended largely on
pipeline routes from gas fields to regional markets. Only recently has LNG added to
the flexibility of sources with the possibility of transporting gas overseas at a com-
petitive price. However, LNG terminal capacities are only developing. In future, when
more shipping and terminal capacities are available around the world, trading before
and after the terminal can take place on a wider scale than currently possible. The
question is how these capacities are best allowed to materialise, through the inter-
national market or through regulation? Currently, the European Commission for
instance treats LNG terminals as part of the pipeline network on which a TPA regime
rests (as for electricity). The Commission has already had to acknowledge (for polit-
ical and economic reasons) that export pipelines and terminals were best exempted
from TPA in order to attract investors into these capital-intensive projects. The fact
that the Commission has opted to continue the exemption policy and not apply a
general rule that any investor who wishes to build a terminal may build one subject
to local planning permission, despite its proposal in the 2007 review to develop clear
and transparent criteria, shows that government and Commission wish to keep their
options open for management of the market in LNG terminals.  Apart from the ques-
tion whether they are equipped sufficiently to synchronise their decisions with inter-
national gas market developments, exemptions can also make governments and
Commission susceptible to lobbying for specific stakeholder interests. The
Commission could, on this relatively small issue, have shown its intention to create
a positive investment climate and, like the US authorities in their Hackberry decision,
could have announced that TPA is not applicable to LNG terminals. Moreover, such a
signal would have been important for public and private foreign stakeholders too and
could have taken away some of the concerns of third-country exporting countries on
access to the EU market.FRAGMENTED POWER
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The boundaries of the EU and external relations
Energy policymaking increasingly includes foreign policy issues. A strategic part-
nership with Russia cannot be considered without firm ideas about the foreign pol-
icy approach to the Caspian Sea region, the Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine. Also, the
discussions with Turkey about EU membership, however far away from completion,
also influence the foreign policy approach to Russia. Moreover, the issue of where
the EU begins and where its membership will end are at the root of any successful
partnership with Russia. Europe must be able to define and present itself to any
potential partner. And again competence plays a role. 
In the paper from the Commission/SG/High Representative for the European Council
(European Commission 2006f), the legitimate right of member states to pursue
their own external relations for guaranteeing security of energy supplies, in addition
to their rights over supplies and the energy mix, is confirmed. This greatly limits the
possibilities of identifying a common energy structure in which solid external ener-
gy relations can be embedded and which goes beyond voluntary and, sometimes,
menu-driven cooperation. Large member states will consider their external energy
policy as part of their foreign and security policy, and prefer different outcomes
from member states that pursue only an external energy policy. In this respect larg-
er member states are no different from the US, China and Russia. The different
approaches of member states to Russia are telling in this regard. Some are clearly
seeking to secure energy supplies and other political and economic interests
through strong bilateral ties, while others are indifferent because they rely less on
these relations.
Since the 1990s, foreign relations on the post-cold war European continent have
exhibited somewhat binary characteristics – a country is either a potential EU
member state or not. This approach to relations on the continent has replaced the
more diverse relations among European countries in the period prior to 1990, when
free trade agreements and other types of alliance reflected more tailored foreign
relations. Apart from the internal difficulties that enlargement has brought the EU
(institutional and redistributive), the fact that the (politically inspired) enlarge-
ment strategy was not sufficiently backed up by a strategy for relations with impor-
tant non-potential member states now haunts policymakers, particularly when they
are important energy resource holders (van der Linde 2005).
The proposals for the ‘long-term framework for the external energy dimension’ in the
SER 2007 or in the March Council’s conclusions are not more concrete than those
voiced in the European Commission/SG/High Representative paper and ensuingEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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communication (European Commission 2006g). The Commission’s statement that
‘energy must become a central part of all EU external relations’ and that ‘effective
energy relations with all its international energy partners should be based on mutu-
al trust, cooperation and interdependence’ (SER 2007) sounds completely different
from the type of communication with Russia we have witnessed in 2006.
Moreover, the EU continues to attempt to export its acquis communautaire in ener-
gy matters to these same non-potential member states without showing the posi-
tive trade-offs, both in energy and in the wider political and economic relations, to
those third countries. The proposals concerning the neighbourhood energy policy,
including a neighbourhood energy investment fund, only emphasise this drive to
engage in regulatory exportation. The positive trade-off for the EU of such an
approach, realising that it did not have jurisdiction over the upstream and some
parts of the mid stream of the value chain, is clear. The EU and Russia are openly
engaged in regulatory and control competition over the mid stream assets in tran-
sit countries. How this competition fits into an external energy policy where mutu-
al trust, cooperation and interdependence must flourish is unclear. The
Commission’s proposals are unlikely to satisfy the potential partner countries that
strategic partnerships with the EU are based on equality or win-wins for both sides
of the partnership. It is no wonder that, in his summary of the G8 Summit, Vladimir
Putin refers to the interests of producers in sharing risk in the face of the huge
investment requirements:
“We also stressed the need for better risk-sharing between all stakeholders in
the energy supply chain through economically sound diversification between
different types of contracts, including market-based long-term and spot con-
tracts, timely decision-making and appropriate adherence and enforcement of
contractual agreements.” (G8 Summit 2006)
Moreover, the Commission now proposes to use its competence in trade
negotiations in external energy relations and thus wishes to discuss reciprocal lib-
eralisation of trading conditions and investments in upstream and downstream
markets. How far this will complicate WTO entry for Russia and other energy produc-
ers is unclear. 
Interestingly enough, the SER 2007 also calls for an Africa-Europe energy partner-
ship. Both the United States and China are already very active in Africa’s oil and gas
sectors. Not so long ago, Africa was considered part of the EU backyard. Given the
drive of all consuming countries to diversify resources, the EU cannot, for more rea-
sons than energy alone, leave Africa aside. The proposal to offer Africa new energyFRAGMENTED POWER
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technologies and to use all the policy instruments available to the EU heralds a new
round of competition for Africa’s resources. A strategic energy partnership with the
continued weak governments of Africa sounds like a foreign policy nightmare for
the coming years, where issues of human rights and energy will make an easily
combustible cocktail for EU policymaking.
The EU stresses that the regular talks with various producer groups, such as OPEC,
should be continued. They should be seen as important instruments to create trust
among producers and consumers. The main aim of these discussions should be to
create more transparency in terms of investments, production capacity, state of
infrastructure, contracts, etc, to meet predictable supply and demand expectations.
Creating transparency would also be an impetus for intra-European transparency in
these matters.
The Commission is right in stressing the importance of the relations with producer
countries. Yet, these discussions can also stimulate producer coordination.
Discussions with oil exporting countries cannot be conducted without discussing
with OPEC. The context of the EU-OPEC talks is changing, with the OPEC countries
bound to capture a larger share of world oil trade in the coming years. This will ele-
vate these talks to a more strategic and political level when competition for oil
among consuming countries increases. Also, in these discussions, market access
and downstream development of state oil companies and other energy-related com-
panies will feature. But discussions about oil are further developed than those on
gas. The structure of the International Energy Foundation (IEF) is well established,
and most regional or bilateral discussions can easily be fitted into the structure of
the IEF. Trust-building in oil relations has been  going on for much longer than in gas,
which is still a predominantly regional business. Only with the growing share of LNG
will the international gas market gain in international importance. Discussions on
gas have been included in the framework of the IEF meetings but the bilateral
nature of most relations continues to predominate. In recent years, gas- producing
countries have oriented themselves towards closer cooperation in an attempt to
prevent ‘divide-and-rule’ approaches by large consuming countries/blocs. The
unhappiness of the producer countries with the Commission’s position on long-
term contracts and market access and the EU’s attempts at regulatory expansion
could have sparked the producer countries into considering a producer cartel,
despite the different approaches of Russia and the other main gas-exporting coun-
tries, such as Algeria and Qatar.
Discussions between the EU and producer-country groups, however, only go so far.
At some point, the EU’s discussion partners expect to be able to talk with mandatedEXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
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delegations and it is in its mandate that the EU’s external energy relations remain
weak. In a world where the economy talks, the construction of the EU is strong. In a
more politicised world, the construction of the EU, which is not a state, can be a
weakness. Together with the EU’s undefined borders, the construction of the EU
itself is the main hindrance to external energy relations. The EU’s strongest card is
the large consumer market it can offer to producers, both private and public. Market
access and the ability to earn a decent return on investment in this fairly mature
market for fossil fuels, further exacerbated by the low-carbon economy strategy, is
crucial.
In a mature market barriers to entry are generally high. It is likely that mergers and
acquisitions can play an important role in the future EU energy market. Not only
within the EU market but also involving third-country companies engaging in
takeovers. The current uncertainty about whether such takeovers will be accepted
by the Commission and by member state governments lies at the core of the cur-
rent debate about security of supply and demand. The member states promote EU
companies to engage in backward integration to gain access to resources with the
idea that these resources can then easily flow to the EU market, and producer gov-
ernments are keen to promote forward integration of their companies to gain mar-
ket access. The political importance of ownership of the energy value chain (and the
ability to capture the rents) is obvious in the current stressed energy relations.
The EU and its member states show, by their reluctance to open their markets to
third-country national or hybrid public-private companies, little faith in their own
competition rules and governance structures. Moreover, the recent outcry over cer-
tain joint ventures allowing companies to integrate along the value chain and create
cross-interests in each others’ energy sectors is, against the background of fifty
years of integration, a strange strategy to create wealth and defuse conflict. Much
of this debate is geared towards the fear of Russian dominance of the European
energy sector. Too little of this debate has been about Russia’s ability to produce
sufficient oil, gas and coal to supply both the domestic market and the European
markets and thus its capacity to dominate. The transition to a low-carbon economy,
where fossil fuels are increasingly replaced by sustainable energies, will be a long
process that will barely have begun in 2020. The member states should therefore
continue to pursue robust policies to secure the flow of fossil fuels to the EU market.
In the current international energy market context, even with its higher prices, it is
clear that Europe and other OECD countries cannot rely on sustainable energies pro-
viding the same quick escape as North Sea oil, Alaska and nuclear power did in the
1970s. This is the big difference now. Moreover, the fossil reserve base and produc-
tion capacity do not rest with the large international energy companies that areheadquartered in OECD countries. These companies nevertheless play an important
role in supplying the marginal oil barrel and gas molecules. These supplies could
determine the coordination power of producing countries, the space for market
domination and thus the future structure of international energy markets. The out-
come of this change in the market structure will provide the preconditions and con-
text for a low-carbon economy to emerge.
The recent rivalry between the EU and producing countries can be best summarised
as a struggle over rents in both the traditional fossil fuel value chains and the future
ones. But it is also as a ‘system’ struggle, in which regulatory regimes, ownership,
supply routes, trade, and neighbourhood policy are all part of the external relations
toolset.
Conclusion
EU energy policymaking must create benefits for member states that override the
incentives to adhere to a national approach. Creating benefits is an important pre-
condition for the member states to agree to transfer sovereignty to the EU level.
These benefits lie in a proper balancing of the three priorities of energy policy at the
level of the individual member states and at the EU level, but also in the avoidance
of radical market structure changes that have a large impact on the political and
social contract of society. The EU has to create benefits for all member states,
although they differ widely in terms their energy mix, import dependencies, energy
resource endowments, and the structure (organisation) of their energy markets.
These different energy structures function within different political, economic and
social systems and are derived from the dominant political-economic model in the
member states. These differences not only reflect past preferences for a certain
economic model of society or the organisation of the sector, but they also reflect to
a large extent current differences in approach.
Preferences are not easily changed, although there has been a strong belief among
proponents of globalisation that ‘the market’ as an ideological concept would also
change the political, social and legal mores of a country (van der Linde 2005).
Despite nearly fifty years of European integration, member states still function
mainly within their own political-social models and the relationship between the
state and the market is still largely shaped by their own model (centralist or decen-
tralist; social compromise model or corporatist). Of course integration in the EU has
forced member states to adapt their systems but they have not been forced funda-
mentally to change them yet. European integration is thus in many ways both a
prime example of the success and, to some extent, the limits of the economy as the
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competences of the state, beyond its economic competences, decision-making has
been very difficult indeed. This complicates the discussion about EU energy policy-
making because the member states are now not only invited to agree on a common
energy framework in which the public interests of security of supply and the envi-
ronment are secured at the EU level but, at the same time, they are also challenged
to agree on restructuring their energy markets beyond the economic efficiency
rationale alone. Member states are reluctant to give up their sovereignty to the EU
because they are not convinced that the EU can deliver to their societies either a
desirable political and social contract, or external relations that suit the strategic
interests of the member states. This is particularly true for securing oil and gas
flows, where government-to-government relations are a crucial part of business-to-
business deals. Because the EU is not a government, member states doubt that the
EU will be able to deliver security for their societies. 
The EU must address the fact that the switch of the international oil and gas market
from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market requires different management of the value
chain. In a buyers’ market, economic rents can more easily be captured by con-
sumers, whether they are consumer governments, companies active in consumer
markets or end-consumers themselves. The liberalisation of the EU energy market
was inspired by the notion that competition in the EU energy market, ie in the mid-
and downstream segment, would deliver more benefits to end-consumers in the
form of lower prices when inefficiencies were competed away, while governments
could continue to capture energy rents through taxation. In a buyers’ market, the
cost of security of supply is very low because of overcapacities in supply over
demand. Third party access is an efficient manner for a company to obtain a price
for unused transport capacity, with the possible loss of market share when new-
comers compete for the same customers. Companies will engage in asset-sweating
and will be reluctant to make capacity expansion investments when they cannot
pass the investment costs onto consumers. In a sellers’ market the economic rents
are captured at the upstream end of the value chain. End-consumers are exposed to
the price effects of scarcity and the costs of security of delivery and supply, while
governments continue to capture their rents through taxation. Competition for con-
sumers shifts to competition for supplies, which in Europe implies that competition
on the European market becomes less significant for end-consumer prices.
Because parts of the value chain have been regulated (TPA and regulated tariffs)
competition cannot play a role here, while tight supplies determine world prices for
oil and gas. Long-term supply contracts can reduce the cost of security of delivery
(eg by not having to pay spot prices) and supply because the contract balances
cost and benefits over a longer period of time and over the entire value chain.
EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY
305Energy is both part of the economic and the political realm. This is true both for the
member states and for other consuming and producing countries. The fact that
countries and regions are not self sufficient automatically introduces foreign policy
aspects into energy relations. As long as member states disagree on the security
and foreign policy agenda, it will be very difficult to agree on an external energy pol-
icy agenda. The weakly developed proposals in the energy package are proof that
this part of the strategic energy agenda is not ready for implementation yet.
How then to move forward on EU energy policy? It is clear that the external relation
proposals are not sufficiently developed to convince the member states that they
can safely abandon pursuit of their strategic external energy interests to the supra-
national level. This implies that the balance between internal and external policy-
making will not easily be achieved in the short run. The geopolitical importance of
oil and gas, and to a lesser extent coal, in the context of diverging energy mixes and
import dependencies will imply continued member state involvement in managing
these relations.
The Commission carefully proposes to use its trade competence and coordination of
bilateral relations with both producers and consumers to negotiate equal terms for
all member states rather than propose outright new competences in external ener-
gy relations. The drive for a more sustainable energy economy in the EU will slowly
align the external energy interests when new fuels gain a more prominent place in
the EU energy mix. Managing the internal market for renewables offers new oppor-
tunities for the Commission to take the lead in setting a proper framework for such
fuels to be produced, transported and consumed. The fact that member states are
more willing to ‘speak with one voice’ in climate change policy matters offers the
prospect of future cooperation in all energy matters. However, the long-term view
cannot replace the immediate stresses and strains in energy policymaking. The cur-
rent determination to reduce CO2 emissions, increase energy efficiency and
increase non-fossil energy could in the short and medium term, with carbon capture
and other necessary breakthroughs unavailable at commercial terms, lead to
increased dependency on imported gas. How that squares with the strategy to
reduce structural dependence on certain producer countries and regions remains
unanswered. The debate about an energy policy for Europe has only just begun.
Notes
1 Security of delivery is fundamentally different from security of supply. Security of delivery is the
ability to technically and physically satisfy, every day, energy demand at reasonable prices and
without interruption. To this end, sufficient infrastructure and production capacity must be avail-




energy resources to their clients. Security of supply refers to the long-term certainty that sufficient
supplies are available to satisfy demand. Security of supply refers to economic and geopolitical
risks of a supply failure. The two notions are used interchangeably in the Commission’s paper ‘An
Energy Policy for Europe’. 
2 Given the member states’ insistence on maintaining national competence in the energy mix, unifi-
cation of policy is however unlikely when is comes to including nuclear in the CO2 emission reduc-
tion policies. 
3 Presidency conclusions 23-24 March 2006, 7775/1/06 Rev 1. 
4 For example, in the so-called ‘upstream directive’ 94/22/EC, OJ L 164, 30 June 1994, pp.3-8, the
issue of sovereignty of member states was addressed. In this directive the sovereignty over hydro-
carbon resources on the member states’ territories was confirmed and allowed member states to
determine their own depletion policy. 
5 At the same Council meeting, the nine member states also decided to engage in the Euro-Arab
Dialogue, which was strongly promoted by France.
6 See Official Journal C241, 25 September 1986, p.1.
7 ExxonMobil, 2005 Energy Outlook.